"The United Nations— Its Ideology and Activities," Address before the Indian Council of World Affairs

NEW DELHI, INDIA FEBRUARY 3, 1956

IN THIS remarkable and mainly extemporaneous address Hammarskjöld turned to words of St. Paul—faith, hope, and charity—to define the ideology of the United Nations to his Indian audience, and concluded with lines from Tagore to express the spirit in which the venture should be pursued. The text given below is the verbatim transcript as edited and corrected by the Secretary-General.

Mr. President, distinguished audience, may I first of all thank you for your much appreciated invitation to address this audience and your Council. I appreciate it especially because, coming here now to India for the second time, I longed to have an occasion to establish a contact —a contact of mind, and I may add perhaps, of spirit. This opportunity which you have given me is a very welcome one indeed.

I had the best of plans. I had a plan to write an address where every word was carefully chosen, and in that way to give you what might be called the considered opinion of the Secretary-General. Well, destiny took matters into its own hands. For the last two and a half weeks I have been travelling, mainly through the Middle East, and frankly the programme has been so full that there has been no time for this kind of preparation. So, I shall have to ask you to accept today a speech without text, perhaps a rather rambling speech, from notes which I made on the plane coming here.

The United Nations has now entered its second decade. It is an appropriate time for reappraisal of this experiment in world cooperation. Where do we now stand, and where do we go? May I try to give a reply

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to these questions frankly, simply, and in very personal terms, speaking, so to say, without my official tie on, speaking as a human being who has been engaged, and deeply engaged, in this venture.

I think it is wise to approach the question from two different directions. I would first of all like to make this appraisal in terms of ideology, and second, I should like to look at it from the more practical, operational angle.

Ideology. The word is a little dangerous, especially when we come to a body now composed of seventy-six Member States, representing all shades of ideas, philosophies, and religions. But, all the same, I feel that there is something that might be called United Nations ideology, a United Nations ideology which is very much alive for everybody who is working in and for the Organization, and, I can say, very much alive also for that famous "man in the street."

There is in one of the Christian texts a statement which I think reflects ideas common to all philosophies and all great religions. I refer to the famous words of Saint Paul about the need for faith, hope, and charity, and I should like to try to define in those terms what I mean by United Nations ideology as I experience it in the Secretariat, in contact with representatives and, perhaps especially, in meeting the public wherever I go. I think that it is proper to say that to the man deeply concerned about peace, about world affairs, in simple human terms the United Nations stands as a symbol of faith. It is also an instrument for action inspired by hope, and in many corners of the world it stands as a framework for acts of charity. Now, I want to be very clear from the very beginning, so that nobody, when I use the word "charity," misunderstands it. I mean it in the original sense as something a brother does for a brother, not as a handing-out operation with the benevolence of the "haves" in relation to the "have-nots." I mean charity in the sense of mutual cooperation in a well-understood common interest.

I said that the United Nations, after ten years, stands first of all as a symbol of faith. It is a simple faith and, I personally believe, a realistic faith that peace is possible, that peace is within reach, given the simplest of all things, good will—good will, of course, also to make the personal sacrifices which are necessary in order to reach understanding and to find the common denominator.

Here, in this city and in this country, it may be natural for me to broaden the sense of the word "faith." There is in the Indian people, as among many other peoples, an undercurrent of acceptance of the world

as it is, not in a spirit of acquiescence, but in a spirit of trust—I would add, in a spirit of trust and humility—in the face of destiny. With respect to the United Nations as a symbol of faith, it may in this perspective be said that to very many it stands as a kind of "yes" to the ability of man to form his own destiny, and form his own destiny so as to create a world where the dignity of man can come fully into its own.

I have met such a reaction frequently during my trip here in Asia, and I would like to mention especially my recent experiences with people whom I have met, both those in responsible positions and those in less responsible positions. It is something worth noting, and worth remembering for all of us, for politicians and nonpoliticians alike, that today in that troubled area west of us, in the Middle East, there is a hope attached to the United Nations which it is extremely encouraging and heartening to experience—a hope which reflects just the kind of active acceptance to which I referred.

