



# 2010 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

IAEA

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## The International Atomic Energy Agency

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as the world's foremost intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Established as an autonomous organization under the United Nations in 1957, the IAEA carries out programmes to maximize the useful contribution of nuclear technology to society while verifying its peaceful use. The Agency is led by Director General Yukiya Amano.

The Agency works with its 151 Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. Through technical cooperation programmes the Agency assists its Member States and promotes the exchange of scientific and technical information between them. The IAEA's work also includes setting the framework for cooperative efforts to build and strengthen an international nuclear safety and security regime and verifying States' fulfilment of their non-proliferation undertakings.

The IAEA Secretariat is headquartered at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria. Operational liaison and regional offices are located in Geneva, Switzerland; New York, USA; Toronto, Canada; and Tokyo, Japan. The IAEA runs or supports research centres and scientific laboratories in Vienna and Seibersdorf, Austria; Monaco; and Trieste, Italy.

The IAEA Secretariat is a team of 2200 multi-disciplinary professional and support staff from more than 90 countries.

## The IAEA and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The IAEA is not a party to the Treaty but is entrusted with key roles and responsibilities under it. The IAEA's safeguards system functions as a confidence-building measure, an early warning mechanism, and the trigger that sets in motion other responses by the international community if and when the need arises.

Under the NPT, the IAEA has specific roles as the international safeguards inspectorate and as a multilateral channel for transferring peaceful applications of nuclear technology:

NPT Article III: The IAEA administers international safeguards to verify that non-nuclear weapon States party to the NPT fulfil the non-proliferation commitment they have made, "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

NPT Article IV: The Agency facilitates and provides a channel for endeavours aimed at "the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world."

## Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology

The Agency, through its technical cooperation programme, aims to promote tangible socio-economic impacts in its Member States, by supporting the use of appropriate nuclear science and technology to address major sustainable development priorities at the national, regional and interregional levels. The programme concentrates on six thematic areas — human health, agricultural productivity and food security, water resources management, environmental protection, physical and chemical applications, and sustainable energy development, together with a cross-

cutting thematic area — safety and security — and supports the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

### **Safeguards Status**

The 2008 Safeguards Statement, the most recent Statement available, notes that safeguards were applied for 163 States with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. Eighty-four States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force. As of 31 December 2008, 84 States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force. Of these, 44 States had significant nuclear activities.

As of the end of 2008, 30 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had not yet brought comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency into force as required by Article III of that Treaty.

Five nuclear-weapon States had voluntarily offer safeguards agreements in force. Safeguards were implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in four of the five States.

By the end of 2009, three quarters of the States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements had signed Additional Protocols and more than half of the States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements had Additional Protocols in force. Moreover, nearly three quarters of the countries with nuclear material under safeguards had Additional Protocols in force.

A detailed description of the Agency's safeguards system is available at:  
[http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg\\_system.pdf](http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf).

A summary of the status of States' safeguards agreements is available at:  
<http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2008-tables.pdf> and at  
<http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sv.html>.

### **Safeguards implementation**

Safeguards implementation involved both activities carried out in the field and at the Agency's headquarters in Vienna. The latter activities included the evaluation of States' accounting reports and other information required under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources. In implementing in-field activities, the Secretariat carried out 1691 inspections, 473 design information verifications and 122 complementary accesses utilizing approximately 11 359 calendar-days in the field for verification in these States.

### **Comprehensive safeguards agreement**

Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the Agency has the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

### **Additional Protocols**

Although the Agency has the authority under a comprehensive safeguards agreement to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State (i.e. the correctness and completeness of the State's declarations), the tools available to the Agency under such an agreement are limited.

The implementation of additional protocols is essential to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. One of the greatest challenges for the Agency is to be able to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. For States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement but no additional protocol in force, the Agency's ability to do so is limited.

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The Model Additional Protocol equips the Agency with important supplementary tools which provide the Agency with broader access to information and locations. The measures provided for under an additional protocol thus significantly increase the Agency's ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

### **Integrated safeguards**

Integrated Safeguards refers to the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the Agency's safeguards obligations.

Integrated safeguards were implemented during the whole of 2008 in 25 States: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mali, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Uzbekistan. Integrated safeguards were implemented for part of 2008 in Chile, Croatia, Finland, Italy, Malta, Monaco, Palau and the Republic of Korea. In addition, integrated safeguards approaches were developed and approved for Cuba, Luxembourg and Uruguay and were under development for Armenia, Denmark, Slovenia and Sweden.

### **Developments in Safeguards Implementation**

#### ***The Democratic People's Republic of Korea***

Since December 2002, the Agency has not implemented safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and, therefore, cannot draw any safeguards conclusion. In April 2009, the Agency's inspectors left the DPRK after the DPRK ceased all cooperation with the Agency. The Agency is no longer able to implement the ad hoc monitoring and verification arrangement in the DPRK.

#### ***The Islamic Republic of Iran***

The Agency continues, under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but cannot confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities because Iran has not provided the Agency with the necessary cooperation.

The necessary cooperation includes, among other things, implementation of relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, implementation of the Additional Protocol and of modified Code 3.1, as well as clarification of issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.

#### ***The Syrian Arab Republic***

Syria has not cooperated with the Agency since June 2008 in connection with the unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and other locations. As a consequence, the Agency has not been able to make progress towards resolving the outstanding issues related to those sites since the previous report to the Board of Governors. Full cooperation is also needed from Syria to facilitate the resolution of issues concerning the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor.