High-Level Thematic: "A World of Risks - A New Commitment for Peace"

The President of the General Assembly, Mogens Lykketoft, organised a high-level Thematic Debate of the UN General Assembly, focused on UN, Peace and Security on 10-11 May 2016. This event served as a platform to identify key threats and engage in a strategic reflection about today's challenges to international peace and security. Furthermore, it allowed for consideration about the means, tools and instruments available within a UN-context to tackle these challenges as well as the responsibilities and institutions required for an effective collective security architecture.

Building on the common trends and synergies from the most recent UN peace and security reviews, including the review of UN peace operations [on the basis of both, the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and the Secretary-General's report on the future of UN peace operations], the Peacebuilding Architecture Review and the Global Study on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, as well as a series of coordinated, independently organized regional workshops and seminars, the thematic debate took place as the world is considering how best to implement the ambitious and wide-ranging 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as well as the Paris Agreement on climate change and who – as the next Secretary-General – will lead the UN in this and other equally vital tasks.

Member States were invited to participate at the highest possible level. Observers, UN entities, civil society, research institutions with global and regional reach, media, and other stakeholders also attended.

12 November 2015

Excellency,

With reference to my letter dated 4 November 2015, I confirmed my intention to convene three High Level Thematic Debates on each of the three inter-related pillars of the United Nations: development, peace and security and respect for human rights. I expressed the hope that these important debates would draw the highest possible level of participation from your government.

The High Level Thematic Debate scheduled for 10-11 May 2016 in particular will examine how to strengthen the role and coherence of the United Nation's architecture in the field of peace and security.

As the active participation of all members of the General Assembly is crucial to ensure the success of this endeavour, I have the honour to bring to your attention a preliminary outline with suggestions for the High Level Thematic Debate and for an inclusive preparatory process that could lead to it.

I have asked my office to organize a first informal discussion to seek your views on those ideas. This informal discussion chaired by my Chef de Cabinet, Ambassador Tomas Anker Christensen will take place on Tuesday 24 November from 1:15 to 3 p.m. in the Trusteeship Council Chamber.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Mogens Lykketoft

To all Permanent Representatives
And Permanent Observers to the United Nations
New York

Office of the President of the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
High-Level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace and Security – 10 & 11 May 2016
Preliminary outline
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Background:

The major priority of PGA Lykketoft is to advance the prompt implementation of the 2030 Agenda. In this regard, the 70th Session of the UNGA represents a unique opportunity to reflect on ways to further strengthen the UN's architecture in support of comprehensive, efficient and effective engagement in the field of peace and security. Such reflections are informed by relevant ongoing reviews and processes, particularly:

(1) The report of the High Level Independent on Peace Operations[1] and the Secretary-General's report on the future of UN peace operations[2].

(2) The Peacebuilding Architecture Review and the challenges of sustaining peace[3].

(3) The Global Study on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and the Secretary-General's report on women, peace and security[4].

These reviews and processes were initiated independently of each other but are all motivated by the need to refine the current UN peace and security response architecture in the light of new challenges and threats. Other related endeavours include notably the ongoing preparation of a Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and the review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism strategy.

Objectives:

- To provide a platform for Member States and other stakeholders to reflect and deliberate on concrete ways to draw out synergies from those reviews and processes and enhance coherence in the UN system on the issues of peace and security.

- Help identify how concretely the interlinkages between these different aspects of the UN's work can inspire a new approach that will promote a concrete continuum of the UN response and improve significantly its effectiveness and impact in the field.

- Galvanize efforts to translate the reviews and subsequent deliberations within relevant bodies of the UN into concrete conclusions and results within a reasonable timeframe.

Cognizant of the ongoing work and efforts among Member States and within the UN system, the High Level Thematic Debate (HLTD) will avoid duplication but aim to complement such efforts in the context of the General Assembly responsibilities and mandate. In this context, the HLTD will be carried-out in close consultation with relevant stakeholders bearing in mind the discussions in the relevant bodies in the UN.

Timing & Format:

This inclusive and interactive HLTD is scheduled for 10-11 May 2016. It will present an account of progress made on the individual reviews and on subsequent deliberations and it will involve open and frank discussions between representatives from Member States, regional and sub-regional organizations, civil society, the private sector, as well as global networks of non-state actors, think tanks and eminent experts in this field.

Preparatory process:

In preparation for the HLTD, the OPGA will encourage an interactive dialogue with the support of relevant UN Departments and in close consultation with all concerned. As part of this process, stakeholders and partners will organize a series of workshops to discuss specific issues arising from the outcomes of the reviews and processes mentioned above. The workshops, which will be conducted between January and April 2016, will aim to ensure inclusive and comprehensive outreach with all relevant actors on concrete ways to advance a new commitment for a solid architecture in support of collective action in the field of peace and security.

Outcome:

The PGA's objective is to pursue a pragmatic course of action that will generate concrete results. The specific outcome will be determined based on the preparation process.

12 November 2015

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[1] A/70/95 – S/2015/446
[2] A/70/357 – S/2015/682
[3] A/69/968 – S/2015/490
[4] S/2015/716

11 March 2016

Excellency,

In November 2015, I confirmed my intention to organize a high-level thematic debate on 10-11 May 2016 in order to engage in a strategic reflection about today's challenges to international peace and security, the means, tools and instruments available within a UN-context to address these and examine how to strengthen the role, coherence and performance of the United Nation's architecture in the field of peace and security.

Since then, the General Assembly, its Committees and other relevant bodies have given further consideration to the recommendations emanating from the major reviews and processes on UN peace operations, the peacebuilding architecture, and the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325(2000) on women, peace and security, in particular.

This reflection on ways to draw out synergies from all those reviews and processes has gained considerable momentum and should contribute to inform the high-level thematic debate itself. More information is available on this address:
http://www.un.org/pga/70/events/hltd-peace-and-security/

The debate will take place as the world is considering how best to implement the ambitious and wide-ranging 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as well as the Paris Agreement on climate change. The UN will also select its next Secretary-General in 2016 to lead the UN in this and other such vital tasks.

I hope that this crucial high-level thematic debate will draw the highest possible level of participation from your government. Further details are enclosed in the attached short outline and provisional program.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Mogens Lykketoft

To All Permanent Representatives and
Permanent Observers to the United Nations
New York

High-Level Thematic Debate of the UN General Assembly

In a World of Risks: *A New Commitment for Peace*

10-11 May 2016, Trusteeship Council Chamber, UNHQ

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The President of the General Assembly, H.E. Mogens Lykketoft, will organize a high-level thematic debate of the UN General Assembly focused on UN, peace and security, on 10-11 May 2016. This event will be a platform to identify key threats and engage in a strategic reflection about today's challenges to international peace and security. Furthermore, it will allow for a consideration about the means, tools and instruments available within a UN-context to tackle these challenges as well as the responsibilities and institutions required for an effective collective security architecture.

Building on the common trends and synergies from the most recent UN peace and security reviews, including the review of UN peace operations, the peacebuilding architecture review and the Global Study on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, as well as a series of coordinated, independently organized regional workshops and seminars, the thematic debate will take place as the world is considering how best to implement the ambitious and wide-ranging 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as well as the Paris Agreement on climate change and who – as the next Secretary-General – will lead the UN in this and other equally vital tasks.

The format will combine a high-level plenary segment with interactive sessions, including a ministerial-level lunch on the first day, specifically designed to engage participants and to encourage reflection on how to address today's threats and achieve sustainable peace – internationally, regionally, nationally – and how the UN system can support Member States as the primary actors.

Member States will be invited to participate at the highest possible level. Observers, UN entities, civil society, research institutions with global and regional reach, media, and other stakeholders will also be invited to attend.

A provisional outline of the event is attached. For more information about the regional workshops and seminars, please refer to the President's webpage: www.un.org/pga/70/events/hltd-peace-and-security/

High-Level Thematic Debate of the UN General Assembly

In a World of Risks: *A New Commitment for Peace*

10-11 May 2016
Trusteeship Council Chamber, UN

Provisional programme

Day 1	Tuesday 10 May 2016
10:00 a.m. – 10:30 a.m.	**Opening Segment:** • **H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft,** President of the United Nations General Assembly • **H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-moon**, Secretary-General of the United Nations (tbc) **Keynote speakers** • Key note address
10:30 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.	**High-Level Plenary:** **In a World of Risks:** *Today's threats to international peace and security* What are the unique international peace and security challenges of our time? How can the UN respond to these threats, in particular those emanating from non-state and transnational actors? **Format**: Statements by high-level Member States representatives.
1:00 p.m.- 2:50 p.m.	**Ministerial Lunch Event - Delegates' Dining Room - West Terrace** **The Next Secretary-General in a World of Risks:** *Expectations vs. Realities*. **Format**: An informal, moderated discussion.
3.00 p.m. – 3.15 p.m.	**Observed Trends in a World of Risks: What does the evidence show?** **Format**: Short presentation of empirical research and trend lines by eminent expert.
3.15 p.m. – 3.30 p.m.	**Input from the field – main conclusions from regional workshops** **Format**: Brief outline of main conclusions from the regional workshops organized and led by a series of prominent research institutions, think tanks with global and regional reach.

3:30 p.m. – 6.00 p.m.	**Interactive session 1:** **Sustainable Peace in a World of Risks:** *Is the UN effective in preventing and managing conflicts?* Are the means, tools and instruments available within a UN-context to tackle today's threats to international peace and security adequate? Do they effectively motivate confidence in UN peace operations – and do they sufficiently incentivize coherence and consistency in the UN's support? If "Motivation + Incentive = Action" then what – in a UN-context – is specifically required to transform political will to mainstream prevention into action and impact? **Format**: Panel discussion designed to encourage interactive exchanges, incl. Q&A and remarks from Member States.
Day 2	**Wednesday 11 May 2016**
10:00 a.m.- 11:25 p.m.	**Interactive session 2:** **Responsibility for Implementation:** *Beyond the current conundrum* What partnerships are required for achieving sustainable peace and where does responsibility and accountability lay? How does this relate to the existing UN institutional structures? **Format**: Panel discussion designed to encourage interactive exchange incl. Q&A and remarks from Member States.
11:25 a.m. – 12:55 p.m.	**Interactive session 3:** **Leading by Example:** *Innovative partnerships and responses* **Format**: An informal, moderated conversation followed by Q&A about examples from the field looking above and beyond the most widely applied approaches, exploring examples focusing on cross UN-system approaches to anchoring peace and reconciliation.
12.55 p.m. – 1:00 p.m.	**Closing Remarks:** ● **H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft,** President of the United Nations General Assembly

19 April 2016

Excellency,

The High-Level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace and Security that I will organise on 10-11 May 2016 is raising considerable interest within the General Assembly and beyond.

In addition to the short outline and provisional program annexed to my letter of 11 March 2016, I have the honour to bring to your attention today a detailed concept note.

I have asked my office to organize an informal briefing on the general preparations for this High-Level Thematic Debate. The informal briefing chaired by my Chef de Cabinet Ambassador T. Anker Christensen will take place on Thursday 28 April from 1:15 till 2:30 pm. The location will be announced in the Journal in due course.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Mogens Lykketoft

To all Permanent Representatives
And Permanent Observers to the United Nations
New York

Concept note

The President of the General Assembly, H.E. Mogens Lykketoft, will organize a high-level thematic debate of the UN General Assembly focused on UN, peace and security, on 10-11 May 2016, in the Trusteeship Council Chamber, at the UN in New York.

Background:

Over 70 years of history, the United Nations has responded to evolving peace and security challenges by developing and adopting a wide range of tools and instruments in support of Member States in order to help maintain and sustain peace.

Today, the global community is faced with increasingly complex challenges to international peace and security on the backdrop of a rapidly evolving geopolitical reality. Faced with a resurgence of important power rivalry, the evolving threat of terrorism and violent extremism, new forms of complex conflict especially in the Middle East , the perception of a United Nations unable to effectively address the most complicated and dangerous conflicts the world has witnessed in recent years is at risk of taking root.

While the international community has recently recommitted to multilateral approaches in the areas of development – on substance as well as on financing – and on climate change, the question is how the Organization can restore its relevance and credibility in matters of peace and security and maintaining its universal aspiration to protect and promote the purposes and principles of the Charter.

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Facts show that the UN remains substantially present and engaged in many parts of the world where it continues to make crucial contributions to consolidate peace and prevent relapse into conflict. The UN remains the largest peacekeeping actor in the world with forces and contingents of variable capabilities and sophistication as well as the single most central actor in humanitarian and relief operations.