But let us leave this most difficult and delicate of subjects, the question of the United Nations as an embodiment of the faith of man, and turn to it as an instrument of action inspired by hope. You know that the United Nations philosophy as expressed in the Charter is one where, instead of force and the resort to war and threats of war, a line of action is laid down which is based on mediation, negotiation, and reconciliation as the proper means for the peoples to settle their affairs. None of these things is in any sense new. Mediation is time-honoured. In the old epics you will find it. All through later history you find the mediators and mediation, you find negotiation and you find reconciliation, but you do not find it as a consistent line of policy with firm priority.

After all, it is not too long ago that a famous phrase was coined, that "war is the ultimate resort of diplomacy." According to the United Nations philosophy, the United Nations ideology, war is in no sense the ultimate resort. War is bad. But then of course there must be an alternative. The United Nations alternative is clearly set out in the terms to which I have referred.

As I said, none of them is new; but previously we had only more or less improvised arrangements when a special emergency arose, or else bilateral or multilateral negotiations through regular diplomatic channels. I do not think that we can now sacrifice either special arrangements for an emergency or the normal operations carried out by diplomatic representations throughout the world. We see such operations

daily. And we see international conferences repeated at regular intervals. They too have their place in the system. But over and above that, not only as a supplement to but as an essential part of the system, through which modern society and the peoples of our day tackle their problems, we have the United Nations. Through the United Nations machinery and the machinery of other international organizations, regularized multilateral negotiation has been added as a new tool for politicians, a new instrument for governments, a new technique of diplomacy.

I think that the ten years that have passed have fully confirmed the belief of those who drafted the Charter in 1945 that in the postwar world a major role in diplomacy would have to be played by such *multilateral* negotiation which brings to bear the influence of other interested parties as well as those immediately engaged in a dispute, with the impact of their own experience, and with their perhaps less emotional and more detached viewpoints.

Finally, I have said in this attempt to describe an ideology, that the United Nations also appears as a framework for charity—in the special sense in which I used the word. It is no news to anybody, but we sense it in different degrees, that our world of today is more than ever before *one* world. The weakness of one is the weakness of all, and the strength of one—not the military strength, but the real strength, the economic and social strength, the happiness of the people—is indirectly the strength of all. Through various developments which are familiar to all, world solidarity has, so to say, been forced upon us. This is no longer a free choice of enlightened spirits; it is something which those whose temperament leads them in the direction of isolationism have also to accept. In such a world it is impossible to maintain the status of "haves" and "have-nots," just as impossible as it has grown to be inside the national state.

Now the operations of a government which irons out unjustified, socially unacceptable differences within a national state are well known —central administration and various forms of democratic procedures aiming at shared decisions. We had for a long time nothing corresponding to this in the international field, and perhaps the greatest new development represented by the United Nations in relation to previous experiments like the League of Nations is to be found just here.

We have in the United Nations no world government, no world parliament, but an organ through which the various states and governments can give expression to their views on this problem of sharing—

and an organ which provides the technical instruments for the administration of such sharing. (As regards the technical instruments, I mean not only the United Nations with its Secretariat and Technical Assistance Administration but just as much the specialized agencies, all the members of the United Nations family, be it the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) or any of the other agencies, omitting none.)

This question of the United Nations family of organizations as a framework for sharing, for charity in the sense referred to, has one aspect to which I would like to draw attention, not because it can in any way be foreign to you but because it is too often forgotten. Previously I have referred to the coexistence of bilateral diplomacy and multilateral diplomacy. In the same way we necessarily will have coexistence between sharing in its multilateral form and sharing in its bilateral form. We have the two-sided programmes—direct agreements between various countries to assist in economic reconstruction, rehabilitation, and development. These programmes and agreements generally are all to the good, but they are not enough.

The multilateral approach represents something essential, something which has to be added if we are really to do what we have to do. And I would go further than that. In the field of diplomacy, I feel personally that multilateral negotiation, valuable and important as it is, should not in any way replace or push aside bilateral diplomacy. In the field of sharing, on the other hand, I sense that the trend is such that we should get away as much as possible from bilateral operations and accept, as widely as possible, multilateral operations. There are various reasons for it, reasons which are well-known. You will recall that I referred previously to a famous phrase from the Christian scriptures; I would refer here to another precept, which tells us that what you do to help your neighbour, you should do privately and not in the open. There is something which is very sound in this advice also in the field of international sharing, international cooperation, because I think that it is not in keeping with the very spirit of this sharing if the country which gives wants to put it on its flag that it is the donor, or if the country which receives has to be constantly reminded of the fact that it receives. It is not a gift from one to the other; it is a sharing, a sharing in the name of solidarity which is a "must" in our world and not something of our free choice.

For that reason, the multilateral forms of financial, economic, and so-

cial cooperation are better for both parties and will in the long run undoubtedly give the better results. I hope that this will be increasingly recognized. I trust that if that happens, the United Nations family of organizations will be able to meet the increasing demands. In fact I am sure of it, and I can assure you that there is not only a willingness, but there is an eagerness in all those varied organizations to be put to full use, to much fuller use than at present.

This I think covers in very broad terms what I felt could be said about the ideological aspects of the United Nations, as in my experience it seems to appear to the common man.

I would now like to turn to a few reflections on the practical activities of the United Nations. A good and orderly way to review the activities of the United Nations and the problems we face at the beginning of the second decade seems to be to comment briefly on the activities of the various main organs of the United Nations itself, that is to say, the General Assembly, the three Councils, the Secretariat, and the International Court, to which I would like to add the International Law Commission.

The General Assembly is, of course, the nearest approximation we have at present to a world parliament. On the other hand, I think it is very dangerous to judge its present state or character in terms of parliamentary experience, techniques or achievements, because basically it is not a parliament. Basically it is an organ for multilateral negotiations with a few of the elements of parliamentary life reflected in it; for example, in the equal right to vote, and the equal weight of votes irrespective of the size and position of the country. Experience so far with respect to the work of the General Assembly points out what everybody recognizes as the greatest danger and perhaps the greatest weakness. It is that everything is enacted in the glaring light of publicity. I say "glaring" because every gesture, every shift of expression of the face, and every change of the voice are enlarged and given back to the public of the world and, for that reason, are oversimplified. In the transition from thinking to speaking, something may be lost. In the transition from public speaking to the headlines of the papers of the world, very much is lost. It is unavoidable, and there is certainly no criticism in it of the way in which the world press serves the United Nations. I admire it. We get a coverage which is very encouraging—although not always flattering, but that is an entirely different matter.

What I have referred to is the fact that wide publicity necessarily

leads to oversimplification and exaggeration. There are people who do not dislike that, and they may be led into temptation and even fall. With full publicity it cannot be avoided that in the debate itself you get a slightly jarring note. I would say it is natural, extremely human and there is no reason for criticism. But it does show a weakness in multilateral public diplomacy in relation to what in America has been called "quiet diplomacy"—that is a diplomacy where you can nuance what you say with all the richness which is possible in a private talk, where you can retreat without any risk of losing face, and where you can test out ideas, it being understood as only a testing out of ideas and not a putting forward of proposals.

On the other hand, this weakness is the price we have to pay for what is the strength of the General Assembly procedure, which for the first time provides for what may be called an open airing of conflicts. Psychologists always speak about the value to the individual of bringing his conflicts out in the open. That may be; I do not know. But anyway it is obvious that it is of great value to world politics that we can get in a public international forum a balanced, well-informed presentation of what the problems really are, and that we get it not in a one-sided way. In the United Nations we have not only the two sides but we very often have many sides of the same conflict truly reflected in the debate.

(I should perhaps add a footnote on this point. When I speak about the General Assembly, I mean of course the General Assembly and all its committees. As always in parliamentary life, very often the committees provide more intimate and, for that reason, more fruitful forums for this kind of open airing of conflicts.)

