

**Remarks by Mr Bouchaib Eloumni, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations, New York, on behalf of the 1540 Committee at the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security in Vienna
(4 July 2013)**

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

I am grateful to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the opportunity to participate in this conference and, in particular, in this panel today. The high level of participation in this conference is evidence of the global importance of the issue of nuclear security and the obvious need to enhance international cooperation to achieve a safer world.

In these brief remarks, that I will make on behalf of the UN Security Council Committee established under resolution 1540 (2004), I would like to focus on the importance of the relationship between the IAEA and the 1540 Committee's task in overseeing the implementation of the resolution.

As I am sure you know the obligations under resolution 1540 (2004) stretch across the whole spectrum of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Resolution 1540 (2004) has established binding obligations on all States to refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. States are also required to adopt and enforce appropriate and effective measures to prevent non-State actors from engaging in these activities. The resolution legally obliges all States to take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials. While the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) rests with States the task of the 1540 Committee, and its group of experts, is to assist them in this endeavour.

As for action by the 1540 Committee we are enhancing our bilateral and multilateral interaction with States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations.

The exchange of information, experiences, and lessons learned is essential for identifying existing and potential challenges and gaps in the implementation of the resolution. Collaborative analysis of the threats is a prerequisite for successfully defining the most critical areas in order to map out urgent measures to be taken on a cooperative basis. From this perspective, resolution 1540 (2004) plays an important preventive role.

The Committee recognizes the role of the IAEA in the implementation of the nuclear security aspects of the obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). The IAEA's full cooperation and assistance are keys for the successful implementation of the resolution. In its Programme of Work for the coming year¹ the Committee has made increased cooperation with international organizations, such as the IAEA, a priority. I am glad to say that steps have already been taken in this direction, for example, by increased sharing of information and plans between the group of experts that support the 1540 Committee and the IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security.

A particular area where the 1540 Committee welcomes the support of the IAEA is in the assistance to States in developing their voluntary National Implementation Action Plans (NAPs). While these NAPs should be designed for the implementation of their obligations across the full spectrum of nuclear, chemical and biological measures (including means of delivery), there is a close relationship with the IAEA's support for States in the development and implementation of their national nuclear security plans to mitigate the risk of nuclear materials being used by non-State actors for illegal and terrorism purposes. Through its guidance documents and advisory services on nuclear security, for example, the IAEA helps States consider how they might strengthen their abilities in this field. Moreover, one of the 1540 Committee's key tasks is a matchmaking role in connecting requests for assistance with those offering assistance – in the case of the latter, with regard to nuclear security, close cooperation with the IAEA is fundamental to success in this task. Coordination of this activity is vital to avoid duplication and in ensuring assistance is delivered promptly where it is most needed.

¹S/2013/327 Section II, Paragraph 6 (c).

I look forward to hearing the views of the representatives of States, as well as the IAEA, on how we can improve this cooperation in support of our common cause, either in the discussion that follows, or at any time during the course of this important meeting.

Thank you for your attention.