The most recent reviews[1] focused on UN peace operations, the peacebuilding architecture, and the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325(2000) on women, peace and security in particular, were all inspired by a sense that the UN needs urgently to

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[1] Report of the High Level Independent on Peace Operations (A/70/95 – S/2015/446) and the Secretary-General's report on the future of UN peace operations (A/70/357 – S/2015/682), Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968 – S/2015/490), and the independent Global Study on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) as well as the Report of the Secretary-General on women, peace and security (S/2015/716) and the subsequent Security Council Resolution 2242 (2015).

upgrade, expand and refine its means, tools and instruments, while enhancing its diplomatic and preventive functions.

The analytical body of work behind these reviews contain significant synergies and converging recommendations – for example, regarding the need to recognize the primacy of politics; to increase investment in prevention; to strengthen the empowerment and participation of women; to advance a people-centred approach to peace and security and to strengthen partnerships in this area, particularly with regional organizations as well as civil society and the private sector.

Informed by those reviews, the high-level thematic debate will aim to offer Member States a platform to reaffirm their commitment to the Charter and purposes of the United Nations, and their determination to transform evolving challenges and threats into opportunities.

It will take place as the world is considering how best to implement the ambitious and wide-ranging 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as well as the Paris Agreement on climate change, and who – as the next Secretary-General – will lead the UN all those vital tasks.

Objectives:

- Engage in a strategic reflection about major trends, evolving threats and opportunities for international peace and security and steps needed to restore and buttress the relevance and credibility of the UN as a trusted and competent cornerstone of the international peace and security architecture.

- Examine the suitability of existing UN means, policies and practices available and ways to enhance the level of their efficiency in the light of the reviews, as well as the respective responsibility of the UN, more particularly the next Secretary-General, as well as Members States and beyond to implement needed responses.

- Contribute to a comprehensive stock taking of the most recent UN peace and security reviews, including the review of UN peace operations, the peacebuilding architecture review and the Global Study on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, and seeking ways to take high priority recommendations forward.

- Seek concrete ways for the Membership to recommit to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Format, outcome and participants

The high-level thematic debate will consist of a high-level opening followed by a high-level plenary segment where participating high-level representatives of Member States will have the opportunity to address the General Assembly on today's threat and opportunities to international peace and security, and how to navigate the changing international security landscape.

An intimate ministerial-level lunch, to which official candidates for the position of Secretary-General have also been invited, will offer an informal platform to reflect on expectations and realities regarding the role of the Secretary-General and more generally how the UN system can support Member States as the primary actors in efforts to achieve sustainable peace – internationally, regionally, nationally.

Building on a quantitative analysis and presentation of key empirical evidence from the area of peace and security as well as the recommendations from a series of coordinated, independently organized regional workshops and experts meetings, three interactive sessions will offer Ministers, distinguished guests and other participants – including representatives from the civil society and the private sector – the opportunity to deliberate on the role of the UN in *'preventing and managing conflicts'*, *'implementation'* and *'innovative partnerships and responses'*.

All discussions will be led by moderators in order to enhance their interactive and collaborative nature.

The outcome of the high-level thematic debate will be a President's summary, extracting and highlighting the key conclusions from statements and interactive deliberations, as a way of communicating also the essence of these many reflections to the membership as well as the candidates for the position of Secretary General.

Observers, UN entities, civil society, research institutions, media, and other stakeholders are also invited to attend.

The agenda of the high-level thematic debate, background documents – including reports from the regional workshops and experts meetings which were organised independently in order to inform this discussion – as well as the detailed list of related events are available on the President's webpage: www.un.org/pga/70/events/hltd-peace-and-security/

4 May 2016

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to previous communications about the High-Level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace and Security that I will organise on 10-11 May 2016, the latest being my letter dated 19 April 2016, which contained the detailed concept note for the event.

In addition, I am pleased to bring to your attention the following three documents, which I hope can serve to assist and guide preparations:

- A provisional programme with indicative timelines and objectives for each segment,
- A guidance note for participants, which contains more detailed information about format, seating arrangements and discussants, as well as a list of key questions for each of the three interactive sessions,
- A note on organizational arrangements with detailed information on logistics.

Kindly note that during each of the three interactive sessions all participating Ministers will be seated in the front row and, in keeping with established practice, be offered speaking preference in the interactive sessions. Personally, I plan to be present and participate throughout the interactive sessions.

I look forward to engaging with Ministers and other high-level Member States representatives in a forthright dialogue about how – in a world of risks – the UN can better tackle international peace and security challenges, and how – collectively – we can most purposefully pursue a new commitment for peace.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Mogens Lykketoft

To all Permanent Representatives
and Permanent Observers to the United Nations
New York

HIGH LEVEL THEMATIC DEBATE

IN A WORLD OF RISKS:

A NEW COMMITMENT FOR PEACE

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY | NEW YORK | 10 - 11 MAY 2016

Trusteeship Council Chamber, UN
Provisional programme

TUESDAY 10 MAY	
10:00 a.m. – 10:35 a.m.	**Opening Segment:** • **H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft,** President of the United Nations General Assembly • **H.E. Mr. Jan Eliasson,** Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations **Future of peace and security: Interlinkages in a complex world** • by Espen Barth Eide, Member of the Managing Board, World Economic Forum **Keynote speakers** • **H.E. Mr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono**, former President of Indonesia • **Ms. Leymah Gbowee**, Liberia, 2011 Nobel Peace Laureate, SDG Advocate • **H.E. Mr. Amre Moussa**, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and former Secretary-General of the League of Arab States
10:35 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.	**High-Level Plenary: In a World of Risks:** **Today's threats to international peace and security** What are the unique international peace and security challenges of our time? How can the UN respond to these threats, in particular those emanating from non-state and transnational actors? Statements by high-level representatives. In light of time constrains, the length of the statements should not exceed five minutes.
1:10 p.m.- 2:50 p.m.	**Ministerial-level lunch** *(by invitation only)*:

The Next Secretary-General in a World of Risks: Expectations vs. Realities.

During lunch, a discussion moderated by **Mr. Ian Martin**, Executive Director, Security Council Report, will start with an informal panel discussion among eminent personalities and continue at individual tables. The moderator will conclude by summarizing main points and key insights.

AFTERNOON SESSION

3.00 p.m. – 6.00 p.m.	**Session 1: Sustainable Peace in a World of Risks: Is the UN effective in preventing and resolving conflicts?**
	Moderator: **Dr Bruce Jones**, Vice-President and Director, Brookings Institution
	The session will ask how the UN can remain the preeminent relevant actor and credibly respond to these threats, in particular those emanating from non-state and transnational actors? Are the means, instruments and policies available within a UN-context adequate to tackle today's threats to international peace and security? Do they effectively motivate confidence in UN peace operations – and do they sufficiently incentivize coherence and consistency in support of the UN? What is needed for the UN peace and security architecture to engage new and emerging actors?
	The moderator will engage all participating Ministers, starting with Ministers of Foreign Affairs from Ethiopia and Mali, in an interactive dialogue.
	This dialogue will further be informed by interspersed interventions by eminent experts, civil society and private sector representatives, using visual demonstration of current empirical evidence and trends in peace and security and outlining the key conclusions from a series of regional workshops organised in advance of the high-level thematic debate.
	Interventions by: **Ms. Sigrid Kaag**, UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, **Mr. Alexandre Marc**, Chief Technical Specialist, Fragility, Conflict and Violence World Bank Group, **Mr. Youssef Mahmoud**, Senior Adviser, International Peace Institute, **Ms. Saba Ismail**, Executive Director, Aware Girls, Pakistan, **Ms Sarah Cliffe**, Director, NYU Center on International Cooperation.
	Inputs from the field – key conclusions from regional workshops: **Mr. Cedric de Coning** (NUPI), **Mr. Ashraf Swelam** (CCCPA), **Ms. Adriana Abdenur** (Igarapé).

10:00 a.m.- 11:20 a.m.	**Session 2: Leading by Example: Innovative partnerships and responses**
	Moderator: **H.E. Ms. Susana Malcorra**, Foreign Relations Minister, Argentina
	The session will focus on examples from the field looking above and beyond the most widely applied approaches, exploring examples of cross UN-system approaches to anchor peace and reconciliation.
	The moderator will engage all participating Ministers, after introductory remarks by **H.E. Mrs. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga**, former President of Sri Lanka, Chairperson of the Office for National Unity and Reconciliation and **H.E. Dr Abdusalam H.**

	Omer, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Somalia.
	Following these remarks, the moderator will engage participating Ministers and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission.
	Interventions by: **H.E. Mr. Gert Rosenthal**, Chair, Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 review of the peacebuilding architecture, **Mr. Tegegnework Gettu**, Associate Administrator and Under-Secretary-General, UNDP (tbc), as well as **Ms. Asma Mansour**, Tunisian Center for Social Entrepreneurship.
11:20 a.m. – 11:30 a.m.	**Message from the FAO-Nobel Peace Laureates Alliance for Food Security and Peace:** **Mr David Nabarro**, Special Adviser on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Food Security and Nutrition, will introduce brief remarks by FAO Director-General **Mr Graziano da Silva** and 2006 Nobel Peace Laureate **Mr Muhammad Yunus** *(live streamed from Rome).*
11:30 a.m. – 12:55 p.m.	**Session 3: Responsibility for Implementation: Beyond the current conundrum** Moderator: **Mr. Espen Barth Eide**, Member of the Managing Board, World Economic Forum The session will focus on implementation, partnerships and accountability for delivering on commitments. It will reflect on the role of all stakeholders their specific relations with the UN institutional under existing frameworks and ways to enhance the level of effectiveness. The moderator will engage all participating Ministers starting with **H.E. Mr Smaïl Chergui**, Commissioner for Peace and Security, AU. *Interventions by:* **H.E. Mr. Jose Ramos-Horta**, Chair, High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, **Mr. Alain Le Roy**, Secretary-General, External Action Service, European Union, as well as **Mr. Alvaro Estaban Pop**, Chair, The Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.
12.55 p.m. – 1.00 p.m.	**Closing Remarks:** **H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft,** President of the United Nations General Assembly

GUIDANCE NOTE FOR PARTICIPANTS

Ministerial lunch *(by invitation only)* **– 10 May 2016, 1:10-2.50pm**

(West Terrace of the Delegates' Dining Room, UN Headquarters)

The next Secretary-General in a world of risks – expectations vs. realities

Ministers, high-level participants, special guests and candidates for the position of Secretary-General will receive personal, non-transferable invitations from the President of the Secretary-General to join a restricted lunch where **Mr. Ian Martin**, Executive Director, Security Council Report, will moderate a discussion under Chatham House rule.

Seating arrangements will follow a multi-stakeholder approach at tables seating 6 participants each.

The informal exchange will focus on the role of the Secretary-General in matters of peace and security, the special contribution expected from the next Secretary-General and constraints that the latter will face.

After brief remarks by the President of the General Assembly, the moderator will open by welcoming guests and panellists, frame the topic and explain the format.

An informal panel discussion among eminent personalities, including **H.E. Mr. Amre Moussa,** former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and former Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, and **Ms. Karin Landgren,** Fellow, NYU Center on International Cooperation, former UN Under-Secretary-General, will follow while the first course is served. Panellists will be asked to share their experience, lessons learned, and concerns of relevance to the next Secretary-General in matters of peace and security.

As the main course will be served, the moderator will introduce tables, identifying topics and lead discussants:

(i) **Socio-economic challenges and conflict prevention:** What is required from the next Secretary-General to leverage recognized inter-linkages between i.a. Agenda 2030, the Paris Agreement, and the peace and security role of the UN? In policy terms and institutionally? How can the UN better promote holistic conflict prevention, including support through inclusive governance?

(ii) **Peace and security challenges:** On the assumption that reform of the Security Council is not immediately around the corner, who needs to do what to adapt the current collective security architecture to today's challenges and threats for the UN to remain truly relevant and credible? What role can – or should – the next Secretary-General play? Is the Charter's article 99 part of the answer?

(iii) **Humanitarian challenges:** Migration and refugees flows can be both a cause and a consequence of conflict. Does the UN – and the Secretary-General – have the right tools to address this? What is needed to reverse the upward trend of forced population displacement?

