

## **64<sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly**

### **Review of the Peacebuilding Commission**

The 2005 World Summit Outcome resolution decided to establish the Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body. The PBC was created:

- a) to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
- b) to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development
- c) to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery.

Comprised of members from the Security Council, Troop Contributing Countries, ECOSOC representatives, top providers of assessed contributions and voluntary contributions to UN funds, programmes and agencies and members of the General Assembly, the Peacebuilding Commission has a unique membership which bridges peace, security, and development.

According to the founding resolutions, the arrangements "will be reviewed five years after the adoption of the present resolution to ensure that they are appropriate to fulfill the agreed functions of the Commission and that such a review and any changes as a result thereof will be decided following the same procedure as set out in paragraph 1.



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF IRELAND TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF MEXICO TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF  
SOUTH AFRICA TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**

Monday, 19 July 2010

His Excellency Mr. Ali Abdussalam Treki  
President of the 64<sup>th</sup> Session of the  
United Nations General Assembly  
United Nations  
New York, NY 10017

Dear President,

As set out in your letters of 11 December 2009 to the UN Membership, and in the letter sent to you by the President of the Security Council on 17 December 2009, we have undertaken our Review of the Arrangements set out in Resolutions A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645(2005), which established the Peacebuilding Commission, in accordance with Paragraph 27 of those Resolutions.

We attach our Report, which seeks to reflect the views expressed to us by member States, based on an extensive, open, transparent and inclusive process. Over the course of the past six months, we have held three open-ended Informal Consultations with the UN Membership, wide-ranging discussions with key actors in the UN System and visits and meetings aimed at consulting a wide range of stakeholders and partners. A full list of our Consultations and other Meetings is attached as an Annex to the Report.

We wish to thank you for the confidence and full support from yourself and your Office throughout the Process. We are grateful to member States and UN System interlocutors for their cooperation and support. Our thanks are also due to the Assistant-Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, Ms. Judy Cheng-Hopkins, and her team at PBSO for their assistance and cooperation.

The Co-Facilitators wish to emphasise the need for consideration and implementation of the range of Recommendations made in our Report. No doubt you, together with the incoming President of the Assembly and successive Presidents of the Security Council, will wish to discuss this important issue; we stand ready to offer our views as to how implementation of our Recommendations can be assured.

Please accept, Dear President, the assurances of our highest consideration.

Anne Anderson  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of  
Ireland to the United Nations

Claude Heller  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of  
Mexico to the United Nations

Baso Sangqu  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of the  
Republic of South Africa to the  
United Nations

# **REVIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE**

## **Section I: Framing the Review**

Introduction

Some Key Issues

## **Section II: In the Field**

Countries on the PBC Agenda

Perspectives of potential Agenda countries

Issues arising from country experiences

Summary of Recommendations

## **Section III: At HQ: PBC Role and Performance**

Organisational Committee

Country-Specific Configurations

Multi-tiered Engagement

Criteria for Entry and Exit

Summary of Recommendations

## **Section IV: Key Relationships**

Relationship with the Security Council, General Assembly, ECOSOC

Referral of countries to the PBC Agenda; A preventive role

Other partnerships: IFIs; UN family; regional bodies

Summary of Recommendations

## **Section V: PBSO and PBF**

PBSO: Within the PBSO; Weight within the Secretariat

PBF: Synergy with PBC; Usage of funds

Summary of Recommendations

## **Section VI: Summing Up**

Overview of Recommendations

Conclusion

**Annex: List of Consultations Undertaken**

## **Section I: Framing the Review**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **Process**

The mandate of the Review has its origin in the provision of the founding Resolutions of the Peacebuilding Commission that the new arrangements would be reviewed after a period of five years. The founding Resolutions were adopted in December 2005; the Co-facilitators of the Review were appointed in December 2009.

Throughout the six months of the Review process, we have been heartened by the levels of interest and engagement in this exercise. The groundswell of support for peacebuilding is strong, cross-regional, and encompasses government, wider political and civil society actors. An annex summarises the consultations held in the course of the Review process and our Report attempts to capture a very wide range of inputs. Although a succinct report cannot do justice to the detail of each submission, we hope that all who gave of their time will find some reflection of their ideas.

#### **Context**

The Co-facilitators are conscious of the weight of expectation on this Review. While the hopes which accompanied the 2005 Resolutions have yet to be realised, the needs which gave rise to these Resolutions remain as great as ever. Indeed, the peacebuilding challenge continues to grow: the World Development Report 2011 will confirm that conflict remains the single most important impediment to development.

The Review is taking place in a context of rapidly changing international realities, with inescapable consequences for the United Nations. Our consultations have brought some fundamental questions into focus: are we facing a paradigm shift in the UN peacekeeping model? Does a more relevant United Nations require a radical re-think of the relationship between Headquarters and the field? Are we still collectively failing to address the root causes of conflict and disproportionately focussing on the symptoms?

The Review also coincides with key dates on the UN calendar. This year's rededication to the Millennium Development Goals is provoking new and challenging debate about delivery on the targets set in 2000. The discussion on UN reform is intensifying, including questions about the equitable participation of the developing world in decision-making processes. Developments regarding System-Wide Coherence have a particular relevance for a process as multi-faceted as peacebuilding.

A key task for the Co-facilitators has been to set the appropriate boundaries for the Review. A very wide interpretation of our mandate would draw us into sweeping commentary on UN reform issues; a very narrow one would not do justice to the scale of the challenge. In trying to find middle ground, we have seen our task as reinvigorating the vision of 2005 and making it more realisable.

### **The Hopes of 2005**

The principal reference point is the 2005 texts; Resolutions 60/180 and 1645, adopted simultaneously in the General Assembly and the Security Council respectively. Setting these Resolutions in the context of the accompanying debate conveys a vivid sense of the hopes which attended their adoption. The new peacebuilding architecture was seen as a determined and ambitious effort to fill a critical void. The President of the General Assembly, speaking of “a genuinely historic moment,” summed up the general sentiment.

Although Resolutions 60/180 and 1645 brought the new bodies into operation, the actual founding decision was taken at the World Summit in September 2005. The Summit deliberations in turn were grounded in a decade of earlier work. As far back as 1995, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s “An Agenda for Peace” defined and discussed peacebuilding. The debate was taken forward in the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of December 2004; this in turn informed Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s seminal 2005 report “In Larger Freedom”. In summary: the decision to establish the new architecture was taken at the highest level, with ample advance consideration, and attended by the highest expectations. This is the backdrop against which performance has to be assessed.

### **How would ‘success’ have looked in 2010?**

Without being unduly speculative, it is reasonable to extrapolate from the 2005 texts and discussion how the peacebuilding architecture might have looked in 2010 if the expectations of 2005 had been fully met. One would have assumed a wider demand from countries to come on the PBC Agenda; that – where it had been involved – there would be a clearer sense of how PBC engagement had made a difference on the ground; that peacebuilding would have a higher place among UN priorities; that stronger relationships would have been forged between the PBC and the Security Council, the General Assembly and ECOSOC; that the PBC would carry more weight within the Secretariat; and that the PBC would be perceived as a key actor by those outside as well as inside the UN system, including by the international financial institutions.

## **A Qualified Record**

That this threshold of success has not been achieved needs to be squarely acknowledged. This is not to understate what has been accomplished, and certainly not to devalue the unfailing commitment shown by many dedicated member State representatives - especially those with chairing responsibilities - and Secretariat staff. The new institutions are up and running; they have kept a focus on countries emerging from conflict that receive insufficient international attention, and in some cases have promoted better planning, more inclusive political dialogue, and more effective resource mobilisation than would otherwise have happened.

However, the momentum that carried the process forward up to and including December 2005 was not sustained at the same pace. The protracted discussion on procedural issues created a hiatus. Member States who were considerably exercised about securing a seat on the Organisational Committee have not always invested commensurate energy in discharging the responsibilities of membership. The PBSO has struggled to find an identity which would enable it to fulfil an effective coordinating role on peacebuilding issues across the UN Secretariat.

## **At the Crossroads**

Incremental improvements have undoubtedly occurred during the lifetime of the new institutions. Successive PBC Chairs and Chairs of Country-Specific Configurations have worked with devotion, and with some success, to enhance the relevance of the Commission's work. The PBF has been twice reviewed. The PBSO, also benefitting from dedicated leadership, has begun to settle down, and some important outputs have been or are currently being prepared.

Something more, however, is required if the vision and ambition of 2005 is to be restored. The Organisation is still not rising to the peacebuilding challenge. There needs to be a new level of attention and resolve on the part of member States and the top echelons of the Secretariat. Either there is a conscious re-commitment to peacebuilding at the very heart of the UN's work, or the PBC settles into the limited role that has been developed so far. From our consultations, we sense a strong desire by the membership to follow the former path.

## **Some Key Issues**

At the outset, the Co-facilitators wish to set out a number of key issues and concerns which underpin the detail of this Report.

### **(I) The Complexity of Peacebuilding**

Peacebuilding of its nature is a complicated process: rebuilding fragile or shattered relationships inevitably takes time. It does not lend itself to compartmentalisation or ‘boots on the ground’ measurement. Organisations such as the UN and the IFIs can find it inherently difficult to deal with this complexity and inter-relatedness. There is inevitably a gravitational pull, for organisations and donors, towards the concrete and more readily measurable.

These complexities, even if recognised at the establishment of the new architecture, are perhaps still not fully internalised. There is impatience for the PBC to construct its narrative, to find its success stories, to define precisely its added value. These are legitimate concerns and the Review seeks to address them. But the Organisation must adjust to the realities: the need is for the UN to continually reappraise its own structures and prioritise its approach to ensure they match needs on the ground.

### **(II) The Imperative of National Ownership**

Put simply, people must own their own peace: it has to begin, grow and become embedded in people’s minds. It follows that peacebuilding can only happen within communities and within a country. ‘National ownership’ is not something that is merely desirable or politically correct; it is an imperative, an absolute essential, if peacebuilding is to take root.

The principle of national ownership is widely invoked and accepted; the challenge is to work through the full range of implications. The international community must understand the limits of its role as midwife to a national birthing process. In the countries concerned, ownership cannot be approached as a right wrested from the international community: what people need and require of their governments is that they exercise the responsibilities conferred by ownership.

The PBC needs to ensure that national ownership genuinely and comprehensively underpins its work. In multiple ways – helping to build administrative capacity, promoting dialogue, encouraging a definition of ‘national ownership’ that fully embraces all stakeholders – it must go beyond mantra to substance.

### **(III) The Illusion of Sequencing**

There is acceptance in all quarters that sequencing does not work; that effective peacebuilding must not follow peacekeeping operations but accompany them from their inception. This is not a new insight: it was clearly articulated, for example, in the Brahimi Report – and now in the New Horizon approach.

Despite this acknowledgement, there is a widespread sense that the sequential approach remains the dominant one in the UN. Even if modest elements of peacebuilding are incorporated in mandates, the focus and mindset of operations is a peacekeeping one. Peacebuilding tends to be viewed as an add-on during the lifetime of the peacekeeping operation, expected to come into its own in the aftermath.

Such a sequential approach neither gives adequate weight to peacebuilding nor responds to needs and realities on the ground. In the current context of debate about the future of a number of UN peacekeeping operations, the question has assumed a further relevance.

The challenge is to ensure that doctrinal or philosophical shifts are fully reflected in new organisational approaches. The obstacles in the way of this – not least the differing financial arrangements underpinning peacekeeping and peacebuilding – are formidable. But meaningful steps can be taken, both in the design of mandates by the Security Council and in the allocation of resources.

The issue of sequencing relates also to the discussion about a preventive role for the PBC. Realities on the ground are not compartmentalised: there can be slides towards conflict or relapses into conflict where lines are crossed almost imperceptibly. The PBC needs to be fully alert to these realities and mindful of the preventive dimension in its existing mandate.

### **(IV) The Urgency of Resource Mobilisation**

The PBC's role in helping to ensure predictable financing for post-conflict recovery is recognised in the founding Resolutions, and was seen from the outset as a key dimension of its work.



It is well understood that peacebuilding requires a parallel addressing of political, security and developmental needs. As conflict ends, people desperately need to live free from fear and free from hunger. To the extent that they can do so, they experience a peace dividend and their resolve to move forward is strengthened. With so many strands interwoven, failure in any one area can reverse progress in others.

Recognising this inter-relatedness, the point nevertheless was repeatedly made to us that it is the failure to deal with basic developmental needs that poses the biggest risk of dragging a country back into conflict. Study after study has shown that underdevelopment and conflict are intimately related. The PBC clearly should not seek to duplicate the work of development agencies. But it must be a strong and persistent voice in calling for the integration of political and developmental perspectives, and in reminding the international community that food, shelter and jobs are also essential tools of peacebuilding.

Resource mobilisation for peacebuilding needs to be both ambitious and focussed. The PBC's role is essentially an advocacy one - a relentless advocacy for the allocation of adequate resources to those critical and urgent issues which, if they remain unaddressed or unfunded, have the potential to threaten peace. Across the widest possible range of actors - within the UN, the IFIs, the private sector - it must seek to leverage resources on the scale necessary to make a real difference, and its relevance and success will in very significant part be demonstrated by its capacity to do so.

#### **(V) The Importance of Women's Contribution**

The PBC has the distinction of being the first UN body to have the gender dimension explicitly built into its founding Resolutions. The potential contribution which women can make to peace processes hardly needs reiteration. It will be underlined again in the forthcoming Secretary-General's report on Women's Participation in Peacebuilding, which is expected to contain clear and action-oriented recommendations.

The PBC has so far not lived up to its strong and specific mandate in this regard. There have been some successes in involving women's organisations, but their voices are insufficiently heard, especially in the field. The exhortation to integrate gender concerns across peacebuilding work has also met with limited success. The gender perspective needs more fully to filter down through the Country-Specific Configurations and inform every aspect of peacebuilding work on the ground. Women's role in peacebuilding needs to move from a niche concern to the mainstream, and the PBC should be at the forefront of that movement.

**(VI) The Need for Connection with the Field**

The appropriate slide-rule for measuring success or failure of the peacebuilding architecture is how much it matters in the field. Throughout the Review, the Co-facilitators have repeatedly been reminded that preoccupations and perspectives on the ground can differ quite radically from those in the corridors of New York. In the area of strategic planning, for example, the kind of exercise that looks reasonable and appropriate in New York may be perceived in the field as excessively burdensome, adding another layer of tasks to an already overstretched and fragile administration. A similar difference of perspective is evident in other areas.

In their field contacts, the Co-facilitators have been struck by the lack of basic understanding of the UN peacebuilding architecture: how it operates and what it offers. The gap that has opened up between HQ and the field must be a matter of concern; we strongly hope that one of the outcomes of this Review will be to narrow that gap.

## **Section II: In the Field**

The first part of this Section summarises some experiences to date of each of the four Agenda countries; we look also at the perspectives of potential candidates. The second part seeks to identify some of the key points emerging.

### **Countries on the PBC Agenda**

Each of the four Agenda countries is of course different and has experienced the PBC differently. Sierra Leone and Burundi were placed on the Agenda in June 2006; Guinea-Bissau in December 2007 and the Central African Republic in June 2008. Given the much longer period of engagement, there has been scope for evolution over time in the relationship with Sierra Leone and Burundi. Despite initial difficulties, both are now seen as generally positive experiences resulting in some concrete benefits. Guinea-Bissau and CAR were further back on the road to peace when they came on the PBC Agenda and have more serious capacity and resource issues. Guinea-Bissau continues to suffer gravely from political instability and has had limited benefit from PBC engagement.

#### **Attention; Political Accompaniment**

In cataloguing the benefits, it can be said that all four countries have experienced, to varying degrees, an increment of international attention as a result of engagement with the PBC. This is especially important for countries perceiving themselves to be suffering an 'attention deficit' on the part of the international community.

The PBC has also played a role in promoting inclusive political dialogue in all four countries. It helped to facilitate a peaceful election process in Sierra Leone in 2007 and subsequently, in the aftermath of the political violence of March 2009, provided a political umbrella for the ERSG to lead negotiations between the political parties. In Burundi, PBC efforts led to the establishment of a Permanent Forum for Dialogue and helped to create an environment conducive to the holding of elections. In CAR, the PBC supported an all-inclusive national political dialogue in December 2008 and gave parties the necessary encouragement to establish an Electoral Commission. In the difficult circumstances of Guinea-Bissau, the PBC has called for calm and dialogue during periods of turmoil.

#### **Planning**

The experience in relation to planning has been mixed. In Sierra Leone, the "Agenda for Change" has replaced the proliferation of political, security and development plans previously in place; having a single planning document has improved coherence and national ownership, and reduced the administrative burden on the country. The "Agenda for Change", however, was agreed only after an extensive period of institutional dispute within and between the UN system and its partners, and after the PBC initially sought to develop a separate Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding.

There was a parallel experience in Burundi. The effort required initially to draw up and implement a Strategic Framework was felt to be extremely onerous. As in Sierra Leone, a compromise was eventually reached, resulting in a single strategy document which better reflects national priorities and is more focussed and realisable.

Notwithstanding the experiences in Sierra Leone and Burundi, the CSCs for CAR and Guinea-Bissau went down the road of separate peacebuilding strategies. The fact that in both cases the drafting processes were prolonged, and to some degree duplicated the existing Poverty Reduction Strategies and other texts, was a source of frustration for actors on the ground. Given the limited national capacity in these countries, the administrative burden of drawing up, implementing and monitoring the Strategic Framework has been particularly felt.

The uneven involvement of national stakeholders in the process of drawing-up peacebuilding priorities has also been commented on. In some cases, civil society organisations have felt marginalised and – despite the PBC’s explicit mandate to integrate a gender perspective – women’s groups in particular have complained of inadequate engagement.

#### Resource Mobilisation

The record as regards resource mobilisation is also mixed. There have been PBF allocations in all four cases: US\$37m to Sierra Leone, US\$40m to Burundi; US\$31m allocation to CAR; and US\$6m to Guinea-Bissau. In the case of all four countries, efforts have been made to mobilise resources more widely. In Sierra Leone, for example, following strong advocacy by the PBC, key partners joined forces to produce a *Joint Response to Youth Employment*. In Burundi, the CSC played a role in breaking the impasse over the sixth IMF replenishment for the country. Co-sponsorship of the donors’ round-table held in Bujumbura in May 2007 produced pledges of increased financial support.

There has been some success in resource mobilisation for CAR. The PBC established a dialogue with the World Bank concerning the country’s progress towards reaching the completion point of the HIPC initiative in June 2009, and this dialogue continues. A list of peacebuilding projects in need of funding is also being prepared, and has managed to elicit the interest of some new partners. In Guinea-Bissau, contributions from PBC members to support the elections in November 2008 were partly a response to CSC advocacy. Continued increases in assistance from the African Development Bank, IMF and World Bank to Guinea-Bissau are also in part attributable to the PBC’s role.

Despite the efforts being made, resource mobilisation is falling well short of needs. The constraints are clear (in Guinea-Bissau, for example, political instability greatly complicates the task) and it is essential that the PBC approach remains realistic and focussed on needs that are distinctively or strongly associated with peacebuilding. Efforts need to intensify, and this issue re-emerges throughout our Report.

## **Perspectives of Potential Agenda Countries**

In 2005, the expectations of potential PBC benefits were such that there was a concern that the number of countries wishing to be considered would overwhelm its capacity. That has not proved to be the case. It is clear that, for a number of potential candidates, the perceived 'risk-to-reward ratio' has not favoured engagement. The Co-facilitators held a number of meetings to try to better understand the perspectives of countries which have preferred not to come on the PBC Agenda.

There is undoubtedly some sense of the potential advantages attached to PBC engagement: the international attention and political accompaniment which the PBC promises can be attractive. Offset against these potential benefits, however, is the perception of potential downsides. Being on the Agenda may be seen as an indication of dysfunctionality. The heavy administrative burden of PBC engagement can be off-putting. We saw some evidence of a mistaken perception that entering the PBC Agenda would imply the loss of Security Council attention and the automatic draw-down of a peacekeeping operation.

It was clear to us that some potential candidates would see a lighter form of PBC engagement as more appropriate to their circumstances than the creation of a fully-fledged Country-Specific Configuration. Such engagement might focus specifically on the peacebuilding process in the country, or on a sector requiring attention. The Co-facilitators see benefit in having such a 'light option' available and, in the following Section, we consider how it might be given practical effect.

## **Issues Arising from Country Experiences**

The experience on the ground brings a number of issues into perspective, some of which are dealt with later in the Report. In this Section the Co-facilitators wish to comment on issues of national ownership and capacity-building; developmental and particularly employment-generation challenges; coordination and coherence; and also briefly to consider the regional dimension of peacebuilding. Responding to the confusion and misunderstandings we perceive in the field, we also underline the importance of developing an effective communications strategy.

### **(I) National Ownership and Capacity Issues**

In the introductory Section, the Co-facilitators underlined their conviction that national ownership must underpin the entire peacebuilding effort. From our exposure to the situation in the field, it is clear to us that the PBC has not yet been able to generate a full sense of national ownership in critical areas.

Perhaps the most crucial stage of establishing ownership is the planning process. Even if they are rudimentary or slow to emerge, national inputs should from the outset form the basis of the engagement of the international community. A stake

for national actors must be built in by establishing mechanisms to transfer the management and implementation of plans and projects to the government and its national partners.

Given the likelihood of an inverse relationship between the length and complexity of the planning document and the degree of genuine national ownership, the Co-facilitators suggest a planning approach that is light but inclusive. Bearing in mind that 'no one size fits all', we are not proposing a single template. On balance, however, it seems that the stand-alone Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies have generated more difficulties than benefits. There are clear advantages to a single overarching planning document (with whatever title the national authorities wish to confer) around which national authorities and the international community can coalesce. This single text should contain well-defined peacebuilding elements worked out with the full involvement of all stakeholders.

The experiences in the four Agenda countries illustrate the vital connection between ownership and capacity: unless local actors have the capacity to fully engage throughout all phases of planning and implementation, national ownership will remain theory rather than reality. In making this point, the Co-facilitators emphasise that it is essential to avoid any risk that lack of capacity becomes an alibi for avoiding potential difficulties associated with involving national actors; rather it should galvanise the international community behind the key task of capacity-building.

Building capacity in national administrations is critical but not of itself sufficient; there is also a need to build capacity across the board. Although the PBC has had some success in bringing together political parties, civil society, the private sector and others, more must be done to ensure that these groups are in a position to engage meaningfully in the peacebuilding process. The record regarding women's organisations is particularly thin.

## **(II) Developmental Aspects of Peacebuilding**

It is widely acknowledged that there can be no peace without development and no development without peace. Our introductory Section underlined the urgency of prioritising development and ensuring its full integration into peacebuilding efforts in countries emerging from conflict. All four countries on the PBC Agenda face a range of development challenges and responding to these challenges is one of the most crucial aspects of building peace.

Youth unemployment in particular is identified as a potential Achilles' heel in any peacebuilding process. Youth who have been caught up in conflict are vulnerable to being drawn into destructive patterns of behaviour if left idle and without the means to support themselves. The need to develop strategies to attract young people back into purposeful civilian life must be a key priority.

The Co-facilitators are conscious that employment generation is a challenge in all economies and an acute one in many developing countries. But the connection between job creation and peacebuilding needs clear and specific focus. It is

imperative that all avenues to enhance local employment are availed of. Local procurement, for example, can create significant opportunities and the international community needs to demonstrate a stronger awareness of this in its local engagement. Many conflict-affected countries are also resource-rich; there needs to be a strong emphasis on local employment in mineral extraction, and transfer of skills should be made a condition for investment.

### **(III) Coordination and Coherence**

The whole PBC concept is built around complementarity and partnership. The PBC should help to provide political support to UN peacebuilding missions, which in turn should reflect UN peacebuilding principles and priorities in their operation. It is especially important that there is a mutually-reinforcing relationship with the Special Representatives and UN country teams. The SRSG/ERSG has a mandate and continuous local presence which confers a particular role and authority. The PBC members represent peer governments, with the empathy and capacity for dialogue which is inherent in a peer relationship. Each should be conscious of empowering the other.

In practice, the international community still struggles to achieve the necessary degree of coherence in the field. The first challenge is to integrate fully the work of UN actors on the ground in a country, based on joint planning and clear inventories of actions so as to avoid duplication. The relationship between the PBC and the SRSG/ERSG needs to be properly worked through, with full accommodation for the lead SRSG/ERSG role on the ground. The second challenge is to improve coordination among the different international partners. The existence of a single strategic document does not guarantee that all actors will act in accordance with its priorities. The PBC must use its political weight to seek to align the various actors behind the same overarching objectives.

If the integration of UN missions works as intended, the prospects of peacebuilding will be greatly enhanced. Fragmentation, territoriality and competition among UN actors as well as among international organisations and donors generally are corrosive of the entire aid effort, and will critically undermine the peacebuilding effort.

### **(IV) Regional Dimension**

Experience in all four Agenda countries underlines the regional dimension of conflict. There is ample evidence of the potential for cross-border spill-over which can create or exacerbate conflict and frustrate peacebuilding efforts. On the positive side, there is the potential for regional organisations to play a crucial role in helping to consolidate peace as countries emerge from conflict.

Some problems are inherently of a cross-border nature, e.g. drug trafficking or the management of displaced persons, and require regional cooperation if they are to be effectively tackled. Other challenges may be primarily domestic, e.g. youth

unemployment or issues surrounding the extraction of natural resources, but are common to several countries in a region, and benefit from joint discussion.

National ownership also benefits from being seen in the context of regional and continental ownership. Many countries may prefer to receive assistance and advice from peer countries in their own region, and regional organisations may be better placed to intervene in a timely manner and to assist in grappling with certain sensitive issues, particularly where the government itself is part of the problem.

For all these reasons, it is clear that the PBC must give even further weight to the regional dimension than has been the case so far. There may be some cases where Region-Specific Configurations would be more logical and hold greater promise of progress than Country-Specific Configurations and this should be an available option. Additionally, the Co-facilitators urge that every opportunity is availed of to enhance the engagement with regional organisations; we revert to this later in the Report.

#### **(V) Communications Strategy**

From our contacts at HQ but particularly on the ground, it is clear to the Co-facilitators that there is a very incomplete understanding of the breadth of the PBC mandate. In part, this may arise from the inherent complexity of the peacebuilding task and the consequent difficulty of neat mission statements or promises of short-term outcomes. However, the issue goes beyond this: there appears to be a major communication gap in which misperceptions and misunderstandings about the PBC role have taken root.

The confusion relates in particular to the PBC-PBF relationship. The PBF was conceived as a complement to the PBC work but in some respects seems to have obscured it. Because it was established at the same time and operates in parallel to the PBC, there is a tendency to view the PBC as primarily a route to PBF funding. This not only misinterprets the relationship between the PBC and the PBF, but it makes it more difficult to create the space in which the PBC was intended to operate.

The PBC together with the PBSO urgently needs to develop a communications strategy that has a strong field focus but is also targeted at member States in New York and the Secretariat. The purpose of such a strategy should be to identify in accessible terms how the peacebuilding architecture is constituted and how the elements interact. It should spell out succinctly the benefits that the PBC offers: key among these are *attention, accompaniment, advocacy*. The 'brand' needs to be repositioned to become much more positive: the PBC represents an innovative and modern approach in which the international community accompanies conflict-affected countries as they chart their own future. The key message is not one of dysfunctionality, but of determination and resolve.

## **Section II: Summary of Recommendations**



#### Capacity; Planning; Levels of Engagement; Regional Dimension

- *Increase the focus on capacity-building across the board - national administrations, political parties, civil society including women's organisations - so as to build expertise and ensure sustainability*
- *Lighten the administrative burden; a single overall planning document should include peacebuilding elements developed through a participatory and inclusive process*
- *Introduce more flexibility, with possibilities of multi-tiered engagement*
- *Strengthen the regional dimension across all aspects of the PBC work*

#### Resource Mobilisation

- *Intensify overall resource mobilisation efforts; ensure they are strongly attuned to development challenges with political implications*

#### Developmental Aspects of Peacebuilding

- *Sharpen the emphasis on employment generation, particularly for youth (local procurement; skills transfer)*

#### Coherence and Coordination

- *Encourage UN actors in all PBC Agenda countries to integrate further their activities on the ground, under SRSG/ERSG leadership*
- *Utilise the PBC's political weight to align international actors on the ground behind agreed overarching objectives*
- *Ensure clear inventories of peacebuilding activities in Agenda countries so as to avoid duplication*

#### Communications Strategy

- *Develop an effective communications strategy, which 'rebrands' the PBC and clearly spells out what it can offer*

### **Section III: At HQ: PBC Role and Performance**

The PBC is dealing not just with the inherent complexity of peacebuilding, but with the challenges associated with being a relatively late entrant in a crowded field. Both across the UN and in other international bodies, there has been a significant growth of interest in peacebuilding over recent years. Rather than suggesting any redundancy on the part of the PBC, this proliferation of actors reinforces the need for a focal point. This was precisely what world leaders had in mind in 2005: that the PBC should bring coherence and impetus to the range of efforts.

Becoming an effective focal point in a crowded field was never going to be easy. Both the Organisational Committee and the Country-Specific Configurations continue to face difficulties. But with the role of the latter more concrete and more readily understood, the OC has the greater struggle to establish its mission and its specific added value.

#### **Organisational Committee**

An initial comment about attendance levels is perhaps applicable to both the OC and CSCs, although particularly to the OC. If in 2005 the PBC was deemed to be a key institution filling a critical gap, it was reasonable to expect that it would receive commensurate attention from member States. This is not always the case. The Co-facilitators have heard significant comment on the level of attendance. There is perplexity that some countries which apparently attached enormous value to becoming PBC members should routinely be represented at a junior level at OC meetings.

##### **(I) Membership Issues**

Issues surrounding the membership of the Organisational Committee surfaced periodically throughout the Review. These issues fall into two categories: firstly the contribution of the different membership streams; secondly the representivity of the PBC.

##### **Contribution of Membership Streams**

A distinctive feature of the OC is the make-up of its membership, with members nominated by the Security Council, the General Assembly and ECOSOC, as well as leading donors and troop contributors. The membership formula emerged as the outcome of lengthy negotiations; and it may be inferred that implicit in the formula was some expectation of a specific contribution by each of the various streams and a degree of bridge-building back to the respective nominating bodies.

The PBC as a whole of course acts collectively and reaches decisions by consensus. But it is not unreasonable to suppose that the General Assembly members would bring a General Assembly perspective, as would the Security Council and ECOSOC members in respect of their nominating bodies.

To date, there is little evidence that the various membership streams have been conscious of particular responsibilities by reference to their nominating bodies. A renewed sense on the part of all OC members of the distinctive contributions expected of them – including the scope for particular engagement by the permanent members – would do much to reinvigorate the OC.

### Composition of the OC

The question of composition consumed considerable time in 2005 and the formula eventually identified is set out in the founding Resolutions. Opinions may differ as to whether the overall OC membership figure of 31 is too large to be efficient or too small to be appropriately representative. However, we do not see any appetite to reopen a debate that was conducted in 2005 and would be unlikely to lead to any different conclusion if rerun today.

Two issues are nevertheless worth commenting on. Firstly, there is a legitimate concern about adequate rotation to ensure balanced regional representation. A number of delegations emphasised the provision in the founding Resolutions that, to help correct any regional imbalances that may have emerged, the General Assembly elections should take place in the aftermath of other nominating processes. The Co-facilitators endorse the importance of this provision.

Additionally, it was pointed out that the group of ten top financial donors to the UN operates a rotation in choosing its five PBC members; a similar rotation does not apply within the group of ten top troop-contributing countries. Although of course a matter for the troop-contributing countries themselves to decide, the Co-facilitators see validity in the suggestion to have at least some element of rotation within both groups.

A second issue relates to the importance of those countries which are on the PBC Agenda having the right to attend OC meetings. This seems to us self-evidently desirable and we believe it should be given effect, without prejudice to the existing OC membership formula.

### **(II) Agenda and Working Methods**

Significant efforts have been made by successive Chairs of the PBC Organisational Committee to enhance the substance and relevance of its work. These efforts have met with some success. However, there is a widespread sense that the OC still needs more focus and output; many of our interlocutors felt that it has yet to demonstrate that it is making a clear and measurable difference. The identity of the OC still needs to settle down; although the founding Resolutions do not define

responsibilities in detail, the designation of the OC as the “standing” committee of the PBC and the care taken in its composition suggest that a role of substance was intended.

The rhythm and duration of meetings might usefully be considered. If the OC is to give real added value, it is important that attendance be at an appropriate level and include expertise from capitals and the field. This might suggest less frequent meetings of a longer duration. In order to support the work of the OC, a representative bureau with a more developed vice-chairing structure might also be considered, while allowing for the flexibility which is a hallmark of peacebuilding work.

#### Relationship with CSCs

The OC should remain fully abreast of what is happening in the CSCs, and be ready to give policy guidance and advice as appropriate. Periodic collective consideration would be helpful, with the CSC Chairs together attending open interactive discussions with the OC. This would provide scope for cross-fertilisation in ideas and methodology and for ensuring a general consistency of approach. A more solid relationship with the CSCs would also help to ensure that the OC’s thematic work remains grounded in field realities.

The Co-facilitators are confident that the membership as a whole is sufficiently conscious that ‘no one size fits all’ to ensure there is the necessary flexibility and space for the CSCs. Nor is there any question of the PBC Chair seeking to substitute for the CSC Chairs in their necessary direct interactions with entities inside and outside the UN. But there should be a ‘whole of PBC’ view on a range of issues, and this is best formulated in the OC and articulated by the PBC Chair. A more committed OC membership – exercising the greater level of engagement sketched out above – should be able to draw fully on CSC experience in forming this ‘whole of PBC’ view.

#### Thematic Issues

As well as having oversight of the overall work programme of the PBC, the OC should identify each year a number of strategic thematic issues on which it would focus for that year. These would comprise issues of high current and operational relevance. The output on each theme would be a subject-specific report which would be presented by the PBC Chair to the Security Council and to the General Assembly. The OC is also the appropriate partner for dialogue on thematic issues with relevant UN entities and other peacebuilding actors.

In addition, the OC should take oversight responsibility for ensuring application of the principle of mutual accountability. Although each of the CSCs should assess mutual accountability in relation to its Agenda country, the OC has an important role in developing the tools that can be used to monitor and track progress. Backed by the PBSO, it should be to the forefront in developing mutual accountability frameworks specifically adapted to the peacebuilding area. In undertaking this work, the OC will be able to draw on lessons learned and on aid accountability research underway in the relevant international bodies.

## Lessons Learned

The Co-facilitators considered whether it might make sense for the 'Lessons Learned' function to be returned to the OC. While there was a level of support and some agnosticism among the membership, the balance of opinion seemed to favour retention of the Working Group on Lessons Learned. The Co-facilitators therefore suggest a focus on its better functioning, with a clear rationale for its discussions and clear outcomes. If the OC develops a stronger and more interactive relationship with the CSCs, it may over time come to feel that the lessons learned function is better carried out directly, rather than at one remove in the WGLL. If so, a decision to that effect could be taken at the appropriate time. The capacity to evolve and innovate is intended to be among the PBC hallmarks, and the OC should not hesitate to exercise that capacity.

## Country-Specific Configurations

The Country-Specific Configurations have been instrumental in the achievements of the PBC to date. As with the OC, there have been notably dedicated Chairs who have invested very considerable time and effort. The Co-facilitators would not wish in any way to devalue the steps taken, and we also recognise that there are significant differences across the four Configurations. However, we are conscious of a general sense that more could be done, both as regards working methods and substantive output.

### **(I) Working Methods**

As regards the working methods, the challenge might be described as how to combine innovation and vibrancy with weight and solidity. It is important to recall the sense of the founding Resolutions that the PBC would be different from other UN bodies: more flexible and innovative in its working methods. The intention was that the PBC would find new ways to bring together key actors from across the public and private sectors and civil society, whose collective wisdom and energy would be at the service of the countries on the PBC Agenda.

At the same time, there is a clear requirement for weight and solidity. The Configuration Chairs need to be of a certain profile: respected, knowledgeable, able to operate effectively both in New York and in the field. They must have the full confidence of the Agenda countries and also inspire the confidence of key actors. They need to be backed up by solid support from the PBSO and from within their national administrations.

In order to give further depth and solidity to the chairing role, the Co-facilitators suggest that a country dimension should be added. Such an approach would have a number of practical implications. The chairing function would continue to be filled by Permanent Representatives in New York as the persons best placed to discharge the responsibilities of the chairing role. However, the country whose Permanent Representative in New York was appointed as CSC Chair would be expected to demonstrate clear commitment and support at all levels of government, both in capital and in the field. Where the chairing

country has a diplomatic presence in the Agenda country, as might normally be expected to be the case, the Ambassador in situ would be expected to play a useful linking role under the leadership of the SRS/ERSG and the host government. The country dimension would also ensure greater continuity: a country would be expected to commit for a reasonable period of time, and its responsibilities would be unaffected by any turnover in the Permanent Representative position in New York.

There has been considerable discussion of the potential benefits of a PBC configuration in the field which could help to feed and validate the work of the CSC in New York. The Co-facilitators agree that an appropriately-structured country-level liaison committee should be established in each Agenda country and should report regularly to the CSC in New York. The committee should be co-chaired by a representative of the host government and the SRS/ERSG; there should be a broad range of members and a level of attendance commensurate with the PBC's high-level political role. A special role could be envisaged for the Ambassador (if one exists) of the CSC Chair country.

## **(II) CSC Output**

The benefits that a CSC brings to an Agenda country may be summarised as attention; accompaniment; advocacy. Depending on the individual circumstances of the country concerned, each of the three may be needed to different degrees. The challenge at all times is to assess what is of most practical value; what is likely to make a real difference on the ground.

The importance of sustaining international attention is obvious. The second potential benefit – 'high-level political accompaniment' – needs to be offered in a context-specific and appropriate way. The objective is to facilitate and advance the kind of broad-based dialogue that will enable a society to heal and rebuild. All stakeholders, notably civil society including women's groups, are central to that dialogue and therefore must be central to the CSC approach.

The advocacy role can take various forms but will certainly include funding advocacy. As we underline throughout this Report, resource mobilisation is critical to demonstrating PBC relevance and added value. Each CSC must exercise its advocacy role in an energetic and innovative way, reaching across the UN, IFIs and other international and regional organisations, but also embracing regional banks, the private sector and other funding sources. Suggestions we have heard include more donor round-tables under PBC auspices, more active outreach to non-traditional donors, steps to bolster absorption capacity, tapping into remittance flows.

Ensuring mutual accountability is critical to the entire peacebuilding effort and is a natural corollary of resource mobilisation. Applying tools developed by the OC, each CSC should map and track delivery of peacebuilding commitments with respect to its Agenda country. Combining its evaluations of delivery both by national stakeholders and by the international community, the CSC will be in a position to authoritatively assess how each is meeting its responsibilities.

Beyond the above general recommendations, the Co-facilitators do not wish to be overly prescriptive in setting out views as to the functioning and output of the CSCs. We are conscious that the elements of specificity, experimentation and agility are central to the whole CSC design. We also note the expectation that a fifth CSC is likely to be established shortly. This will provide a fresh opportunity to demonstrate how the approach might be further adapted and new avenues explored.

### **Multi-tiered Engagement**

Given a widespread sense that there should be possibilities of multi-tiered engagement (sectoral, regional, 'light footprint'), the Co-facilitators have sought to address the issue of what form should be given to that engagement. The approach of establishing a Country-Specific Configuration as soon as a country comes on the PBC Agenda has worked well to date. A dedicated CSC brings a degree of attention and engagement that is not otherwise possible, and will continue to be the normal vehicle for interaction with a country on the PBC Agenda. Equally, it can be anticipated that, if there is to be a regional referral, the complexity will be such as to require a dedicated regional configuration.

There may, however, be situations where something lighter is required than the full CSC precisely along the lines of the current models. The Co-facilitators sense a general readiness to consider some degree of experimentation, as long as there is a guarantee of the situation receiving the requisite degree of dedicated attention. Options could include, for example, appointment of a country-specific focal point by the PBC Chair, a role for a Vice-Chair in the OC Bureau, or establishment of an informal working group. The engagement instrument would be decided on a case by case basis, by reference to the particular context and in close consultation with the national stakeholders.

### **Criteria for Entry and Exit**

The potential for the PBC to add value is in significant part dependent on the choices made as to which countries or situations form part of its agenda. No matter how dedicated its work, a Country-Specific Configuration will struggle if the situation on the ground is unripe for peacebuilding efforts. Equally, if a country has progressed to a situation where its challenges are essentially developmental rather than distinctively of a peacebuilding nature, it makes little sense to have a continuing PBC focus.

Given the fluidity and specificity of individual circumstances, the Co-facilitators do not believe it appropriate to draw up detailed or technocratic criteria for entry and exit. Referral must rely on informed political judgement. The referring body – to date the Security Council, in future perhaps others – needs to be reasonably confident that the primary effort now required is a peacebuilding one, that there is potential for clear added value in PBC engagement, and that the government concerned is fully conscious of the responsibilities as well as the potential benefits of coming on the Agenda.

As regards exit strategies, here too benchmarks must be flexible and essentially political. The PBC needs to be a responsive body, available to take on new situations as circumstances require. Inevitably, however, there are capacity constraints and new countries cannot indefinitely be added without the graduation of any of the existing Agenda countries.

An Agenda country will have its own sense of when it is ready to graduate, and this must be the key to decision-making. There needs, however, to be regular mapping and measuring of progress, with periodic assessments of the extent to which priorities defined as a country came on the PBC Agenda have been achieved, and of gaps remaining. The biannual reviews of the Strategic Framework in each Agenda country provide key opportunities for such assessments.

The multi-tiered levels of PBC engagement sketched out above may also prove relevant in this regard. A country that feels itself ready to move on from a Country-Specific Configuration could transitionally opt for a lighter relationship.



### **Section III: Summary of Recommendations**

#### Organisational Committee:

- *Encourage members of the OC to reflect their constituencies and ensure regular two-way communication*
- *Confirm that General Assembly elections should follow other nominating processes; consider some degree of rotation among TCCs as well as donors*
- *Adopt a decision giving countries on the PBC Agenda the right to attend OC meetings*
- *Consider having fewer OC meetings but of longer duration*
- *Consider establishment of a bureau with a more developed vice-chairing structure*
- *Develop a more solid relationship between the OC and the CSCs*
- *Identify a number of strategic thematic issues for annual consideration by the OC; develop tools for mutual accountability*

#### Working Group on Lessons Learned:

- *Clarify the rationale for the WGLL's discussions; ensure clear outcomes; identify defined follow-up*

#### Country-Specific Configurations:

- *Add a country dimension to the chairing role in Country-Specific Configurations*
- *Establish a PBC liaison committee on the ground in each Agenda country*
- *Strengthen the resource mobilisation functions of the CSCs*
- *Present authoritative assessments on mutual accountability by the CSCs, applying tools developed by the OC*

#### Multi-tiered Engagement

- *Consider options for a lighter form of engagement; make available the option of regional or sectoral tiers of engagement*

#### Entry and Exit Criteria

- *Retain flexibility in benchmarks, taking account of the fluidity and specificity of individual circumstances*
- *Give due weight to the view of the Agenda country as to when it is ready to graduate*
- *Refocus the biannual reviews to assess countries' progress towards nationally-recognised peacebuilding goals*

## **Section IV: Key Relationships**

### **Security Council; General Assembly; ECOSOC**

#### **Making Space and Earning Space**

In the course of the Review, we have encountered two propositions that can be set side by side: (i) that the PBC needs to be accorded more space within UN structures; and (ii) that unless and until the PBC can more convincingly demonstrate its added value, the Security Council and other UN bodies will not see good reason to accord that space.

We do not believe that these two propositions should be viewed as either competitive or sequential. The PBC certainly faces its own challenges. But it is in the interest of the UN and its entire membership that the new body should more fully succeed. No part of the Organisation can sit back and wait for the PBC to prove itself. The General Assembly and the Security Council are co-parents of the PBC, and have the nurturing responsibilities inherent in that role. The founding Resolutions also recognise a key role for ECOSOC, which needs to be more fully developed.

#### **(I) Relationship with the Security Council**

The 2005 Resolutions make clear that a key, although not exclusive, route by which countries will arrive on the PBC Agenda is through requests for advice by the Security Council. The relationship with the Security Council is therefore critical in shaping the Agenda; beyond this, however, it is key to determining the relevance of the PBC within the UN architecture. If the Security Council is seen to attach real value to the PBC role, respect for the PBC is enhanced. Conversely, if the role accorded by the Security Council to the PBC is felt to be slight, the Commission is devalued.

The Security Council has recently shown an increasing recognition of the importance of peacebuilding, through a series of thematic debates on the matter, as well as Presidential Statements setting out the views of the Council on peacebuilding issues. The PBC Chair has been invited to address the Council at each of the relevant open thematic debates and the CSC Chairs have also addressed the Council at all formal meetings where the Council deals with countries on the PBC Agenda.

However, a Security Council more convinced of the added value of the PBC would have gone beyond the steps taken to date. It would actively and creatively be looking for opportunities to involve the PBC. There would be more frequent requests for advice. The engagement with the PBC would be earlier, beginning at the stage of drafting mandates.

Instead, the interaction between the Security Council and the PBC has been limited. The problem appears to be two-fold: the Security Council perceives that the PBC does not provide much added value in its advice; and the PBC does not provide more focussed advice in part because the Security Council does not make more specific requests.

This situation is one of missed opportunities, and falls short of the hopes and expectations of 2005. More positively, however, the Co-facilitators believe that the benefits of an enhanced and more organic relationship between the Security Council and the PBC are increasingly being recognised, and the potential now exists to create a new dynamic between a more forthcoming Security Council and a better performing PBC.

Questions arise as to how such an improved interaction could be given procedural form. The Co-facilitators have no doubt that, if the political will exists, appropriate processes will be identified. The Security Council has demonstrated a capacity for procedural innovation in the past (for example, in establishing mechanisms for meeting privately with troop-contributing countries; and in setting up the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations with scope for external participation) and could do so again.

Even within existing procedures, more could be done. There could be more meaningful exchanges with the PBC in informal settings where advice can be better shared. More regular exchanges between the OC and CSC Chairs and the President of the Security Council would provide opportunities to offer advice privately. Formats such as informal interactive dialogue sessions could be used to have the CSC Chairs share their insights. When the Security Council identifies a lead country in relation to the framing or renewal of a peacekeeping mandate, consultation could take place between the appropriate PBC representative and the designated lead country. The head of the PBSO could be invited to brief the Security Council in closed consultations in the same way as the heads of DPKO, DPA or OCHA.

#### Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

There is a widely held view that Security Council deliberations would benefit from PBC advice at an early stage in the framing of peacekeeping mandates, on relevant aspects during the lifetime of missions, and as drawdown approaches.

In order for this to happen, the PBC has to be an informed and focussed interlocutor in such a dialogue, bringing an analysis and perspective that is genuinely valuable to the Security Council. An effectively performing PBC will be well positioned to convey specific elements of information and concern that the Security Council might not obtain elsewhere. It can bring to bear its deep knowledge and experience of Agenda countries, and can draw on its interactions with the IFIs and other actors. It can make an important contribution in addressing the linkage between security and development where the Security Council does not always have an integrated perspective.

The Co-facilitators are of course fully conscious of the rights and responsibilities which the Charter confers on the Security Council in relation to peacekeeping mandates. Consistent with these prerogatives, however, and in the context of a better-performing PBC bringing genuine added value, the Co-facilitators believe that the Council should draw on the expertise and advice of the PBC to the maximum extent at the successive phases of mandate framing and renewal, and in approaching the draw-down of operations.

Beyond the processes of interaction between the Security Council and the PBC, a more fundamental question is the relative prioritisation of peacekeeping and peacebuilding within the Organisation as a whole. The Co-facilitators note a strong sense among the membership that a new balance will need to be struck if the UN peace operations of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are to achieve their goals. For the purpose of this Review, we focus on the more limited question of how to inject greater substance and relevance into the Security Council-PBC interaction. But the larger question is likely to be posed with increasing urgency.

Financing implications will be an integral part of that larger question. Peacebuilding budgets are a fraction of peacekeeping budgets, and the UN system can draw salutary lessons from the comparative figures. But the one unacceptable lesson would be any inference that peacebuilding is UN engagement 'on the cheap'. Peacekeeping operations must draw down at the right time for good reasons; peacebuilding operations must be adequately financed to have a realistic chance of success. A new approach to peace operations, including the financial implications, is a challenge confronting the Organisation as a whole.

## **(II) Relationship with the General Assembly**

The PBC's founding Resolutions clearly outlined the General Assembly's relationship with the new body. However, despite the relatively heavy formal relationship established, there is a widely shared view that the General Assembly has had insufficient weight in the activities of the PBC and that more structured and interactive relations are needed.

The point is rightly made that the PBC draws legitimacy and strength from the General Assembly and that this must be reinforced. We suggested earlier that General Assembly and ECOSOC nominees to the OC should play a conscious bridging role. Additionally, some members are of the view that the General Assembly should discuss peacebuilding policy more often – that the current annual overview debate is insufficient. We also noted the suggestion that the General Assembly hold a high-level debate on peacebuilding during Ministerial Week.

The Co-facilitators endorse the view that the co-parenting role of the General Assembly should be more visible and meaningful. However, as in the case of the Security Council, any box-ticking exercises are to be avoided. Additional debates, if they are to be held, need to be purposeful and value-added.

A range of choices is available in seeking to advance this objective. Reflecting the co-parenting role, the Presidents of the General Assembly and of the Security Council might periodically lead joint discussions. The seven members elected by the

General Assembly to the PBC Organisational Committee might address the Assembly in panel and interactive format as to how they interpret and are discharging their role. The SRSGs/ERSGs of countries on the PBC Agenda might also engage in joint interactive discussions to illuminate common issues and approaches.

In addition to the wide-ranging annual overview debate, it would seem useful periodically to bring a General Assembly perspective to bear on a key thematic issue under consideration in the PBC, or otherwise to frame Assembly discussions with a view to achieving specific outcomes.

### **(III) Relationship with ECOSOC**

The founding Resolutions also set out a strong role for ECOSOC, both in relation to the election of PBC members and the prerogative to request PBC advice on the same basis as the General Assembly. The Resolutions note the particular relevance of PBC advice to ECOSOC as countries move from transitional recovery towards development. At the time of adoption, the President of the General Assembly underlined the importance of a reformed ECOSOC playing its rightful role in peacebuilding.

This rightful role has yet to be properly and fully identified. The nexus between peacebuilding and development is a key focus of this Report, and creates the basis for very substantive interaction between the PBC and ECOSOC. The efforts made to date to give meaning to this interaction (including periodic briefings by the PBC Chair to ECOSOC, meetings between the PBC Chair and the President of ECOSOC, the recent joint bureaux meeting, and occasional joint thematic sessions between the two bodies) are important steps in the right direction.

However, more needs to be done to fulfil the intentions which informed the Resolutions. As with the Security Council and the General Assembly, if there is sufficient commitment and focus, the appropriate mechanisms for interaction will be found. ECOSOC could consider adding peacebuilding themes to its annual session; it could facilitate PBC interaction with UN Funds and Programmes, as well as with the Specialized Agencies; more regular joint events could be scheduled. For its part, the PBC could take the initiative of establishing a practice of regularly updating ECOSOC on aspects of its work.

Specific opportunities also present themselves: for example, the Ministerial Declaration of this month's high-level segment of ECOSOC urged ECOSOC and the PBC jointly to explore ways of strengthening the contribution of women in the prevention and resolution of conflict and in peacebuilding processes generally. A serious exercise in this regard would be an important step towards a more meaningful relationship between the two bodies.

## **Referral of Countries to the PBC Agenda**

The founding Resolutions (Operative Paragraph 12) identify four avenues by which countries may come on the PBC Agenda: referral by the Security Council, the General Assembly, ECOSOC and by the Secretary-General. All four referrals to date have been by the Security Council, and (despite the reference to regional balance in the Resolutions) all four are African countries. The question arises as to why a more diverse range of countries – in terms of size, of regional background, of the stage of the peacebuilding process which has been reached – has not been referred.

The referral prerogatives of ECOSOC and the General Assembly are carefully circumscribed and their use is likely to be limited in practice. Nevertheless, these prerogatives are important and should not be allowed to lapse through inertia or default. Neither should the referral right of the Secretary-General remain an academic one.

In practice, however, referral by the Security Council is likely to remain the main channel by which countries arrive on the PBC Agenda. The process by which these referrals occur therefore deserves particular comment.

There are two elements to the equation: the attitude of potential Agenda countries and the approach of the Security Council. The position of the potential Agenda country is of course critical, since referral is always dependent on the wish and consent of the country concerned. Section I of our Report touches on the ambivalence that may be felt by a potential Agenda country about a perceived ‘downgrading’ from Security Council to PBC consideration. Better communication, reassurance, and an up-scaling of PBC performance may help to address concerns in this regard.

As for the Security Council approach, the Co-facilitators have already indicated a concern about possible circularity – a Security Council that sees the PBC as insufficiently relevant and a PBC that feels it does not have sufficient opportunity to demonstrate its relevance. We hope that this Review will help to break any such circle and open the way towards a more forthcoming and interactive relationship.

We do not of course advocate experimentation for the sake of experimentation: referral of new countries must be needs-based and take account of PBC performance and capacities. What is important is to move beyond a limited and limiting view of the PBC; the PBC is an instrument that was created and designed to make a real difference and should be challenged to do so.

In practice, this would mean a readiness on the part of the Security Council to consider a wider range of situations for referral: these could include larger countries, or sectoral or regional situations. The multi-tiered approach set out earlier would offer a new menu of possibilities for engagement.

## **A Preventive Role**

In the course of our consultations, many interlocutors expressed the view that the time is now ripe for, and situations on the ground require, a more forthright acceptance of the preventive dimension of the PBC role.

The PBC founding Resolutions provide scope for a preventive dimension. Operative Paragraph 12 confers an unqualified prerogative on both the Security Council and on the Secretary-General to request PBC advice. In the case of other referral routes (ECOSOC; General Assembly, member States themselves), requests for advice can arise in situations where the member State concerned is in “exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict” and with which the Security Council is not seized.

The Co-facilitators are mindful of the controversy on this point prior to the establishment of the PBC in 2005 and are also conscious of the preventive work being carried out across the UN system. Dealing with situations of risk of relapse into conflict is likely to remain the focus of PBC work. However, the mandate provides wider scope.

In approaching its preventive role, the PBC will need to be guided both by demand from affected countries and by realism in assessing its likely added value. Where there is the determination and willingness of the country concerned to seek assistance, and the belief on the part of the PBC that it can respond meaningfully, the PBC should utilise to the full the potential offered by its existing mandate.

### **Other Partnerships: IFIs; UN Family; Regional Bodies**

#### **International Financial Institutions**

The partnership with the IFIs is critical to the functioning of the PBC; their role is specifically recognised in the founding Resolutions and their participation in all meetings of the Commission is provided for. Consistent with our concern about the developmental and resource mobilisation priority for the PBC, the Co-facilitators have devoted particular attention to the relationship with the World Bank.

We recognise that there are already regular and useful exchanges in the field, at meetings in New York, and when the PBC or CSC Chairs periodically travel to Washington. The current PBC Chair has attached priority to improving the partnership. However, much further work is required if the aspirations of genuine UN-World Bank partnership are to be met, and we note a growing impatience in this regard.

There is a major challenge for member States to engage in joined-up thinking within their own administrations. The difference in approach that can open up between different arms of government, as articulated in the World Bank

Headquarters in Washington and UN Headquarters in New York, is well documented. In this year of the 16<sup>th</sup> IDA replenishment, it is especially important that member States should ensure coherence between their UN priorities and the positions taken by their Executive Board representatives and IDA negotiators.

Improving coordination in the field is vital: it is the first and essential step in achieving coherence of approach. But it is not of itself sufficient. Proposals framed in the field are decided at HQ: we have consequently probed as to what scope there is for PBC input in the relevant decision-making processes in Washington.

We believe there is potential for more systematic PBC entry points into HQ decision-making, and that this is achievable in full respect for internal World Bank processes. For countries on the PBC Agenda, we suggest that, in the interim between receipt of recommendations from the field, and the files going to the Executive Board for decision, there should be a structured and well-prepared session in Washington to allow the CSC Chair and his/her team to have meaningful input.

As well as this specific recommendation, we strongly endorse all ongoing initiatives to improve policy and operational coherence between the two bodies. Our earlier recommendation for less frequent and thus better-attended PBC meetings will also, we trust, result in consistently senior-level attendance by the IFIs.

#### **Within the UN Family; Regional and Other Bodies**

The PBC should be a constant and active networker within the UN family. There is need, for example, for interaction with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in the promotion of human rights during conflict as well as in its aftermath, and in the advocacy for legislation that protects all forms of human rights. There is a similar space for dialogue with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, which plays a significant role in preparing refugees for normal civilian life. The International Labour Organisation should be an important partner in underpinning lasting peace with sustainable livelihoods. There is need to interface with bodies such as the International Organisation for Migration to involve diaspora more fully in peacebuilding initiatives.

The importance of the regional dimension is emphasised in our earlier 'In the Field' Section. For example, there is a network of regional and sub-regional organisations on the African continent that are active in the peacebuilding field. The African Union's Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework and the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism, as well as sub-regional organisations such as SADC and ECOWAS, constitute a well of local knowledge, experience and lessons learned. It is vital that the PBC taps into this wealth of experience, in Africa and on other continents.

PBC working arrangements, both at HQ and in the field, must fully reflect the importance of regional engagement. Participation by regional bodies in the field, through video conferencing or otherwise, should be standard in PBC discussions.



Field visits by CSCs should include, wherever possible, representation by the relevant regional organisations as part of the delegation.

The Co-facilitators' visit to the European Union in Brussels underlined the interests shared with the EU. The OECD, the OSCE and other bodies also have a track record of engagement in peacebuilding. Backed by PBSO research and analysis, the PBC should ensure that the experience, resources and sense of common purpose in the international community is fully brought to bear.

#### **Section IV: Summary of Recommendations**

##### Relationships with the Security Council, General Assembly, ECOSOC

- *Strengthen the relationship with the Security Council. In a context of a better-performing PBC bringing genuine added value, its advice would be sought when peacekeeping mandates are being established, reviewed, or approaching draw-down*
- *Pending procedural innovation, encourage an expansive use of existing Security Council procedures*
- *Identify more innovative ways to give substance to the relationship with the General Assembly and ECOSOC*

##### Referral of Countries to PBC Agenda

- *Consider a more diverse range of situations for referral: larger countries; sectoral or regional situations*
- *Utilise to the full the potential for a preventive role offered by the PBC's existing mandate*

##### Other Partnerships

- *Establish a more structured interaction with the World Bank, in particular by establishing a mechanism for consideration of PBC input into HQ decision-making processes*
- *Strengthen connections within the UN family; promote and institutionalise linkages with regional organisations to facilitate exchanges of experience and best practice; ensure fuller collaboration with bodies such as EU, OECD and OSCE*

## **Section V: PBSO and PBF**

The Co-facilitators have not seen it as within their mandate to conduct a root and branch review of the PBSO and the PBF. We are conscious that the key responsibility for PBSO management lies within the Secretariat and that the PBF has been reviewed both in 2008 (Office of Internal Oversight Services) and in 2009 (Five Donor Review).

Nevertheless, the quality of the support offered by the PBSO and the synergy with the PBF are critical to the overall effective functioning of the PBC. As well as administrative support, the PBSO has to offer solid analytical input to buttress the PBC's work. The PBC and the PBF need to be visibly working to the same logic, with coherence and a strong sense of partnership.

### **PBSO**

The founding Resolutions make clear that the PBSO would be a 'small' secretariat, which would be drawn from existing resources within the system. Its functions are identified as supporting the PBC, managing the PBF and providing analysis of cross-cutting issues and best practices. The intended role, therefore, is not an operational one but rather one of coordination and support.

The PBSO has had some success in these various functions: it provides some useful support to the OC and CSC Chairs; its management of the PBF is now recognised to be largely sound; and it is drawing on resources outside the Office to produce important outputs.

Nevertheless, there is still a considerable distance to travel. The PBSO continues to struggle with the issue that confronts the PBC more generally: how to carve out a distinctive and leadership role in an Organisation where peacebuilding functions are distributed across many Departments and Offices. In the view of the Co-facilitators, the problem partly lies with the PBSO and partly relates to the place of the PBSO within the Secretariat as a whole.

#### **(I) Within the PBSO**

It is our view that the PBSO needs to be strengthened if it is to perform adequately its mandated role, and meet the additional challenges defined in this Report. The issue of resources needs to be addressed. Currently, the Office has 41 posts, of which 13 are classified as core posts, with the remainder temporary, seconded, extra-budgetary-funded or PBF-funded. Lack of technical expertise limits the PBSO's analytical capacity and ability to network and communicate effectively with experts outside.

One avenue towards achieving the necessary strengthening would be a significant upward adjustment of the ratio of core to non-core staff. The Co-facilitators strongly recommend that a ratio in the order of two-thirds core, one-third non-core be put in place and sustained. In our view, core functions should be carried out by core staff. Whether conducting in-house work, or tapping the expertise that exists elsewhere in the system, the PBSO needs a complement of capable and experienced officers who stay a sufficient time in the Office to ensure institutional memory, set and achieve mid-term objectives, and bring a sense of identity and teamwork. Developing appropriate staff recruitment and retention policies must be a clear priority.

There is also a need for the Office itself to use better its existing resources. Improvements are visible in the way in which the PBF is managed by the Office. Similar advances are required in the two other branches of the PBSO's work, namely in supporting the PBC – especially the Country-Specific Configurations – and in carrying out its analytical functions.

There needs to be a clearer understanding across the system as to what analysis is best done where. The PBSO should not seek to duplicate expertise which resides currently within various Agencies and Secretariat entities; rather it should leverage and collate this expertise so as to ensure its coherence, accessibility and usefulness.

The goal should be a PBSO that gains respect as a 'centre of competence', at the cutting edge of UN thinking on peacebuilding. Drawing on work across and outside the UN system – including that of NGOs, academics, and local actors – the PBSO can ensure that UN peacebuilding efforts are informed by the best available research and the most relevant field experience. Analytical work of this quality would be an important resource for the PBC, and would also be influential in challenging other parts of the system to engage in innovation and experimentation.

## **(II) Weight of the PBSO within the Secretariat**

The PBSO was envisaged as a small office, but one whose weight would be multiplied by (i) being able to harness resources from across the Secretariat and (ii) being actively and visibly supported from the most senior level of the Organisation. The two aspects are interlinked, since – as in any organisation – a new arrival is more likely to command the respect of larger and longer-established offices if it is seen to be championed from the top.

It is worth recalling that, in the original concept of the High-level Panel, the PBSO was envisaged as operating in association with a powerful new Deputy Secretary-General for Peace and Security. The envisaged DSG, by virtue of rank, would be in a position to ensure that offices such as DPA and DPKO would put their considerable weight behind the peacebuilding efforts to be led by PBSO. In the event, for a variety of reasons, the DSG proposal was not pursued; and the Co-facilitators do not suggest reviving it.

Nevertheless, the current situation cannot be regarded as satisfactory. It is not consistent with the 2005 intention that the PBSO be relegated to a kind of add-on role within the Organisation. In the course of our consultations, the Co-facilitators did not form the impression of an office that is seen as a significant player across the Secretariat.

Part of the answer will lie in the proposed adjustment in staffing ratios which will assist the PBSO in demonstrating that it brings a distinctive and valued contribution to cross-Secretariat deliberations. But it will also be important to have a clear, continuing and unequivocal message from the Secretary-General that peacebuilding is central to UN priorities – and his support for organisational arrangements that reflect this.

The Co-facilitators encourage the Secretary-General to consider the various avenues through which this support can be expressed. These could include, for example, strengthening the mandate and role of the Senior Peacebuilding Group and also the peacebuilding dimension of the Policy Committee. The objective must be to ensure the mainstreaming of peacebuilding across the Organisation, clarify the roles of each of the component parts, and strengthen the role of the PBSO as a focal point in the overall effort.

## **PBF**

As set out in the founding Resolutions, the Peacebuilding Fund's objective is to ensure the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery. The PBF is not a development fund nor is it a continuous funding mechanism. Rather, it was intended to be a first resort: to have a catalytic function that would trigger additional and longer term funding. In summary: a vehicle for consolidating early wins through quick impact projects. Donors have so far contributed US\$343m, well ahead of the initial target of US\$250m; of this, US\$205m has been allocated to date.

The Co-facilitators are conscious that the PBF has been twice reviewed over the past five years and we do not wish to duplicate work already done. There are, however, two aspects we wish to address:

### **(I) Synergy between PBC and PBF**

The Secretary-General's report on the Arrangements for the Revision of the Terms of Reference for the Peacebuilding Fund (A/63/818) noted the need for greater synergy between the PBC and the PBF, and this is reflected in the revised Terms of Reference agreed in 2009. In our consultations, however, many have suggested that stronger synergy and alignment between PBC and PBF is still required.

We recognise that this is a sensitive issue. The PBF has an independent decision-making structure, with decisions being made by the Secretary-General following recommendations by the Advisory Group. This independence of decision-making is in line with donor wishes and also with wider UN procedures.

In practice, there is a strong correlation between being on the PBC Agenda and receiving funds: 56% of the PBF funds have been allocated to the four Agenda countries (of this total allocation to PBC countries, 20% has been allocated to Burundi, 18% to Sierra Leone, 15% to CAR and only 3% to Guinea-Bissau).

The Co-facilitators welcome this correlation and assume it will be maintained. The fact that countries choose to come on the Agenda involves a clear reaching out on their part for the advice and assistance of the international community. This act of outreach should be recognised with a readiness to ensure that the PBF remains strongly focussed on their needs.

It is widely recognised that communication between the PBF and the PBC needs to be improved. The Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support briefs the Organisational Committee on a regular basis. However, more should be done through PBSO briefings to the CSCs and through briefings by the Chair of the PBF Advisory Group to the Organisational Committee. It is clearly important that that PBC Chairs should receive timely information on allocation decisions (this has not always been the case in the past). PBF projects and expertise will become steadily more relevant to the PBC's thematic work, and detailed briefings by the PBSO on PBF recipient countries not on the PBC Agenda should also be envisaged.

## **(II) Usage of PBF Funds**

A comment in relation to the level of risk tolerance on the part of the PBF seems appropriate. Various studies, including the Secretary-General's report on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, point to the need for a considerable degree of risk tolerance in post-conflict funding. An appropriate balance between the necessary prudence in the use of donor monies, and the boldness required in post-conflict situations, is not an easy one to strike. However, with its emphasis on early impact and quick wins, the PBF was intended to be qualitatively different from other development-focussed funds; its risk tolerance threshold can therefore be expected to be higher. While of course relying on due diligence being exercised by the Secretariat, a kind of venture capital approach needs to be brought to bear in deciding PBF allocations.

A second point relates to the need for speedy and streamlined decision-making procedures. PBF-funded projects are intended to be locally owned, and sufficient time must be allowed to ensure full national buy-in. However, once this national ownership is assured, decision-making should move efficiently, in keeping with the quick impact concept of the PBF.

## **Section V: Summary of Recommendations**

### PBSO:

- *Strengthen the staffing arrangements of the PBSO – notably through a significant upward adjustment of ratio of core to non-core staff, in the order of two-thirds core to one-third non-core*
- *Use better the existing resources of the PBSO, in particular in improving support to the CSCs and in carrying out its analytical functions*
- *Draw on research within and outside the UN system to ensure UN peacebuilding is backed by the best available analysis and most relevant field experience*
- *Demonstrate the importance of peacebuilding for the Organisation as a whole through leadership from the top; encourage the Secretary-General to consider organisational arrangements reflecting this importance – for example, through strengthening the mandate and role of the Senior Peacebuilding Group and the peacebuilding dimension of the Policy Committee*

### PBF:

- *Retain the decision-making autonomy of the PBF but strengthen its synergy with the PBC*
- *Demonstrate more risk tolerance on the part of the PBF*

## **Section VI: Summing Up**

As we stated at the outset, the Co-facilitators hope that this Review will help to reclaim and reinvigorate the vision of 2005. We are suggesting some recalibration of the operation of the peacebuilding architecture in the light of experience of the initial years. But we emphasise that the exercise will not succeed unless infused with a renewed commitment and a strengthened sense of engagement. Change must be psychological as well as institutional.

The PBC needs to recognise and play to its distinctive strengths. It currently lacks a sufficiently clear identity, and confusion as to its role has contributed to disappointment about its delivery. Neither a technical nor an implementing body, it should conceive of itself as a political actor and make full use of this privileged position.

As a political actor, the PBC is uniquely positioned to serve as a high-level liaison between needs on the ground and the UN system in New York. Its initial task is to assist Agenda countries in determining their own peacebuilding priorities. Using its knowledge and experience, it must bring its political weight to bear in efforts to engage the UN system and the wider international community in fulfilling these priorities in the best possible way. And it must not hesitate to use its political weight to urgently address issues of mutual accountability.

It is by recognising and leveraging to the full this essentially political role that the PBC can best carve out its space.

## **Overview of Recommendations**

The recommendations lend themselves to a certain categorisation and are presented at the conclusion of individual Sections of the Report. However, the Co-facilitators see them working as an integrated whole – with one element reinforcing another. It is obvious, for example, that if it becomes more relevant in the field, the PBC will enhance its role at HQ. But conversely, interlocutors in the field will value the PBC connection more if it is perceived as being at the heart of member State priorities.

Our focus throughout this exercise has been on seeking to achieve real, implementable change which will lead to a qualitative enhancement of the PBC contribution. Within each Section, we have included commentary which provides the rationale for our recommendations and the suggested means of implementation.

Taking our recommendations together, we would hope to see emerging:

- **A more relevant PBC**, with genuine national ownership ensured through capacity-building and greater civil society involvement; simplification of procedures; more effective resource mobilisation; deeper coordination with the IFIs; and a stronger regional dimension
- **A more flexible PBC**, with a possibility of multi-tiered engagement
- **A better performing PBC**, with an Organisational Committee that has improved status and focus; Country-Specific Configurations that are better resourced, more innovative and have a stronger field identity
- **A more empowered PBC**, with a considerably strengthened relationship with the Security Council as well as with the General Assembly and ECOSOC
- **A better supported PBC**, with a strongly performing PBSO that carries greater weight within the Secretariat; and a PBF that is fully attuned to the purposes for which it was created
- **A more ambitious PBC**, with a more diverse range of countries on its Agenda
- **A better understood PBC**, with an effective Communications Strategy that spells out what it has to offer and creates a more positive branding



## Conclusion

Article 1 of the UN Charter, setting out the purposes of the United Nations, enshrines the responsibility “to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace”. That the UN focus should have so disproportionately moved to peacekeeping in the intervening years is a matter that the membership as a whole needs to address. In creating the new architecture in 2005, world leaders clearly wished to reclaim the Organisation’s peacebuilding vocation.

The Co-facilitators hope that this Review will be in the nature of a wake-up call. We have not captured every point made to us by our interlocutors: some went in competing directions, others were very pertinent but more detailed than our Report could accommodate. But the basic message is unmistakable: that peacebuilding is a litmus test of our Organisation and that much more needs to be done, collectively, if that test is to be passed.

As we noted in the Introduction, the World Development Report 2011 will provide a reality check. Its message is stark: more than half of the world’s poorest billion live in conflict-affected and recovering countries, and the development challenge faced by those countries is deep both in absolute and in relative terms. In combination with this Review, we hope that the World Development Report findings will help to strengthen the collective resolve to deal with peacebuilding in a more comprehensive and determined way.

As to next steps, it is for the membership to decide how to take forward the outcome of this Review. We hope that our recommendations will be found widely acceptable and implemented in a sufficiently comprehensive way to make a real difference. Above all, we hope the Organisation as a whole will prove responsive to our call for the peacebuilding challenge to be addressed with a renewed sense of urgency.

Finally, we thank the Presidents of the General Assembly and of the Security Council for the confidence placed in us, and the Membership, the Secretariat and the wider UN for their commitment to this exercise and the high quality of their engagement.



Anne Anderson  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of  
Ireland to the United Nations



Claude Heller  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of  
Mexico to the United Nations



Baso Sangqu  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of the  
Republic of South Africa to  
the United Nations

## Annex: List of Consultations undertaken by the Co-facilitators

### Informal Open-ended Consultations of Member States

- 17 February 2010
- 10 May 2010
- 7 July 2010

### UN stakeholders

- Secretary-General
- President of the General Assembly
- President of the Security Council
- President of the Economic and Social Council
- Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs
- Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping
- Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support
- Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Coordination and Strategic Planning
- Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme
- Former Executive Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi
- Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Central African Republic
- Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Guinea-Bissau
- Executive Representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone
- Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Liberia
- Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Timor Leste
- Past and current Chairs of the Organisational Committee and Country-Specific Configurations

### Member States and regional organisations

- Representatives of individual Member States
- Representatives of Regional Groups
- Political and Security Committee of the European Union
- Peace and Security Council of the African Union

## **Partners**

- Representatives of the World Bank
- Representatives of international civil society organisations
- Representatives of civil society organisations in Burundi, CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, DRC, Liberia, South Africa, Sudan
- African Union Partners' Group

## **Specific events organised to enable the Co-facilitators to gather views from stakeholders**

- Reviewing the PBC: Perspectives from Civil Society – roundtable discussion hosted by the International Peace Institute, with participation from internationally and locally based civil society organisations, including the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 30 March 2010
- Five-year Review of Peacebuilding Commission – consultative workshop hosted by the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, with participation from Geneva-based organisations active in peacebuilding, 12 April 2010
- Securing Sustainable Peace in Africa: Coordination, Coherence and Partnerships. Assessing the Progress of the Peacebuilding Commission – conference co-hosted by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes and the South African Department for International Relations and Cooperation, with participation from government – including heads of state and government – civil society and academia from the countries on the PBC's Agenda and other conflict-affected States in Africa, 29-30 April 2010
- Review and Vitalisation of Peacebuilding – conference hosted by the Stanley Foundation, with participation from member State representatives, civil society representatives and academics, 21-23 May 2010

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 was seen as a ground-breaking step, holding new promise for the populations of countries emerging from conflict. Five years later, despite committed and dedicated efforts, the hopes which accompanied the founding Resolutions have yet to be realised. We are now at a crossroads: either there is a conscious re-commitment to peacebuilding at the very heart of the UN's work, or the PBC settles into the limited role that has developed so far. Our consultations suggest that the membership strongly favours the former path.

Before entering the detail of the Report, the Co-facilitators set out half a dozen issues which frame the exercise: (I) the complexity of peacebuilding; (II) the imperative of national ownership; (III) the illusion of sequencing; (IV) the urgency of resource mobilisation; (V) the importance of women's contribution; and (VI) the need for connection with the field.

### **In the Field**

The Report looks at the mixed experience to date with the four Agenda countries and notes the views of potential Agenda countries. This field perspective brings a number of issues into relief: national ownership (particularly in the planning process) and capacity-building; developmental aspects of peacebuilding; the need for coherence and coordination; the importance of the regional dimension. Given the widespread lack of knowledge of, and misunderstanding about, the PBC's role and potential, we underline the need for an effective communications strategy.

### **PBC Role and Performance**

The Report looks at a number of issues relating to the Organisational Committee (OC), including its composition and representivity, and the potential for distinctive contributions by each of its membership streams. We envisage a more solid relationship between the OC and the Country-Specific Configurations, while allowing for the necessary flexibility. The main OC focus should remain on strategic thematic issues; on building partnerships within and outside the UN; and on developing mutual accountability frameworks.

On the CSCs, we consider the challenge of how to combine innovation and vibrancy with weight and solidity. We recommend adding a country dimension to the chairing role, so as to buttress the support available to the Chair. We also recommend the establishment of CSC liaison committees in the field.

We note the widespread support for possibilities of multi-tiered engagement and suggest some options in that regard.

### **Key Relationships**

To date, the interaction with the Security Council has been limited and falls short of the expectations of 2005. We believe, however, that the potential now exists to create a new dynamic between a more forthcoming Security Council and a better performing PBC. We consider how this might be given substance, and focus in particular on the potential for PBC involvement in relation to Council consideration of peacekeeping mandates.

The PBC's relationships with the General Assembly and with ECOSOC also remain insufficiently developed and we recommend steps that might be taken. On partnerships generally, we note a growing sense of the importance of strengthening the UN-World Bank relationship and suggest a more structured PBC input at World Bank Headquarters.

We consider why a more diverse range of countries has not so far been referred to the PBC. On the preventive dimension, we note the scope offered by the existing mandate and suggest it be utilised to the full.

### **PBSO and PBF**

The Report looks at issues within the PBSO, where we recommend a strengthening of resources and also a better use of existing resources. The weight of the PBSO within the Secretariat also needs to be enhanced; it is important that the Secretary-General puts in place organisational arrangements that properly reflect the priority of peacebuilding.

Despite improvements, a stronger synergy and better communication between the PBC and the PBF is still required.

### **Summing Up**

Our detailed Report builds on high-quality inputs by the membership, the Secretariat, the wider UN and other stakeholders and partners, as well as the valuable insights provided by those who have worked to develop the PBC since its inception. We believe that implementation of the Report's recommendations in an integrated manner will help to pave the way for a revitalised PBC: more relevant, more flexible, better performing, more empowered, better supported, more ambitious and better understood.

Our hope is that this Review will be in the nature of a wake-up call, helping to strengthen the collective resolve to deal with peacebuilding in a more comprehensive and determined way.



Anne Anderson  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of  
Ireland to the United Nations



Claude Heller  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of  
Mexico to the United Nations



Baso Sangqu  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of the  
Republic of South Africa to  
the United Nations



# General Assembly

Distr.: General  
30 December 2005

---

**Sixtieth session**  
Agenda items 46 and 120

## Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 2005

[without reference to a Main Committee (A/60/L.40)]

### **60/180. The Peacebuilding Commission**

*The General Assembly,*

*Guided* by the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

*Reaffirming* the 2005 World Summit Outcome,<sup>1</sup>

*Recalling* in particular paragraphs 97 to 105 of the World Summit Outcome,

*Recognizing* that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing,

*Emphasizing* the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace,

*Recognizing* the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development,

*Recognizing also* the vital role of the United Nations in preventing conflicts, assisting parties to conflicts to end hostilities and emerge towards recovery, reconstruction and development and in mobilizing sustained international attention and assistance,

*Reaffirming* the respective responsibilities and functions of the organs of the United Nations as defined in the Charter and the need to enhance coordination among them,

*Affirming* the primary responsibility of national and transitional Governments and authorities of countries emerging from conflict or at risk of relapsing into conflict, where they are established, in identifying their priorities and strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding, with a view to ensuring national ownership,

---

<sup>1</sup> See resolution 60/1.

*Emphasizing*, in that regard, the importance of supporting national efforts to establish, redevelop or reform institutions for the effective administration of countries emerging from conflict, including capacity-building efforts,

*Recognizing* the important role of regional and subregional organizations in carrying out post-conflict peacebuilding activities in their regions, and stressing the need for sustained international support for their efforts and capacity-building to that end,

*Recognizing also* that countries that have experienced recent post-conflict recovery would make valuable contributions to the work of the Peacebuilding Commission,

*Recognizing further* the role of Member States supporting the peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts of the United Nations through financial, troop and civilian police contributions,

*Recognizing* the important contribution of civil society and non-governmental organizations, including women's organizations, to peacebuilding efforts,

*Reaffirming* the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution and peacebuilding,

1. *Decides*, acting concurrently with the Security Council, in accordance with Articles 7, 22 and 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, with a view to operationalizing the decision by the 2005 World Summit,<sup>1</sup> to establish the Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body;

2. *Also decides* that the following shall be the main purposes of the Commission:

(a) To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;

(b) To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;

(c) To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery;

3. *Further decides* that the Commission shall meet in various configurations;

4. *Decides* that the Commission shall have a standing Organizational Committee, responsible for developing its own rules of procedure and working methods, comprising:

(a) Seven members of the Security Council, including permanent members, selected according to rules and procedures decided by the Council;

(b) Seven members of the Economic and Social Council, elected from regional groups according to rules and procedures decided by the Council, giving due consideration to those countries that have experienced post-conflict recovery;

(c) Five top providers of assessed contributions to United Nations budgets and of voluntary contributions to United Nations funds, programmes and agencies, including a standing peacebuilding fund, that are not among those selected in (a) or (b) above, selected by and from among the ten top providers, giving due consideration to the size of their contributions, according to a list provided by the Secretary-General, based on the average annual contributions in the previous three calendar years for which statistical data are available;

(d) Five top providers of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions that are not among those selected in (a), (b) or (c) above, selected by and from among the ten top providers, giving due consideration to the size of their contributions, according to a list provided by the Secretary-General, based on the average monthly contributions in the previous three calendar years for which statistical data are available;

(e) Giving due consideration to representation from all regional groups in the overall composition of the Committee and to representation from countries that have experienced post-conflict recovery, seven additional members shall be elected according to rules and procedures decided by the General Assembly;

5. *Emphasizes* that a Member State can only be selected from one category set out in paragraph 4 above at any one time;

6. *Decides* that members of the Organizational Committee shall serve for renewable terms of two years, as applicable;

7. *Also decides* that country-specific meetings of the Commission, upon invitation of the Organizational Committee referred to in paragraph 4 above, shall include as members, in addition to members of the Committee, representatives from:

(a) The country under consideration;

(b) Countries in the region engaged in the post-conflict process and other countries that are involved in relief efforts and/or political dialogue, as well as relevant regional and subregional organizations;

(c) The major financial, troop and civilian police contributors involved in the recovery effort;

(d) The senior United Nations representative in the field and other relevant United Nations representatives;

(e) Such regional and international financial institutions as may be relevant;

8. *Further decides* that a representative of the Secretary-General shall be invited to participate in all meetings of the Commission;

9. *Decides* that representatives from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other institutional donors shall be invited to participate in all meetings of the Commission in a manner suitable to their governing arrangements;

10. *Emphasizes* that the Commission shall work in cooperation with national or transitional authorities, where possible, in the country under consideration with a view to ensuring national ownership of the peacebuilding process;

11. *Also emphasizes* that the Commission shall, where appropriate, work in close consultation with regional and subregional organizations to ensure their involvement in the peacebuilding process in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter;



12. *Decides* that the Organizational Committee shall, giving due consideration to maintaining a balance in addressing situations in countries in different regions in accordance with the main purposes of the Commission as stipulated above, establish the agenda of the Commission based on the following:

(a) Requests for advice from the Security Council;

(b) Requests for advice from the Economic and Social Council or the General Assembly with the consent of a concerned Member State in exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict and with which the Security Council is not seized in accordance with Article 12 of the Charter;

(c) Requests for advice from Member States in exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict and which are not on the agenda of the Security Council;

(d) Requests for advice from the Secretary-General;

13. *Also decides* that the Commission shall make the outcome of its discussions and recommendations publicly available as United Nations documents to all relevant bodies and actors, including the international financial institutions;

14. *Invites* all relevant United Nations bodies and other bodies and actors, including the international financial institutions, to take action on the advice of the Commission, as appropriate and in accordance with their respective mandates;

15. *Decides* that the Commission shall submit an annual report to the General Assembly and that the Assembly shall hold an annual debate to review the report;

16. *Underlines* that in post-conflict situations on the agenda of the Security Council with which it is actively seized, in particular when there is a United Nations-mandated peacekeeping mission on the ground or under way and given the primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter, the main purpose of the Commission will be to provide advice to the Council at its request;

17. *Also underlines* that the advice of the Commission to provide sustained attention as countries move from transitional recovery towards development will be of particular relevance to the Economic and Social Council, bearing in mind its role as a principal body for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and recommendations on issues of economic and social development;

18. *Decides* that the Commission shall act in all matters on the basis of consensus of its members;

19. *Notes* the importance of participation of regional and local actors, and stresses the importance of adopting flexible working methods, including use of videoconferencing, meetings outside of New York and other modalities, in order to provide for the active participation of those most relevant to the deliberations of the Commission;

20. *Calls upon* the Commission to integrate a gender perspective into all of its work;

21. *Encourages* the Commission to consult with civil society, non-governmental organizations, including women's organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate;

22. *Recommends* that the Commission terminate its consideration of a country-specific situation when foundations for sustainable peace and development are established or upon the request of national authorities of the country under consideration;

23. *Reaffirms its request* to the Secretary-General to establish, within the Secretariat, from within existing resources, a small peacebuilding support office staffed by qualified experts to assist and support the Commission, and recognizes in that regard that such support could include gathering and analysing information relating to the availability of financial resources, relevant United Nations in-country planning activities, progress towards meeting short and medium-term recovery goals and best practices with respect to cross-cutting peacebuilding issues;

24. *Also reaffirms its request* to the Secretary-General to establish a multi-year standing peacebuilding fund for post-conflict peacebuilding, funded by voluntary contributions and taking due account of existing instruments, with the objective of ensuring the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery;

25. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly on the arrangements for establishing the peacebuilding fund during its sixtieth session;

26. *Calls upon* relevant bodies and Member States referred to in paragraph 4 above to communicate the names of members of the Organizational Committee to the Secretary-General to enable him to convene the first constituting meeting of the Committee as soon as possible following the adoption of the present resolution;

27. *Decides* that the arrangements set out above will be reviewed five years after the adoption of the present resolution to ensure that they are appropriate to fulfil the agreed functions of the Commission and that such a review and any changes as a result thereof will be decided following the same procedure as set out in paragraph 1 above;

28. *Also decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session an item titled "Report of the Peacebuilding Commission".

*66th plenary meeting  
20 December 2005*



## Security Council

Distr.: General  
20 December 2005

---

### Resolution 1645 (2005)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5335th meeting,  
on 20 December 2005**

*The Security Council,*

*Guided* by the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

*Reaffirming* the 2005 World Summit Outcome,<sup>1</sup>

*Recalling* in particular paragraphs 97 to 105 of that resolution,

*Recognizing* that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing,

*Emphasizing* the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace,

*Recognizing* the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development,

*Recognizing also* the vital role of the United Nations in preventing conflicts, assisting parties to conflicts to end hostilities and emerge towards recovery, reconstruction and development and in mobilizing sustained international attention and assistance,

*Reaffirming* the respective responsibilities and functions of the organs of the United Nations as defined in the Charter and the need to enhance coordination among them,

*Affirming* the primary responsibility of national and transitional Governments and authorities of countries emerging from conflict or at risk of relapsing into conflict, where they are established, in identifying their priorities and strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding, with a view to ensuring national ownership,

---

<sup>1</sup> Resolution 60/1.



*Emphasizing*, in that regard, the importance of supporting national efforts to establish, redevelop or reform institutions for effective administration of countries emerging from conflict, including capacity-building efforts,

*Recognizing* the important role of regional and subregional organizations in carrying out post-conflict peacebuilding activities in their regions, and stressing the need for sustained international support for their efforts and capacity-building to that end,

*Recognizing also* that countries that have experienced recent post-conflict recovery would make valuable contributions to the work of the Peacebuilding Commission,

*Recognizing further* the role of Member States supporting the peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts of the United Nations through financial, troop and civilian police contributions,

*Recognizing* the important contribution of civil society and non-governmental organizations, including women's organizations, to peacebuilding efforts,

*Reaffirming* the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution and peacebuilding,

1. *Decides*, acting concurrently with the General Assembly, in accordance with Articles 7, 22 and 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, with a view to operationalizing the decision by the World Summit, to establish the Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body;

2. *Also decides* that the following shall be the main purposes of the Commission:

(a) To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;

(b) To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;

(c) To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery;

3. *Decides* that the Commission shall meet in various configurations;

4. *Also decides* that the Commission shall have a standing Organizational Committee, responsible for developing its own rules of procedure and working methods, comprising:

(a) Seven members of the Security Council, including permanent members, selected according to rules and procedures decided by the Council;

(b) Seven members of the Economic and Social Council, elected from regional groups according to rules and procedures decided by the Council and giving due consideration to those countries that have experienced post-conflict recovery;

(c) Five top providers of assessed contributions to United Nations budgets and of voluntary contributions to United Nations funds, programmes and agencies, including the standing peacebuilding fund, that are not among those selected in (a) or (b) above, selected by and among the ten top providers, giving due consideration to the size of their contributions, according to a list provided by the Secretary-General, based on the average annual contributions in the previous three calendar years for which statistical data are available;

(d) Five top providers of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions that are not among those selected in (a), (b) or (c) above selected by and among the ten top providers, giving due consideration to the size of their contributions, according to a list provided by the Secretary-General, based on the average monthly contributions in the previous three calendar years for which statistical data are available;

(e) Giving due consideration to representation from all regional groups in the overall composition of the Committee and to representation from countries that have experienced post-conflict recovery, seven additional members shall be elected according to rules and procedures decided by the General Assembly;

5. *Emphasizes* that a Member State can only be selected from one category set out in paragraph 4 above at any one time;

6. *Decides* that members of the Organizational Committee shall serve for renewable terms of two years, as applicable;

7. *Also decides* that country-specific meetings of the Commission, upon invitation of the Organizational Committee referred to in paragraph 4 above, shall include as members, in addition to members of the Committee, representatives from:

(a) The country under consideration;

(b) Countries in the region engaged in the post-conflict process and other countries that are involved in relief efforts and/or political dialogue, as well as relevant regional and subregional organizations;

(c) The major financial, troop and civilian police contributors involved in the recovery effort;

(d) The senior United Nations representative in the field and other relevant United Nations representatives;

(e) Such regional and international financial institutions as may be relevant;

8. *Further decides* that a representative of the Secretary-General shall be invited to participate in all meetings of the Commission;

9. *Decides* that representatives from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other institutional donors shall be invited to participate in all meetings of the Commission in a manner suitable to their governing arrangements;

10. *Emphasizes* that the Commission shall work in cooperation with national or transitional authorities, where possible, in the country under consideration with a view to ensuring national ownership of the peacebuilding process;

11. *Also emphasizes* that the Commission shall, where appropriate, work in close consultation with regional and subregional organizations to ensure their involvement in the peacebuilding process in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter;

12. *Decides* that the Organizational Committee shall, taking due consideration to maintaining a balance in addressing situations in countries in different regions in accordance with the main purposes of the Commission as stipulated above, establish the agenda of the Commission based on the following:

(a) Requests for advice from the Security Council;

(b) Requests for advice from the Economic and Social Council or the General Assembly with the consent of a concerned Member State in exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict and with which the Security Council is not seized in accordance with Article 12 of the Charter;

(c) Requests for advice from Member States in exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict and which are not on the agenda of the Security Council;

(d) Requests for advice from the Secretary-General;

13. *Also decides* that the Commission shall make the outcome of its discussions and recommendations publicly available as United Nations documents to all relevant bodies and actors, including the international financial institutions;

14. *Invites* all relevant United Nations bodies and other bodies and actors, including the international financial institutions, to take action on the advice of the Commission, as appropriate and in accordance with their respective mandates;

15. *Notes* that the Commission shall submit an annual report to the General Assembly and that the Assembly shall hold an annual debate to review the report;

16. *Underlines* that in post-conflict situations on the agenda of the Security Council with which it is actively seized, in particular when there is a United Nations-mandated peacekeeping mission on the ground or under way and given the primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter, the main purpose of the Commission will be to provide advice to the Council at its request;

17. *Also underlines* that the advice of the Commission to provide sustained attention as countries move from transitional recovery towards development will be of particular relevance to the Economic and Social Council, bearing in mind its role as a principal body for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and recommendations on issues of economic and social development;

18. *Decides* that the Commission shall act in all matters on the basis of consensus of its members;

19. *Notes* the importance of participation of regional and local actors, and stresses the importance of adopting flexible working methods, including use of videoconferencing, meetings outside of New York and other modalities, in order to

provide for the active participation of those most relevant to the deliberations of the Commission;

20. *Calls upon* the Commission to integrate a gender perspective into all its work;

21. *Encourages* the Commission to consult with civil society, non-governmental organizations, including women's organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate;

22. *Recommends* that the Commission terminate its consideration of a country-specific situation when foundations for sustainable peace and development are established or upon the request by national authorities of the country under consideration;

23. *Reaffirms* its request to the Secretary-General to establish, within the Secretariat, from within existing resources, a small peacebuilding support office staffed by qualified experts to assist and support the Commission, and recognizes in that regard that such support could include gathering and analysing information relating to the availability of financial resources, relevant United Nations in-country planning activities, progress towards meeting short and medium-term recovery goals and best practices with respect to cross-cutting peacebuilding issues;

24. *Also reaffirms* its request to the Secretary-General to establish a multi-year standing peacebuilding fund for post-conflict peacebuilding, funded by voluntary contributions and taking due account of existing instruments, with the objective of ensuring the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery;

25. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly on the arrangements for establishing the peacebuilding fund during its sixtieth session;

26. *Calls on* relevant bodies and Member States referred to in paragraph 4 above to communicate the names of members of the Organizational Committee to the Secretary-General to enable him to convene the first constituting meeting of the Committee as soon as possible following the adoption of the present resolution;

27. *Decides* that the arrangements set out above will be reviewed five years after the adoption of the present resolution to ensure that they are appropriate to fulfil the agreed functions of the Commission and that such a review and any changes as a result thereof will be decided following the same procedure as set out in paragraph 1 above;

28. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

---



# General Assembly Security Council

Distr.: General  
11 June 2009

Original: English

**General Assembly**  
**Sixty-third session**  
Agenda items 10, 101, 107 and 112

**Security Council**  
**Sixty-fourth year**

**Report of the Peacebuilding Commission**  
**Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund**  
**Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit**  
**Strengthening of the United Nations system**

## **Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict**

### *Summary*

In its presidential statement of 20 May 2008 (S/PRST/2008/16), the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to provide advice on how to support national efforts to secure sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively, including in the areas of coordination, civilian deployment capabilities and financing.

The present report focuses on the challenges that post-conflict countries and the international community face in the immediate aftermath of conflict, defined as the first two years after the main conflict in a country has ended. Reflecting on past peacebuilding experience, section II underscores the imperative of national ownership as a central theme of the report and highlights the unique challenges arising from the specific context of early post-conflict situations. The threats to peace are often greatest during this early phase, but so too are the opportunities to set virtuous cycles in motion from the start.

The immediate post-conflict period offers a window of opportunity to provide basic security, deliver peace dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts thereby beginning to lay the foundations for sustainable development. If countries develop a vision and strategy that succeeds in addressing these objectives early on, it substantially increases the chances for sustainable peace — and reduces the risk of relapse into conflict. In too many cases, we have missed this early window. Section III identifies several recurring priorities that relate directly to these core objectives, and for which international assistance is frequently requested in the early days after conflict. Seizing the window of opportunity requires that international actors are, at a minimum, capable of responding coherently, rapidly and effectively to support these recurring priorities.





Section IV describes efforts undertaken to date by the United Nations to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of its post-conflict response, and identifies systemic challenges related to differing mandates, governance structures and financing arrangements across diverse United Nations entities, which prevent the Organization from making deeper reforms.

Section V sets out an agenda to strengthen the United Nations response in the immediate aftermath of conflict as well as to facilitate an earlier, more coherent response from the wider international community. The core elements of this agenda include (a) stronger, more effective and better supported United Nations leadership teams on the ground; (b) early agreement on priorities and alignment of resources behind them; (c) strengthening United Nations support for national ownership and capacity development from the outset; (d) rationalizing and enhancing the United Nations system's capacity to provide knowledge, expertise and deployable personnel to meet the most urgent peacebuilding needs, in concert with partners who have a comparative advantage in particular areas, as well as assisting countries to identify and draw on the most relevant capacities globally; and (e) working with Member States, particularly donors, to enhance the speed, alignment, flexibility and risk tolerance of funding mechanisms.

Section VI considers the critical role of the Peacebuilding Commission in supporting post-conflict countries and proposes several suggestions for consideration by Member States as to how the Commission could strengthen its advisory role in relation to the early post-conflict period that is addressed in the report.

## I. Introduction

1. In its presidential statement of 20 May 2008 (S/PRST/2008/16), the Security Council encouraged the Secretary-General, the Peacebuilding Commission, international and regional organizations and Member States to consider how to support national efforts in affected countries to secure a sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively, including in the areas of coordination, civilian deployment capabilities and financing. The Security Council also invited the Secretary-General to provide advice within 12 months to the relevant United Nations organs on how best to take forward these issues within the United Nations system and, taking into account the views of the Peacebuilding Commission, how to coordinate peacebuilding activities and encourage the mobilization and most effective use of resources for urgent peacebuilding needs. Accordingly, following consultations with the Peacebuilding Commission, I am submitting the present report to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

2. The report focuses on the challenges that post-conflict countries and the international community face in the immediate aftermath of conflict, defined as the first two years after the main conflict in a country has ended. When large-scale violence ends, the challenges facing the leadership and people of the country are enormous. The situation is fluid, the peace is often very fragile, and the needs of the people are far greater than the capacity to meet them. The threats to peace are often greatest during this early phase, but so too are the opportunities to set virtuous cycles in motion from the start.

3. The immediate post-conflict period offers a window of opportunity to provide basic security, deliver peace dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts. If countries succeed in these core areas early on, it substantially increases the chances for sustainable peace — and reduces the risk of relapse into conflict.

4. While building peace is primarily the responsibility of national actors, the international community can play a critical role. In too many cases, we have missed this early window. Time and again, we have failed to catalyse a response that delivers immediate, tangible results on the ground. Often, it has taken many months before essential government functions resume or basic services are available. In some cases, it has taken several years before the international community has aligned its efforts behind a common strategic vision. Capacities and resources have been insufficient to meet urgent demands on the ground. Even though capacity is limited, we frequently struggle to focus scarce resources on a limited set of agreed results that can enhance confidence in and commitment to a peaceful future.

5. Within the international community, the United Nations has a critical and significant role to play in peacebuilding. At the same time, the United Nations system is only one of several actors working to support post-conflict countries, and the coherence of this broader international effort is key to helping countries to succeed in their efforts to construct a viable peace. Partnerships and coordination among the main regional and international actors is essential since no single actor has the capacity to meet the needs in any of the priority areas of peacebuilding.

6. In the present report, I reflect on some of the lessons of peacebuilding and set out an agenda to strengthen the Organization's response as well as to facilitate an earlier, more coherent response from others. The core elements of this agenda

include (a) stronger, more effective and better supported United Nations leadership teams on the ground; (b) early agreement on priorities and alignment of resources behind them; (c) strengthening United Nations support for national ownership and capacity development from the outset; (d) rationalizing and enhancing the United Nations system's capacity to provide knowledge, expertise and deployable personnel to meet the most urgent peacebuilding needs, in concert with partners who have a comparative advantage in particular areas, as well as assisting countries to identify and draw on the most relevant capacities globally; and (e) working with Member States, particularly donors, to enhance the speed, alignment, flexibility and risk tolerance of funding mechanisms. National authorities, the United Nations system and other international partners can have a much greater and earlier collective impact if we agree on an early strategy with defined and sequenced priorities, and align action and resources behind that strategy.

## **II. Context and the need for national ownership**

7. While every post-conflict situation is unique, the United Nations has accumulated a broad range of experience, and we have learned many lessons from supporting dozens of countries emerging from conflict. First and foremost, we know that peacebuilding is a national challenge and responsibility. Only national actors can address their society's needs and goals in a sustainable way. The imperative of national ownership is a central theme of the present report, as are the unique challenges we encounter arising from the specific context of early post-conflict situations.

8. Despite their diversity, the initial post-conflict period in most countries is characterized by significant insecurity and political uncertainty. We have learned that continued fragility and considerable volatility often accompany evolving peace processes. Stability in one part of a country may coexist alongside continued violence in other parts. Humanitarian crises and continued violations of human rights may continue to unfold beyond the formal cessation of hostilities. The end of conflict does not necessarily mean the arrival of peace: a lack of political consensus and trust often remains and the root causes of the conflict may persist. There may also be increased tensions as people return to destroyed or occupied homes. Impunity for serious crimes and atrocities, including sexual and gender-based violence, which may have occurred before, during and after the conflict can seriously jeopardize peacebuilding efforts during this early phase. Failure to restore State authority, particularly in remote border areas, may create new sources of threat or permit wartime practices of smuggling or illegal trade in natural resources to persist or even expand, undermining State revenue.

9. The end of conflict nevertheless tends to create high expectations for the delivery of concrete political, social and economic dividends. Building confidence in a peace process requires that at least some of these expectations are met. Equally important is effective communication and an inclusive dialogue between national authorities and the population, not least to create realistic expectations of what can be achieved in the short run.

10. There also needs to be a basic level of political will, commitment and consensus among the main national protagonists, without which most peacebuilding efforts will be futile. The extent to which a consensus can emerge depends heavily

on the conditions under which violence ceases, the quality of the peace agreement, and the nature of the peace process. Some peace processes are robust and inclusive and, as a result, have the support of a broad cross section of the population. As we saw in Cambodia, Guatemala, El Salvador and Namibia, peacebuilding efforts, while still complex to implement, benefited from a detailed agenda to address the causes of conflict. However, many peace processes are more fragile and require careful political reinforcement and determined efforts by international and national actors to hold the peace in the face of ongoing violence and opposition from spoilers. Some agreements even fail to establish minimum conditions for sustainable peace or an agenda for the resolution of conflict.

11. In some post-conflict countries, the capacity and will to exercise full national ownership may be constrained because the peace process is still ongoing and a stable political order is yet to be established. Many post-conflict countries are governed by transitional political arrangements until the first post-conflict elections are held. National authorities are often appointed rather than elected, put in place through a brokered agreement between parties to the conflict who may not be fully representative or recognized by the population. In addition, some of the national actors with whom the international community must engage may be implicated in past human rights abuses or significant atrocities.

12. International support in such complex and rapidly evolving situations is therefore a fundamentally political and often high-risk undertaking. Efforts that bolster the power of unrepresentative leaders, or empower one group at the expense of another, can exacerbate the causes of conflict or create new sources of tension. International actors need to be mindful of these considerations. Local and traditional authorities as well as civil society actors, including marginalized groups, have a critical role to play in bringing multiple voices to the table for early priority-setting and to broaden the sense of ownership around a common vision for the country's future. The full participation of women in these processes is essential, both as victims of the conflict and as important drivers of recovery and development.

13. Beyond the domestic political circumstances, establishing the conditions for peacebuilding is also significantly influenced by regional and international actors. Given that many conflicts have cross-border dimensions, neighbouring States as well as regional and subregional organizations play a critical role and have commensurate responsibilities in supporting peacebuilding processes. Regional organizations have increasingly been at the forefront of peace processes, including in mediating and guaranteeing peace agreements, and monitoring their implementation.

14. The support of United Nations intergovernmental bodies, individual Member States and other international stakeholders has proven to be crucial in the immediate aftermath of conflict when counterproductive behaviour by even one major actor can be very damaging. The Security Council plays an essential role in signalling strong international attention and support for a peace process and for the initiation of peacebuilding, calling on all stakeholders for their constructive support and engagement and authorizing a number of potential steps, including new peacekeeping operations, special political missions, panels of experts and other measures.

### III. Recurring peacebuilding priorities

15. We know that when large-scale violence ends, the needs of the people tend to be far greater than the capacity of national or international actors to meet them. Given this imbalance, national and international efforts in the early post-conflict period should focus on meeting the most urgent and important peacebuilding objectives: establishing security, building confidence in a political process, delivering initial peace dividends and expanding core national capacity.

16. The challenge is to identify which activities best serve these objectives in each unique context. As my report of 8 April 2009 on enhancing mediation and its support activities (S/2009/189) outlines, peace agreements should provide an overall framework, but at times they set out an overly broad, ambitious and sometimes only preliminary agenda. Additionally, priority-setting must reflect the unique conditions and needs of the country rather than be driven by what international actors can or want to supply. Our plans and actions also have to reflect a clear understanding of existing capacities on the ground, whether they are national, subnational or international (including those of the operational United Nations agencies, funds and programmes). Scaling up these capacities and operations, where relevant, can yield the fastest and most effective results in the initial months.

17. In addition, experience and analysis accumulated over the last two decades, as well as numerous interviews conducted with national and international practitioners for the preparation of the present report, point to several recurring areas where international assistance is frequently requested as a priority in the immediate aftermath of conflict. There will always be additional country-specific priorities such as organized crime and natural resources management. However, seizing the window of opportunity in the immediate aftermath of conflict requires that international actors are, at a minimum, capable of responding coherently, rapidly and effectively in these areas, which relate directly to the core objectives mentioned above. They are:

- Support to basic safety and security, including mine action, protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, strengthening the rule of law and initiation of security sector reform
- Support to political processes, including electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, and developing conflict-management capacity at national and subnational levels
- Support to the provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, health and primary education, and support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees
- Support to restoring core government functions, in particular basic public administration and public finance, at the national and subnational levels
- Support to economic revitalization, including employment generation and livelihoods (in agriculture and public works) particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants, as well as rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.

18. Basic security and safety — whether provided by the State or with international assistance — are essential to the population and to create the needed

political space, and to enable the delivery of international assistance. Supporting the political process and reconstituting a stable and peaceful political order have to be central goals. The post-conflict government needs to build core State capacities that will help to restore its legitimacy and effectiveness, including the capacity to provide basic services and essential public safety, to strengthen the rule of law, and to protect and promote human rights. Visible peace dividends that are attributable to the national authorities, including early employment generation and supporting returnees, are also critical to build the confidence in the government and the peace process. Jump-starting economic recovery can be one of the greatest bolsters of security, and provides the engine for future recovery. These priority areas span across development, peace and security and human rights, reflecting the interlinked and mutually reinforcing nature of these areas, as repeatedly emphasized by Member States, including in the 2005 World Summit Outcome.

19. National capacity development across all these areas must start immediately. Too often, capacity development is seen in the context of international exit strategies from post-conflict countries. This is always too late. Inattention to capacity development constrains national actors from taking ownership of their recovery and limits accountability between the State and its people. It must be a central element of all peacebuilding activities from the outset and be targeted particularly at strengthening national leadership to forge a clear vision with manageable priorities.

20. Getting the timing and sequencing right among priorities requires a delicate balance and difficult trade-offs within the framework of a coherent strategy. Early security provision, for example, may be essential to prevent relapse into conflict and to deter potential spoilers to a peace process. The establishment of livelihood opportunities and addressing housing, land and property issues often requires early emphasis because it helps to meet people's most immediate needs and thereby builds confidence in as well as a commitment to peace. Other priority activities, if pursued too early after conflict, can undermine a fragile peace. Electoral processes can contribute to more legitimate political authority but may also be a source of tension and renewed conflict if they are rushed and the political environment is not conducive to holding them, if inadequate attention is paid to technical constraints, and the need to strengthen and nurture nascent political processes, community participation and civil society is ignored. When military forces or the civil service should be restructured is also often a delicate issue. In the past, national and international actors have arguably moved too quickly in some areas while moving too slowly in others, upsetting the balance between building confidence and exacerbating tensions. In the first two years after conflict, one of the greatest strategic challenges is to ensure that actions or decisions taken in the short term do not prejudice medium- and long-term peacebuilding.

21. The needs of women and girls require more attention, as recovery efforts may prioritize the needs of men. The early post-conflict period offers a critical opportunity for women to capitalize on the changes in gender relations that may occur during conflict where women may have taken on community leadership roles or non-traditional employment. A tendency by outsiders to work with and acknowledge the leadership of men in governance and the economy, however, can mean that women's capacities to engage in public decision-making and economic recovery may not receive adequate recognition or financing. Women's marginalization can be exacerbated in contexts where sexual violence has been a

major feature of the conflict, eroding public safety and women's social standing. As Security Council noted in its resolution 1820 (2008), persistent violence, intimidation and discrimination are obstacles to women's participation and full involvement in post-conflict public life, which can have a serious negative impact on durable peace, security and reconciliation, including post-conflict peacebuilding.

22. Over the past two decades, we have learned that no single template can be applied to fluid and complex situations. Maintaining flexibility and adaptability are essential while at the same time respecting fundamental principles of international law and human rights is essential. This cannot come, however, at the expense of predictability and speed. At the very least, we need to be ready to provide support in these recurring priority areas. In the past, our response has been slow and piecemeal, reflecting inadequate organization, a resistance to prioritization and common assessment and planning approaches, a lack of capacity in several priority areas and considerable deployment delays in others, and insufficient financing delivered through poorly suited funding mechanisms. Our collective task is to resist the temptation to create new mechanisms unless they are absolutely necessary. Rather, we should build on our experience of what works, and strengthen our capacities to ensure a more predictable, coherent and targeted approach to supporting countries as they emerge from conflict.

#### **IV. United Nations efforts to date and systemic challenges**

23. Over the past several years, the United Nations has been working to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness through reform efforts in several areas, ranging from political, peacekeeping, security, human rights and humanitarian, to development activities. Among the common themes of these initiatives is their focus on better coherence and coordination, clarity on roles and responsibilities, coherent integrated strategies, stronger partnerships among key actors, and a move towards greater predictability and accountability. In the humanitarian sphere, progress has been achieved through pooled funds, increased coordination, capacity and accountability in specific sectors, and strengthened support to country-level leadership. In peacekeeping, partnership frameworks with regional and other organizations are being developed and deepened to enable us to engage more coherently and effectively in support of peace and security. Development and humanitarian actors have been working closely to ensure that as humanitarian assistance draws down over time, coordination arrangements, increased capacity, programmes and funds are in place to maintain and expand efforts to help countries to establish the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Yet, many of these efforts have encountered serious systemic obstacles. For example, voluntary and ad hoc funding arrangements have frustrated many attempts to create real predictability and accountability for results. Member States have supported little or no standing capacities for many priority areas.

24. Bringing to bear the full force of the United Nations system in support of a country emerging from conflict presents unique and significant challenges. The United Nations has deep capabilities in the fields of peace and security, human rights, development and humanitarian action, and successful peacebuilding requires the combined efforts of all of these "pillars". However, the United Nations entities with capacity in these fields were each designed for a different purpose. Each of them has different mandates, guiding principles, governance structures and

financing arrangements — and different cultures and notions of how things should be done. As practice has evolved, each part of the United Nations system has developed its own set of external partners and stakeholders. This becomes a complicating factor for unity of purpose and action on the ground. Various parts of the United Nations are very rightly linked to distinct international instruments, each with its own pace and accountability. In this context, our efforts to “deliver as one” in the field are vital but not sufficient. The fragmented nature of governance across the United Nations system heightens the need for Member States to carry a common position into the multiple United Nations organs dealing with peacebuilding-related issues, and to work closely with us to better configure the Organization for a more rapid and effective response in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

25. A key mechanism to ensure greater coherence in this regard is the Peacebuilding Commission. The Commission’s establishment in 2005 reflects Member States’ recognition of the need for a dedicated United Nations mechanism to sustain attention, mobilize resources and improve coherence while addressing critical gaps, needs and priorities in countries emerging from conflict. Through its unique membership and working modalities, the Commission has promoted an inclusive and integrated approach to peacebuilding in countries on its agenda. As the Commission approaches a five-year review in 2010, the experience it has gained to date in supporting Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic could contribute to strengthening the United Nations peacebuilding architecture and informing the evolving nature and scope of the Commission’s advisory role.

## **V. Supporting a coherent and effective response: an agenda for action**

26. I am strongly committed to an improved response by the United Nations in the early period after conflict, particularly by ensuring strengthened United Nations leadership and delivery capacity as well as greater levels of clarity, predictability and accountability within the United Nations system. This will require stronger and better supported leadership teams that are empowered to set out an early strategy with clearly defined priorities, working with national counterparts, and to align action and resources behind that strategy. The present report sets out an agenda aimed at achieving these objectives.

27. The elements of this agenda are interconnected. Agreeing on priorities and forging a common strategic approach require effective and empowered leadership. But a coherent strategy is meaningless without the capacity and resources to implement and fund it. Aligning funding decisions behind agreed priorities can help to drive all actors in the same direction. The absence or weakness of one element can undermine all the others. But they can also be mutually reinforcing, thus increasing our ability to support national actors in their quest for sustainable peace.

28. This agenda builds on the systems that are on the ground before hostilities cease, improving or augmenting them as necessary. A United Nations country team is in place before, during and after a conflict, led by the Resident Coordinator, who often is also the Humanitarian Coordinator during and for some time after the conflict. Once conflict ends, the United Nations presence on the ground may be configured in different ways and its presence may evolve during the first two years,



including bringing in the capacity of non-resident agencies as appropriate. Regardless of its configuration, the United Nations and its partners typically have considerable country expertise and humanitarian capacities on the ground that will continue to provide life-saving support based on humanitarian principles in the early post-conflict period. Some of these capacities can also be transitioned towards early peacebuilding priorities, particularly through those entities that have a dual humanitarian and development mandate, such as the United Nations Children's Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization. These agencies also work with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Early Recovery Cluster/Network to initiate recovery at the earliest opportunity. This can help to jump-start the response, deliver early peace dividends and develop national capacities in key areas during the earliest phase, for example, by expanding essential services in health and education or rehabilitating essential infrastructure.

29. Also in this period, the Security Council may mandate the deployment of multidimensional peacekeeping operations or special political missions. Over the past decade, much of the focus and accumulated experience of the United Nations in supporting peacebuilding has been carried out in the context of integrated missions. Integrated missions emerged from a recognition of the interdependence of United Nations efforts at the country level and the need for greater coherence among these efforts, primarily through integration at the level of leadership and planning. This is particularly important with respect to peacebuilding activities where a coordinated engagement with and support to State structures and populations is often essential. More recently, we have started applying the principle of integration to a broader set of integrated United Nations presences in post-conflict countries, and we are developing new tools to strengthen the strategic partnership between United Nations missions and country teams, such as the integrated strategic framework. The main objective of these efforts is closely linked to the agenda set out in the present report, namely to maximize the individual and collective impact of the United Nations response. As we continue to move towards more effective integration, we will also need the support of Member States to ensure that United Nations rules and regulations allow for and facilitate collaboration among different United Nations entities at the country level.

#### **Effective leadership, coordination and accountability**

30. One of the core elements of the agenda set out in the present report is the need for stronger, more effective and better supported United Nations leadership teams on the ground. This will not only enhance coherence and collective impact among United Nations entities but also facilitate a more coherent response from other international actors. As the Security Council has noted, there is often a need for the United Nations to play a leading role in the field in coordinating broader international efforts in post-conflict situations, especially in the earliest phase. Despite these expectations, the United Nations has encountered a number of serious obstacles that the present report intends to address.

31. The United Nations faces unprecedented demands on leadership capacity as the number, size and complexity of peacekeeping and political missions has expanded dramatically in recent years. The extreme nature and scope of the challenge requires a highly unique profile. In addition to the essential political negotiation and mediation expertise, in-depth regional knowledge and requisite

linguistic capabilities, mission leaders should ideally possess demonstrated experience in strategic planning and management of large, complex organizations. As it is unlikely that a single individual possesses all of the skills and competencies required, the solution must be found in the development and strengthening of well-integrated leadership teams that would bring together the senior leadership of the political, peacekeeping and development elements of the United Nations country presence, where relevant. Individual appointments must contribute to the overall balance of complementary skills and strengths within the leadership team.

32. With this in mind, the Organization is building on efforts to succession plan and to better articulate the requirements of senior positions across missions. It is reaching out to potential candidates, with a particular emphasis on women, and broadening communication with Governments, regional organizations and non-governmental entities, as well as strengthening partnerships throughout the United Nations system and with our key multilateral partners. These partners, in turn, are better able to understand the unique demands of the field and assist in growing the pool of potential candidates capable of assuming these demanding responsibilities.

33. Given the magnitude of the task, leadership teams need to be supported by analytical, planning and coordination capacities in the form of small, unified teams of experts that can be rapidly supplemented by additional pre-identified expertise. These teams provide the support to bring the various parts of the United Nations response together, including providing a dynamic link with the political process, and facilitate a common approach among national and international actors. At present, such capacities do exist but they are still well below the level and range of expertise necessary to support an effective and strategic response. Experts continue to be deployed piecemeal with different rules and procedures to support separate parts of the United Nations in-country presence. This complicates their ability to come together quickly and work together effectively. Support for the Resident Coordinator is particularly weak because as the support provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for humanitarian coordination winds down, it is replaced with considerably less capacity in the Resident Coordinator's office, just as the need for assessment, planning and coordination of recovery activities begins to increase.

34. However, there is presently no mechanism in place at Headquarters that looks at country-level leadership from a team perspective and ensures that the right leadership teams are in place and properly supported. Such increased leadership capacity and support is required in all peacebuilding contexts, irrespective of the configuration of the United Nations on the ground. ***I have therefore asked the lead departments at Headquarters to create a senior-level mechanism with other key entities at Headquarters that will ensure that the right leadership and support teams are in place as early as possible.*** This will include much more focused attention on how well our senior staff is functioning as a team. A greater degree of senior-level attention will help avoid the delays and piecemeal nature of most efforts to date, and accelerate and adapt existing mechanisms for identifying, recruiting and deploying leaders and support teams, as required, as well as troubleshooting where clear problems emerge. Ongoing efforts by relevant Secretariat departments and the Development Operations Coordination Office to strengthen the capacities they can make available to leaders in the field are being reinforced and accelerated. These capacities are funded either through the assessed budget or through extrabudgetary

resources. ***I urge Member States to make the necessary funding available through these existing mechanisms so that shared analysis, planning and coordination capacities can be strengthened.***

35. Strengthening country-level leadership also requires improving guidance and support from Headquarters so that field presences can draw on existing capacities in a more seamless and coherent fashion, irrespective of the configuration of the United Nations on the ground. At present, integrated task forces are convened by the lead department for all relevant conflict and post-conflict countries. They are meant to bring together all the relevant departments and agencies of the United Nations system at Headquarters to facilitate coherent support to the Organization's in-country presence. However, the quality of support provided by these Headquarters task forces to the field has been uneven and not sufficiently focused on strategic guidance and the needs on the ground. This issue is being taken up by my senior managers, who have initiated a review and will submit their recommendations later this year as to how to make these task forces more effective and responsive to the needs of the field.

36. There is also a need to review the core elements of coherent and predictable Headquarters support and guidance to the field more generally. This will include reviewing the provision of coherent Headquarters support and guidance to Resident Coordinators and United Nations country teams, building on the existing Resident Coordinator framework and mechanisms, particularly in situations of armed conflict, political crisis or rising political tension where there is no political mission or office. Based on this review, I will build expectations for Headquarters support into my compacts with the relevant Under-Secretaries-General and monitor progress. The resources for Headquarters support of United Nations country operations need to be able to increase and decrease according to the country's changing political and operational needs.

37. Strengthening senior leaders' authority to ensure a more coherent approach among the United Nations entities on the ground should be accompanied by more robust accountability mechanisms. I have introduced "senior managers' compacts" for all Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant-Secretaries-General at Headquarters, but no similar mechanisms exist for Special Representatives or other Heads of Mission. Therefore, ***I am taking steps to strengthen the accountability of my Special Representatives to reflect their substantial duties and responsibilities.***

38. The senior United Nations leadership in the field needs the authority to convene all United Nations actors to agree on priorities and the division of responsibilities, which should then be reflected in the Organization's integrated strategic framework. This framework could be used as a mechanism for mutual accountability between the senior representative and the members of the United Nations presence for delivering on agreed responsibilities. A system of mutual accountability would bolster the authority of the Organization's in-country leadership to ensure that United Nations entities deliver on agreed priorities in support of a common strategy, while allowing members of the United Nations team to provide valuable feedback on the leadership support they need. The "management and accountability system of the United Nations development and resident coordinator system" that was recently adopted by the United Nations Development Group could provide a model that should be explored further. ***I will explore with my senior managers the development of mutual accountability measures whereby my***

*senior representative is both empowered and held accountable for his or her performance by the system and at the same time he or she can hold each part of the system accountable for implementing agreed roles and activities, consistent with their mandates, based on the integrated strategic framework.*

#### **Assessment, planning and strategy**

39. The establishment of a coherent strategy in a fast-moving and uncertain post-conflict environment requires the support and cooperation of a diverse range of national and international actors. At present, efforts to foster such a strategy are frustrated by disunity among actors, fragmentation of assessment and planning tools and the lack of a framework for prioritization. Key stakeholders often pursue competing individual agendas based on unilateral political, economic, security and institutional interests and perspectives. Bilateral and multilateral agencies re-engaging in a country after conflict may set in motion multiple, separate and often competing programmes without a clear or coherent vision as to the needs and priorities of the country, or a link to the unfolding peace process. Within the United Nations, despite ongoing efforts to integrate planning for security, efforts aimed at political, humanitarian and development remain a serious challenge.

40. The capacities and tools at our disposal within the Organization vary depending on the United Nations presence on the ground immediately following conflict and how that presence evolves during the first two years. In cases with Security Council-mandated missions, the United Nations internal integrated mission planning process is focused on ensuring unity of purpose in-country through establishing a shared vision and agreed priorities. Although we have made substantial progress, the Organization still needs to improve its ability to agree on and deliver a critical set of priorities for early post-conflict environments. In this context, my decision that all United Nations integrated presences have a shared analytical and planning capacity, as well as an integrated strategic framework, represents an important step forward. The United Nations integrated strategic framework is meant to articulate a shared vision of the Organization's strategic objectives as well as a related set of agreed results, timelines, and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace. The integrated mission planning process, while focused on the coherence and coordination of United Nations strategies and operations, is also designed to align United Nations roles, capacity and scarce resources in specific country situations with national priorities and the roles of other international actors.

41. Effective peacebuilding also requires a level of international support that goes beyond that provided by the United Nations. Experience has shown that when the United Nations and the World Bank work closely together they can provide a valuable platform for a coherent approach between national and international actors. Over the last several years, the United Nations Development Group and the World Bank, recently joined by the European Commission, have expanded their partnership in post-conflict environments. The focus has been on developing an in-country and nationally led common assessment and priority-setting methodology, known as the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment. This methodology seeks to situate local actors at the centre of the assessment process. It is focused on immediate and medium-term peacebuilding and recovery assistance needs and provides the basis for discussion with national actors, leading in time to the development of a national framework for peace consolidation and recovery, which can guide international and

national resource allocation. It is intended to be an iterative process, which can be initiated rapidly and successively expanded and detailed over time, with greater national involvement and ownership. The national framework for peace consolidation and recovery can then provide the basis for a compact that can be used by both national and international partners in monitoring progress against commitments. The Peacebuilding Commission could have an important role to play in monitoring progress against such compacts.

42. Over the last year, the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment methodology has been significantly revised to reflect political and security dimensions and to enable more effective engagement with political and security actors present on the ground. The revised methodology provides a framework for a more coherent and rationalized approach to aid coordination. ***I encourage Member States with significant in-country presence to join Post-Conflict Needs Assessment processes, as appropriate, and all Member States to align funding with the resulting outcome.***

43. The United Nations integrated mission planning process and the national peace consolidation and recovery framework derived through the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment methodology follow different timelines and serve different purposes, but they need to be complementary and mutually reinforcing. The senior United Nations leadership team has a responsibility to ensure the strategic coherence and appropriate linkages between the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment and the United Nations internal planning processes by maintaining an ongoing dialogue around a common vision with the key national, regional and international stakeholders.

44. Notwithstanding the important progress on integrated planning and common assessments, United Nations and non-United Nations actors on the ground are often slow to adapt to changing political circumstances when conflict ends and new missions take time to deploy and become operational. There is still too often a gap in terms of clear prioritization and new or revised plans for implementation in the early months, before a mission may be fully deployed or more extensive assessments have taken place in advance of a major donor conference. Efforts to fill this gap should be guided by the terms of the peace process, mandates provided by the Security Council, and existing planning and activities of the United Nations country team. Ongoing activities that are essential to the success of peacebuilding should also be included. ***My senior representatives on the ground will convene relevant actors in the immediate aftermath of conflict and develop an early strategy and action plan focusing on immediate national priorities, appropriate sequencing of priority initiatives, and clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for activities that have to be implemented or supported by the United Nations and funded right from the start, including through an early Peacebuilding Fund disbursement. Relevant World Bank activities should also be reflected.*** Where a mission is deployed or being planned, an early iteration of an integrated strategic framework should be used for this purpose. Doing so will help to bring all relevant actors around a common and limited set of priorities quickly, thereby also enabling bilateral and multilateral actors to align their early funding decisions behind a common strategy.

#### **National capacity development**

45. As discussed above, capacity development has to be considered from the outset and should be a central element of all peacebuilding efforts. Enhancing

leadership and aid coordination capacity is particularly important in the early days because it enables national leaders to drive their country's recovery and to better manage their relationship with international partners. Too often major international operations have failed to draw on the capacities that do exist. Such operations have also undermined opportunities for national capacity development by relying too heavily on international personnel to substitute in areas where capacity may be lacking, without paying adequate attention to capacity development needs in those areas.

46. The extent to which human and institutional capacities are depleted by conflict varies significantly from country to country. Too often the international community begins activities in a post-conflict country without first assessing what capacities exist. There is a tendency to assume that capacity has been completely depleted, rather than finding existing capacity and strengthening it. ***Post-conflict peacebuilding should begin with an assessment of existing capacities and needs in the typical priority areas at the national and subnational levels using agreed common assessment tools. The results of such assessments should then inform decisions on the design of support and the deployment of international resources and expertise.***

47. As part of the humanitarian response, the Early Recovery Cluster/Network provides an important foundation for later efforts by protecting and investing in people's livelihoods and developing the capacity of community leaders, civil society organizations and local government in pockets of peace, and assessing national capacity in key sectors and institutions, where possible. This can facilitate efforts to identify and mobilize existing national and local capacity once conflict ends. The Cluster also ensures that assistance adapts to the rapidly evolving political situation in the early days after conflict, including the need to transition international actors from providing services directly to populations, to supporting national actors to provide those services.

48. International organizations often recruit qualified national professionals away from local institutions and organizations through financial and other incentives. This undermines the need to strengthen national institutions and distorts the domestic economy. Early and sustained support to the civil service and local institutions is crucial to provide adequate compensation and conditions for professionals who remain within domestic structures where their contribution to peacebuilding and recovery may have greatest impact.

49. Using and supporting national capacity should be the first preference for international assistance. Representatives from the diaspora can also be an important resource of knowledge and expertise, although experience shows that mobilizing the diaspora is potentially a politically sensitive undertaking that must be carefully managed. If there is need for international expertise, regional experts would be most effective, given their language skills and knowledge of local conditions. The substitution of international capacity to perform critical peacebuilding tasks, even if only on a short-term and limited basis, must be approached cautiously and on the basis of demonstrable need. At a minimum, it must not undermine or replace existing national capacities and should be accompanied by efforts to develop the necessary capacity. ***Where the international community is requested to provide international technical capacity to support line-functions in national Governments, this must be accompanied by capacity development programmes.***

50. *Building on existing structures and mechanisms in the field, the senior United Nations leadership team should ensure that there is sufficient dedicated expertise to promote and coordinate capacity development efforts, and to strengthen mutual accountability between national and international partners. Additional financial support (both within mission budgets and voluntary funding as appropriate) will be required to ensure that capacity development strategies are put in place from the outset of a post-conflict effort.*

#### **Predictable international support**

51. Being ready to rapidly ramp up a coherent international response in the immediate aftermath of conflict requires predictable technical support in the recurring priority areas outlined above. As part of this response, the United Nations needs ready capacity to ensure that country-level leaders can draw on the knowledge and expertise of diverse United Nations entities. Member States, regional and subregional organizations also have important capacities that are deployed as part of a broader international response. However, a number of steps need to be taken to ensure that international capacities are in place to meet recurring demands in a timely, well-coordinated and complementary manner. Across all priority areas, the United Nations and other international actors face considerable challenges identifying, recruiting and deploying the right individuals who have the requisite technical knowledge as well as applicable experience in post-conflict or difficult settings. Finding this unique combination at short notice is particularly challenging and requires pre-positioning some capacity for immediate deployment and ensuring that we have the ability to put more substantial expertise in place relatively quickly.

#### *Predictable international support: clarity within the United Nations system*

52. The United Nations faces severe shortages of expertise and capacity in several of the recurring priority areas outlined above. For some of these areas, this problem is rooted in a lack of institutional clarity as to which entities are responsible for providing United Nations country-level leaders with access to readily available knowledge, expertise and guidance, as well as for investing in rapidly deployable capacity. This limits the predictability of the United Nations response and hampers our ability to move quickly in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Work is already under way in several areas. For example, I have identified designated entities at Headquarters that should provide system-wide service in their respective area of expertise. This responsibility entails serving as a knowledge resource, including for best practices and lessons learned, elaborating standards and guidance in the specific area and providing advice to United Nations entities in the field. It may also require, where possible, establishing deployable human and technical capacities to deliver operational support including, as appropriate, support to the development of national capacities. At the country level, roles and responsibilities will differ as senior leaders designate responsibilities based on in-country presence and capacity as well as host-country Government requests. In each context, field presences should be able to draw on designated expertise and capacities at Headquarters.

53. Progress to date varies considerably and has been linked to the availability of resources. In some cases, a single entity acts as a go-to source of knowledge, expertise and capacity and may host limited rapidly deployable capacities. This is

the case for the Mediation Support Unit and Electoral Assistance Division in the Department of Political Affairs; the United Nations Mine Action Service and the Police Division in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Rapid Response roster.

54. The “cluster approach” is seeking to strengthen the predictability and coherence of humanitarian response by establishing global leads in specific areas: agriculture, camp coordination/management, early recovery, education, emergency shelter, emergency telecommunications, health, logistics, nutrition, protection, and water, sanitation and hygiene. Cross-cutting issues such as gender, human rights and the environment are also represented by specific technical focal points. This approach encourages United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to invest in building their own response capacities in the area they support, as well as to identify gaps in knowledge and capacity in the sector as a whole and to build capacity with partners at both global and national levels to be able to fill these gaps. This facilitates a more coherent and transparent system with which Governments, donors, and external partners can engage. Capacities and mechanisms put in place during the humanitarian crisis can provide a basis to quickly support the development of national capacities and delivery of basic services in the early post-conflict phase.

55. In operational areas where multiple United Nations actors are involved and diverse technical capacities are required, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, rule of law and security sector reform, emphasis has been placed on identifying the specific contribution of each actor, jointly identifying common standards and guidance through dedicated inter-agency frameworks, and establishing arrangements for coordinated delivery in the field. On the basis of lessons learned to date, the challenge we face in these complex areas is to ensure coherence at Headquarters and in the field, avoid gaps where no single entity is responsible, and deliver in those areas where responsibilities are set out.

56. In some of the priority areas, the United Nations currently has relatively limited capacity and looks to external partners to provide additional expertise, knowledge and operational resources. Developing national capacities for public administration, for example, is an area where UNDP is present and active at the national and subnational level, including during the immediate aftermath of conflict, albeit with limited resources. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs has important research and analytical capacity. The World Bank has a critical mass of expertise in the provision of public sector management support at the national level. In some critical areas for immediate post-conflict action, such as public finance and basic monetary and fiscal policy, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, respectively, are the main source of international knowledge, expertise and capacity. There is potential for the United Nations and external partners to increase their collaboration further in order to make full use of their respective strengths.

57. We will continue to work towards greater levels of clarity, predictability and accountability across all priority areas identified in the present report. ***In order to strengthen the Secretariat-based institutional arrangements already in place in a number of these areas, I will ensure that they are reviewed at the most senior level on a regular basis. These reviews will assess progress against defined and agreed benchmarks, particularly the extent to which the arrangements have resulted in faster and more effective results on the ground, and determine appropriate follow-up action.***



58. There are a number of recurring priority areas where further clarity and predictability are needed, both within the United Nations system and among key partners. We will work with the relevant United Nations entities and partners, including the World Bank and regional organizations, to improve our collective performance in these areas. Based on in-depth discussions with many of these entities in preparation of the present report, we intend to focus on the following areas where we want to make significant progress in the coming months:

- Public administration, in particular immediate support to key government institutions to enable them to administer and manage core government functions from the outset
- Transitional governance arrangements, including constitutional processes
- The reintegration of returnees
- Early employment generation
- Other aspects of economic revitalization
- The rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.

59. As we have seen in a number of other recurring priority areas, a core of standing United Nations capacities can be essential to a predictable and effective international response. Based on the upcoming discussions regarding the areas listed above, we may present requests for additional resources for standing capacities or other arrangements that would improve the international response in critical areas. Some of these capacities may have to be funded from the regular or assessed budget. Others may have to come from extrabudgetary resources and should become part of the core funding for the relevant agencies, funds and programmes.

*Predictable international support: Fielding United Nations and other international civilian capacities*

60. Ensuring a rapid and effective response in countries devastated by conflict requires augmenting the existing capacity on the ground and deploying additional international civilian capacity in areas such as the rapid restoration of agricultural production or effective management of natural resources. While the United Nations is an important source of such capacity or a conduit for it, Member States and regional and subregional organizations also provide important civilian capacity. The challenge is to ensure that these efforts are complementary and are deployed to meet country demand, rather than on the basis of existing supply.

61. The need for rapid deployment should not outweigh careful consideration as to how to draw on capacities that are already on the ground, both national and international. There is almost always international capacity on the ground as conflict ends and, in some cases, humanitarian actors and assets are the only international actors present beyond a national capital. These operational capacities can be critical to support the quick delivery of basic services, particularly as people begin to return. Mechanisms to rapidly reinforce these existing capacities, including through agencies' own surge capacities and rosters, are an essential element of a post-conflict response. In particular, where humanitarian actors are engaged in activities that coincide with immediate peacebuilding priorities, the fastest way to scale up those activities is to augment the capacities and resources of these humanitarian actors.

62. Predictable delivery of international support can only be assured if operational capacities and resources are in place. The precise form of these capacities differs from issue to issue. Where requirements are urgent, and given the significant challenges to rapidly identifying and deploying appropriate civilian expertise, it is most time-efficient to rely on standing and standby civilian capacities maintained by entities across the United Nations system, by international financial institutions, and by external partners.

63. Standing capacities are the most immediate capacities we can draw upon. Within the United Nations, they constitute experienced staff whose conditions of service require that they deploy rapidly to meet urgent operational requirements, and can support urgent capacity development needs until regular recruitment is finalized. These individuals are hired under conditions of service established by their organization and are deployed at critical points to underpin the integrated efforts of the United Nations system on the ground. We have learned that standing capacities can play a critical role in the early planning and start-up phases of a mission, thereby ensuring a seamless transition from the planning to the implementation stages. And using existing capacities can accelerate the delivery of peace dividends. The Mediation Support Unit's Standby Team and the Standing Police Capacity have received high praise for their work in mediation and mission start-up, respectively. ***I recommend that we build on the successful experience with the Standing Police Capacity to ensure, from the outset, a holistic and coordinated approach to strengthening rule of law that results in the equally rapid deployment of justice and corrections capacities. I intend to provide further details in this regard, taking into account the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions 61/279 and 63/250.*** Other multilateral actors, including the European Union and the World Bank, have established or are developing arrangements for quick deployment of civilian experts, which could complement United Nations standing capacities.

64. Standby capacities include rosters of pre-vetted candidates able and ready to deploy rapidly to serve as staff members of a United Nations mission or under engagement with other United Nations organizations, international financial institutions, non-governmental organizations or external partners. They also include mediation and other capacities held "on retainer" as well as Member States' capacities ready to be activated rapidly when needed. Rosters of experts are a necessary tool for the rapid deployment of civilian capabilities. However, experience has shown that roster maintenance requires significant investment, particularly to ensure depth, range and diversity of expertise, notably from the Global South. Moreover, expert-level rosters are rarely interoperable or coordinated and there is no single point for national and United Nations actors to transmit requests or obtain information on what resources are available. ***The United Nations Secretariat will work with roster leads to facilitate the development of common standards, training, and guiding principles to enhance the interoperability across expert rosters within each of the typical priority areas.***

65. Rapidly deployable standing and standby capacities complement but do not replace the need for efficient recruitment processes and human resources management. Within the United Nations system, we have a rich resource of personnel with diverse backgrounds, skills, knowledge and experience from many different contexts. However, our own procedures inhibit mobility of staff across the system. We need to be able to draw on this staff much more readily. ***I urge Member***

*States to approve the remaining parts of my human resources reform package to harmonize the conditions of service so that through inter-agency mobility with compatible remuneration and benefits packages, the United Nations can utilize and build its community of post-conflict practitioners and occupational experts and foster greater cross-fertilization among the relevant United Nations entities.*

66. International support to initial peacebuilding efforts can benefit from the contribution of personnel from neighbouring regions, from countries with a similar socio-economic, cultural or linguistic composition, or from countries that have undergone a post-conflict transition. With its global reach and country presences in the Global South, the United Nations should be able to better leverage such capacities to support peacebuilding efforts. *I am directing United Nations recruitment efforts to establish new outreach to appropriately qualified personnel from the Global South. I am also directing United Nations field presences to identify qualified national staff for rostering and potential selection for work in post-conflict situations.*

67. The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) Programme offers valuable support to the provision of civilian capacities in post-conflict environments in a broad range of occupational areas, drawing particularly from neighbouring countries. Built on the principle of volunteerism, the UNV Programme currently deploys individuals in over 140 countries in support of United Nations peace and development activities. *I encourage UNV, in cooperation with relevant United Nations entities, to prioritize the identification of civilian capacity in the recurring priority areas, and to explore the establishment of a special programme for the deployment of United Nations Volunteers with relevant expertise and experience for short-term field service as peacebuilding volunteers.*

68. Beyond the United Nations, considerable efforts have been made internationally to expand civilian capacities but primarily within a small number of western donor countries. Too often, these efforts have been undertaken with little attention to one another; with inadequate linkages to multilateral systems, through which the bulk of post-conflict response is undertaken; and with insufficient attention to the question of mobilizing capacity in the Global South and among women. *A review needs to be undertaken that would analyse how the United Nations and the international community can help to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian experts to support the immediate capacity development needs of countries emerging from conflict, focusing particularly on the priority areas identified in the present report. To take this forward, I intend to have further discussions with Member States.* This review could take stock of the capacities that exist or can be generated within the United Nations, as well as those that exist within regional organizations and Member States, and map these against potential demand. It could look at how we can strengthen and improve interoperability between multilateral institutions, regional organizations and Member State capacities, giving particular attention to mobilizing capacity in the Global South, as well as the potential for developing partnerships.

69. The international community has repeatedly recognized the contribution that civilian experts from the Global South can bring, but investment in building such capacities, to date, has fallen far short. Some valuable steps are being made in Africa, including the establishment of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, the establishment of the African Civilian Standby Roster for

Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Missions, and the recent opening of the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa. Similar steps have been taken in south-east Asia with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, and in the Pacific through the Political and Security Programme of the Pacific Islands Forum. Efforts to build regional crisis management capacity in Africa and other regions need to be further supported and strengthened in order to address civilian expert capacities in a more systematic way.

70. Regional and subregional organizations have an important role to play in developing civilian capacities for deployment to post-conflict countries. The United Nations regional economic commissions also have an important role to play in facilitating outreach to qualified individuals and in supporting regional organizations to enhance their crisis management capacities. ***I call upon Member States to invest the necessary resources, as well as to support regional organizations, in their efforts to mobilize civilian experts in countries from the Global South, in particular women.***

#### **Engagement with the World Bank**

71. Close collaboration between the United Nations and the World Bank is critical to an effective multilateral response and can provide a platform to support the engagement of other international actors. Recognizing the need for a strong strategic partnership, the President of the World Bank and I signed a Partnership Framework Agreement in October 2008, to strengthen cooperation between our organizations in crisis and post-crisis contexts and thereby contribute to a more effective and sustainable international response. ***Building on this Agreement, the United Nations and the World Bank Group will establish a specific mechanism for regular headquarters-level consultations on crisis and post-crisis countries of common concern. The goal of this consultation mechanism will be to improve the strategic coordination and the collective impact of United Nations and World Bank efforts.***

72. The World Bank has a strong technical capacity in several of the recurring priority areas, which provides an important complement to the United Nations strengths. ***In specific post-conflict situations, the senior United Nations leadership should call upon World Bank country directors and managers for early engagement and rapid technical advice, as appropriate, in priority areas where the Bank has a clear comparative advantage.***

#### **Financing**

73. Effective leadership, common strategy, and more predictable support capacity will amount to very little without rapid financial resources. Funding during the humanitarian phase comes in quickly, using special procedures designed for fast release. Funding for peacebuilding is usually drawn from development budgets, which typically have long lead times from inception to disbursement at the country level. The result is a funding gap between the time humanitarian funding starts to diminish and development funding starts to flow. The challenge is to close the gap from both sides, maintaining adequate levels of humanitarian financing in the period immediately after conflict, but also pre-positioning some funding for immediate and catalytic activities, and bringing development funds in earlier. We also need to ensure that mechanisms used to do this are suited to the fluid and volatile nature of early post-conflict environments, and that they enable funds to come in behind a coherent strategy.