Very much has been said about the value of this open airing from the "propaganda" point of view. Of course, it is always a satisfaction to those who already are believers to hear their views expressed in such a forum. But I doubt that the praise of the General Assembly as a propaganda forum is very justified. On the other hand, what can be said about it in a critical sense was covered, I think, by what I said about the weaknesses of public procedure in such cases generally. If you scale away the unpleasant colour of the word "propaganda" there is something essentially true in the idea some people talking in this sense may have wished to convey. We have seen and will see again and again that the open airing of conflicts means that those who have a just cause have an opportunity to appeal to world conscience. People all over the world are sensitive to arguments which bring injustice out into the open and

show that might, in some cases, has been stronger than right. In order to make it possible for the General Assembly to serve in this way for an appeal to world conscience in the cases where such an appeal is justified by facts, we must have the democratic parliamentary procedure to which I have already referred; that is to say, an equal right to the floor for everybody and an equal influence on the decisions of everybody in the technical sense of voting.

As you know, sometimes there have been discussions about this or that kind of weighted voting. It is one of those ideas which have come up in discussions about a revision of the Charter. I think that we would lose something very essential if we were to abandon the present system. We may be ripe for weighted voting when we are ripe for world government. Then, of course, the weight should be the weight in the democratic sense of the word, not for the national state as such but for what the national state represents of mankind. But as long as we base international cooperation on the representation of sovereign national states, I feel that the only true application of the democratic principle is to uphold the equal right of each Member nation. In fact, that does mean an equal right for the smaller countries to express their views as against the views of supposedly stronger countries. There is an exception to which I shall revert—the veto rule, which however, as you know, does not apply to the General Assembly but only to the Security Council.

The weight and importance of the General Assembly were very well illustrated by the developments during the tenth session of the General Assembly last fall. I think that those of us who followed the developments during that session noted that in two cases—the most important, I think—the votes of the smaller countries were decisive and, more than that, that the leadership of the smaller countries was decisive.

(Again I must warn against misunderstanding. For the sake of convenience, I have used the term "smaller countries." I hope nobody misunderstands it. It is not a substantive qualification. It is just an expression in common usage to indicate those countries which are not permanent members of and, for that reason, without the veto right in the Security Council.)

The two key decisions at the last session of the General Assembly to which I referred were taken on the question of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the question of the admission of new Members. In both cases, the leadership was strongly on the side of the smaller countries and, in the final vote, their attitudes were decisive. At the same

time, during this Assembly, you could in these two cases register an interesting development of new patterns. It is natural in a body like the General Assembly, where there are no political parties, to find groupings based on mutual interests, mutual traditions, and so on. Those groupings have a necessary function to fulfil. But I think that they become a danger to the whole procedure of the General Assembly if they become fixed and frozen so that the vote, so to say, can always be safely predicted. There have been some tendencies in that direction. The tenth session of the Assembly in this respect represented new departures.

I go on to the Security Council. This is a body the functions of which are sometimes a little bit misunderstood. It may have been the idea of the founding fathers at San Francisco that it should be a world government in some measure. It is not, and it should not be. Nor is it a kind of a court of appeals. In a certain sense, it is a special committee of Member nations, set up for certain well-defined and limited purposes. It provides a continuous forum for everybody who encounters a conflict. At present, with the troubled conditions in some parts of the world, the Security Council has been rather busy. In those cases, it is not only the regular members of the Security Council who take part in the debate; it is also the parties directly concerned.

We have seen in two recent cases how the Council can function in practice, and what its impact may be, although it is neither a government nor a court. I refer to the incidents at Lake Tiberias and in the so-called El Auja area. The Security Council in both those highly controversial issues—perhaps not controversial as to the facts but controversial in the general political setting—reached unanimous decisions. The value of such unanimity—not only among all the five permanent members, the so-called Big Powers, but among all the members of the Security Council—cannot be overrated. I think that it has an impact on world opinion and on the actions of the parties which will bear fruit.