(iv) **Human rights and gender:** Is the UN as currently configured properly equipped to respond to early signs of human rights and rule of law violations? How should the next Secretary-General relate to the "Human Rights up Front" initiative? What is needed to strengthen women's empowerment – in policy terms? In HQ? In the field?

(v) **Institutions and financing:** What are the key steps the next Secretary-General can take to overcome fragmentation, improving integration, coherence and performance across the UN System? How can Member States overcome current deadlock in terms of flexible financing options, accountability and responsible use of resources? What role for the Secretary-General?

(vi) **Terrorism and prevention of violent extremism** is increasingly central to the peace and security agenda. What instruments can the next Secretary-General deploy to support the front-line nations that respond directly to this threat?

By approximately 2:30pm, the moderator will facilitate an interactive debate among rapporteurs, inviting all participants to contribute before drawing out conclusions and closing the session.

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Interactive session 1 – 10 May 2016, 3-6pm

(Trusteeship Council Chamber, UN Headquarters)

Sustainable Peace in a World of Risks: Is the UN effective in preventing and resolving conflicts?

Moderator: Dr Bruce Jones, Vice-President and Director, Brookings Institution

Objective: What are the unique international peace and security challenges of our time? How can the UN contribute most effectively to tackling them, including those emanating from non-state and transnational actors? Are the means, instruments and policies available within a UN-context adequate to tackle today's threats to international peace and security? Do they effectively motivate confidence in UN peace operations – and do they sufficiently incentivize coherence and consistency in support of the UN? What is needed for the UN peace and security architecture to engage new and emerging actors?

Format: The moderator will make some very brief opening remarks highlighting the challenges confronting UN peace and security functions, and then engage all participating Ministers, starting with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and Mali, in an interactive dialogue.

Questions and remarks from the floor will be encouraged. No speakers' list will be established.

The dialogue with Ministers will be informed by interspersed interventions by expert contributors and discussants. Consequently, expert contributors and discussants should note that the moderator will determine the appropriate time during proceedings for their

interventions. The format is meant to encourage dialogue and dynamic exchanges, avoiding prepared statements or opening remarks by participants.

When suitable, the moderator will ask **Mr. Alexandre Marc**, Chief Technical Specialist, Fragility, Conflict and Violence in the World Bank Group, to deliver a visual presentation of key empirical evidence, data and trends in the area of peace and security.

Similarly, he will invite **Mr. Cedric de Coning** (NUPI), **Mr. Ashraf Swelam** (CCCPA), **Ms. Adriana Abdenur** (Igarapé) to present jointly 'insights from the field' and key conclusions from a series of regional workshops and experts meetings organised in all regions of the world in advance of this High-Level Thematic Debate.

At 5:50PM, the moderator will wrap up, draw key lessons and conclusions from debate and set the scene for next interactive sessions on the following day.

Seating: Ministers will be seated in the first row of seating. All expert contributors and discussants will be seated in front of the podium in order to be level with Ministers. The moderator will have a roaming microphone and will roam the floor space between Ministers, expert contributors and discussants. Contributions should be made from the seat.

Expert contributors and discussants:

- **Ms. Sigrid Kaag**, UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon,
- **Mr. Youssef Mahmoud**, Senior Adviser, International Peace Institute,
- **Ms. Saba Ismail**, Executive Director, Aware Girls, Pakistan
- **Ms. Sarah Cliffe**, Director, NYU Center on International Cooperation.

Key questions will include:

Q1: How can major geopolitical challenges – by some identified as proxy-wars - be addressed and/or prevented, while maintaining and enhancing the UN's continued relevance in the area of peace and security, including through the use of the good offices of the Secretary-General and other crisis-management or conflict resolution tools?

Q2: How do preventative steps effectively translate into impact? What is required to strike the right balance and ensure consistency with the core principle of sovereignty and national leadership? How can the UN best support Members or regional organisations to defuse an emerging crisis?

Q3: Today, UN operations in effect do not have the tools to effectively address an environment where non-state actors using terrorist tactics are a key factor. The 10-year review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is now under way, also looking at the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. What is required - from the UN, from Member States, from regional organisations - to overcome fragmentation and provide UN with the tools to tackle these challenges and support Member States?

Q4: In the area of peace and security, what should the top three key priorities of the next Secretary-General be - both in policy terms and in institutional and structural terms? How can these priorities effectively get the support from Members and be transformed into change?

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Interactive session 2 – 11 May 2016, 10-11:20am

(Trusteeship Council Chamber, UN Headquarters)

Leading by Example: Innovative partnerships and responses

Moderator: **H.E. Ms Susana Malcorra**, Minister of Foreign Relations of Argentina

Objective: Through specific examples and country situations from different regions of the world, highlighting diverse challenges and patterns, participants will be invited to reflect on ways for the UN to enhance the flexibility and coherence of its response, and more generally on how to strengthen inclusive national ownership of conflict resolution processes.

Format: The moderator will engage <u>all participating Ministers</u>, after introductory remarks by **H.E. Mrs. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga**, former President of Sri Lanka, Chairperson of the Office for National Unity and Reconciliation and **H.E. Dr Abdusalam H. Omer**, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Somalia.

Following these remarks, the moderator will engage participating Ministers and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Questions and remarks from the floor will be encouraged. No speakers' list will be established.

The dialogue will be informed by interspersed interventions by expert contributors and discussants. Consequently, expert contributors and discussants should note that the moderator will determine the appropriate time during proceedings for their interventions. The format is meant to encourage dialogue and dynamic exchanges, avoiding prepared statements or opening remarks by participants.

At 11.10 am, the moderator will wrap-up discussion.

Seating: Ministers will be seated in the first row of seating. All expert contributors and discussants will be seated in front of the podium in order to be level with Ministers. The moderator will have a roaming microphone and will roam the floor space between Ministers, expert contributors and discussants. Contributions should be made from the seat.

Expert contributors and discussants:

- **H.E. Mr. Gert Rosenthal**, Chair, Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 review of the peacebuilding architecture,
- **Mr. Tegegnework Gettu**, UNDP Associate Administrator and Under Secretary-General *(tbc)*,
- **Ms. Asma Mansour**, Tunisian Center for Social Entrepreneurship.

Key questions will include:

Q1: The range of models available for UN engagement in conflict- and crisis-affected situations spans widely depending on context. What are the lessons learned from lower-key political engagements in situations where the UN's presence may be focused on developmental issues?

Q2 What does "national ownership" imply? And how can various expressions of national ownership shape and most effectively customize a UN engagement?

Q3: Beyond mere bureaucratic dynamics, what could the key steps be to upgrade existing planning, policies and instruments and ensure flexible "whole of UN System" approach and response? It is widely recognized that the UN is struggling with silos that duplicate and create inefficiencies in its performance. How to incentivize financial structures and flow of funds to respond to those challenges? If strategic and structural integration no longer provide clear ways to strengthen performance – what comes next?

Q4: How to strengthen coordination among Member States and intergovernmental bodies including the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as well as Troop and Police Contributing Countries throughout the cycle of a peace operation? How to better link responsibilities for delivering mandates and the budget authority?

Q5: The implementation of the Agenda 2030 and the Paris Climate agreement is also crucial to the promotion of peace and security. How should peace operations embed the core principles of inclusivity, gender empowerment etc. in order to "leave no one behind"?

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Interactive session 3 – 11 May 2016, 11:30am-12.55pm

(Trusteeship Council Chamber, UN Headquarters)

Responsibility for Implementation: Beyond the current conundrum

Moderator: **Mr. Espen Barth Eide,** Member of the Managing Board, World Economic Forum

Objective: The session will focus on implementation, partnerships and accountability for delivering on commitments. It will reflect on the role of all stakeholders, their specific relations with the UN institutional under existing frameworks and ways to enhance the level of effectiveness. Options for organisational, structural and financial adaptations of the UN to better fulfil its role will also be under consideration.

Format: The moderator will engage all participating Ministers staring with **H.E. Mr Smaïl Chergui**, Commissioner for Peace and Security, AU.

Questions and remarks from the floor will be encouraged. No speakers' list will be established.

The dialogue will be informed by interspersed interventions by expert contributors and discussants. Consequently, expert contributors and discussants should note that the moderator will determine the appropriate time during proceedings for their interventions. The format is meant to encourage dialogue and dynamic exchanges, avoiding prepared statements or opening remarks by participants.

Seating: Ministers will be seated in the first row of seating. All expert contributors and discussants will be seated in front of the podium in order to be level with Ministers. The moderator will have a roaming microphone and will roam the floor space between Ministers, expert contributors and discussants. Contributions should be made from the seat.

At 12.40pm, the moderator will wrap-up discussions.

Expert contributors and discussants:

- **H.E. Mr. Jose Ramos-Horta,** Chair, High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations,
- **Mr. Alain Le Roy,** Secretary-General, External Action Service, European Union,
- **Mr. Alvaro Estaban Pop,** Chair, The Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues

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Key questions will include:

Q1: What would a stronger framework for strategic partnerships with civil society and the private sector look like?

Q2: How to ensure that recommendations outlined in the reviews continue to be championed, and are translated into concrete action? How to ensure accountability for results and implementation?

Q3: What mechanisms can Member States put in place to hold the United Nations and themselves accountable for the reform process and a more inclusive approach to sustainable peace that delivers for all groups, particularly for women? How can the UN Secretariat better support intergovernmental decision-making?

Q4: How can national commitment be translated into actual change in the UN? Are there countries, regional organisations – or groups or coalitions – that are willing and able to champion this change?

UN @ 70 – A New Commitment to Action

Organizational arrangements for the High-level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace and Security, 10 - 11 May 2016
http://www.un.org/pga/70/events/hltd-peace-and-security/

Participation

1. The High-Level Thematic Debate (HLTD) is expected to be attended by a significant number of Ministers. UN entities, civil society, research institutions with global and regional reach, media, and other stakeholders were also invited to attend.

Programme

2. The HLTD will be composed of an opening segment, a high-level plenary, followed by three interactive sessions, as well as a high-level lunch (by invitation only). Additional details are provided below.

Opening and Plenary

3. The opening of the HLTD will take place in the **Trusteeship Council Chamber from 10:00 to 10:30 am on 10 May, 2016** and will consist of statements by the President of the General Assembly (PGA), the Deputy Secretary-General and guest speakers invited by the President of the General Assembly.

4. The plenary meeting will begin **at 10:30 am and will continue through to 1:00 pm.** To enable maximum participation of high-level speakers within the limited time available, statements in the plenary meetings **should not exceed five minutes**.

5. Delegations wishing to speak in the high-level plenary segment are kindly requested to inscribe on the list of speakers, General Assembly Affairs Branch (Ms. Antonina Poliakova (e-mail poliakova@un.org; tel. 1-(212) - 963-5063).

6. Speaking order will follow the customary protocol order.

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7. A lectern will be provided for the delivery of statements.

Documentation, statements and interpretation

8. Delegations are invited to submit PDF-formatted versions of their statements via e-mail to for posting on papersmart@un.org for electronic circulation through the PaperSmart portal. Delegations wishing to do so should provide them no later than two hours in advance of delivery to papersmart@un.org. The name of the meeting, agenda item, speaker and country should be indicated in the subject line of the e-mail and in the heading of the statement. The statements will remain embargoed until their delivery and then posted. Only statements presented during the course of the meeting will be posted. Alternatively, delegations can bring a hard copy (unstapled and printed single-sided), for scanning and uploading, to the PaperSmart portal at the documents distribution counter located inside the Trusteeship Council.

9. Delegations are encouraged to bring a minimum of 15 hard-copies of statements for interpreters. They can be handed over to conference service staff in the room.

10. Statements made in any of the six official languages of the General Assembly are interpreted into the other official languages. Any speaker may also make a statement in a language other than the official languages. In such cases, the delegation in question must provide either an interpreter from the non-official language into an official language, or a written text of the statement in one of the official languages to be read out by a United Nations interpreter. On the basis of this interpretation or the written text, which is accepted by the Secretariat as representing the official text of the statement, it will be interpreted into the other official languages by United Nations interpreters. When a written text is provided, the delegation concerned should make available to the interpreter someone who knows the language in which the statement is to be delivered and the official language into which it has been translated, to guide the interpreter through

the translated text and to ensure synchronization between the speaker and the interpreter. Detailed arrangements for interpretation from non-official languages, including access by non-United Nations interpreters to the interpreter booth in the Trusteeship, must be made in advance through the Meetings Management Section (telephone: 212 963 8114; e-mail: emeetsm@un.org). The interpreter or the guide provided by the delegation should be brought by the delegation to the conference officers' desk in the Chambers 30 minutes prior to the delivery of the statement.