74. Immediately after conflict, humanitarian assistance will still be required. In fact, humanitarian needs can sometimes increase as access to affected areas opens and displaced populations begin returning home. During the conflict period, there will be pockets of peace where, in addition to direct “life-saving” interventions, peoples’ lives can be greatly improved through transitional safety nets that protect human assets, investments in livelihood opportunities, semi-permanent shelter, road access, and strengthened local governance. These activities are included in the early recovery component of the humanitarian response. They provide important investments in national capacities that help to provide the foundation for a faster response once the conflict ends. **I urge donors to fully fund these important early recovery activities, and continue supporting essential humanitarian assistance in the conflict and post-conflict period.**

75. At the multilateral level, several Funds have been established to pre-position resources for rapid and early disbursement. In addition to its role in the countries on the Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda, the Peacebuilding Fund could be used in two ways to catalyse early priorities and to bridge the funding gap between donor pledges and funding disbursements. In the immediate aftermath of conflict, a first quick release of funds could be requested by the senior United Nations official in the country, working closely with national authorities, to catalyse concrete activities identified in an early integrated strategic framework, or its equivalent. A second more significant allotment could be made available once a national peace consolidation and recovery framework has been established, to catalyse the urgent activities identified therein and help to bridge delays in donor disbursements. *I have suggested in my report on the Peacebuilding Fund to the General Assembly (A/63/818) that the terms of reference for the Fund should be revised to accommodate both a flexible and early release of funds for critical peacebuilding needs and a second catalytic release as other resources are mobilized. I will take steps to strengthen the catalytic focus of the Peacebuilding Fund on core peacebuilding priorities and ensure the right timing and focus of Peacebuilding Fund funding.*

76. Several other fast-disbursing mechanisms, such as the World Bank State- and Peace-Building Fund, the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery Trust Fund, and the European Commission Instrument for Stability have been designed to support peacebuilding activities while more comprehensive funding becomes available. The WFP Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation funding instrument was also specifically introduced and designed to address the transition funding gap. Complementarity between these instruments and the Peacebuilding Fund is essential to ensure that the Fund can fulfil its catalytic function.

77. The Peacebuilding Fund and other fast-disbursing pre-positioned funds will not be sufficient to close the gap. Additional country-specific funds need to come in earlier to support peacebuilding priorities in the first days and months. But, existing funding mechanisms are not suited to early post-conflict situations, which require a considerable degree of speed, flexibility and risk tolerance. I look forward to an early outcome from the ongoing efforts of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee to revise donor procedures so as to allow earlier and faster release of funds in post-conflict situations with a higher tolerance of risk. Transparency in international assistance is also essential to foster confidence in the peace process and enable greater accountability to beneficiaries and national stakeholders. ***I urge donors to be bold***

*and innovative in finding solutions that will establish flexible, rapid and predictable funding modalities for countries emerging from conflict.* Funding should be adequate and commensurate with pledges made, and should be made available in a timely manner to close funding gaps, including for early recovery, and avoid duplication. Funding should also be aligned behind the limited set of priorities identified through common assessment and planning processes to ensure that financial incentives drive all actors in the same direction. Given the persistence of this issue, it is time that Member States take the necessary action to address the shortcomings in funding practices that they have identified. ***I will ask the Chair of the United Nations Development Group, working closely with the Peacebuilding Support Office, to engage in this process and to ensure that the United Nations and other key multilateral partners provide the necessary support to bring this discussion to a rapid and satisfactory conclusion.***

78. The early establishment of country-level multi-donor trust funds and other pooled funding mechanisms can reduce the risk for each individual donor while increasing the predictability of funding for national authorities. Evidence has shown that when resources are channelled through such funds, they can contribute significantly to predictability and coherence and facilitate alignment by directing funds towards a focused set of agreed priorities. If well-supported, multi-donor trust funds and other pooled funds can be the muscle behind a common strategic approach. In the past, such funds were plagued by administrative and legal obstacles that diminished their effectiveness considerably. Within the United Nations-World Bank Partnership framework agreement, we have addressed the management of multi-donor trust funds to reduce the obstacles inhibiting their fast and smooth operation. ***In addition to calling upon donors to fully fund ongoing operations through existing mechanisms, I will encourage the establishment of in-country multi-donor trust funds and other pooled funding mechanisms in countries emerging from conflict, as appropriate. I encourage donors to make use of these mechanisms to the fullest possible extent.***

79. Funding for women's early recovery needs is vital to increase women's empowerment and correct historical gender imbalances, as well as the deficit in funding for women's and girls' needs. Neglect of women's needs for physical security, income control and access to decision-making can impose serious costs. ***Early funds for women's organizations and networks can empower female voices in the evolving peace process. I will ensure that United Nations-managed funds and in particular the United Nations Development Group Multi-Donor Trust Funds will pilot a system pioneered by UNDP to allow decision-makers to track gender-related allocations.***

## **VI. Role of the Peacebuilding Commission**

80. The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission in late 2005, through Security Council resolution 1645 (2005) and General Assembly resolution 60/180, represented a major milestone in the evolution of the international community's response to peacebuilding. The Commission combines a close link to three principal organs of the United Nations (the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council) with a unique membership that brings together not only seven members of each of these organs, but also the top providers of assessed and voluntary contributions, and of military personnel and civilian police to United

Nations missions. In the presidential statement of 20 May 2008 by which the Security Council requested the present report, the Council welcomed the work of the Peacebuilding Commission in advising on the coordination of international peacebuilding activities and resources, and expressed its support for enhancing the role of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund.

81. In the less than four years of its existence, the engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission with the countries on its agenda has continued to evolve. While it is still early to draw conclusions from the limited country engagement, Sierra Leone and Burundi offer useful lessons that can be applied in other countries. At the same time, Peacebuilding Commission deliberations have identified a need to further adapt its mechanisms and working methods to strengthen its contributions to the overall peacebuilding effort.

82. The Peacebuilding Commission has a critical role to play in championing and promoting the agenda outlined in the present report. After the main conflict in a country ends, many of the critical peacebuilding tasks have to be initiated. This also means that the role of the Peacebuilding Commission extends to the critical period immediately after conflict covered by the report. Several of the main purposes of the Commission, as defined in paragraph 2 of its founding resolutions, are highly relevant during this period. As the founding resolutions also underline, the main purpose of the Commission in post-conflict situations on the agenda of the Security Council (in particular where there is a United Nations-mandated peacekeeping operation on the ground) is to provide advice to the Council at its request. ***The Security Council should consider more proactively how the advice of the Commission could contribute to its work during the early phase of the Council's consideration of post-conflict situations, for example, by providing an integrated peacebuilding perspective and specific suggestions for the Council's own engagement with the country on its agenda.*** For countries on the Security Council's agenda, the respective roles of the Council and the Commission need to be seen as complementary and in parallel, as envisaged by the founding resolutions, rather than sequenced in a manner that would diminish the Commission's role during earlier phases where it could add significant value.

83. ***The Peacebuilding Commission may also wish to consider how it could further enhance its advisory role in relation to countries on its agenda and a number of areas covered in the present report, such as:***

- (a) ***Focusing and sustaining attention to specific peacebuilding priorities;***
- (b) ***Encouraging relevant actors to channel appropriate and timely human and financial resources for developing national capacities and institutions in critical priority areas;***
- (c) ***Monitoring progress in the implementation of national peacebuilding strategies and recovery frameworks developed through common assessment and planning processes among national and international actors, and providing political support as necessary;***
- (d) ***Promoting greater coherence and synergies between the different parts of the United Nations system and other relevant actors outside the United Nations system.***

84. *Building on ongoing discussions in the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on financing for development, the Peacebuilding Commission may also wish to work with these two organs to encourage discussion of aid effectiveness and mutual accountability with a specific emphasis on the funding challenges that arise as conflict ends. More specifically, the Commission could:*

(a) *Promote innovative approaches to mobilizing resources for peacebuilding, especially for countries that receive inadequate attention and funding;*

(b) *Advance aid effectiveness and mutual accountability between donors and programme countries around national peacebuilding compacts and priorities;*

(c) *Encourage donors to provide faster, more flexible and more risk-tolerant funding to address the specific funding challenges and gaps that arise when conflict ends.*

85. I also look forward in 2010 to the review of arrangements set out in the founding resolutions of the Peacebuilding Commission by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In preparation for this review, I welcome the efforts of the Peacebuilding Commission, with the support of the Peacebuilding Support Office, to assess its current working methods and tools and propose more innovative and flexible approaches to how it can best engage and provide advice in post-conflict situations. This could range from more in-depth engagement, as has been the case so far, to lighter and more focused attention to specific priority issues where the Commission can add value in ways that other mechanisms cannot. In all cases, the Commission should build on and enhance existing country-level strategy-setting processes where they exist, and ensure that its work is closely linked to and driven by the specific needs and priorities of the country on its agenda. The unique membership and flexible configurations of the Commission should be considered as important factors in these deliberations as well.

86. More generally, I anticipate that the review in 2010 will provide Member States, particularly the members of the Commission, with an opportunity to deepen their own engagement with the Commission and to take greater ownership of its agenda and the advice it provides. The Commission can only succeed if all of its members come together to maximize its potential. They can ensure that the Commission plays a key role in supporting countries to achieve sustainable peace and development, and ultimately move beyond the stage where some of them require large peacekeeping missions. As the present report has made clear, however, this engagement needs to start early and it has to be focused on the key priorities that will ultimately allow for this transition to occur.

## **VII. Conclusions and observations**

87. The challenges addressed in the present report are not new. For over a decade we have been grappling with how to bring peacebuilding upstream and mount a more rapid and effective response in the immediate aftermath of conflict. However, at this time of global resource constraints, when the most vulnerable bear the brunt of economic downturn, there is a new urgency to redouble our efforts and ensure that resources are used more efficiently by promoting a more coherent, effective and focused response.



88. In the present report, I have focused on the first two years after conflict because this period presents particular challenges and persistent gaps, but also considerable opportunities. By meeting people's demands for security, shoring up the political process, delivering a peace dividend and strengthening national capacity, we can help national actors in their efforts to set positive dynamics in motion right from the start. I must underscore the importance of an early emphasis on strengthening national capacity, ensuring it is part of an entry strategy, and not merely as the basis for exit.

89. Given the imperative of national ownership and the fluidity of post-conflict contexts, peacebuilding efforts must be anchored at the country level. While the support and guidance from the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, United Nations Headquarters and Member State capitals is essential, it is largely the leaders on the ground, both national and international, who can ensure that vision, strategy and decision-making respond effectively to the realities of an ever-changing situation.

90. The United Nations is increasingly expected to play a leadership role in the field, facilitating engagement between national and international actors, and among international actors. I have set out an agenda to strengthen the United Nations contribution to a more rapid and effective response in the immediate aftermath of conflict. The elements of this agenda include, strengthening and supporting leadership teams in the field, promoting earlier strategic coherence, strengthening national capacity from the outset, improving our ability to provide rapid and predictable capacities, and enhancing the speed, flexibility, amount and risk tolerance of post-conflict financing. Each element reinforces the others. To be successful, we need to implement the full agenda.

91. The United Nations will always be one among many actors involved in efforts to support countries emerging from war and therefore relies on strong partnerships based on clear comparative advantage. The World Bank is a critical strategic partner in the initial post-conflict period. I am committed to deepening our relationship and ensuring that it can be operationalized to leverage our respective strengths. Regional and subregional organizations also have vital political, security and economic roles to play in the immediate aftermath of conflict. We must build on our nascent partnerships in the peacemaking, peacekeeping and development spheres to promote the engagement of regional and subregional organizations in peacebuilding.

92. Implementing this agenda would be a critical step forward in improving international support for countries emerging from conflict. This agenda represents the beginning rather than the end of a process. I am eager to take these steps forward within the United Nations system. I look to Member States as key partners without whose support this agenda cannot be realized.

93. The successful implementation of this agenda requires that certain fundamental political conditions are in place. A basic level of political will and commitment on the part of national actors is a precondition for peacebuilding. A regional environment conducive to transforming conflict dynamics into peaceful political and economic conditions is essential. International support is also fundamental and requires that Member States align their assistance and engagement in support of a coherent and sustained effort. Unless these basic political conditions are in place, the ability of the Organization to promote a coherent and effective response will be limited.

94. There are no quick fixes for holding and sustaining peace. National actors face enormous political, security and development challenges after conflict. But if the international community, led by the United Nations system, is ready to respond rapidly, coherently and effectively, we can help to give national actors a greater chance of sustaining peace and laying the foundations for sustainable development. All too often it is innocent men, women and children who pay the price of war. We cannot ask them to pay the price of peace.

---

**General Assembly  
Security Council**Distr.: General  
3 August 2009

Original: English

**General Assembly  
Sixty-fourth session  
Item 108 of the provisional agenda\*  
Report of the Secretary-General on the  
Peacebuilding Fund****Security Council  
Sixty-fourth year****The Peacebuilding Fund****Report of the Secretary-General***Summary*

The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 63/282 and covers the activities of the Peacebuilding Fund from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009. As at 30 June 2009, the Fund's portfolio stood at \$312.9 million, with deposits totalling \$309.6 million having been received from a broad base of 45 donors. The Fund is currently active in 12 countries, directly contributing to building the foundations for peace in countries emerging from conflict or helping post-conflict countries to prevent a relapse into conflict.

Recent evaluations and performance reports submitted by recipient organizations confirm that early notable results have been achieved during the Fund's initial two years and that the Fund has the potential to fill a unique peacebuilding niche. The evaluations also identified a number of management and operational challenges: those are being addressed in part through a revision of the Fund's terms of reference and in part through management improvements instituted by the Peacebuilding Support Office. The revised terms of reference were endorsed by the General Assembly on 17 June 2009, and give impetus for a broad revision of the Fund's operational and procedural guidelines.

---

\* A/64/150.



## Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Introduction . . . . .	3
II. Administration and use of the Fund . . . . .	3
A. Deposits, allocations, approvals and utilization . . . . .	3
B. Mobilizing funding for peacebuilding . . . . .	6
III. Achievements by country and priority area . . . . .	7
A. Country progress reports . . . . .	7
B. Key results obtained in the four priority areas of the Fund . . . . .	11
C. Lessons learned . . . . .	14
IV. Improving the responsiveness and effectiveness of the Fund . . . . .	16
A. External evaluations . . . . .	16
B. Revision of the terms of reference . . . . .	16
C. Structural and management reforms . . . . .	17
D. Focus on results and learning from the field . . . . .	17
V. Management and oversight of the Fund . . . . .	18
VI. Partnership-building and collaboration with other funds . . . . .	19
VII. Conclusions and the way ahead . . . . .	19
Annexes	
I. Peacebuilding Fund: cumulative pledges, commitments and deposits as at 30 June 2009 . . . .	21
II. Peacebuilding Fund projects approved in 2008/09 . . . . .	23

## I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 63/282, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit an annual report on the operation and activities of the Peacebuilding Fund. The report covers the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009, and reflects the highlights of the consolidated annual progress report prepared by the Fund's administrative agent, the Multi-donor Trust Fund Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It offers insights into the administration and use of the Fund and gives an overview of the scope of activities and key results to date. Efforts to identify ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Fund are described along with emerging lessons and recommendations.

2. The report is informed by evaluations and reviews, in particular by the findings and recommendations of an independent evaluation undertaken by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) during the second half of 2008, which highlighted both the successes and the challenges of implementing the Fund. In that connection, the report outlines how the Peacebuilding Support Office has been addressing the emerging challenges through its management response to the evaluation, working in close collaboration with other United Nations partners and stakeholders.


## II. Administration and use of the Fund

### A. Deposits, allocations, approvals and utilization

3. The financial situation of the Peacebuilding Fund from its inception to 30 June 2009 reflects robust growth (see figure I). At 30 June 2009, the Fund's portfolio stood at \$312.9 million (up \$44 million from June 2008), with deposits of \$309.6 million (an increase of \$71 million from June 2008). With 45 donors, the Fund enjoys one of the broadest donor bases of any multi-donor trust fund administered by the United Nations (see annex I). Eighteen countries had contributed more than once to the Fund, reflecting continued donor commitment to supporting the Fund and its objectives. The 10 largest contributors were Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada, Ireland, Spain, Germany and Denmark.


Figure I

**Peacebuilding Fund portfolio growth: cumulative deposits, allocations and approvals, 2005-June 2009**



4. Of the Fund’s programmable funds (i.e., those received in the trust fund account) of \$309.6 million, a total of \$141.3 million had been allocated to support peacebuilding activities in 12 countries, four of which were countries on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (see figure II). Five countries not on the Commission’s agenda had been declared eligible for Fund support by the Secretary-General and had received such support. Nine country situations drew on emergency funding under the Fund, some also receiving support under priority plan funding.

Figure II  
**Peacebuilding Fund: geographical distribution of countries receiving support**



Note: Shaded countries are those on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission.

5. The certified financial report of the UNDP Multi-donor Trust Fund Office for 2008 indicates that the funds transferred to recipient organizations totalled \$87.7 million at 31 December 2008; by June 2009, that amount had increased to \$115 million. In comparison with 2007, the number of participating United Nations organizations at the end of 2008 had increased from 6 to 11. The table below shows the distribution of funds allocated and transferred as at 31 December 2008. UNDP was the recipient organization having received the largest allocation (\$67.3 million, or 77 per cent of the total funding available).

### Peacebuilding Fund: project fund flows by recipient organization and implementation rate by country at 31 December 2008

(Thousands of United States dollars)

#### A. Project fund flows by recipient organization

	Number of projects	Fund flows	
		Transfers	Expenditure
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	2	4 611	1 249
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)	1	400	77
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	38	67 257	38 767
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	1	900	—
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	1	4 200	2 574
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	3	2 800	941
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	1	189	30
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)	2	3 718	2 484
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)	1	900	113
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	2	2 694	870
<b>Total</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>87 669</b>	<b>47 105</b>

#### B. Implementation (delivery) rate by country

	Implementation rate (percentage)
1. Countries on Peacebuilding Commission agenda	
Burundi	64
Guinea-Bissau	39
Sierra Leone	53
Central African Republic	—
Average	57
2. Countries not on Peacebuilding Commission agenda	
Côte d'Ivoire	61
Liberia	14
Nepal	—
Guinea	—
Comoros	—
Average	37
3. Emergency projects (52 projects)	43
<b>Overall</b>	<b>54</b>

6. The project expenditures of each recipient United Nations organization, which are reported according to categories agreed by the United Nations Development Group (<http://www.undg.org/docs/9442>), show that implementation rates are lagging behind expectations and confirm concerns raised by key stakeholders of the Fund. The implementation rates, determined in terms of expenditure as a proportion of total amount transferred by country, reflect both the difficulty of operationalizing the Fund in post-conflict settings with weak local-level capacities and the effect of protracted country-level project vetting processes following the allocation of funds. In some cases, the rates may be misleading, as for Liberia, where several projects were approved only in the second half of 2008 and would not be expected to have a high implementation rate at year-end.

7. Estimates by the Peacebuilding Support Office for 2009 show significant increases in implementation rates, in part as a consequence of management efforts by the Office and by the recipient United Nations organizations. There is an increasing awareness and recognition that the Fund's performance should be measured not only by short-term implementation rates but also, and more importantly, by the longer-term success of the processes, capacity-building and broader national ownership it supports.

## **B. Mobilizing funding for peacebuilding**

8. While the Fund's current funding position is solid, the global financial crisis may well have an adverse impact on future funding for peacebuilding and this has to be taken into account when Fund allocations are being programmed and when Fund-supported projects are looking for additional funding. In addition, the Peacebuilding Support Office will have to contemplate continuing funding for activities that were intended to be initiated by the Fund but then continued by donors and Governments. Early indications are that fund-raising is becoming more difficult.

9. The evaluations also indicated out that the Fund had yet to demonstrate its catalytic value in terms of attracting additional resources. While a number of activities have been able to attract additional donor or Government funding (see para. 26), some critical initiatives will have to be discontinued for lack of additional funding. The importance of building fund-raising and partnership strategies into project designs and of making that a condition for approval of funds has now been recognized and is being addressed with the support of the joint steering committees and the Peacebuilding Commission.

10. In this regard, the Peacebuilding Support Office also intends to collaborate more closely with other relevant funding instruments, such as the European Union's Instrument for Stability, the World Bank's State- and Peacebuilding Fund and the UNDP Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, to explore joint funding or follow-up funding opportunities.

11. One of the Peacebuilding Fund's unique advantages is its ability to fund critical activities in the area of security sector reform, which is typically an underfunded sector. While 86 per cent of the Fund's resources allocated to activities in 2007 and 2008 corresponded to official development assistance, the 14 per cent not under the heading of official development assistance went to support human rights training for military personnel, provision of equipment and improved housing to boost morale and improve relationships with civilians.



### III. Achievements by country and priority area

#### A. Country progress reports

##### Countries before the Peacebuilding Commission (window I)

###### *Burundi*

12. Peacebuilding in Burundi entered a new phase in the country's efforts to emerge from a long civil war, following the 4 December 2008 agreement that had facilitated the transformation of the Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu-Forces nationales de libération (Palipehutu-FNL) into a political party. The creation of political momentum conducive to effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of this last armed group in Burundi was achieved with additional and timely assistance provided by the Peacebuilding Support Office. Of the 18 projects approved, 4 had been completed and the rest were expected to be closed by the end of December 2009, with the exception of one recently initiated project on socio-economic reintegration and community recovery of populations affected by war in three provinces. During the past 12 months, implementation improved and the delivery rate against the total budget of \$35 million reached 75 per cent at the end of the first half of 2009. The improvements in monitoring and evaluation capacity during 2009 enabled both the steering committee and the implementing agencies to undertake more rigorous tracking of project progress. Some peacebuilding initiatives combining Fund projects and other means of intervention were beginning to show some tangible results in the areas of administrative and political governance, justice and human rights, the fight against corruption, security sector reform and the empowerment of women and civil society. The ongoing national dialogue process was expected to help restore social trust after decades of violence.

13. The Peacebuilding Support Office quickly released additional emergency funding for the demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants in Burundi, resulting in the registration of more than 5,000 of the 11,000 adults associated with FNL, they were issued return kits, paid the first instalment of return assistance and transported to their home communities. Support under the Fund complemented other efforts that enabled some 3,500 FNL elements to be assimilated into the military and police.

###### *Central African Republic*

14. Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic continued to face challenges in building on the momentum created by the national political dialogue in late 2008, including the formation of a broad-based government and the establishment of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration steering committee to consolidate the momentum for peace; and in overcoming threats posed by sporadic rebel violence in the north. Pending the start-up of demobilization activities, critical preparatory work advanced and provisional lists of potential ex-combatants, were submitted to the United Nations. Initial funding of \$4 million (40 per cent of the Fund envelope) was used to start up that exercise, while additional appeals were made to the wider international community for further DDR support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, which was a critical precondition for improved security and peaceful elections. The priority plan funded 11 projects in the following areas: (a) support for the demobilization and reintegration process (60 per cent of the total

envelope); (b) governance and rule of law, primarily to support human rights and women's networks (14 per cent); and (c) revitalization of communities affected by conflict (26 per cent). Work on the United Nations integrated strategic framework was completed in May 2009, enabling the initiation of discussions for a second tranche under the Fund.

#### *Guinea-Bissau*

15. The period under review was characterized by significant political and military tension in Guinea-Bissau. The prevailing political situation had had a negative impact on peacebuilding efforts. As a result, three ongoing Peacebuilding Fund projects experienced disruptions. Notwithstanding those events, the meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission country-specific configuration on Guinea-Bissau coupled with numerous United Nations country support visits enabled continuous engagement and tracking of project progress. A professional training and employment programme would provide training for 500 youths. To combat drug trafficking and organized crime, the Fund has provided support to enhance both police capacity and prison security. Public tenders for the rehabilitation of 10 military barracks were scheduled for July 2009.

#### *Sierra Leone*

16. In March 2009, Sierra Leone saw the worst political violence since the end of the civil war in 2002. An inter-party dialogue facilitated by the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) brought the two main parties to the negotiating table and the resulting agreements were laid down in a joint communiqué. Quick application of contingency funds provided for (a) setting up a commission of inquiry to investigate allegations of sexual violence during the disturbances and (b) rehabilitation of the damaged offices of one of the political parties. In support of the joint communiqué, two projects to be funded under the Fund's emergency facility were prepared by UNIPSIL and approved by the Peacebuilding Support Office in May 2009. These interventions are aimed at improving police control and techniques for riot control and fostering national political dialogue and reconciliation. Delivery of projects overall improved steadily over the past year. Notable results included improved outreach of the National Human Rights Commission, increased awareness of the recently passed Gender and Child Rights Act and a sharp reduction in the backlog of detainees awaiting trial (90 per cent of 600 cases cleared). At the request of the Government and following endorsement by country-level stakeholders and the Peacebuilding Commission, the priority plan was revised in August 2008 in order to address critical energy shortfalls in the country. To assess and better guide the implementation of Fund activities in the country, a midterm review was conducted by independent consultants in April 2009, creating an opportunity for the Government, the United Nations and civil society to improve performance prior to the final series of approvals. In addition to identifying improvements essential for the creation of a joint United Nations/UNDP vision, the evaluation highlighted the need for greater advocacy and effective management of stakeholder expectations regarding Fund-supported projects.

## **Countries declared eligible for funding by the Secretary-General (window II)**

### *Comoros*

17. The commitment of the Comoros to peacebuilding was evidenced by the launch in March 2009 of the “inter-Comorian dialogue”, in advance of the operationalization of the Fund-supported priority plan (envelope of \$9 million). The initial phase of the dialogue generated some consensus on governance, functioning of State institutions, harmonization of presidential mandates, and rationalization of the election timetable. But it also revealed deep divergences on aspects related to the procedures to be followed to implement necessary reforms. The United Nations country team devoted attention to building structures and capacities for the joint implementation support capacity and national institutions essential for rapid, effective and transparent implementation. For its part, the Government set up the Commission for National Solidarity to guide the peacebuilding process. The priority plan identified four priority areas of intervention, which were being translated into specific projects by recipient United Nations organizations together with national counterparts. Of these, a project to strengthen national peacebuilding and project management capacities had already been approved.

### *Côte d’Ivoire*

18. While the security and political climate in Côte d’Ivoire continued to be relatively stable and calm, the political situation remained somewhat fragile, especially as elections were further postponed to late 2009. The Fund was providing support through a priority plan of \$5 million comprising the support for the facilitation of the “inter-Ivorian direct dialogue” (follow-up to the emergency funding) within the framework of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement and assistance to Operation 1,000 Microprojects, a quick peace dividends project to support reintegration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants, former militia members and youth at risk in the interim period between the signing of the Agreement and the pending elections. By June 2009, at least 70 per cent of the allocation had been disbursed in support of a total of 3,407 participants, increasingly including women (18.3 per cent) and members of communities affected by conflict; that total broke down as follows: 1,099 ex-combatants, 757 former militia members, 847 youth at risk and 704 community members. Plans were under way to evaluate this project and explore ways to strengthen the sustainability of these initiatives and identify follow-up funding. Sustainability of this effort remained a major challenge.

### *Democratic Republic of Congo*

19. The Secretary-General declared the Democratic Republic of the Congo eligible to receive Peacebuilding Fund funding on 17 June 2009. Eligibility was justified by the situation in the eastern portion of the country, where elements of fragility and insecurity remained but significant opportunities for a durable peace were also present, mainly with the signing of accords and agreements between the Government and armed groups. Within the context of United Nations support to help the country sustain this positive momentum, the Peacebuilding Support Office will work with country-level partners to jointly identify priority support areas.

### *Guinea*

20. Political instability in Guinea reached a peak in December 2008 following the death of the President and the subsequent takeover of power by a military junta. That development coincided with the finalization of the Peacebuilding Fund priority plan, which was deferred while the United Nations country team reassessed the situation and emerging peacebuilding priorities. The priority plan was approved in February 2009 with an initial funding envelope set at \$6 million, aimed at ensuring inclusive and sustainable national dialogue, supporting human rights promotion, civic education and reform of the security sector, and strengthening the contribution of women and youth to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. A joint start-up mission of the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery was fielded to Guinea in June 2009 and recommended approval of projects urgently to ensure that they would contribute positively to the transition process in the lead-up to the legislative and presidential elections scheduled for late 2009.

### *Liberia*

21. As of May 2009, a total of 20 Peacebuilding Fund projects had been approved for Liberia, fully committing the allocated envelope of \$15 million. The pilot project funded from the emergency funding window, for alternative reconciliation approaches in Nimba County, was independently evaluated in September 2008, with positive findings that enabled national-level roll-out of the pilot programme. Liberia was the first Peacebuilding Fund recipient country to establish a dedicated national peacebuilding office, located in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the office is intended to build national conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding capacity and also carries the task of coordinating and managing the Fund's activities in the country. The action agenda of the office focuses on training in conflict sensitivity, fostering community peacebuilding networks and strengthening results-oriented monitoring and evaluation. Other Fund-supported activities charting new ground included the youth peace ambassadors, the Tumutu comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration approach and the partnership with the Ministry of Justice to establish a gender-based violence unit to deal primarily and decisively with the abuse of women, which started during the conflict era and continues with impunity in the post-conflict period.

### *Nepal*

22. The Peacebuilding Support Office approved the Peacebuilding Fund priority plan for Nepal and committed \$10 million to it in September 2008. The resources are channelled through the United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal and have helped to catalyse additional funding for peacebuilding. Projects have been approved under three priority areas of the Fund: strengthening of State capacity for sustaining peace, community recovery, and conflict prevention and reconciliation. Assistance under the Fund has enabled the United Nations country team to focus more on key structural dimensions of the conflict, such as creating new employment opportunities for a large and politically vulnerable young population.

### **3. Emergency funding (window III)**

23. Under the Fund's initial terms of reference, emergency funding was provided for 9 one-off projects of less than \$1 million. This facility has proved to be a flexible and responsive instrument that enables the Secretary-General to respond quickly to imminent threats to peace, while demonstrating the Fund's risk-taking capabilities. Nearly all the emergency projects, however, experienced implementation delays due to local circumstances that affected quick delivery. Project extension requests or requests for additional funding were received from Côte d'Ivoire (political dialogue facilitation required additional assistance following postponement of elections), the Central African Republic (inclusive political dialogue needed additional funding to conclude the process), Haiti (security reforms were delayed by pending relocation of affected communities), Kenya (community-based reconciliation required additional time and resources to scale up the process) and Burundi (political dialogue required additional funding to respond to the December 2008 agreement).

24. During the reporting period, four new emergency projects were approved, for Burundi (1 project), Sierra Leone (2) and Timor-Leste (1).


## **B. Key results obtained in the four priority areas of the Fund**

25. Between July 2008 and June 2009, three additional priority plans and 40 new projects were approved, bringing the number of countries receiving Peacebuilding Fund support to 12, with 89 projects. With this doubling of the Fund's portfolio, the distribution of projects over the four priority areas identified for the Fund in the revised terms of reference (A/63/818, annex), remained largely the same. A portion of 35 per cent was allocated to support implementation of peace agreements, 33 per cent to the promotion of coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict, 15 per cent to early economic recovery and peace dividends and 18 per cent to rebuilding infrastructure and technical capacity.

26. As of June 2009, 12 projects had been completed and 26 new projects had been started in the previous four months. An initial attempt to assess the catalytic effect of the Fund on the basis of recipient organizations' reports to 31 December 2008 revealed that 21 of the 51 projects in the Fund's overall portfolio had reported additional mobilized resources totalling \$21 million, equivalent to 24 per cent of the overall approved budget of the Fund at that time.

27. A results-oriented analysis of the 10 priority plans and 89 approved projects identified 13 outcomes that reflect the intended results of each of the four priority areas of the Fund. In the present section, an overview of the key results achieved in 2008/09 is presented, highlighting the trends and critical challenges encountered (see figure III).

Figure III  
**Fund-approved project budget by priority area and outcomes**



**1. Support for the implementation of peace agreements**

28. The Fund is largely intended to be used in the immediate aftermath of conflict when a serious risk of relapse into violent conflict exists. One third of the Fund’s resources are directed at country-level support for the implementation of peace agreements, including immediate priorities in strengthening security and the rule of law. Political dialogue to maintain progress with agreements is proving to be an important aspect that the Fund can support, along with initial inputs into comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes to assist the effective reintegration of ex-combatants.

29. A total of nine projects relating to security sector reform (with funding of \$15 million) have been completed or are ongoing, concentrated largely in countries on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission, along with eight projects for the reintegration of ex-combatants (\$16 million). The Fund’s engagement in the areas of rule of law and of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is intensifying, as both have been adopted as thematic priority areas in most Fund-supported countries. Fostering an independent judiciary with efficient legal procedures to reduce backlogs of court cases and pretrial detention periods is another priority area, with six projects valued at \$7 million. In Côte d’Ivoire, a modest Peacebuilding Fund country programme of \$5 million includes an element of support for the facilitation of political dialogue with third-party involvement; political dialogue is also supported by three emergency grants under the Fund.

30. Recipient United Nations have organizations reported that, although security and justice sector capacity was substantially strengthened in 2008, there were delays in project delivery due to an often-unpredictable institutional and security context. An example of this occurred in Burundi when violent confrontations with armed forces took place in 2008; the situation was resolved only when a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration agreement was reached later in the year. Other identified challenges included inadequate project staffing, meeting of international

legal standards by post-conflict countries and implementation delays owing to national elections.

## **2. Promotion of coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict**

31. In order to prevent conflict from reigniting, peacebuilding programme design needs to address the causes of the conflict as well as changed power relations in the immediate post-conflict period. Nearly 50 per cent of Fund-supported projects seek to build national and local capacity to better understand root causes and conflict drivers and to identify ways to promote peaceful coexistence.

32. A total of 17 projects have focused on national reconciliation, accounting for \$17.9 million. A review of the Fund commissioned in 2009 on behalf of its five major donors identified this as the main underfunded peacebuilding area ([www.unpbf.org/docs/PBF\\_Review.pdf](http://www.unpbf.org/docs/PBF_Review.pdf)). Common approaches include launching of land dispute settlement commissions; conducting of peace education, mediation and dialogue training; and lending of support for independent media and for truth and reconciliation commissions. Thirteen governance projects (\$11.3 million) have emphasized improving leadership and the relationship between authorities and civilians, funding activities such as anti-corruption commissions and processes for free and fair elections. Through nine projects totalling \$8.5 million, the Fund also prioritizes equal representation of women in peace processes, protection from gender-based violence and psychosocial and economic assistance for women affected by conflict. The number of projects addressing specific hardships faced by women in post-conflict countries increased dramatically from one to eight over the past year. Four projects totalling \$4 million have supported awareness and access to human rights for the population at large, such as through the establishment of national human rights commissions and the transformation of indigenous legal practices.

33. Recipient United Nations organizations have underlined the successful support provided to national election commissions in Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, filling a crucial funding gap and leading to orderly and calm elections. A pilot community reconciliation project in Liberia's volatile Nimba County succeeded in developing a model for conflict resolution, including mechanisms for settling property disputes. The success of this project in fostering reconciliation and post-conflict reintegration led to the roll-out of a similar approach at the national level. Challenges to such approaches include political risks affecting the performance of reconciliation and governance projects; limited political will and national ownership, along with difficulties in national legislatures; and inflexible positions of some key stakeholders. Such challenges attest to the fact that sustainable peacebuilding is not a short-term endeavour.

## **3. Early economic recovery and immediate peace dividends**

34. A major threat to the stability of many post-conflict societies is the lack of economic opportunity, which results in massive and pervasive underemployment and unemployment, with youth being especially at risk. At the same time, young people are a country's most valuable asset for the future. Hence, the Fund is supporting six large-scale youth empowerment and employment projects, valued at \$11 million. Eight projects (\$7 million) support the reintegration of returning internally displaced persons and refugees, as well as reviving agricultural production and providing basic services as immediate peace dividends to the population at large.

35. Youth empowerment and employment figure high in the priority plans for Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone. Short-term labour projects are envisioned, to be complemented by medium- and longer-term employment initiatives by the Government and development partners for training and employing young people. The implementation of such programmes, however, is proving challenging, owing to limitations in local capacity and a lack of political consensus over who should benefit from the activities. Recipient United Nations organizations have furthermore acknowledged the need for a stronger gender focus so as to address significant disparities in literacy and economic opportunities.

36. Six projects were recently initiated to assist internally displaced persons and refugees in returning to and reintegrating in communities and reviving agricultural production. This is a vast increase over only two approvals during the previous year. A good example can be drawn from the Central African Republic, which decided to prioritize the urgent reintegration of ex-combatants and affected populations over investments in security and judiciary reform, deciding that the latter could be funded from subsequent Fund allocations to the country.

#### **4. Establishment or re-establishment of essential administrative services and capacity-building**

37. Eight projects (\$21 million) have supported authorities in post-conflict settings to rapidly restore essential administrative services and boost related institutional and technical capacity for service delivery. Outcomes have included improved infrastructure (such as electricity, sewerage and water supply) and institutions that are able to function better, including through the construction of barracks, courthouses and prisons.<sup>1</sup>

38. To date, one project, building 32 courthouses in rural provinces of Burundi, has been completed. This boosted rural employment and improved access to the judiciary for local populations. Overall, Fund allocations to infrastructure increased 50 per cent in 2008, largely due to a one-time gap-filling allocation to maintain electricity supply in key regions of Sierra Leone as articulated in the national Integrated Strategic Framework endorsed by the Peacebuilding Commission's country-specific configuration.

### **C. Lessons learned**

39. Countries emerging from conflict typically have many needs, all of which seem to be priorities. Governments and partners are pressured to deliver peace dividends immediately at a time when capacities and resources are very limited. This largely characterizes the environment in which the Peacebuilding Fund has operated and continues to operate. Emerging lessons and experiences noted in the previous report remain for the most part pertinent (A/63/218-S/2008/522). Progress was made, however, in the present reporting period in defining responses, as more lessons, including those indicated below, continued to be garnered from recent experiences.

---

<sup>1</sup> Projects combining technical and human capacity-building aimed at an explicit peacebuilding outcome are listed under the first priority area (support for implementation of peace agreements) or under the second priority area (peaceful conflict resolution).



40. *The start-up phase of Peacebuilding Fund activities in a country is one of the most critical and labour-intensive periods for the United Nations country team and its national partners, yet there is little spare capacity to meet the new demands entailed in start-up. It is therefore absolutely essential to ensure greater focus on start-up support to address weak planning, programming and implementation capacity.* Given the considerable lag between the declaration of eligibility for support under the Fund and the approval of the first projects, more upfront support from the Peacebuilding Support Office and the UNDP Multi-donor Trust Fund Office, with key partners such as the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, is warranted for the development of priority plans and initial projects. This should be coupled with the development of training curricula and partnerships to strengthen capacity on the ground in the initial months.

41. *Synergy between the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Commission has improved but there is scope for better calibrating the engagement between the Fund and the Commission.* Members of the Peacebuilding Commission could play a greater role in helping to identify and promote the engagement of bilateral and multilateral donors. This is particularly important during the later stages of implementation with a view to phasing out the Fund's involvement to make way for more substantial and sustainable resource bases, such as country-level multi-donor trust funds. The Commission's influence could also be tapped to support policy choices and prioritization in national budgets to favour actions that serve to consolidate a participative peace. The Fund's revised terms of reference underline synergy and closer collaboration in countries before the Commission. Innovative and successful approaches supported by the Fund could provide a wealth of experience for the Commission's Working Group on Lessons Learned and enrich the country debate.

42. *More attention needs to be given to the critical role of the joint steering committees and to ensuring that they are able to play their role to the fullest.* National joint steering committees, with diverse membership and co-chaired by the senior United Nations official and a senior Government counterpart in the country, are a fundamental feature of the Fund designed to promote national ownership and capacity. The role of the joint steering committees needs to be further enhanced, for example in the area of results-oriented planning, monitoring and evaluation.

43. *Sound and sustained peacebuilding needs effective partnerships at all levels.* More needs to be done to ensure effective partnership at all levels. While this starts at the country level, where partnerships between the Government, civil society, donors, the private sector and the United Nations are crucial to the success of peacebuilding, it is also played out at the global level, where improved synergy between the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund can lead to a greater catalytic impact of the Fund. The success of Fund-supported activities depends, to a large extent, on good collaboration and cooperation between the Peacebuilding Support Office and the rest of the United Nations system, especially the agencies, funds and programmes. The recently established inter-agency task force is expected to guide and ensure broad support and engagement of the United Nations system in the review and enhancement of the Fund's guidelines in line with its revised terms of reference.

44. *The tensions inherent in the concept underlying the Fund and the competing demands and expectations require a strong strategic communications strategy at both the field and global levels.* The Peacebuilding Support Office needs to better manage the diverse expectations of the Fund's key stakeholders at the global and national levels. At the global level, this should include strengthening the Office's communications with Member States and the United Nations system, in particular to explain to stakeholders the environment in which the Fund operates, the impact of that environment on the activities supported by the Fund, the Fund's ability to deliver rapidly and the value added by the Fund in promoting peacebuilding. At the national level, the Fund's purpose and priorities must be better communicated as well. Such a communications strategy demands sound monitoring, evaluation and lesson-learning capacity within the Office.

## **IV. Improving the responsiveness and effectiveness of the Fund**

### **A. External evaluations**

45. Emerging lessons from the first two years of operation indicate that the Fund has had a difficult start, in no small measure due to political demands to disburse rapidly before capacity and systems were in place or recipients had a clear idea of the purpose of the Fund. Despite this, considerable knowledge and useful lessons have emerged from recent activities. According to the OIOS evaluation and the review conducted in 2009 (see para. 32), the Fund has made considerable progress in helping to generate early peace dividends and strengthening recipient country capacity to promote peaceful resolution of conflicts and respond to threats that might lead to the recurrence of conflict. The evaluations also indicate, however, that the Fund could do better in a number of areas, emphasizing that there is a need (a) to strengthen the strategic focus of its funding; (b) to clarify the roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders; (c) to engage in critical start-up activities; (d) to improve its operational guidance; (e) to enhance communication and information-sharing; and (f) to accept the political realities of peacebuilding and manage expectations proactively. In addition, the evaluations called upon the Peacebuilding Support Office and its partners to identify and tackle the main and systemic sources of delays in the conceptualization and implementation of critical peacebuilding activities. The Office fully concurred with those action points in its management response and has developed a plan of action to address them.

### **B. Revision of the terms of reference**

46. As set out in the Secretary-General's report on the arrangements for establishing the Peacebuilding Fund (A/60/984), the Peacebuilding Support Office initiated a revision of the Fund's terms of reference in 2008. The process of revision incorporated and benefited from a series of discrete processes, including a review of lessons learned from the Fund's activities, and extensive informal consultations and briefings held with Member States, donors, the Peacebuilding Commission and other stakeholders. The revision also reflected the proposals contained in the Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (A/63/881-S/2009/304) concerning the two ways in which the Fund could be used to catalyse early priorities and to bridge the funding gap between donor contributions

and funding disbursements. On the advice of Member States, the revised terms of reference transform the Fund's three-window architecture into two facilities: (a) the Immediate Response Facility (an expanded and more agile emergency window); and (b) the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (merging windows I and II). In its resolution 63/282, the General Assembly welcomed the revised terms of reference, thus opening the way for improving the Fund's performance through greater operational responsiveness, increased effectiveness and efficiency and enhanced synergy between the Fund and the Peacebuilding Commission.

### **C. Structural and management reforms**

47. The evaluations also informed a series of structural and management improvements. The Peacebuilding Support Office's management response built on many actions already under way, and progress has been made regarding the recruitment of additional staff to fill critical capacity gaps hand in hand with increased partnership with United Nations agencies and departments and internal task-sharing within the Office.

48. An inter-agency task force has been formed to draw upon United Nations system expertise and provide practical inputs for guidelines on field programming and implementation of the Fund, and a series of meetings to share ideas and lessons on peacebuilding support is ongoing. Revised guidelines will better articulate the means of pursuing the Fund's core objectives and define the new structural arrangements as approved in the revised terms of reference. Clarifying the various roles and responsibilities at all levels, in particular in decision-making, reporting and accountability, is a paramount objective, including synchronizing arrangements with the UNDP Multi-donor Trust Fund Office as the Fund administrator. Initial work has also commenced with the United Nations and external partners, such as academic institutions, for stepping up related peacebuilding training, awareness-raising and field support, all with an emphasis on drawing upon and bolstering the Fund's effectiveness.

### **D. Focus on results and learning from the field**

49. Results-based monitoring and reporting is a priority for the Fund in order to follow project progress, document effective and catalytic strategies and share lessons with key actors across Fund-supported countries. Responsibility for monitoring and reporting at the project level rests with the recipient United Nations organization, while the joint steering committee and the Fund's country-level secretariats monitor overall progress of the country programme. Quarterly project updates are compiled to allow the Peacebuilding Support Office, the UNDP Multi-donor Trust Fund Office, country-level joint steering committees and recipient organizations (at their respective headquarters) to monitor progress and results. Monitoring support missions were fielded to West Africa and staff exchanges were initiated between Fund-supported countries in Central and West Africa. In collaboration with academic institutions, a pilot monitoring and evaluation training exercise has been developed for the Fund's secretariats and joint steering committees, and is expected to lead to inputs for Fund-specific training modules.

50. The first two countries supported by the Peacebuilding Fund, Burundi and Sierra Leone, commissioned midterm reviews in 2009 to assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the projects and to provide a set of practical recommendations to aid in successful project completion and in the phasing out of Fund activities in those countries. In Sierra Leone, the joint review was initiated by the Government, UNDP (the main recipient United Nations organization) and UNIPSIL, and its conclusions indicated improved performance and delivery rates following a slow start-up. The review highlighted the need to strengthen project management, to ensure effective monitoring and reporting practices, to institute a communication strategy for wide dissemination of results and to enhance the Fund's catalytic effect. The midterm review in Burundi is scheduled for August 2009.

## **V. Management and oversight of the Fund**

### **Activities of the Peacebuilding Support Office**

51. The consideration and approval of new project requests slowed down during the second half of 2008 and in early 2009 in order to allow for the results of the various evaluation exercises and the review of the terms of reference to be reflected in an improved management and guidance system. In response to the evaluations, the Peacebuilding Support Office embarked on management improvements in the following four priority areas: (a) strengthening global management: review of existing accountability mechanisms and decision-making processes; review and staffing up of the Fund's global office to meet programmatic fund management needs and review of the division of labour with the UNDP Multi-donor Trust Fund Office; (b) improving guidelines and training: update of guidelines to reflect the new terms of reference and development of a training package for operational and programmatic issues; (c) strengthening support for Fund-supported countries: stronger field management structures; increased Peacebuilding Support Office engagement during the start-up phase; organization of an annual training event for Fund-supported countries and increased monitoring visits to those countries; and (d) improving communications and outreach: development of a global and country-level communications strategy and regular progress reporting to both the Fund and the Fund's donor group. The Peacebuilding Support Office, in collaboration with the UNDP Multi-donor Trust Fund Office, UNDP and the Department of Political Affairs, fielded support and start-up missions to Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Nepal and Sierra Leone.

### **Activities of the Advisory Group**

52. Pursuant to the Fund's terms of reference, the Secretary-General appointed an independent advisory group to provide advice and oversight on the speed and appropriateness of the fund allocations and to examine performance and financial reports on its use to ensure accountability, effectiveness and transparency. The Peacebuilding Fund Advisory Group met in October 2008 and May 2009 to discuss the OIOS evaluation of the Fund, advise on the revision of the Fund's terms of reference and review the Fund's guidelines and procedures. The Advisory Group furthermore revisited and clarified its own terms of reference, in particular with regard to its oversight function vis-à-vis the Fund, and agreed to concentrate on three critical oversight tasks: (a) review of the policy on and speed of Peacebuilding

Fund allocations; (b) review of the performance of the Fund; and (c) identification of best practices and lessons learned in peacebuilding. The Advisory Group will participate actively in the reformulating of the guidelines and operational policies required to make the revised terms of reference operational.

## **VI. Partnership-building and collaboration with other funds**

53. Some of the difficulties experienced by recipient United Nations organizations in implementing Fund activities reflect systemic constraints that cannot be fully resolved within the context of the Fund. Most recipient organizations do not have implementation modalities tailored to countries emerging from conflict and this puts limitations on their response capacity. The Peacebuilding Support Office has been working with its partners to identify solutions to some of those limitations. The Office has also increased its engagement and partnerships with other multi-donor trust funds, e.g. the Central Emergency Response Fund, the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security and the UNDP Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery; and further consultation meetings are planned in the context of revising the Fund's guidelines through the sharing of experiences, methodologies and lessons learned. In addition, the Office has shared its views on funding for peacebuilding in the context of the work of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's International Network on Conflict and Fragility and will continue to do so with interested partners. Collaborative opportunities with specialized agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations have recently been stepped up, with the Development Operations Coordination Office and the United Nations System Staff College harmonizing fund application within common country planning processes and supporting conflict prevention principles embedded in United Nations responses to national recovery and development plans.

## **VII. Conclusions and the way ahead**

54. The Fund has demonstrated its potential to fill a critical niche in the area of peacebuilding. While much remains to be done, evaluations have documented early successes and innovations that underline the importance and relevance of this new funding instrument. The teething problems faced by the Fund are not unusual for a new fund. Much has been learned during the initial two years of full operation and this must now inform a concerted effort by the Peacebuilding Support Office, recipient United Nations organizations and Member States in order to fully address the shortcomings identified in the external evaluations.

55. The Fund's revised terms of reference provide an effective platform for improving its performance and application. Applying the new terms of reference while addressing the challenges identified in the evaluations should enable the Fund to serve as a fast-disbursing, agile, responsive and risk-taking peacebuilding instrument that can be fully utilized in the spirit of the Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

56. The way ahead includes the establishment of full fund management capacity within the Peacebuilding Support Office in order to improve global and country-level support, in particular during the critical start-up phase of Fund activities in each country; the establishment of a robust accountability framework so as to

respond to the information and oversight requirements of the Fund's donors; improved synergy with the Peacebuilding Commission, in particular regarding countries on its agenda and for better capturing the lessons learned by activities through the Working Group on Lessons Learned; using the Fund to improve United Nations cooperation and collaboration on peacebuilding so as to strengthen the system's ability to support countries emerging from conflict; and expanding the Fund's operations to strategically assist more countries requiring urgent peacebuilding support.

## Annex I

**Peacebuilding Fund: cumulative pledges, commitments and deposits as at 30 June 2008**

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Pledges<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Commitments<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Deposits</i>
	<i>(donor currency)</i>	<i>(United States dollars)</i>	
Australia	\$A 3 000 000	2 414 400	2 414 400
Austria	€1 500 000	2 108 550	2 108 550
Bahrain	US\$ 10 000	10 000	10 000
Belgium	€2 477 651	3 647 407	3 647 407
Brazil	US\$ 590 000	590 000	590 000
Canada	\$Can 20 000 000	18 765 294	18 765 294
Chile	US\$ 161 449	161 449	161 449
China	US\$ 3 000 000	3 000 000	2 000 000
Croatia	US\$ 30 000	30 000	63 000
Cyprus	US\$ 20 000	20 000	40 000
Czech Republic	US\$ 346 682	346 682	346 682
Denmark	DKr 50 000 000	8 878 509	8 878 509
Egypt	US\$ 45 000	45 000	45 000
Finland	€4 800 000	6 543 638	6 543 638
France	€1 000 000	1 359 100	2 881 600
Germany	US\$ 11 000 000	11 000 000	11 000 000
Iceland	US\$ 1 000 000	1 000 000	1 000 000
India	US\$ 2 000 000	2 000 000	2 000 000
Indonesia	US\$ 40 000	40 000	40 000
Ireland	€10 000 000	12 600 000	12 600 000
Italy	€4 000 000	5 766 562	5 766 562
Japan	US\$ 20 000 000	20 000 000	20 000 000
Kuwait	US\$ 500 000	500 000	500 000
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	US\$ 50 000	50 000	50 000
Luxembourg	€916 927	1 256 551	1 256 551
Mexico	US\$ 100 000	100 000	100 000
Morocco	US\$ 5 000	5 000	5 000
Netherlands	US\$ 46 456 518	46 456 518	46 456 518
Norway	NKr 200 000 000	32 124 458	32 124 458
Poland	US\$ 100 000	100 000	100 000
Portugal	US\$ 1 000 000	1 000 000	1 000 000
Qatar	US\$ 200 000	200 000	200 000
Republic of Korea	US\$ 3 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000
Romania	€100 000	147 210	147 210
Russian Federation	US\$ —	—	2 000 000

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Pledges<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Commitments<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Deposits</i>
	<i>(donor currency)</i>	<i>(United States dollars)</i>	
Saudi Arabia	US\$ —	—	500 000
Slovenia	US\$ 20 000	20 000	20 000
Spain	€8 900 000	12 001 999	12 001 999
Sweden	SKr 400 000 000	54 555 181	54 555 181
Thailand	US\$ 10 000	10 000	10 000
Turkey	US\$ 1 200 000	1 200 000	1 200 000
United Arab Emirates	US\$ —	—	500 000
United Kingdom	£30 000 000	52 960 200	52 960 200
Organization of the Islamic Conference	US\$ 20 000	20 000	20 000
Private donors	US\$ 18 933	18 933	18 933
<b>Total</b>		<b>306 052 641</b>	<b>309 628 141</b>

*Notes*

<sup>a</sup> Pledges: voluntary contributions by donors pending formalization of letter of agreement.

<sup>b</sup> Commitments: contribution as per signed letter of agreement. United States dollar equivalents of commitments are estimated at United Nations operational exchange rates and are for indicative purposes only.



## Annex II

## Peacebuilding Fund projects approved in 2008/09

## A. Burundi

<i>Burundi Peacebuilding Fund Steering Committee approval date</i>	<i>Burundi Peacebuilding Fund priority area</i>	<i>Recipient United Nations organization</i>	<i>Project title</i>	<i>Approved budget (in United States dollars)</i>
3 November 2008	Human rights	UNDP	Reduction of violence by relaunching the national programme for the enforcement of decisions rendered by courts; and capacity-building for judicial institutions	158 520
18 November 2008	Democratic governance	UNDP	Initiation of dialogue among national partners	148 000
18 November 2008	Democratic governance	UNIFEM	Strengthening the role of women in the process of community reconstruction	105 193
24 November 2008	Democratic governance	UNFPA	Youth participation in social cohesion	200 005
24 November 2008	Security sector	UNDP	Rehabilitation of the barracks of the National Defence Forces to reduce their impact on the population	229 150
<b>Total approved</b>				<b>840 868</b>

## B. Central African Republic

<i>Central African Republic Peacebuilding Fund Steering Committee approval date</i>	<i>Central African Republic Peacebuilding Fund priority area</i>	<i>Recipient United Nations organization</i>	<i>Project title</i>	<i>Approved budget (in United States dollars)</i>
3 December 2008	Security sector reform	UNHCR	Reintegration of young people through employment	500 000
1 April 2008	Security sector reform	UNDP	Support for the start of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme	3 955 710
12 November 2008	Security sector reform	UNICEF	Prevention of recruitment, demobilization and reintegration of children associated with armed forces and groups and other children and women	2 000 000
12 November 2008	Communities affected by conflict	FAO	Revival of agro-pastoral activities in Paoua, Bozoum and Ndelé	300 000
12 November 2008	Communities affected by conflict	FAO	Socio-economic recovery for communities affected by the conflict	300 000
12 November 2008	Communities affected by conflict	UNDP	Apprenticeship training for young people affected by the conflict	450 000
12 November 2008	Communities affected by conflict	UNESCO	Community radios for social cohesion throughout the country	324 000
12 November 2008	Communities affected by conflict	UNESCO	Vocational training centres in Bozoum, Bossangoa and Bria	355 000

<i>Central African Republic Peacebuilding Fund Steering Committee approval date</i>	<i>Central African Republic Peacebuilding Fund priority area</i>	<i>Recipient United Nations organization</i>	<i>Project title</i>	<i>Approved budget (in United States dollars)</i>
12 November 2008	Communities affected by conflict	UNESCO	Expression and reconciliation	371 000
12 November 2008	Governance and rule of law	UNFPA	Empowerment of women affected by the conflict for community reconstruction	686 200
12 November 2008	Governance and rule of law	UNDP	Network of women leaders for women's rights	390 000
3 December 2008	Governance and rule of law	UNHCR	Training for women in human rights in Ouham-Pendé and Bamingui-Bangoran	368 090
<b>Total approved</b>				<b>10 000 000</b>

### C. Côte d'Ivoire

<i>Côte d'Ivoire Peacebuilding Fund Steering Committee approval date</i>	<i>Côte d'Ivoire Peacebuilding Fund priority area</i>	<i>Recipient United Nations organization</i>	<i>Project title</i>	<i>Approved budget (in United States dollars)</i>
12 June 2008	Support for the reintegration of ex-combatants, former militia members and youth at risk	UNDP	1,000 micro-projects for reintegration of ex-combatants and youth	4 000 000
12 June 2008	Support to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement	UNDP	Supporting implementation of Ouagadougou "direct dialogue"	1 000 000
<b>Total approved</b>				<b>5 000 000</b>

### D. Liberia

<i>Liberia Peacebuilding Fund Steering Committee approval date</i>	<i>Liberia Peacebuilding Fund priority area</i>	<i>Recipient United Nations organization</i>	<i>Project title</i>	<i>Approved budget (in United States dollars)</i>
25 September 2008	Fostering national reconciliation and conflict management	UNHCR	Community empowerment: peace, human rights and civic partnerships	932 400
17 October 2008	Fostering national reconciliation and conflict management	UNESCO	Peace, human rights and citizenship schooling	900 000
22 December 2008	Fostering national reconciliation and conflict management	UNDP	Volunteers for peace	450 000
22 March 2008	Fostering national reconciliation and conflict management	UNDP	Truth and Reconciliation Commission final initiative: consultations and national conference	350 000

<i>Liberia Peacebuilding Fund Steering Committee approval date</i>	<i>Liberia Peacebuilding Fund priority area</i>	<i>Recipient United Nations organization</i>	<i>Project title</i>	<i>Approved budget (in United States dollars)</i>
22 March 2008	Fostering national reconciliation and conflict management	UNDP	Strengthening Government capacity to consolidate peace	600 000
22 March 2008	Fostering national reconciliation and conflict management	UNICEF	Youth empowerment and peace promotion	1 000 000
22 March 2008	Fostering national reconciliation and conflict management	UNOPS	Platform for dialogue and peace	1 000 000
25 September 2008	Strengthening State capacity for peace consolidation	UNHCR	Strengthening the rule of law	1 167 610
29 September 2008	Strengthening State capacity for peace consolidation	UNDP	Government Peacebuilding Office	902 759
22 December 2008	Strengthening State capacity for peace consolidation	UNDP	Improving Ministry of Justice prosecution services	1 082 000
22 December 2008	Strengthening State capacity for peace consolidation	UNDP	Strengthened public defence	750 066
22 December 2008	Strengthening State capacity for peace consolidation	United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat)	Support to the Land Commission	750 000
22 December 2008	Strengthening State capacity for peace consolidation	UNFPA	Strengthening prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence offences	792 857
22 March 2008	Strengthening State capacity for peace consolidation	UNDP	Enhancing police-community relations	750 000
25 September 2008	Critical interventions to promote peace and resolve conflict	UNDP	Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme	1 123 500
22 December 2008	Critical interventions to promote peace and resolve conflict	UNFPA	Psychosocial and community support	889 902
22 December 2008	Critical interventions to promote peace and resolve conflict	UNDP	Supporting the Anti-Corruption Commission	500 000
22 March 2008	Critical interventions to promote peace and resolve conflict	UNDP	Peaceful reintegration of high-risk youths through rural transport opportunities	250 000
<b>Total approved</b>				<b>14 191 904</b>

## E. Sierra Leone

<i>Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Fund Steering Committee approval date</i>	<i>Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Fund priority area</i>	<i>Recipient United Nations organization</i>	<i>Project title</i>	<i>Approved budget (in United States dollars)</i>
15 July 2008	Democracy and good governance	UNDP	Support to the National Anti-Corruption Strategy secretariat	349 034
15 July 2008	Democracy and good governance	UNIFEM and UNICEF	Supporting gender capacity, women's rights and child protection	802 640
15 July 2008	Democracy and good governance	IOM	Supporting the reparations programme as a recommendation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission	3 000 000
5 June 2009	Democracy and good governance	IOM	Supporting the parliament in representation, oversight and legislative enactment	700 000
5 June 2009	Democracy and good governance	IOM	Attitudinal and behavioural change	140 000
5 June 2009	Democracy and good governance	IOM	Strengthening the Civil Society Peacebuilding Engagement Committee and women's organizations in peace consolidation	140 000
5 June 2009	Democracy and good governance	IOM	Regional cooperation in the Mano River Union	130 000
15 July 2008	Justice and security	IOM	Reformation, justice and security for prison inmates	1 610 933
15 July 2008	Justice and security	UNDP	Support to the Office of National Security	1 576 538
3 June 2009	Justice and security	IOM	Promoting women's participation in the SSR process	45 261
15 July 2008	Energy	UNDP	Emergency support to the energy sector	9 000 000
15 July 2008	Capacity-building of public administration	UNDP	Supporting the Government's capacity for peacebuilding engagement	348 125
5 June 2009	Public administration	UNDP	Independent national public broadcasting service	850,000
<b>Total approved</b>				<b>18 629 531</b>

## F. Peacebuilding Fund emergency projects

<i>Head of Peacebuilding Support Office approval date</i>	<i>Recipient United Nations organization</i>	<i>Project title</i>	<i>Approved budget (in United States dollars)</i>
11 May 2009	UNDP Burundi	Support to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, phase 1	1 000 000
29 May 2009	UNDP Timor-Leste <sup>a</sup>	Support to internally displaced persons and communities affected by internally displaced persons	543 284

<i>Head of Peacebuilding Support Office approval date</i>	<i>Recipient United Nations organization</i>	<i>Project title</i>	<i>Approved budget (in United States dollars)</i>
11 June 2009	UNDP Sierra Leone	Political reconciliation and restoration of democratic institutions	946 950
11 June 2009	UNDP Sierra Leone	Support to police's public order maintenance capacity	999 870
<b>Total funds for emergency projects</b>			<b>3 940 445</b>

<sup>a</sup> Funding in the amount of \$450,341 jointly approved for IOM.



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF IRELAND TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF MEXICO TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF  
SOUTH AFRICA TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**

Thursday, 24 June 2010

Dear Colleagues,

Further to our two previous informal Consultations, we now wish to invite you and your delegation to a third and final Informal Consultation on the 2010 Review of the Peacebuilding Commission, to be held in Conference Room 1 on 7 July 2010 at 10 am.

As we are now at the stage of drafting our Report, we look forward to a further exchange with members.

As you will recall, at the first open-ended session we shared our general planning and our Roadmap. At the second session we identified 'Emerging Issues' and invited your views. At this stage, we would like to share some 'Emerging Recommendations' which we are considering and on which it would be useful to have your feedback.

Our Report will seek to address the range of relevant issues. The areas explored in the attached paper are by no means comprehensive; instead, we have felt it more useful to concentrate on a set of concrete issues where further input will be particularly helpful at this stage.

In view of the focussed nature of the discussion, we anticipate that a half day meeting will be adequate. We do not propose a sequential agenda: we will welcome single interventions focussing on whichever of the topics colleagues would wish to address.

We look forward to seeing you on 7 July. Meanwhile, you are of course welcome to contact us or any of our collaborators in advance of the meeting for discussion or clarification, or indeed to express a view on any of the issues relevant to the Review.

Yours sincerely,

Anne Anderson  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of  
Ireland to the United Nations

Claude Heller  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of  
Mexico to the United Nations

Baso Sangqu  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of the  
Republic of South Africa to  
the United Nations

## **Some Emerging Recommendations**

The Co-facilitators hope to present a full set of recommendations which, taken together, will lead to a qualitative improvement in the PBC role and impact. Our Report will assess (i) the situation in the field; (ii) the working of the PBC at HQ; (iii) key relationships within the UN and outside; (iv) the operation of the PBSO and PBF.

We have had a rich set of inputs during the consultative process to date and are open to further comments on any aspect of our work during the coming days. However, rather than having a further general round of discussion on 7 July, our preference is to focus on a limited number of specific issues and to have the benefit of member States' comments on these points. The identification of issues below, therefore, is highly selective and our Report will range considerably wider.

### **I. The Functioning of the PBC**

#### **a) Multi-tiered Engagement**

There has been a good deal of discussion of a 'PBC-lite', and some potential candidates have suggested they would prefer a form of engagement other than a fully-fledged CSC.

While there is understanding of this viewpoint, there is also a certain concern that a 'PBC-lite' may come at the cost of the fully-rounded and holistic approach that is key to successful peacebuilding. There are also questions as to how, in the absence of a CSC, there is to be proper engagement with and oversight of the 'light touch' approach.

Members may have a view as to whether it would be desirable to have some sort of menu of choices available to potential Agenda countries. The CSC approach would remain the staple on this menu, offering a uniquely in-depth consideration. However, a sectoral or regional or 'lighter footprint' engagement could also be an available option.

The question of how such 'light footprint' situations might best be overseen would need to be addressed: the OC? (And, if so, what arrangements would need to be put in place to ensure meaningful engagement?) Some lighter variants of CSCs? Alternative arrangements?

We would welcome views on the range of issues surrounding 'multi-tiered engagement.'

**b) Strengthening the OC: Responsibility for all Generic Issues**

The Report will look at various ways of strengthening the OC, including a more focussed agenda, a clearer oversight of the CSCs, a defined responsibility in relation to assuring mutual accountability.

A specific issue relates to 'lessons learned'. There is no doubt that the PBC needs to learn continually from experience and to apply lessons learned. The question is whether this is better done in a separate working group as at present or done directly by the Organisational Committee.

Some see the benefits of a separate working group and point to useful work accomplished to date in the Working Group on Lessons Learned. Other interlocutors, while appreciating the quality of work being done in the WGLL, feel that the OC is the body best equipped to address all generic themes as well as having oversight of the CSCs. In their view, a more logical and streamlined approach would be to have the OC conduct the lessons learned exercise.

We would welcome views in this regard.

**c) Strengthening the CSCs: The Chairing Issue**

Our Report will also address the strengthening of the CSCs, including how the Chair might be better supported (notably through the introduction of a country dimension to the chairing role) and the connection with the field tightened.

One of the issues that arises in this context is the appropriate profile for Chairs. The pattern to date is chairing of the CSCs by a Permanent Representative in New York. This is based on a view that a suitably experienced PR has the overview, political sensitivity and access across the UN system to bring real value-added.

Another view is that the pool from which CSC Chairs are drawn should be widened. For example, senior capital-based figures may bring more hands-on experience, perhaps more permanence, and there is no reason why they should not travel to New York and the field as often as necessary.

We would value the views of members on the issue.



**d) Criteria for Entry and Exit**

During our consultations we heard extensive discussion of the need to draw up entry and exit criteria for PBC engagement. On the one hand there is a perceived need to identify the kinds of situations which are amenable to engagement by the PBC and in what circumstances that engagement should end. On the other, it was clearly articulated that technocratic criteria which pay insufficient attention to the specific political contexts and individual wishes of the countries concerned must be avoided.

We would value the views of members as to how these two sets of considerations can best be balanced.

**II. The Preventive Dimension**

The need for conflict prevention is obvious: there is no doubt as to the importance of trying to strengthen the fabric of a society as it threatens to fall apart, rather than relying on repair after the damage has occurred. The preventive dimension of the PBC work was discussed prior to establishment in 2005 and has come back into focus during the Review.

The point has been emphatically made to us, on the ground as well as in our consultations in New York, that the PBC mandate should include a clear preventive role. What is not so clear is the extent to which this is already accommodated in the existing mandate (preambular paragraph 7 and operative paragraph 12). Some would view the existing text as providing adequate scope for preventive work; others would consider that, the preventive dimension needs to be more fully and unequivocally brought out, and that a clarification would help to dispel any doubts and confirm the membership's backing for such a move.

We would welcome any further views in this regard.

**III. The Wider Peacebuilding Architecture**

**a) Enhanced capacity in the PBSO**

The PBSO has a critical part to play in the UN's peacebuilding architecture, in its mandated roles of supporting the PBC and the PBF and providing analysis of cross-cutting issues and best practices. There is a general view that it is not yet performing this role to the extent intended.

In our consultations we have heard that the PBSO needs to improve significantly its analytical capacity and tap more effectively into expertise available across the UN system. We have also heard that the current staffing situation of the Office (particularly the ratio between core and non-core staff) does not easily lend itself to such improvement. The concern has also been expressed that the positioning of the PBSO within the Secretariat is not conducive to commanding the attention of the UN system on peacebuilding issues.

We would value the views of members as to how these issues are best addressed.

**b) Allocation of PBF Funding: A degree of Ring Fencing?**

PBF allocations are made not by the PBC but as a result of a separate and independent decision-making process. In practice, about 60% of PBF allocations have gone to the four PBC Agenda countries, although there is no formal requirement in this regard.

There is a view that it is important to incentivise countries coming on the PBC Agenda and that it might be desirable to formalise in some way their 'preferential access' to PBC funds. A contrary view would be that it is better to remain with a more ad hoc approach and leave discretion in the matter to the PBF decision-makers: the Advisory Board and the Secretariat.

We would value the views of members on this point.



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF IRELAND TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF MEXICO TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF  
SOUTH AFRICA TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**

Thursday, 1 April 2010

Dear Colleagues,

We have been continuing our consultations as Co-facilitators of the Review of the Peacebuilding architecture and have appreciated the opportunity to engage with many of you over recent weeks. We would now like to invite all colleagues to a Second Informal Consultation on the 2010 Review of the Peacebuilding Commission on Monday 10 May.

Our earlier roadmap had envisaged this second consultative meeting before the end of April. However, with field visits envisaged in the latter half of April, and many colleagues preoccupied with ministerial visits during the opening days of the NPT Review Conference, we felt it preferable to have a slight deferral to 10 May.

We are providing an 'Emerging Issues' Paper (attached) to help shape the discussion. Rather than trying to encompass all issues, we have selectively identified some clusters that we feel would benefit from further discussion at this stage.

We envisage both a morning and an afternoon session on 10 May and would plan to work through the clusters, preferably in a sequential manner. We would greatly appreciate and benefit from your focussed - and ideally interactive - comments on each area on which you would like to contribute. At the close of the session, there will be a wrap-up opportunity for comment on any issues not already covered.

As an aid to our work, it would be helpful if your collaborators could indicate in advance to one of our Missions the clusters or issues you intend to address.

We look forward to seeing you on 10 May and to continuing contact on an individual or group basis in the interim.

Yours sincerely,

Anne Anderson  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of  
Ireland to the United Nations

Claude Heller  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of  
Mexico to the United Nations

Baso Sangqu  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of the  
Republic of South Africa to  
the United Nations



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF IRELAND TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF MEXICO TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF  
SOUTH AFRICA TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**

DRAFT

Monday, 29 March 2010

Dear Colleagues,

We have been continuing our consultations as Co-facilitators of the Review of the Peacebuilding architecture and have appreciated the opportunity to engage with many of you over recent weeks. We would like to invite all colleagues to a second open-ended consultation on Friday 7 May.

Our earlier roadmap had envisaged this second consultative meeting before the end of April. However, with two field trips envisaged in the latter half of April, and many colleagues preoccupied with ministerial visits during the opening days of the NPT Review Conference, we felt it preferable to have a slight deferral to 7 May.

As set out in our earlier roadmap, we are providing an 'Emerging Issues' Paper (attached) to help shape the discussion on 7 May. Rather than trying to encompass all issues, we have selectively identified some clusters that we feel with benefit from further discussion at this stage.

We envisage both a morning and an afternoon session on 7 May and would plan to work through the clusters sequentially. We would greatly appreciate and benefit from your focussed - and ideally interactive - comments on each area on which you would like to contribute. At the close of the session, there will be a wrap-up opportunity for comment on any issues not already covered.

We look forward to seeing you on 7 May and to continuing contact on an individual or group basis in the interim.

Yours sincerely,

## **Review of Peacebuilding Architecture**

### **Emerging Issues**

As set out in the roadmap circulated at the first open-ended consultation, the Co-facilitators have been engaging in extensive consultations over the past weeks. We are grateful for the inputs from a range of interlocutors, and it is clear that clusters of issues are emerging from the various consultations.

At the second open-ended meeting, rather than inviting colleagues to work through an exhaustive check-list, we feel it will be more useful to invite discussion around half a dozen key propositions. The identification of issues below is necessarily selective, and the Co-facilitators will of course continue to gather views on all other matters that are relevant to the review.

#### **(i) PBC Place within UN Architecture / Internal Organisation**

**Proposition:** The PBC should occupy a more central and more strategic place within the overall UN architecture.

**Challenge:** Translating this general proposition into concrete reality: this means reassessing the relationship with the key UN bodies (Security Council, General Assembly, ECOSOC) and the extent to which peacebuilding is prioritised within the Secretariat and across the UN system.

**Issues:** Can the Security Council and the General Assembly make more strategic use of the PBC to enhance its effectiveness? The composition of the PBC confers a particular legitimacy: how can this be better leveraged? What role can the Secretary-General play in giving heft and clout to the PBC? Does the PBO have sufficient strength and analytical capacity to effectively underpin the PBC? Does it carry sufficient weight in its interaction with other parts of the system?

Are there ways in which the PBC can better “earn” this more strategic space? For example, is the Organisational Committee sufficiently adding value? Does the Working Group on Lessons Learned achieve what it set out to do?

## **(ii) Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding**

**Proposition:** A sequential approach will not work: peacebuilding needs to be factored into peacekeeping from the outset so that the transition, when it occurs, is as seamless as possible.

**Challenge:** To ensure this relatively new way of approaching peacekeeping/peacebuilding becomes truly embedded in the UN mentality and practice.

**Issues:** How do we move away from a view that peacebuilding is a relatively minor (and considerably lower cost) aftermath of peacekeeping? Does it mean further changes in peacebuilding design? Does it imply an earlier and more pro-active engagement by the PBC, such as in the drafting of mandates? How to ensure that transition to peacebuilding does not, in practice, signify a loss of international attention and resources?

## **(iii) Mobilising Resources/Development Issues/Mutual Accountability**

**Proposition:** Peacebuilding requires an integrated and multi-dimensional approach, going well beyond injection of resources; nevertheless, the fabric of war-torn societies will not be repaired without significant financial resources. The PBC has a role in resource mobilisation, particularly in ensuring that an early 'peace dividend' helps to reward effort and sustain hope.

**Challenge:** With no funds directly at its disposal, the PBC has to identify appropriate entry points to decision-making elsewhere.

**Issues:** How can the interaction with the PBF be improved, while respecting the separate decision-making process of the PBF? Can a more structured and more strategic PBC input to the decision-making processes of the IFIs be defined?

How is the PBC to give adequate weight to the developmental challenges which characterise post-conflict societies? What should be the distinctive PBC focus in seeking to mobilise resources: catalytic? drawing attention to funding gaps? Trying to fill political/security spaces (eg. SSR)? focussing on developmental needs that have strong political implications (eg. youth employment)?

Mutual accountability is particularly relevant when it comes to resource allocation: what is the PBC's role in ensuring that delivery on the part of governments is matched by delivery on the part of the international community, and vice-versa?

#### **(iv) In the Field**

**Proposition:** Peacebuilding succeeds or fails in the field: this implies national ownership, ensuring that administrative burdens do not overwhelm new and fragile national structures or duplicate existing strategies, ensuring that the 'risks to reward' ratio is such as to incentivise governments to engage with the PBC.

**Challenge:** Ensuring that New York-based processes truly connect with, and bring added value to, what is happening on the ground.

**Issues:** How best can international partnership support national ownership? Is there general support for moving towards a single strategy document (for example, on the lines of the Sierra Leone "Vision" document)? How does this mesh with 'Delivering as One'?

If there are to be possibilities of multi-tiered engagement with the PBC, do we need to define these potential tiers? (Would the OC rather than the CSCs take oversight in cases of lighter engagement?)

Bearing in mind that each situation is distinctive and "no one size fits all", can we identify some elements of a successful peacebuilding model that may be transferable? If so, what are they and how to best ensure their application? How best to measure progress in peacebuilding?

#### **(v) Regional Approaches to Peacebuilding**

**Proposition:** Very many conflict situations go beyond national boundaries, both fuelled by and feeding into cross-border tensions. The PBC should take better account of this regional dimension.

**Challenge:** To develop a regional perspective and the regional partnerships that will reflect the complexity and inter-relatedness of many conflict situations.

**Issues:** In practice, how is this regional perspective to be developed? How will regional situations come onto the PBC agenda, and how will they be dealt with (OC? Specific regional configurations? Add-on to current CSCs?) How to encourage greater cooperation between different UN entities working in particular regions? How best can relationships with regional and sub-regional bodies (in Africa, for example, with the AU, ECOWAS, SADC and others) be developed?

**(vi) Scaling Up**

**Proposition:** After its five initial years, the PBC is ready to extend its level of ambition, taking on further specific situations and including countries with larger population size.

**Challenge:** To inspire confidence that the PBC is ready for such scaling up; encouraging further countries to come under PBC consideration and having the support of the Security Council to move in this direction.

**Issues:** Does the PBC have the determination, the tools, and the experience to move to this next stage? Beyond actual performance, is its 'brand image' sufficiently positive and well established? If not, how can it be improved on? As well as the PBC being an advocate for countries on its agenda, is the wider UN membership prepared to become an advocate for the PBC in encouraging its greater and more strategic use?





**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF IRELAND TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF MEXICO TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**



**PERMANENT MISSION  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF  
SOUTH AFRICA TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**

Friday, 5 February 2010

To: All Permanent Representatives  
and Permanent Observers

Excellency,

We refer to the letters dated 11 December 2009 from the President of the General Assembly and 17 December 2009 from the President of the Security Council, in which they informed that we, the undersigned Permanent Representatives of Ireland, Mexico and South Africa, have agreed to serve as Facilitators for the **2010 Review of the Peacebuilding Commission**.

As recalled in the letters, the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, as an Advisory Body of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, was one of the major outcomes of the 2005 World Summit.

Paragraph 27 of the founding resolutions A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645/2005 provides that the arrangements set out by those resolutions will be reviewed after five years.

We are honoured to have been invited to facilitate this important review and we look forward to the engagement and support of all member States. We are committed to conducting our work in an open and inclusive manner.

To launch the Review Process, we would like to convene Informal Consultations on the 2010 Review of the Peacebuilding Commission on **Wednesday 17 February 2010, at 10 am** in Conference Room 2 in the TNLB.

At this first informal Consultation, we will share our initial thinking as to how we envisage the conduct of the review exercise. We look forward to hearing member States' views about the process and the issues they deem most important to be covered in the review. The meeting will also be an opportunity for the Facilitators to hear initial views on how best to ensure that the Peacebuilding Commission is adequately equipped and adapted to perform its mandate, including at the country level.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration.

Anne Anderson  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of  
Ireland to the United Nations

Claude Heller  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of  
Mexico to the United Nations

Baso Sangqu  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of the  
Republic of South Africa to  
the United Nations

20 November 2009

## 64<sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly

### Statement by the President of the General Assembly at the first meeting on the 2010 Review of the Peacebuilding Commission

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen

In recent years, peacebuilding has come to be recognized as an essential and integral component of a comprehensive approach to peace and development. The challenge of assisting countries emerging from conflict move towards sustainable peace, and the imperative of preventing relapse of conflict, was duly acknowledged by the 2005 World Summit. The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund as the new UN institutional architecture was a logical outcome, responding to the need for a more coherent system-wide approach and strengthened capacity for successful peacebuilding.

Into the fourth year of its operation, this joint debate provides a useful opportunity to the general membership to assess the performance of the new peacebuilding architecture and to suggest ways and means of improving it further. We need to reflect deeply on how and to what extent the vision and objectives of peacebuilding have been put to practice. We should always keep in mind that for the millions of people struggling to win back their future from a past shattered by conflict and devastation, what matters most is the tangible benefit on ground, the improvement in their daily lives brought about by peace-building. These people are the best judge of their priorities and interests. Their voices should be heard first and foremost. That is why the principal of national ownership is the corner stone of an effective peace-building partnership.

This partnership must also address the complex underlying issues – the interlinked military, political, development, humanitarian and other dimensions of conflict situations. Sustained integrated strategies backed by adequate resources are required to respond to these challenges. Such strategies also entail a more effective and operational interface between peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. It is a serious undertaking, whose success depends on the commitment and collective political will of Member States.

It is this commitment and support that the Peacebuilding Commission must continue to enjoy, given its important mandate, which it has carried out quite admirably since 2006. The upcoming review of the Peacebuilding Commission, mandated by the founding resolutions A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645(2005), I hope will provide an opportunity to not only renew our commitment to the cause of peacebuilding but also to ensure that the Peacebuilding architecture is adequately equipped and adapted to perform its core mandates.

I have been in consultation with the Presidents of the Security Council regarding the process for this review. We have agreed that the review needs to be conducted in an open and inclusive manner. To this end, I intend to appoint two facilitators.

I hope this review will prioritize the effective delivery of political and economic support to countries emerging from conflict, and that Member States would combine their energies to reach an outcome which corresponds to the high expectations for more responsive, effective and efficient peacebuilding by the United Nations.

Thank you.

17 February 2010

## 64<sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly

### Statement by the President of the General Assembly at the 2010 Review of the Peacebuilding Commission informal consultation

Mr. Secretary-General,  
Mr. President,  
Excellencies,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

War is devastating and it takes many years to recover. I have seen first hand in many countries, in Sierra Leone, in Central African Republic and elsewhere, as indeed have many of you, the suffering of ordinary people; homes, buildings, and schools destroyed; as well as the struggle to find food, water, shelter, and electricity. National authorities in these countries are desperate to help their people, to rebuild their economies, and to provide basic security and rule of law with few resources and little capacity. The needs are huge and post-conflict countries look to the international community to help them in their time of need.

The international community must provide better, more reliable and more substantial support to countries recovering from violent conflict. This is why the Peacebuilding Commission was created. The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Fund following the 2005 Summit were greeted as remarkable accomplishments in strengthening the UN and to organising the international community's efforts to help countries build lasting peace. Five years after its creation, it is time for Member States to review the Commission and to seize this opportunity to assess whether the Commission has met the expectations for which it was created.

It has not been easy for a new body like the Peacebuilding Commission to start working. There have been some gains in Liberia, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic and Guinea Bissau. However, there is a general feeling that more should have been accomplished in the time so far, especially in terms of tangible results on the ground. Too much time has been spent on procedure and process. I have heard from many of you that interest has faded and the performance and impact of the Commission have been mixed.

Fundamental questions need to be answered in this review: Has the Peacebuilding Commission succeeded in supporting the countries on its agenda build lasting peace? Are international efforts and the UN system, in particular, better coordinated and more coherent in their support? Do national authorities have access to sustainable resources and full ownership of peacebuilding processes? In addition to assessing the work of the Commission, I also call upon Member States to make concrete recommendations on how best to improve the Peacebuilding Commission to make it a useful and

central body. Ladies and gentlemen, we must seize this opportunity to reform and strengthen the Commission, and more importantly to enable it to provide more effective and sustained support to countries emerging from conflict.

I am pleased that the three co-facilitators agreed to guide Member States in this important review process and urge the membership to extend their full support and cooperation to the Permanent Representatives of Ireland, Mexico and South Africa. I am confident in their ability to conduct a process that is open, inclusive and transparent that will lead to a positive outcome which will greatly strengthen the Peacebuilding Commission for it to live up to its true potential.

As you know, the Peacebuilding Commission was born from both the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as drawing its membership from the Economic and Social Council. I am pleased that the President of the Security Council is here today so that we may both offer our support to this process together. Along with the Presidents of the Security Council and ECOSOC, I assure you that we are together on this review and will work closely with the Secretary-General to ensure a successful outcome.

Excellencies, you have an important responsibility and I urge you to work hard and in a spirit of cooperation to meet this responsibility.