

**STATEMENT BY
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TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
IN VIENNA**

**AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2010
REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE STATE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

VIENNA, 30 April – 11 May 2007

Mr. Chairman,

Let me first of all, on behalf of my delegation, to congratulate you and Ambassador of Ukraine on your election as the Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively of this important meeting. We are confident that you will steward us effectively in the deliberations. We assure you of our full support in making the outcome of this critical Meeting meaningful and result-oriented.

My delegation fully associates itself with the statement of the Group of the Non Aligned Movement.

Non-proliferation and international security

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is in deep crisis, and faces unprecedented challenges. The failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference makes it clear that the non-proliferation regime needs to be fixed. Since we are at the start of a new NPT review cycle, it is the opportune time that the States parties should do their utmost for the realization of the noble objectives and principles of the Treaty.

Despite the inequities in the Treaty, the vast majority of States parties continue to believe in and support it. The Treaty has been an important symbol and a corner stone of the global aspiration for a nuclear-free-world. Its preamble and provisions are the essential starting point for a renewed effort to curb proliferation and to disarm nuclear weapons.

As an example of the above illustration, Dr. El Baredai said (*I quote*) "If we wish to escape self-destruction, then nuclear weapons should have no place in our collective conscience and no role in our security." (*unquote*) In the same vein, the WMD Commission in its report underscored that the nuclear weapons must never again be used—by State or by terrorists, and the only way to do that is to get rid of them before someone, somewhere, is tempted to use them: Thus, in the next five years, we must pay heed to these words.

Mr. Chairman,

Disarmament and security assurances

It is most unfortunate that upon entering the eighth review cycle of the NPT, the world continues to face a grave threat posed by the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons, both in stockpiles and high-alert status. Even worse, more sophisticated of these deadly weapons are being developed. Therefore, it would be difficult for some countries to renounce their nuclear options, if the existing nuclear-weapon-states (NWS) upgrade their nuclear capability.

We underline that the existing stock of nuclear weapons should be outlawed, and eliminated in a systematic and progressive manner. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is not a utopian dream. It is very much possible and realistic if there is a leadership on part of the NWS. As highlighted by the four prominent Americans in the Wall Street Journal of January 2007, "The United States leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage—a world free of nuclear weapons."

It is clear to most of us that the major obstacles in making progress on Article VI lie in the hands of the US and Russia, the two possessors of more than three-quarter of the nuclear arsenals. Leadership for peace and disarmament needs to happen through example. We witnessed this on the signing of Moscow Treaty in 2002, in which the US and Russia agreed to reduce their nuclear warheads significantly by 2012.

Unfortunately, the Moscow Treaty was made without considering the principles of verification, irreversibility, and transparency. Consequently, other NWS seem reluctant to fully implement their nuclear disarmament obligations and commitment under Article VI, and the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

Instead of pursuing progressive efforts for nuclear disarmament, some NWS are taking efforts to advance and modernize their nuclear arsenals. That is why we will not pause to urge the NWS, to take the necessary steps for progressing further on nuclear disarmament, in a verifiable and irreversible manner.

Until nuclear disarmament is achieved, the NWS should provide security assurance that the non-nuclear-weapon-states (NNWS) will not be threatened by the use of nuclear weapons. The security assurances by NWS should be translated into a universal, unconditional and legally binding treaty. At the same time, NWS should commit that there would be no 'new and usable' weapons that could trigger a new nuclear arms race.

Safeguards

The IAEA's safeguards system is essential in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and my delegation reaffirms the importance of the Agency as the sole competent authority for nuclear verification within the framework of the Agency's safeguards system. We appreciate the extensive efforts made by the Agency in strengthening the safeguards

and verification system, and we are convinced that the IAEA has the ability to effectively face up to challenges on issues of safeguards and verification before us.

Indonesia had signed and ratified the NPT, concludes comprehensive safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol with the Agency, and is particularly pleased that the conclusion has been drawn for nuclear material and activities in Indonesia. Let me also reaffirm our commitment to the adherence to the Additional Protocols as these constitute the centerpiece of the Agency's response in strengthening and improving the effectiveness of the safeguards system as a contribution to global non-proliferation objectives, especially needed to derive credible assurance regarding the non-diversion of nuclear materials and the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. We are most welcomed by the developments on the increasingly application of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, and in this regard call upon all States that has not yet done so, to conclude the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the Agency.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Indonesia believes that the inalienable rights of all States Parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with the Article IV of the NPT constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the NPT, and nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty. We reiterate that each country's choices and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international co-operation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

For many NNWS, the option to pursue nuclear energy is considered crucial to the achievement of energy security and energy independence. Although many states believe that access to dual-use technology should be further restricted and more closely monitored, we have to be cautioned that excessive controls on access to the full nuclear fuel cycle may unfairly deprive developing countries of nuclear energy and technology.

We share the growing concern over the challenges in ensuring the non-proliferation and all safeguards issues, and note the initiatives and proposals put forward in this regard. Various initiatives have been undertaken by several Member States of the IAEA in the areas of uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel cycle services, spent fuel cycle and reprocessing. This represents efforts by Member States in helping the IAEA to face challenges in the field of nuclear power. Indonesian delegation believes that such proposals should be addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory manner under the auspices of the IAEA, taking into account all aspects associated with it. Moreover, the proposals should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment, and the development of nuclear technology and know-how for peaceful purposes required by Member States, particularly those of developing countries for their continued development.

In this regard, the proposal of the Group of Expert, entrusted by the Director General of the IAEA in 2005, to explore the possibility to develop a regional-based multinational facility has its own merit and deserves further consideration by Member States in meeting their prevailing concern regarding assurances of supply and non-proliferation.

Mr. Chairman,

Nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East

There is a fundamental development in the security and political landscape of the Middle East. The prolonged conflict in Iraq, the issue of Iranian nuclear programme, and the Israel's admittance of possessing nuclear weapons, could directly or indirectly affect regional stability.

A mixture of these situations would be reason enough to revisit the need of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East. It is high time to move tangibly for realising the UN Security Council resolutions 487 and 687 as well as the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which advocated the establishment of such a zone.

Article X and compliance

Since the inception of NPT, Article X has recognised the possibility of a State party to withdraw from the NPT, if an extraordinary event has jeopardised its supreme interest and security. But, in accordance with Article 70 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, such withdrawal does not forgive a State party from performing the obligations that accumulated prior to the valid exercise of the right to withdraw.

As in all Treaties, the States parties have obligations to fully comply with all provisions of the NPT. But, full compliance does not only mean the declaration of good intent. Instead it includes actual performance. This constitutes an equilibrium in the obligations and commitments both of the NWS and NNWS, in a non-discriminatory and non-selective manner.

Therefore, it would be unfair to insist the NNWS on their compliance with their non-proliferation obligations, when the NWS have failed to live up to their disarmament obligations and commitments. The application of 'double standard' in the implementation of NPT would only undermine further the integrity and the validity of the Treaty.

Mr Chairman,

Approaches and measures

As we are entering a new cycle towards the 2010 Revcon, there is a pressing need to build a new consensus on the gravity of nuclear dangers, and the necessity to revive disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Given deep differences on how to resolve the challenges facing the Treaty today, it is crucial for all States parties to consider new ways and approaches to regain confidence in the Treaty's core bargains.

What we need is not only ways to deal with the current threat, but it is a balanced 'plan of action' to implement all provisions of the Treaty. The States parties should exercise restraint to address and focus only one pillar of the NPT bargains, be it nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, or peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Indeed, the NWS should honour their nuclear disarmament obligations and commitment. If not, we must all prepare to face a continuing erosion of the non-proliferation regime, and to live with the emergence of new NWS, be it big or small. If we are serious about non-proliferation, the NWS must create a conducive atmosphere for disarmament, to reduce the incentive for others to possess nuclear weapons.

We remain concerned that some NWS have been providing nuclear material and technology through a deal to non-states parties to the NPT. What will be the impact of such a deal on the integrity of the NPT? Article I of the NPT states that each NWS agrees not to transfer or to assist any NNWS to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, because such transfer or assistance to NNWS is prohibited under the Treaty, let alone to the non-state party to the NPT.

On the other hand, the NNWS should commit themselves not to acquire or seek assistance for nuclear programmes, except those only for peaceful purposes. It would be unacceptable, if the inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purpose is used as a pretext to build nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman,

Conclusion

We believe that this Prepcom provides yet another important opportunity for the States parties to engage actively with a view to achieving results on the procedural arrangements and substantive recommendations reflecting the views of all States. We must focus on achievable and practical outcomes, and should not appear to reinterpret or reduce existing obligations and undertakings under the NPT.

The NPT States parties should seek to build bridges among themselves to strengthen the Treaty's core bargains as they did in 1995 and 2000. To achieve this, visionary leadership, strong political will, and constructive approach are fundamental requirements.

Thank you.