An interesting fact in those two cases is that the backstage diplomacy, the quiet process of building up toward the decisions, was perhaps more active than in a long while. There again, I would point to a development which I feel should be pursued to the greatest possible extent in the future. The reason for this appeal for more quiet diplomacy in the Security Council as well as elsewhere derives from the experience over a period of years. If the viewpoints of the different parties and of the various Powers in the Security Council are presented for the very first time in a public meeting of the Council, it is unavoidable that atti-

tudes which at the very beginning may be far apart, become, to a certain extent, frozen. I feel that in order to make the operations of the Security Council fully fruitful, it is desirable that all efforts should be made beforehand to reduce the differences of opinion to an absolute minimum, so as to present to the world from that very high forum only what remains to be settled in open negotiation after attempts to iron out differences, as far as possible, in privacy. The tendency may be in this direction; it may be away from it. The extent to which quiet diplomacy in preparation for the public diplomacy of the Security Council may be attempted will be largely dependent upon the general state of tension in the world. The less tension there is, the greater will be, I think, the chance for this kind of approach; the greater the tension, the stronger the tendency to bring out the differences in, so to say, their raw state at the first meeting of the Security Council on a controversial question.

It has been especially during the discussions of the revision of the Charter that the question of the veto, the privileged voting position of the permanent members of the Security Council, has come up for discussion again and again. Harsh words have been said about the use or abuse of the veto; sometimes there seems to me to be a tendency to underestimate the difficulties for the countries possessing the veto right to maintain their line of action in the Council in a way that is faithful to their opinions, without having recourse to the veto. However, the practical question is: Is there any reason to do away with the veto, is there any possibility even to do away with it? I think everybody is agreed that at present the veto could not be abolished, and I doubt whether it would be really desirable to abolish the veto. We must not forget that the veto, from the point of view of those countries which are not permanent members of the Security Council, is a guarantee that decisions taken by the Security Council are unanimous as among the permanent members. Some of the functions of the Security Council involve very heavy responsibilities for all Members of the United Nations, very heavy responsibilities in the military field, in the field of sanctions, police actions and so on. It should not be forgotten that for those countries whose hands would be tied by a decision of the Security Council, it does mean something that there is unanimity of the permanent members behind the decision.

So far as the practical possibility of getting rid of the veto is concerned, I should like here to quote Mr. Krishna Menon who, I think, was the one who coined the phrase: "The day we can get rid of the veto

there is no reason to get rid of it." This is quite true. The very day we can reach unanimity on the abolition of the veto, we have reached a state of understanding among the permanent members of the Security Council which certainly would mean that the veto would no longer be a major obstacle to action by the Security Council.

May I turn next to the second of the Councils, the Economic and Social Council. In the first place, it is a coordinating organ for all those activities of sharing, to which I referred. The specialized agencies report to it, and the activities of the specialized agencies can be viewed as a whole by the Council. But the Council has another important function. It should give guidance for their policies, and it should give inspiration to those subordinate organs of the Council, such as the Commission on Human Rights, which elaborate economic and social policies in detail.

I would say that the main trouble with the Economic and Social Council at present is that, in public opinion and in practice, the Council has not been given the place it should have in the hierarchy of the main organs of the United Nations. I guess that we are all agreed that economic and social problems should rank equal with political problems. In fact, sometimes I feel that they should, if anything, have priority. While the Security Council exists primarily for settling conflicts which have arisen, the Economic and Social Council exists primarily to eliminate the causes of conflicts by working to change those conditions in which the emotional, economic, and social background for conflicts develops. The Economic and Social Council has a basic responsibility, and this basic responsibility should be recognized in its position and in the respect it enjoys. In order to get it into the right position, many things can be done. The Member Governments which are represented on the Council are doing a great deal. We on the Secretariat side try to do what we can. I think we are on the right road but I would really, if I could, appeal to public opinion for greater support and for greater interest in the work of the Economic and Social Council in full understanding of the vital significance of the activities that that Council has to direct and conduct.

The third of the Councils is the Trusteeship Council. I shall not here and now go into the very intricate problems with which this Council has to deal. They very much deserve a chapter of their own, but I would use the Trusteeship Council rather as a symbol for what is a third and decisive line of activity for the United Nations, the assistance and guid-

ance that can be given through international cooperation in the development towards self-determination of peoples so far dependent on others. Here again we have a Council which can lay the basis for a line of development which in time could greatly reduce the kind of conflicts with which the Security Council has had to deal. For that reason, I think that it rightly takes its rank in the Charter equally with the other two Councils, and I hope that here again we may, all over the world, find an increasing understanding of the problems which the Council has to tackle.

The Council can look back at a good record in terms of results. If we look forward to the next two years, I think that we will see the emergence of new national States which I hope will quickly take their places at the table of the United Nations as Members, thus coming into their own not only as independent States, but also as independent States with access to the forum of the world which the United Nations represents.

The problem of self-determination which dominates this part of the picture was the obvious reason why I said that in a certain sense the Trusteeship Council requires a chapter of its own. Let me quote myself on only this point. In the report to the tenth session I referred to the developments through which the formerly dependent countries were coming into their own and a new relationship to what history calls the West was developing. I said that it was a question of Asia today and Africa tomorrow, and I added that I felt that the new relationship which was necessary could best be forged in the United Nations.

The next of the main organs which I should like to mention briefly is the Secretariat. I guess the public in general very often shares the view which was reflected by somebody who said to me: "Well, but you in the Secretariat—what are you doing when the General Assembly is not in session?" That refers, of course, to the most obvious fact—that the Secretariat is a service organization—and so the idea is that as it serves as a parliamentary secretariat, when parliament is not in session, the members of the Secretariat have a good time. Well, it is a service organization, and one, I hope, that functions reasonably well. But, as you know, it is much more than that. A service organization would never have been labelled a main organ by the Charter.

The Secretariat is also an executive organ—in fact, *the* executive organ for the United Nations. In the field of sharing to which I have referred, you have within the Secretariat special divisions and sections, such as the Technical Assistance Administration or the Economic and Social Department, with the very important regional representations in

the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, the Economic Commission for Europe and the Economic Commission for Latin America—all of them part of the Secretariat, all of them vital for the Member nations cooperating in the United Nations. I have come, as you know, from Bangalore, where the twelfth session of ECAFE has just been opened. I think you will find that what is debated there is important and that the Secretariat activities guided by those debates are of great significance for development in this region of the world. And I know that the same judgment applies equally to the two other Economic Commissions. There are, of course, very many other specialized executive sections within the Secretariat, but I shall leave them out because I do not want to tire you too much with such technicalities.

At any rate, when the Secretariat is referred to as a main organ of the United Nations, it is, perhaps, not primarily because of its important executive functions but because of its political responsibilities—political responsibilities which are rather meagrely expressed in the Charter but which nevertheless have found expression, first of all, in the famous Article which gives the Secretary-General the right to exercise initiative before the Security Council in any matter which he considers may be a threat to peace and security. Out of that Article and that authorization there has grown a very widespread diplomatic and partly political activity about which I think I should say a few words.

However, before entering upon that subject, I should like to remind you of the fact that, because of these political and executive responsibilities, very strict rules are laid down to guarantee the truly international character of the Secretariat, its international spirit—and I am happy to say that on that point I have no worries. There may be justified criticism as to national representation in the Secretariat. It grew up in the formative years in a way which probably was unavoidable but which has not led to a good balance at present. We are trying to correct it. That is a material issue. But the other side is the spirit of the Secretariat, its morale, its feeling of deep loyalty to the international community represented by the United Nations, and in that respect I have no doubts and I am happy to testify to the high quality of all my collaborators and the high spirit of the whole Secretariat.

May I now turn to the political responsibilities of the Secretariat and especially of the Secretary-General. I shall be very brief.

First of all, I should like to point out that those activities are never in any way in competition with activities of governments. The Secretariat

is not a kind of super-diplomacy or super-Foreign Office. It is not even a coordinated organ of that kind. It is, in a very qualified sense, a service organization here too: It supplements, but it never competes with the activities of Governments. It follows that the Secretariat, or the Secretary-General, never tries and never should try to tell any country, any Government, what it should do. Personally, I am firmly against any kind of attempt at policy-making through statements from the Secretary-General. And finally, the Secretariat should not, unsolicited, mix into interstate affairs in the sense of volunteering as a mediating body or something of that kind. If it is called upon, that is another matter. But that is not its natural function on the basis of the terms of reference laid down in the Charter.

What, then, you may ask, is the political function of the Secretariat, if it is not to compete with the activities of governments, if it is not to give guidance in a public sense and not to serve as a mediator? Perhaps I might put the reply in this way: Its function is to find and to keep alive and to broaden whatever may be the common denominator in the foreign policies of the nations. To find this common denominator is not too difficult, because I think that there is no doubt about the unanimity as to general aims, to the extent that they fall within the sphere of interest of the United Nations. As to keeping it alive, very much can be done in that respect, and very much is done in direct contacts and in public relations as well. As to broadening it, there we come to what is really a crucial point—that is, to work not as a mediator but in such a way that you daily and constantly increase the understanding of "the other point of view," increase the understanding of the extent to which the common denominator, the common element, is to be found in the policy of the other side.

It is an activity which is very much needed, and I feel that it is highly challenging and that its results are rather encouraging. If we translate what has just been said into terms of practical action, the Secretariat constantly has to analyse positions and problems; when asked to do so, it has to give the results of its analysis in terms of advice; and it has itself to use the opportunities which constantly arise to smooth out those unnecessary differences and misunderstandings which are bound to develop in a big world system.

This definition of the Secretariat's activities is, I think, roughly as far as I should go here. All I can say in addition is that I feel that the work of the Secretariat in these respects is a good example of what I said be-

fore about the usefulness of new supplementary diplomatic tools added to the traditional machinery of international relations.

Concerning the last of the main organs to be mentioned, the International Court of Justice—and, as I said before, I should like here to mention also the International Law Commission—I have only one thing to say. I regret—and I have expressed this regret several times to the General Assembly—that somehow, in the period after the Second World War, the central significance of international law has been neglected. We have come to realize the significance of economic and social matters. We have, alas, not been permitted to lose sight of the significance of pure politics. But I think we have let those two aspects overshadow a little too much the significance of law. I would hope that in the next decade Governments would support a stronger development in the field of international law—codification of international law, first of all—and a freer and more frequent appeal to the International Court of Justice.

I cannot end these comments on the present state of affairs in the United Nations without saying a word about the special position of Asia. Asia and Asian nations have a very great heritage, of which we have daily experience in the United Nations. Asia also has potentially a very great influence on the development of our work. Already, as matters stand, this influence is being strongly felt in the United Nations. I am sure it will continue to develop, and all to the good of the United Nations and of the world. And the United Nations has served and, I think, will increasingly serve as a platform, a forum, an instrument, in all the respects to which I have referred, just as much for the peoples of Asia as for other peoples.

A year ago, there was a significant conference in Bandung. Some people looked upon it as a warning—or even as a threat—from the United Nations angle. I confess that I never saw it in that way, and I must say that the results of the conference, as expressed in its decisions and resolutions, with their strong emphasis on adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, confirmed those who felt that this was a sound and natural development which, in its final results, should strengthen the processes of international cooperation embodied in the United Nations. But the Conference did indicate one thing: It indicated the need for a broadened field of international cooperation, a broadened platform for the Asian peoples speaking to the world. I think that you can reach both results in the United Nations, and I am happy to look

forward to a strengthened cooperation between the Organization and all the active, expanding, dynamic peoples of Asia.

A couple of days ago, in Bangalore, I saw some Indian dances in the Lal Bagh Gardens. One of the dances was based on a poem by Rabindranath Tagore, and, in thanking our hosts, I felt that it was appropriate to quote a few lines of the poem which was represented in the dance. These are the lines:

> Listen to the rumbling of the clouds, oh heart of mine.
> Be brave, break through and leave for the unknown assignation.

I think that these lines, which—at least to me, as a European—seem typical of deep trends of thought in this people, express in a very noble way the attitude we must take to this venture which is the United Nations. We may listen to the rumbling of the clouds, but we can never afford to lose that kind of confidence in ourselves and in the wisdom of man which makes us brave enough to break through and leave—always leave—for the unknown assignation.