Interactive Sessions

11. The three Interactive sessions will take place in the course of the afternoon of the 10 May and the morning of 11 May. The sessions will have a form of moderated discussions between discussants and high-level guests seated in the front row of the Trusteeship Council Chamber and other participating delegations.

12. The afternoon segment on 10 May will start at 3:00 pm with brief opening remarks from the moderator who will then proceed to engage all participating Ministers, discussants and other participants in an interactive dialogue. No speakers' list will be established for this segment. Contributions and interventions can be made from Delegations' seats.

13. The second interactive session will take place on 11 May from 10:00 am to 11:20 am and will be devoted to innovative partnerships and responses. The last interactive session focused on responsibilities for implementation will continue from 11:30 am until 12:55pm.

The Interactive sessions will provide opportunities to have in-depth discussions on the themes identified above. To promote interactive, free-flowing discussions without prepared statements, participants will be invited to make very brief remarks, not to exceed two minutes, to raise questions and to respond to other speakers.

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In order to promote interactive and substantive discussions; participation in the interactive discussions will be conducted without establishing a list of speakers.

Lunch

14. This session will combine presentations and interactive discussion over the course of a moderated two hour lunch, from **1:10 pm to 2:50 pm in the West Terrace of the Delegates Dining Room on the 4th floor**. To access the Delegates Dining Room, please take the elevators or the escalator from the third floor. Following an informal panel discussion, the moderator will introduce the tables and their lead discussants and topic.

15. The working language of the lunch will be English and no interpretation will be available.

16. Participation in the lunch is by **invitation only** and will be at **Ministerial level** and principals will be unaccompanied. **Please bring paper invitation for access to the lunch**. An additional information note will be sent to lunch participants.

Webcast

17. The opening, the plenary and the interactive sessions will be transmitted via live webcast.

Accreditation of Delegations

18. Accreditation of official delegations will be carried out by the Protocol and Liaison Service. Missions/offices are required to submit their accreditation requests by using the existing online system "eAccreditation", available through the eDelegate Portal at https://delegate.un.int. Delegations wishing to obtain information on the system may refer to the updated "Guidelines on eAccreditation" and "Frequently Asked Questions" posted on the Protocol website at www.un.int/protocol. It should be noted

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that all accreditation requests, including requests for VIP passes, must be submitted via the eAccreditation system.

Media accreditation

19. There may be some limited time-slots available for press briefings in the UN Press Briefing Room, S-0237. Please contact the PGA's communications team in advance: Communications Director and Spokesperson Daniel Thomas daniel.thomas@un.org +1 917 225 1913, Special Adviser Ulla Oestergaard oestergaard@un.org +1 646 334 4440 and Digital Media Specialist Katharina Kandt kandt@un.org +1 917 244 3890.

20. A Media Advisory will be issued prior to the event and a press release will be issued immediately afterwards.

21. The event will be webcast at WEBTV.un.org and OPGA and others will be reporting on the meeting on social media using the hashtag #commmit2peace.

22. You are encouraged to promote the event on social media and share as much as you like during the two days. Event hashtag is #commit2peace Please also keep an eye on the main Twitter account @un_pga

23. All members of the media accompanying high-level guests or Heads of Delegation, **including official photo/video**, must submit a letter of assignment from the Permanent Mission concerned. The letter listing the names of the media representatives with their functional titles and affiliation, should be sent to the Media Accreditation and Liaison Unit, Department of Public Information, fax: 212-963-4642 or email: malu@un.org. First time applicants must create an online account: http://www.un.org/en/media/accreditation/form/

24. Members of the media accompanying Heads of State/Government or Heads of Delegation must present themselves to the Media Accreditation

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Office, where they will have their photographs taken and be issued a United Nations grounds pass upon presentation of national passports.

25. All media representatives will be required to present a valid United Nations grounds pass to the United Nations security officers at the gate.

26. Members of the media need to be escorted to the media booths from the Media Accreditation and Liaison Unit office (S-250) or liaison desks. For some meetings, tickets to the gallery will be available for print press, on a first-come first-served basis.

9 May 2016

Excellency,

The High-Level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace and Security that will take place Tuesday and Wednesday this week has raised considerable interest within the General Assembly and beyond.

In addition to the short outline annexed to my letter of 11 March 2016, the detailed concept note annexed to my letter of 19 April, the provisional program, the guidance note and a logistical note annexed to my letter of 4 May, I have the honour to bring to your attention today the final version of the program of the High-Level Thematic Debate as well as two background documents aimed at informing the interactive sessions.

Given the high number of speakers inscribed for the high-level plenary of the morning of Tuesday 10 May, this session will be continued on Wednesday 11 May from 1:15 until 5:55pm. Speakers other than Ministers are kindly invited to limit their statements to no more than 3 minutes in order to give an opportunity to all those inscribed on the list to deliver their statements.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Mogens Lykketoft

To all Permanent Representatives
and Permanent Observers to the United Nations
New York

The UN at 70—Celebration, or Commemoration?
Or: The Case for Re-Tooling the UN's Conflict Management Capacity

By Bruce D. Jones

As the UN turns 70, should we be celebrating or commemorating? Two and a half decades of important progress since the end of the Cold War suggest the former; great power deadlock in Ukraine and Syria (with its attendant humanitarian catastrophe) suggest the later. The balance arguably lies in whether the UN can initiate the kind of re-tooling that adapted the UN for the post-Cold War era. Then the challenge was to meet new geopolitical opportunities and take on new roles in internal conflict; now the challenge is to confront complex crises unfolding on a fraught geopolitical landscape.

Since its founding the UN has played a range of conflict management roles in different settings. In conflicts with low geopolitical salience, the UN has been a supportive actor in mediation, the leading actor in peacekeeping and humanitarian response, and a participant in peacebuilding. In conflict with higher geopolitical salience, the UN has also *contributed* to conflict management, often combining forces both figuratively and literally with NATO, the EU, and coalitions who are willing to invest the manpower and resources to produce peace and security outcomes. And in proxy wars or conflicts where the largest military powers are closely engaged, those powers have sometimes turned to the UN to help freeze the conflicts or de-escalate proxy tensions. Will the UN be able to perform these functions in the years ahead? Or will it lapse back into the kind of paralysis that characterized much of the Cold War?

This question arises during important shifts in the nature and location of conflict. During the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s violence and insecurity was concentrated in internal conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa and at the peripheries of the major continents—in the Balkans, Haiti, Timor Leste, etc. In all of these regions conflict has declined substantially, though the challenges that remain are large and enduring (e.g. in D.R. Congo and Sudan). They are also costly, at a moment when resources for the UN are shrinking. In one region of the world, the Middle East, violence and insecurity are rising: the region confronts in internal war but also inter-state conflict, as well as sub-state and trans-national violence. And most conflicts in the Middle East (and North Africa) have terrorist entities as combatants, which poses challenges to the UN.

The second form of rising insecurity is geopolitical. Already we have seen a form of attenuated proxy war in the Ukraine and direct support to war-fighting in Syria by both the great powers and regional powers. The deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations and rising tensions between the China, the U.S. and other east Asian powers, especially in maritime Asia, bode ill for international security. Of course, there are some issues on which there are underlying shared interests, like aspects of proliferation and terrorism. Even here, though, shared interests do not necessarily translate into shared approaches, as has been brutally evident in Syria.

Against these difficulties there is a silver lining for the UN, in the form of a growing number of states with the capacity to make effective contributions to peace and security. Many of these are states that have grown economically but are still far from having the military capacity to act beyond their neighborhoods. Their diplomatic reach exceeds their military grasp. Because this is so, and for reasons of status, these states have a strong interest in working through the UN, often the only tool accessible for them to project capacity beyond their neighborhoods (within their neighborhoods, some of these states have access to effective regional organizations). These states are a resource and the question of whether the UN is an effective source of peace and security in the coming period will depend heavily on how these countries engage the UN and whether the UN learns how to mobilize their capacity.

In short: If the UN is going to be useful in conflict management and peace and security in the coming period, it has to pull off a multi-part retooling:

- Increase the efficiency of its operational capacity to sustain large field operations for peacekeeping and humanitarian response;
- Streamline its bureaucracy to aid in more integrated policy and operations between preventive, peacekeeping and peacebuilding work
- Create new platforms that allow a wider set of states to contribute more, both operationally and in the political and diplomatic management of conflicts;
- Increase its ability to contribute to conflict management in the Middle East, including in cases where terrorist actors are present, either by building its own operational capacity, through deeper partnerships with more capable organizations (though there are few of these), or by more consistently utilizing multi-national arrangements;
- Position itself diplomatically to be useful to the great powers when they seek to de-conflict themselves from proxy entanglements or from escalating tensions.

The efficacy and efficiency of UN-led peacekeeping

An international audience reading about the UN in early 2016 will have predominant in their minds the blockages in UN Security Council over Syria and Ukraine; and may scoff the notion of strengthening or reforming UN conflict management functions. However, P5 tensions over those two geopolitically significant conflicts obscure the fact that the United Nations still has 138,000 personnel on the field in 39 missions, an all-time high. Unfortunately, new security challenges and new resource constraints mean that both resources available for such operations and political support for UN roles is likely to shrink, putting a premium on the efficacy and efficiency of UN operations.

On the question low geopolitical conflicts, the recent High-level Panel on Peace Operations provides the essential guide; the challenge is implementation. Gains are likely to come most quickly in four areas: in improving planning, in reinforcing the political frameworks for peace keeping, in rapid deployment of field headquarters, and in augmenting the efficiency of management tools.

The UN needs no new authorities, no new capacities, and no new budgets to augment civilian planning; it simply needs creativity and will on the part of its most senior leadership. Similarly, for reinforcing the political framework for operations: it's a matter of vital policy that peacekeeping operations should be conducted in support of a political framework, or a political agreement, or in pursuit of one. The two most important variables here are the attitudes of the P5/regional powers, and the quality and the creativity of the special representatives that the SG deploys to lead UN missions. This is another area where gender issues will be particularly important, as leadership from the top will help ensure that gender issues are prioritized throughout the UN response.

It will take more political will by member states to return to an earlier situation of the UN having available to it a rapidly deployable headquarters and planning tool. In Ethiopia/Eritrea, and other contexts, the UN made very effective use of such a mechanism in the form of the European-supported Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). A revived capacity could be broadened to include a wider set of aspiring powers.

The UN can also do more with regional organizations, where they are effective, and with the World Bank; and this may be particularly important for prevention. A theme that should run throughout the preventive work is inclusion; everything we know about conflict suggests that inclusive governance and inclusive economies are essential to conflict avoidance.

A fourth step, and one extremely important for efficiency, but requiring more political negotiation among member states, entails a greater flexibility for the Department of Field Support (DFS), and greater flexibility in its interaction with the more bureaucratic, headquarters-focused Department of Management (DM). As will streamlining the bureaucratic arrangements between DPA, DPKO, and UNDP, and – finally – forging an effective relationship with the World Bank, to make for more integrated peacebuilding efforts at all parts of the conflict cycle. It may require substantial changes to Secretariat arrangements and even more so to the hard divisions between various UN budgets. This will not be an easy lift, but incoming Secretaries-General

have a honeymoon period in which, historically, they have been able to execute important bureaucratic changes with tacit support from the membership.

That is a lot to take on. But if we think about how the UN can contribute to conflict management in more complex, more geopolitically fraught settings, then we have to look more deeply at two other issues: the question of operating in settings (of which there will be a growing number) where terrorist entities are operating; and the involvement and participation of rising powers in policy and mandate making functions.

Contributing to Conflict Management in Higher Geopolitical Settings

If the UN is going to meet contemporary security challenges, it will have to have access to the capability of the widest possible range of actors: the major African and South Asian states that have become the bedrock contributors of the large, but relatively low-capability forces that the UN now fields; high-end and enabling capabilities from European contributors; and an increasingly sophisticated set of force capabilities and enabling capabilities from states that have not historically used the UN to project power status or force.

The High-Level Report touches on this issue but in a modest way, as have the members of the P5, who, when they've opened up to light consultations, haven't seen much impact and thus resist further reform. That is not a way to drive political change. The UN is going to have to go much deeper on reform of its machinery to seriously involve aspiring countries if the latter are to take up new roles and put serious resources into the organization and its operations. That's an important agenda for the coming Secretary General, who confronts now a set of activist states who want to do more, who can do are, and who are frustrated by a lack of reform at the UN.

Of course, the broader question of Security Council reform is germane to this; but there is much the UN can do short of Charter reform to meet the appetite of rising powers for more engagement. The first and most obvious is for the new incoming Secretary-General to use senior positions in the UN Secretariat for political and diplomatic figures from the non-European, non-P5 powers. That may create some tensions with OECD states who frequently claim such roles, but that is a balance that the new secretary general will have to strike.

The second way a wider set of states can participate in a more serious manner is through their own contributions to peacekeeping. This is a decision in their hands. Brazil has been providing force commanders in Haiti, using its own region as a testing ground, but then going farther afield and putting a force commander in the eastern Congo, even in the context of a controversial and complicated mission with a stabilization presence. This is an important part of how Brazil will build influence in the UN. The other aspiring powers will simply have to take this step themselves if they want to see more influence.

A third step, and one that lies in the hands of the P5, is to engage the aspiring powers on policy. Here, one option would be to revive the Brazilian concept of responsibilities while protecting—an argument that when the Security Council authorizes other actors to use force, it should do so under a policy framework where the "responsibility to protect" (R2P) is embedded in a wider concept of the responsible use of force. Re-engagement on this issue would go some distance to creating a legitimate political framework around UN Security Council authorization decisions, which would enable a far wider set of capabilities to be deployed under a political framework. It would helpfully create a more legitimate framework for the authorization of multi-national forces, which may be crucial to confront today's complex conflicts.

Tackling more complex conflicts and conflicts involving terrorist entities

Indeed, the debate around UN conflict management tends to focus on the traditional "blue helmet" operations, that is, operations managed centrally by the UN Secretariat. There's a powerful alternative in the UN's toolkit, namely UN-mandated multi-national forces (MNF). These are operations that fly under a UN banner but are led and commanded by an individual state, rather than the UN Secretariat. As the UN conflicts more complex conflicts with stronger armies, stronger rebel forces and sophisticated terrorist entities, it may be necessary to put more emphasis on using this option, and some of its variants.

Friends of the UN should undertake a detailed examination of the range of alternatives available to the UN—from blue helmet operations to multi-national forces to so-called hybrid operations (where the UN

and a regional organization fuse their forces into a single structure). Such a study would enable the member states to better support and more firmly encourage the UN to explore a variety of options when confronted with an emerging conflict.

Another tool in the UN's potential quiver is to ask the most capable military powers to provide over-the-horizon guarantees to more traditional UN operations. This would add confidence to potential contributors. And to anticipate the criticism that this is an unrealistic ask of the top-powers: the United States did exactly this in the early days of the Kosovo crisis, mounting an over-the-horizon extraction force that provided guarantees to the unarmed Kosovo Verification Mission established by the OSCE. Over-the-horizon guarantees would be eminently feasible in a context like Libya, for example.

Finally, the UN will have to engage in a deeper examination of its current high degree of conservatism in its role in confronting trans-national terrorist organizations in the conflict theatres in which it's deployed. The High-level Panel tackled this issue, and rightly insisted that the current UN is not the right mechanism to undertake counter-terrorism operations. That's surely true of the present: currently configured, currently managed, currently mandated peacekeeping missions are not particularly well suited to taking robust counter-terrorism operations, or even really robust counter-insurgency operations.

But looking forward, we need a deeper answer to the question: if not the UN, who? The risk of the Security Council not taking this on is that of un-restrained unilateral action by states, with seriously destabilizing consequences. There is no consensus on this issue in the Secretariat; in member state missions to the UN; or in the international community. But the simple fact of the matter is that we confront a growing number of conflicts where terrorism is a central part of the reality and there are few organizations other than the UN with the operational or legal authority to mount peacekeeping operations. How we grapple with this thorny challenge will be as consequential for the UN's next twenty years as was the decision in the early 1990s to enter into internal wars, breaking with the long UN tradition of limiting itself to inter-positional roles.

De-confliction of Great Power Tensions

Finally, how then can the UN be relevant to the management of tensions between the top military powers? How can it serve as a mechanism for de-confliction or mitigation when the top powers find themselves butting up against one another or risking conflict?

If the UN evolved in the way detailed above, with more capable machinery built on a wider political coalition comprised by both European states and aspirational powers, then there is a greater chance that the top powers will be able to identify their interests in, and have confidence using, this tool to deescalate tensions. The participation of both the European and the aspiring powers is important because the top military powers have important bilateral interests with all those actors. Where a UN mechanism has the confidence and participation of such states the top powers will be more hesitant to ignore it than they would a device primarily confined to lower geopolitical contexts. This may matter a great deal for the period we are entering.

An important silver lining is the shared P5+ consensus on limiting nuclear proliferation. This has led to critically important major power cooperation through the UN on Iran, and increasingly on North Korea. Such P5+ diplomatic mechanisms are an important part of how the UN can contribute to peace and security in today's environment.

Are there other parts of geopolitical challenge where the UNSC could, in principle, help slow the upwards spiral of tensions? Let's first acknowledge that the most important issues—China's strategic perspective and economic/resource claims in the East and South China Seas, Russia's search for a security architecture that limits Western influence on its border, America's sustained naval role in the Pacific and its sustained political/economic/military roles in Russia's backyard—are ones that fall squarely into the realm of bilateral relations and perhaps bilateral arms control regimes, as aspects of the Soviet-American relationship did during the Cold War. But specific crises or incidents within this challenges, incidents that could generate unwanted escalation of tensions, could be the subject of UN contribution. There could be value added, for

example, if there were a standing incident review mechanism, established under the UNSC, on which an aggrieved country could call in the case of a maritime accident or incident to give an impartial assessment of the facts of the case, to push solutions towards diplomacy and arbitration, rather than military escalation. The search for *ad hoc* mechanisms is an alternative but one that leaves tense states scrambling for diplomatic options at a moment of crisis. Standing mechanisms established under UNSC authority would give the major powers tools for de-confliction, time for diplomacy.

Of course, another aspect of rising geopolitical tensions is the concern that P5 tensions will restrict UN action, including in cases of high levels of violence. On this, the French have introduced their proposal that the P5 should voluntary restrict their use of the veto when the UN seeks to confront instances of mass atrocity crimes or humanitarian crises. Were such incidents to occur only in low geopolitical settings, perhaps the P5 would agree; the problem is that such situations also occur in places where the P5 have high geopolitical stakes, and are highly unlikely to agree to unfetter the UN. But what if we narrowed this proposal to the question of the establishment of UN operations? In other words, each P5 nation would agree to voluntarily restrict its use of the veto in circumstances where we confront the risk of mass atrocity *and* (the combination is critical) the Secretary General proposes to establish a *UN* operation—not handing the operation off to a coalition, NATO or to a unilateral actor. Why is this different? Because UN missions report back to the UNSC and that body holds the power to renew the operations; and so in restricting veto use in the establishment of a mission, the P5 are not giving up their ability to shape policy or manage the UN's engagement in that situation. Instead, they would retain that capacity on a continuing basis. Even this suggestion is ambitious, but by contrast to the wider proposal it may have a slim chance of being considered.

Of course, it is evident that it will not be the Secretary General her or himself that will determine the position of the UN in the coming period. The top powers, the major economies, and the aspiring powers will either choose to craft the UN into an effective tool and use it to manage their tensions, or not.

But there is an important interaction between the Secretary-General and these powers. And at present, the Secretary-General has only a limited ability to understand and interact with that wider set of powers, beyond the New York missions. Over the Cold War period, successive Secretaries-General have understood the need to maintain a more direct relationship to Washington and to have an Assistant-Secretary-General level official in his office assisting in that function. As the number of decisive powers grows, replicating that model is not an option. But the Secretary-General could establish an (informal) International Affairs Advisory Board comprised of former senior officials or prominent policy scholars to assist her (or just possibly him…) in tracking both the evolution of conflict and security but also the dynamics of the relationship between the major powers, a dynamic that will shape the options available to the UN.

Taken together, these four sets of issues—increasing the efficiency of existing operations; preparing for more complex roles, perhaps through multilateral arrangements; more directly engaging a wider set of states; and re-positioning the UN for the new realities of geopolitics—could help re-tool the UN for the coming era. There is no doubt that we will need an effective UN; whether we will have one is the challenge in front of us.

IN A WORLD OF RISKS:
A NEW COMMITMENT FOR PEACE

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY | NEW YORK | 10 - 11 MAY 2016

Trusteeship Council Chamber, UN
Programme

TUESDAY 10 MAY

10:00 a.m. – 10:35 a.m.	**Opening Segment:** • **H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft,** President of the United Nations General Assembly • **H.E. Mr. Jan Eliasson,** Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations **Future of peace and security: Interlinkages in a complex world** • by Espen Barth Eide, Member of the Managing Board, World Economic Forum **Keynote speakers** • **H.E. Mr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,** former President of Indonesia • **Ms. Leymah Gbowee**, Liberia, 2011 Nobel Peace Laureate, SDG Advocate • **H.E. Mr. Amre Moussa**, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and former Secretary-General of the League of Arab States
10:35 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.	**High-Level Plenary: In a World of Risks:** **Today's threats to international peace and security** What are the unique international peace and security challenges of our time? How can the UN respond to these threats, in particular those emanating from non-state and transnational actors? Statements by high-level representatives. In light of time constrains, the length of the statements should not exceed five minutes.
1:10 p.m.- 2:50 p.m.	**Ministerial-level lunch** *(by invitation only)*:

The Next Secretary-General in a World of Risks: Expectations vs. Realities.

During lunch, a discussion moderated by **Mr. Ian Martin**, Executive Director, Security Council Report, will start with an informal panel discussion among eminent personalities and continue at individual tables. The moderator will conclude by summarizing main points and key insights.

AFTERNOON SESSION

3.00 p.m. – 6.00 p.m.	**Session 1: Sustainable Peace in a World of Risks: Is the UN effective in preventing and resolving conflicts?** Moderator: **Dr Bruce Jones**, Vice-President and Director, Brookings Institution The session will ask how the UN can remain the preeminent relevant actor and credibly respond to these threats, in particular those emanating from non-state and transnational actors? Are the means, instruments and policies available within a UN-context adequate to tackle today's threats to international peace and security? Do they effectively motivate confidence in UN peace operations – and do they sufficiently incentivize coherence and consistency in support of the UN? What is needed for the UN peace and security architecture to engage new and emerging actors? The moderator will engage <u>all participating Ministers</u>, starting with Ministers of Foreign Affairs from Ethiopia, Mali and Norway, in an interactive dialogue. This dialogue will further be informed by interspersed interventions by eminent experts, civil society and private sector representatives, using visual demonstration of current empirical evidence and trends in peace and security and outlining the key conclusions from a series of regional workshops organised in advance of the high-level thematic debate. *Interventions by:* **Ms. Sigrid Kaag**, UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, **Mr. Alexandre Marc**, Chief Technical Specialist, Fragility, Conflict and Violence World Bank Group, **Mr. Youssef Mahmoud**, Senior Adviser, International Peace Institute, **Ms. Saba Ismail**, Executive Director, Aware Girls, Pakistan, **Ms Sarah Cliffe**, Director, NYU Center on International Cooperation. *Inputs from the field – key conclusions from regional workshops:* **Mr. Cedric de Coning** (NUPI/ACCORD), **Mr. Ashraf Swelam** (CCCPA), **Ms. Adriana Abdenur** (Igarapé).
10:00 a.m.- 11:20 a.m.	**Session 2: Leading by Example: Innovative partnerships and responses** Moderator: **H.E. Ms. Susana Malcorra**, Foreign Relations Minister, Argentina The session will focus on examples from the field looking above and beyond the most widely applied approaches, exploring examples of cross UN-system approaches to anchor peace and reconciliation. The moderator will engage <u>all participating Ministers</u>, after introductory remarks by **H.E. Mrs. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga**, former President of Sri Lanka, Chairperson of the Office for National Unity and Reconciliation and **H.E. Dr Abdusalam H.**

	Omer, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Somalia.
	Following these remarks, the moderator will engage participating Ministers and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission.
	Interventions by: **H.E. Mr. Gert Rosenthal**, Chair, Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 review of the peacebuilding architecture, **Mr. Magdy Martínez-Solimán**, Assistant Administrator and Director, UNDP, as well as **Ms. Asma Mansour**, Tunisian Center for Social Entrepreneurship.
11:20 a.m. – 11:30 a.m.	**Message from the FAO-Nobel Peace Laureates Alliance for Food Security and Peace:**
	Mr David Nabarro, Special Adviser on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Food Security and Nutrition, will introduce brief remarks by FAO Director-General **Mr Graziano da Silva** and 2006 Nobel Peace Laureate **Mr Muhammad Yunus** *(live streamed from Rome).*
11:30 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.	**Session 3: Responsibility for Implementation: Beyond the current conundrum**
	Moderator: **Mr. Espen Barth Eide,** Member of the Managing Board, World Economic Forum
	The session will focus on implementation, partnerships and accountability for delivering on commitments. It will reflect on the role of all stakeholders their specific relations with the UN institutional under existing frameworks and ways to enhance the level of effectiveness.
	The moderator will engage <u>all participating Ministers</u> starting with **Mr. Alain Le Roy**, Secretary-General, External Action Service, European Union
	Interventions by: **H.E. Mr. Jose Ramos-Horta**, Chair, High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, , as well as **Mr. Alvaro Estaban Pop**, Chair, The Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.
1:15 p.m. – 5:55 p.m.	**Continuation of the plenary**
	Speakers are encouraged to limit statements to no more than 3 minutes to allow all those who inscribed on the speakers' list to deliver statements.
5.55 p.m. – 6.00 p.m.	**Closing Remarks:**
	H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft, President of the United Nations General Assembly

Working Together for Peace: Synergies and Connectors for Implementing the 2015 UN Reviews

ARTHUR BOUTELLIS AND ANDREA Ó SÚILLEABHÁIN

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

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
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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

AGE	Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture
AU	African Union
CEB	Chief Executives Board for Coordination
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ERSG	Executive Representative of the Secretary-General
GA	General Assembly
HIPPO	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PGA	President of the UN General Assembly
QCPR	Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review
SC	Security Council
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SG	Secretary-General
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UN	United Nations
UNDG	UN Development Group
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNMEER	UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia

Executive Summary

The United Nations carried out three major reviews in 2015 on peace operations, the peacebuilding architecture, and the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security. Like the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the World Humanitarian Summit, the reviews were inspired by the need to strengthen the effectiveness, coherence, and relevance of the seventy-year-old UN peace and security architecture to make it better "fit for purpose" and able to respond more effectively to today's complex and interconnected crises.

In preparation for the UN General Assembly's High-Level Thematic Debate on the UN, Peace and Security from May 10 to 11, 2016, this report aims to help member states and other stakeholders "make sense of it all" by identifying and analyzing common themes, interlinkages, and synergies emerging from these reviews, particularly in four areas: (1) sustaining peace and prevention; (2) gender equality and women's participation; (3) collaborative and strategic partnerships; and (4) people-centered approaches.

It also aims to identify and analyze key enablers for operationalizing the reviews' policy recommendations in three areas: (1) integration and coherence; (2) financing; and (3) accountability, leadership, and governance.

While recognizing the limitations imposed by the silos entrenched in the UN Charter's three foundational pillars (peace and security, development, and human rights), this report points to a number of existing connectors and processes through which member states and the UN Secretariat have worked across these silos to bridge policy differences and address pressing challenges. Recent examples include the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement on climate change, and the response to the Ebola emergency.

At the operational level, the UN system has also developed new cross-cutting policies and capacities, such as peace and development advisers, that enable its entities to work differently across systemic divides. There is hope that the newly minted Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the peacebuilding architecture, which coin "sustaining peace" as a new unifying framework, could enable the Peacebuilding Commission to engage in prevention and realize its bridging potential. This report argues that the UN as a whole should build on past best practices and successful precedents, acknowledge and make full use of existing connectors, and create new connectors to help energize the organization to transact business differently and provide integrated responses to the world's interconnected problems.

This will require the UN to organize and present its work differently in the field and at headquarters under the leadership of the next secretary-general. It will also require member states to change the way they engage with and incentivize UN bodies, structures, and mechanisms in order to build on and consolidate emerging policy consensus and bring about incremental, practical changes (both political and financial) on issues of peace and security, development, and human rights. Building on the momentum the three peace and security reviews achieved in engaging member states, the next secretary-general could put forward a limited number of very concrete proposals during her first eighteen months in office. Member states or groups of member states could champion these proposals as they try to deliver holistically on their commitments under these parallel but interlinked global agendas.

Introduction

In recent years, the world has faced a series of crises that have challenged global peace and security and raised questions about the United Nations' capacity to respond. While the first decade of the twenty-first century brought a decline in the number of violent conflicts, the last few years have witnessed a wave of new conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. At the same time, old conflicts have rekindled and sparked new violence in the Central Africa Republic, Mali, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Yemen. The rise of extremist groups such as the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) and Boko Haram and the spread of transnational criminal networks have placed civilians at greater risk and challenged existing response mechanisms and policies. In 2014, nearly 60 million people were forcibly displaced, a four-fold increase in four years.[1] In 2014 and 2015,

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1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *World at War—UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014*, 2015.

the spread of Ebola in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the resurgence of great and regional power rivalries, and new complex forms of conflict placed further stress on the international system.

Yet in 2015, amidst these crises, the UN system came together to achieve landmark outcomes. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on climate change were adopted with an unprecedented sense of ownership by member states and their people, which accounts for their now accepted universal standing.[2] The UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), moreover, demonstrated that the system can work together across silos to deliver an effective operational partnership in the face of emergencies. However, these examples of collective response remain the exception rather than the norm. The nature of crises today demands a multilateral system that can respond to transnational threats and regional spillovers, prioritize prevention—including national- and local-level prevention and peacebuilding capacities—and effectively partner with a greater diversity of actors both at headquarters and in the field. How, then, can the UN remain relevant and credible and contribute to effective multilateralism in matters of peace and security?

In 2015, on the occasion of its seventieth year of existence, the UN undertook a comprehensive assessment of its peace and security work. Three major policy reviews were completed on peace operations (the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations), peacebuilding (the Advisory Group of Experts), and the implementation of the women, peace, and security agenda (the Global Study). (See Figure 1 for an overview of the milestones and outcome documents produced by each review, as well as other key multilateral processes, Box 1 for an overview of the genesis and mandate of each of the three reviews, and the Appendix for a table summarizing key recommendations from the three reviews.)

Box 1. Genesis and mandates of the three reviews

Peace operations: On October 31, 2014, the secretary-general announced the establishment of a sixteen-member High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) to address the perceived need to reform peace operations and make them fit to address contemporary challenges. This exercise built on the 2000 Brahimi Report and the 2008 Capstone Doctrine. Chaired by former President of Timor-Leste José Ramos-Horta and vice-chaired by Ameerah Haq of Bangladesh, the panel presented its report on June 16, 2015.

Peacebuilding: On December 15, 2014, the presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council asked the secretary-general to nominate up to seven experts to form an Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) to review the UN peacebuilding architecture, ten years after its creation. Chaired by Ambassador Gert Rosenthal of Guatemala, the group was tasked with conducting a policy and institutional review of the peacebuilding architecture and developing recommendations based on this work. The AGE submitted its report on June 30, 2015, for the General Assembly and the Security Council to consider through an inter - governmental process.

Women, peace, and security: On October 18, 2013, in Resolution 2122, the Security Council invited the secretary-general to commission a study on the implementation of Resolution 1325 to inform a high-level review that would coincide with the resolution's fifteenth anniversary in October 2015. In response, the secretary-general appointed a high-level advisory group of seventeen experts led by former UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women Radhika Coomaraswamy of Sri Lanka. Following a series of global consultations, the Global Study was launched on October 14, 2015.

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2 Independent Commission on Multilateralism, "The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Addressing Climate Change," Discussion Paper, February 2016, available at www.icm2016.org/the-2030-agenda-for-sustainable-development-and-addressing-climate-change .

Figure 1. Timeline of review processes and outcomes

Thong Nguyen

The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) released its report, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People*, in June 2015. This was followed by the secretary-general's report on the future of peace operations, outlining his agenda and "priorities and key actions" to move forward the panel's recommendations by the end of 2016.[3] The UN General Assembly adopted a procedural resolution taking note with appreciation of the secretary-general's initiative to strengthen the UN system.[4] It has also begun examining recommendations from the HIPPO and the secretary-general's reports within its various committees, including the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34). Meanwhile, on November 20, 2015, the secretary-general briefed the Security Council on his action plan for taking forward the recommendations in the HIPPO report. The Security Council subsequently took note of those recommendations and, following a wide-ranging debate, issued a presidential statement.[5]

The Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (AGE) also released its report, *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, in June 2015.[6] The report was followed by inter-governmental negotiations co-facilitated by Angola and Australia and was discussed in an open debate in the Security Council on February 23, 2016. This resulted in identical Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the peacebuilding architecture, adopted on April 27, 2016 (Resolutions 2282 and 70/262, respectively).[7]

The Global Study on Women, Peace and Security, for its part, produced a report in October 2015 entitled *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*.[8] The secretary-general's 2015

report on women, peace, and security and Security Council Resolution 2242 take up many of the report's recommendations, as well as those made by the HIPPO on gender issues.[9]

These three reviews offer ideas for the future global governance of the UN's peace and security work and beyond, together producing nearly 600 pages of analysis and over 300 recommendations. As these review processes were conducted on separate but related tracks, it is critical to reflect on linkages and highlight synergies between them so that their combined effect stimulates the multilateral system to organize its peace and security architecture differently and to address the twenty-first century's urgent and interconnected threats more holistically.

To that end, President of the General Assembly (PGA) Mogens Lykketoft is convening a High-Level Thematic Debate on the UN, Peace and Security from May 10 to 11, 2016, to encourage member states and other actors to consider key messages from the reviews on the overall effectiveness of the UN's work in these areas. The PGA's objective is to help the UN move beyond the vaguely defined "need for change" and focus instead on concrete steps to realize change within a reasonable timeframe.

In referring to this high-level thematic debate, the PGA indicated that "ensuring synergy and coherence between these three reviews will promote a holistic reflection on matters that are clearly interconnected."[10] The three reviews, coupled with the process for selecting and appointing the next UN secretary-general, provide genuine opportunities to revitalize the role of the UN in matters of peace and security.

In analyzing the linkages and potential synergies between the reviews, this report is not meant to

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3   United Nations, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace—Politics, Partnership, and People: Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, June 16, 2015; United Nations Secretary-General, *The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations*, UN Doc. A/70/357–S/2015/682, September 2, 2015, paras. 15, 94, 95.

4   General Assembly Resolution 70/6 (November 12, 2015), UN Doc. A/RES/70/6.

5   United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2015/22, November 25, 2015.

6   United Nations, *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, UN Doc. A/69/968–S/2015/490, June 30, 2015.

7   Youssef Mahmoud and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, "With New Resolutions, Sustaining Peace Sits at Heart of UN Architecture," *Global Observatory*, April 29, 2016; Security Council Resolution 2282 (April 27, 2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2282; General Assembly Resolution 70/262 (April 27, 2016), UN Doc. A/RES/70/262.

8   UN Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, October 12, 2015.

9   United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security*, UN Doc. S/2015/716, September 16, 2015; UN Security Council Resolution 2242 (October 13, 2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2242.

10 Mogens Lykketoft, opening remarks at the General Assembly plenary debate on strengthening of the UN system, New York, October 12, 2015.

preempt the outcomes of the PGA's high-level debate, nor the agenda of the next secretary-general. Instead, it is essentially a primer, providing a number of guideposts to help process the reviews and suggesting possible ways forward. It first presents common themes, interlinkages, and synergies across these reviews. It then suggests key enablers for operationalizing the reviews' shared recommendations and points to existing connectors through which member states and the UN Secretariat have been able—in at least some instances—to work across silos, as well as precedents for doing so. It concludes that the UN as a whole—including both member states and the Secretariat—should build on these best practices, leverage emerging policy consensus, and create new connectors that will energize the organization to work across silos and provide integrated responses to the world's interconnected problems.

Common Themes and Interlinkages across the Three Reviews

This report identifies four common themes that have emerged from the three reviews: (1) sustaining peace and prevention; (2) gender equality and women's participation; (3) collaborative and strategic partnerships; and (4) people-centered approaches. These four areas may provide the foundation for a more effective and less fragmented UN system and energize member states to transact business differently across the three UN pillars.

SUSTAINING PEACE AND PREVENTION

"Sustaining peace" is a new term embraced by the reviews as an overarching framework to guide the wide spectrum of UN peace and security work. Sustaining peace means putting member states and their populations in the lead, putting politics and political solutions front and center, giving prevention an uncontested home, and leveraging the UN's three foundational pillars in a mutually reinforcing way. Resolutions 2282 and 70/262, both passed on April 27, 2016, define sustaining peace as including "activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escala-

tion, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development."[11] Sustaining peace is an inherently political process that spans prevention, mediation, conflict management and resolution, and integrated approaches to peacebuilding. It aims to ensure national ownership through inclusivity while sustaining international attention and assistance.

This new terminology takes "peacebuilding" out of the erroneous time horizon constraints it has been subject to since the 1990s, when it was considered a "post-conflict" exercise to be implemented by outsiders. "Prevention is not something to be turned on and off," said UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at the Security Council's first High-Level Debate on Security, Development and the Root Causes of Conflict in November 2015.[12] The reviews emphasize that building peace is an ongoing undertaking—before, during, and after conflict—a concept endorsed in Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture and echoing previous agreements, such as Security Council Resolution 2171 on conflict prevention.

In addition to moving beyond this sequential approach, sustaining peace means breaking out of sectoral approaches to peace and conflict and better integrating the UN's three foundational pillars (peace and security, development, and human rights) and their respective governance structures. Both the HIPPO and the AGE reports underscore the importance of creating the conditions for sustainable peace and sustainable development, with pointed references to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—in particular Goal 16 calling for the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for durable development. This also explains the emphasis that all three reviews place on the role of UN country teams in helping member states deliver on their commitment to sustaining peace as a function of inclusive governance and equitable development.

Regarding human rights, the HIPPO report recommends ensuring coherence between the UN's human rights and protection functions. This

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11 Security Council Resolution 2282; General Assembly Resolution 70/262.
12 UN Secretary-General, remarks to Security Council Open Debate on Security, Development and the Root Causes of Conflicts, New York, November 17, 2015.

recommendation illustrates the tendency to view human rights as primarily civil and political in the context of peace operations, when they should also be economic and social, as well as the tendency for human rights work to focus on protection, when it should also focus on prevention. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has increasingly been seeking to integrate human rights with peace and security by considering how violations of economic, social, and cultural rights may serve as early-warning indicators for conflict and how grievances from non-enjoyment of such rights can be triggers of conflict.

For sustaining peace to gain traction as a conceptual, strategic, and practical approach, the UN needs to address a number of long-identified deficits.[13] These include the need to avoid technical and supply-driven approaches, to respect nationally identified priorities, and to interact inclusively with local actors—particularly women and youth beyond capital cities and elite groups. Sustaining peace encompasses supporting inclusive national and local mechanisms for conflict prevention and institutions that address drivers of violence and build resilience. Where development and exclusion have left people behind and sowed the seeds of violence, well-targeted assistance can address risk factors, such as inequality and marginalization, at the most critical moments.[14] However, the increasingly dangerous asymmetric environments where peace operations are deployed make the above tasks hard to implement, particularly when extremist groups scorn compromise and have vested interests in fanning conflict.

Perhaps the most crucial lesson the UN has learned and needs to implement is the necessity of prevention. In recent years, international crisis management has overwhelmingly emphasized reaction rather than prevention, and responses have been largely military rather than political. Military engagements or technical solutions, while necessary to protect civilians, will not restore and sustain peace; missions should be guided primarily by politics. Implementation of the reviews must involve tangibly shifting efforts and resources toward prevention.

GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION

The importance of the women, peace, and security agenda for the UN's work as a whole is a cornerstone of the 2015 reviews. The reviews consider this agenda critical to the success of peace programs, the durability of peace and political change, and equality (see Box 2). For the UN, increasing women's participation is also a prerequisite to realizing the HIPPO report's call for a people-centered approach. Already, inclusive mechanisms created by Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions—such as procedures for representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to speak in the Security Council—have been used by a broad range of civil society actors, male and female, on many issues.

The Global Study on Resolution 1325 calls on member states to empower women throughout peace and transition processes "to bring the benefits of inclusiveness, representativeness, and diversity."[15] It also emphasizes that localizing approaches to inclusive and participatory processes is crucial to the success of national and international peace efforts.

At UN headquarters, the women, peace, and security agenda may have a unique role to play as a strategic connector because of its cross-cutting nature. The agenda has achieved both normative and operational targets across the fragmented organs and departments of the UN system; it is meant to inform staffing and analysis in peace operations, human rights investigations and accountability, and strategies to prevent violent extremism, as well as to lay the foundations for sustainable development. Yet for its potential to be realized, greater commitment in planning and budgeting is required; out of all funding for peace and security, only 2 percent is allocated to gender issues.[16]

Currently, whether a UN program or mission takes an inclusive approach is largely dependent on the leadership appointed and their personal commitment to engage women and non-state

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13 See Cedric de Coning, "From Peacebuilding to Sustaining Peace: Implications of Complexity for Resilience and Sustainability," *Resilience* (March 16, 2016).

14 Youssef Mahmoud, "A Ripe Moment for Change at the UN?" *Global Observatory*, March 9, 2016.

15 UN Women, *Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, p. 47.

16 Ibid.

> **Box 2. Women and sustaining peace**
>
> The positive impact of gender equality on peace, security, and development was often cited in all three reviews, despite the lagging implementation of Resolution 1325 in many areas. In recent years, there is mounting evidence that women's participation is not only a right but is necessary to sustain peace and political solutions after conflict. Countries with higher gender equality indicators are less likely to go to war with their neighbors, to be in poor standing in the international community, or to face crime and violence at home. Gender equality is a better indicator of a state's peacefulness than other factors like democracy, religion, or gross domestic product (GDP).[17] Women's decision-making power is directly related to the likelihood of violence, and one comparative analysis found that an increased percentage of women in parliament reduces the risk of civil war. Moreover, a number of empirical studies highlight that gender inequality can serve as a predictor of armed conflict—both between and within states.[18]
>
> When it comes to mediation and peace processes, inclusion of a range of actors—especially pro-peace and nonviolent women's groups—can generate political will and increase the chance of reaching a sustainable agreement. Peace agreements that include women as negotiators or mediators have been 20 percent more likely to last at least two years and 35 percent more likely to last 15 years.[19] Despite increasing calls for women's participation, progress has been slow, and only 2 percent of mediators and 9 percent of negotiators in official peace talks between 1992 and 2011 were women.[20]

peacebuilders or to coordinate with regional actors. All three reviews pointed to the need for mandates more specifically calling for inclusive approaches and for both the UN and its member states to be held accountable for their commitments in this area.

The latest Security Council resolution on women, peace, and security (Resolution 2242), which takes into account the findings of the Global Study and the HIPPO report, urges the secretary-general to put forth a new strategy to double the number of women in peacekeeping in the next five years. It also, once again, calls on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to scale up and roll out their gender analysis and technical gender expertise across the mission cycle, from mandate to drawdown.[21] As recommended in the AGE report, the Peacebuilding Commission is developing a gender strategy aimed at identifying entry points to strengthen its emphasis on women's participation and gender equality in its country-specific engagement.[22]

COLLABORATIVE AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS

The three reviews highlight the need to develop strong global and regional partnerships for peace and security, to promote regionally led and legitimate approaches to peacebuilding, and to implement commitments related to women, peace, and security. While the UN is a state membership body, it functions in an international ecosystem that includes states, international and regional organizations, private sector actors, and international and local civil society organizations. In many conflict settings, civil society is more present than the state or intergovernmental organizations. In others, terrorists, traffickers, and organized criminal networks operate across borders, in some cases redefining them. In this multi-stakeholder global governance network, the UN can catalyze, convene, and coordinate increasingly diverse partners inside the UN system (across sectors) and beyond (with civil society and private sector actors)

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17 Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, and Chad F. Emmett, *Sex & World Peace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

18 Erik Melander, "Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 4 (2005); Mary Caprioli, "Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 2 (2005). Cited in Marie O'Reilly, "Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Societies," Institute for Inclusive Security, October 2015.

19 Quantitative findings by Laurel Stone, published in Marie O'Reilly, Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, and Thania Paffenholz, "Reimagining Peacemaking: Women's Roles in Peace Processes," International Peace Institute, 2015.

20 UN Women, "Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence," October 2012.

21 UN Security Council Resolution 2242 (October 13, 2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2242.

22 United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, para. 183.

to respond to crises.[23]

Although the UN cannot single-handedly address all peace and security challenges, it can facilitate partnerships that lead to more coherent international action in support of inclusive national and local peace, reconciliation, and reconstruction initiatives. In particular, a stronger global-regional peace and security partnership is needed. Regional organizations increasingly have improved sector-specific guidance and strategic planning tools that integrate gender perspectives, including tools for early warning, mediation, security sector reform, transitional justice, and preventing violent extremism.[24] These tools can enable global, regional, and national cooperation and collaboration.[25] The UN and regional organizations must achieve a better division of labor under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to enable the Security Council to call upon a more resilient and capable network of actors to respond to future threats.[26] As every regional organization is different, such partnerships will also be different in nature.

The African Union (AU) is a key partner for the UN, and fostering a strategic relationship between the UN Security Council, the AU Peace and Security Council, and African regional economic communities is an important step toward developing a common vision.[27] Such collaboration should go beyond operational coordination and support and beyond peace operations; it should establish avenues to share learning and exchange information—such as on gender-sensitive analysis, planning, and programming—and to develop a shared understanding of issues. The UN has sought to bolster its regional approach through regional political offices and envoys, from Africa to Central Asia (see Box 3). Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture also call on the Peacebuilding Support Office and the AU Commission to engage in regular desk-to-desk exchanges and joint initiatives.[28]

Other important partners for the UN include international financial institutions (explored below) and research institutions and think tanks—especially those in the Global South. The latter, in particular, can help develop more comprehensive analysis and new thinking.[29] Strategic, collaborative, and financial partnerships will thus be an essential feature of international governance in the future and will be critical to successful prevention, peace operations, and peacebuilding.

PEOPLE-CENTERED APPROACHES

To understand how to prevent conflict and sustain peace in each unique context, the UN must engage with local people already working against violence and for peace in their communities. While a "people-centered approach" was a main feature of the HIPPO report and was present in all three reviews, it is not a new idea; engaging with "we the peoples" is as old as the UN Charter. Still, the reviews consider inclusive engagement to be one of the fundamental shifts the organization must undertake to make its field missions fit for purpose.[30] At the same time, both the AGE report and the Global Study caution that inclusivity should not be reduced to a box-ticking exercise.[31] This call for inclusivity is echoed in several current UN agendas—most recently and visibly in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which pledges to "leave no one behind."[32]

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23   United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, p. 32.

24   The term "countering violent extremism" (CVE) is also used, but the UN secretary-general opted for the term "preventing violent extremism" (PVE) in his December 2015 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (UN Doc. A/70/674–A/70/675), which the General Assembly adopted by consensus on February 12, 2016 in Resolution 70/254. In this resolution, member states stressed that "it is essential to address the threat posed by violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism" and recognized that "violent extremism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group." They welcomed the secretary-general's initiative, took note of his plan of action, and decided to consider it further, including at the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy review in June. UN General Assembly Resolution 70/254 (February 12, 2016), UN Doc. A/RES/70/254.

25   UN Women, *Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, p. 257.

26   United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, p. 28.

27   Cedric de Coning, Ashraf Swelam, Priyal Singh, and Natasja Rupesinghe, "African Regional Consultation on the UN General Assembly Debate on UN, Peace and Security," NUPI, Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), March 4, 2016, p. 8.

28   UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 19; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 19.

29   United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, p. 177.

30   United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, p. 14.

31   See, for example, United Nations, *Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, pp. 145, 169, 328.

32   UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 (September 25, 2015), UN Doc. A/RES/70/1.

Box 3. Regional integration through UN regional offices and envoys

In recent years, the addition of UN regional offices and the creation of regional envoy posts have come in response to the need to respond to conflict through global-regional partnerships. UN regional offices have increasingly been recognized as an important and cost-effective operational tool (their annual budgets range from $3 to $10 million) not only to carry out the organization's prevention mandate but also to develop collective longer-term responses to transnational challenges. UN regional offices have made singular contributions to mediation efforts, particularly in Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, and Mauritania, where they worked collaboratively and effectively with regional and subregional organizations.[33] Establishing additional UN regional offices could help maintain a focus on conflict prevention across borders through better analysis and support to dialogue and reconciliation processes.[34]

As the secretary-general puts it, "transforming peace operations into instruments that can address regional dimensions of conflict requires a mind-set change across the Organization."[35] UN engagement in countries such as Mali and Somalia and in regions like the Sahel and the Great Lakes has taken on multiple forms: peacekeeping operations; regional offices and special envoys; and agencies, funds, and programs. These all plan and operate alongside one another, requiring significant efforts to maintain coherence. In a welcome step, in January 2016 the Security Council approved the merger of the UN Office for West Africa with the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel. This merger expands the duties of the renamed UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), building on a mandate that already cut across peace and security, human rights, and governance in the region.[36]

Still, much of the UN system is constrained to country-specific, state-centric mandates and programs. Developing a unified interface to bring together teams from the DPKO and DPA in the same regional groupings with their "clients"—the host countries and the UN field missions, whether peacekeeping missions, special political missions, or UN country teams—could help address these constraints.[37]

There are a number of reasons for this renewed attention to people-centered approaches to peace operations and peacebuilding. First, in a multi-stakeholder world, most threats to peace and security are driven from below and cannot be solved by governments alone. The state is a necessary but not a sufficient partner in this endeavor, particularly if it is weak, absent from certain parts of its territory, captured by elites, or not trusted by its people. State-centric, prescriptive peacebuilding focused on building state capacity has shown its limitations in places like the Central African Republic and South Sudan.[38] Elite peace deals have also revealed their weaknesses, and Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding

architecture highlight the importance of broad and inclusive national ownership of peace agreements and transition processes "to ensure that the needs of all segments of society are taken into account."[39]

In practice, working closely with local communities enables missions to monitor how local people experience and perceive the impact of peace operations and ensures that these operations do not unwittingly harm those they are deployed to serve and protect.[40] These actors have a critical role to play in improving the UN's conflict analysis and in mapping peace resources that can help prevent violence and resolve conflict before it becomes entrenched. For peace to be sustainable, those on the receiving end need to lead the way. The reviews

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33 Charles T. Call, "UN Mediation and the Politics of Transition after Constitutional Crises," International Peace Institute, February 2012.

34 Civil Society Dialogue Network, "The 2015 UN Reviews: Civil Society Perspectives on EU Implementation," Brussels Meeting Report, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, February 1, 2016, p. 4.

35 United Nations Secretary-General, *Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations*, para. 23.

36 United Nations, Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2016/88, January 28, 2016.

37 Arthur Boutellis, "Driving the System Apart? A Study of United Nations Integration and Integrated Strategic Planning," International Peace Institute, August 2013.

38 United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, p. 17.

39 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 3; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 3.

40 See, for example, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, "Understanding and Integrating Local Perceptions in Multi-Dimensional UN Peacekeeping," 2013.

make a number of recommendations to this end, mostly on processes and mechanisms to meaning-fully engage local communities at various stages of the mission cycle (see Box 4). As the reviews highlight, in most fragile and conflict-affected states, youth make up half the population yet often have few or no avenues to participate in decision making.[41] It is essential to engage young people as a key stakeholder group that has the potential to have a positive impact on peace and security rather than viewing them as a challenge or potential threat.[42]

Compelling as these reasons may be, the implementation of people-centered approaches is not without challenges or risks. First, it is not always easy to identify civil society representatives who are outside of elite circles and genuinely speak on behalf of local people. Therefore, questions of who, when, and how to engage become central. Second, reaching out to communities associated with insurgents can put UN personnel at risk. Third, peace operations' direct engagement with civil society organizations can raise concerns with the host government if it views the mission as interfering with its sovereign relationship with its people.[43] Finally, it remains challenging to rigorously analyze local realities before planning engagement strategies.[44]

However, the reviews made cogent recommendations on how best to overcome these obstacles, as many national and international NGOs have done in the past. The central challenge remains to ensure that local engagement is not treated merely as a box-ticking exercise or a technical indicator left to specialists but as a key component of political

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Box 4. Supporting local knowledge for peace

Multilateral policymakers and field officials are increasingly committed to civil society participation but often find they still do not have the tools or mechanisms required to make it happen in a regular, structured way.[45] Many international NGOs have sought to provide this guidance, such as in the Local First approach from Peace Direct, the analytic tool Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts from World Vision, and the Better Peace Tool on inclusive mediation from the International Civil Society Action Network.[46] These are just a few examples of the many tested approaches that organizations large and small have developed to make partnerships with local and national actors more consistent and effective.[47] Supporting local knowledge and community-level peacebuilders is critical, not only to achieve broader participation but also to better analyze what is working locally in order to build on—rather than undermine—these initiatives, and ultimately to sustain peace.

The Secretariat and field missions have followed suit and embarked on a number of initiatives to standardize and systematize local engagement processes and practices, which are already in use in several missions. Civil affairs teams and programs are often the primary interface between the mission and local people, and their initiatives, such as community dialogues and local mediation programs, can play an important peacebuilding role at the local level. These initiatives should be supported in the long term rather than abandoned at the time of mission drawdown. In addition to commissioning surveys on local perceptions, each mission should have a broader community engagement strategy to inform its overall political strategy, including during transitions. This approach should be developed in cooperation and consultation with local civil society actors and regularly shared and reviewed with local communities.[48]

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41   See, for example, United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, pp. 16, 22; United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, pp. 32, 53, 77.

42   UN Security Council Resolution 2250 (December 9, 2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2250.

43   See Cedric de Coning, John Karlsrud, and Paul Troost, "Towards More People-Centric Peace Operations: From 'Extension of State Authority' to 'Strengthening Inclusive State-Society Relations,'" *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 4, no. 1 (2015), pp. 1–13.

44   United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, pp. 77–78.

45   Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, ed., "Leveraging Local Knowledge for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Africa," International Peace Institute, March 2015, p. 2.

46   To access these tools, see www.actlocalfirst.org , www.participate-mstc.net , and www.betterpeacetool.org .

47   For more on inclusivity in peacebuilding, see Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, "Inclusive Peacebuilding: Recognised but Not Realized," Development Dialogue Paper no. 63, December 2015.

48   "Civil Society Recommendations for the Reviews of UN Peace Operations and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture," New York Peacebuilding Group, March 2015.

decision making in the field and in headquarters.

Operationalizing the Reviews: Key Areas for UN Action

The operational recommendations put forward by the reviews can be broadly grouped in three areas for action: (1) integration and coherence; (2) financing; and (3) accountability, leadership, and governance. Several key challenges and opportunities in each area are explored below, followed by the existing connectors and processes through which both member states and the UN Secretariat have been able—in some instances—to overcome fragmentation and work across silos to address today's complex and interconnected global challenges.

INTEGRATION AND COHERENCE

At an open debate of the Security Council in February 2016 on the review of the peacebuilding architecture, a number of member states made the point that "unless we succeed in breaking the silos within our governments, between the UN principal organs, and between and within the UN Secretariat, agencies, funds and programs, we will fail the peoples that we are mandated to serve."[49] The UN's largest silos have their origins in the UN Charter, which entrenches the organization's three founding pillars of work (see Figure 2). The charter tasks the Security Council with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." It tasks the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with making recommendations to the General Assembly, member states, and UN agencies on "international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters" and "for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights."[50] Over time, the UN Secretariat developed within these silos and created new and further siloed institutions within each pillar, such as the DPKO and DPA. Specialized agencies, funds, and programs have also sometimes reinforced these silos in their own internal organi-

zation and structure, such as standalone units dealing with conflict.

Over the last twenty-five years, the UN has undertaken a series of institutional innovations to promote integration and greater coherence in engaging with realities on the ground. The UN has developed a comprehensive body of integration-related policies and planning tools and has experimented with many forms and levels of integration. Much of this drive for integration emerged from the peacekeeping failures of the 1990s and the realization that various parts of the UN were acting separately and, at times, at cross-purposes.

While member states and UN staff alike frequently discuss and use the term "integration" as a guiding principle, it encompasses different processes (e.g., within the Secretariat versus among the Secretariat and UN agencies, funds, and programs), different levels (e.g., in the UN Secretariat versus in field missions and offices), and different outcomes. The UN has taken the integration agenda further than many other organizations and "whole-of-government" approaches, particularly in the field, including through its 2006 Delivering as One initiative in the development arena.[51] However, integration now faces a number of obstacles, ranging from persisting structural and financial impediments to the lack of incentives and rewards.[52]

Looking ahead, the 2015 reviews have the potential to renew this drive for greater coherence. Two rhetorical shifts are critical markers of this push: (1) adopting the term "peace operations" to denote the full spectrum of responses, rather than perpetuating the bureaucratic turfs of and silos between peacekeeping, special political missions, and UN country teams; and (2) investing in "sustaining peace" as a shared responsibility across the organization before, during, and after conflict. As described in the following section on financing, predictable and pooled funding could also greatly incentivize system coherence. The need to recognize the primacy of politics and better analyze and plan across the silos, as discussed below, are also important drivers.

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49 Joint Statement by Ukraine, Egypt, and Spain at a UN Security Council Open Debate on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, February 23, 2016.

50 Charter of the United Nations, "Preamble," "Chapter I: Purposes and Principles," and "Chapter III: Organs," 1945.

51 United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment*, November 20, 2006, UN Doc. A/61/583.

52 For a detailed study of UN Integration, see Boutellis, "Driving the System Apart? A Study of United Nations Integration and Integrated Strategic Planning."

Figure 2. Silos in the UN system

Peace and Security   **Sustainable Development**   **Human Rights**

Member States

General Assembly

5th and 6th Committees

1st and 4th Committees   2nd Committee   3rd Committee

Security Council   Economic and Social Council   Human Rights Council

UN Secretariat

Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB)

High-Level Committee on Programmes (HLCP), High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM), and the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) [see below]

Executive Office of the Secretary General

Policy Committee, Management Committee, and Senior Management Group

New Analysis & Planning Cell

Department of Peacekeeping Operations/ Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS)   Department of Political Affairs (DPA)   UNDG — UN Agencies, Funds, and Programs   Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

Field Level

Peacekeeping Operations   Special Political Missions   Resident Coordinators and Country Teams   Human Rights Components and Special Rapporteurs

Thong Nguyen

Looking ahead, the focus of the next secretary-general's integration drive should be more at the strategic than the structural level. Strategic integration means following certain policy principles, such as analyzing and planning as one and integrating only where it matters and adds value. Structural changes are secondary and can take different forms to reflect evolving and contextual needs and circumstances. Simply put, "form follows function," a guiding principle suggested by the June 2008 UN Policy Committee decision on integration.[53] Future integration will also need to be field- and client-oriented rather than headquarters-focused and will need to recognize that the UN's "clients" are not only host states but also the people.

The next secretary-general will therefore need to build a compelling narrative—accompanied by concrete incentives—on the value and relevance of UN integration and coherence that both the UN bureaucracy and member states can support. Reforms should go beyond headquarters structures to also focus on the coherence and quality of the UN response in the field. Such reforms would challenge established power structures and the risk-averse behaviors and mindsets of individuals, departments, and member states. The AGE report argues powerfully that the responsibility to realize integration lies with member states, which, some argue, tend to blame the system for its lack of coherence while helping to perpetuate siloed approaches and competition within the system through their funding practices and internal divisions.

FINANCING

The UN's fragmentation is mirrored in, and arguably driven by, its financing arrangements. For instance, peace operations deployed with multi-dimensional mandates have large budgets dedicated almost entirely to running the mission itself, with little for programs to support the host government and communities. Earlier recommendations on civilian capacity deployment calling for more flexibility to use a mission's budget to respond to crises and changing circumstances and for channeling budgets to fund short-term programmatic activities have not been acted upon.[54] Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture recognize the importance of funding for the peacebuilding components of relevant UN missions, including during mission drawdown and transitions, when inadequate support can increase the risk of relapse (see Box 5).[55] Inadequate financing perpetuates an expectations gap often detrimental to perceptions of UN missions on the ground.

To close this expectations gap, close cooperation between UN actors on the ground is urgently needed. Yet the UN Secretariat and UN agencies, funds, and programs face structural disincentives to working together and, in some cases, prohibitions against pooling their funding streams.[56] Furthermore, they are not always ready or able to prioritize key aspects of building peace, particularly if their funding, which comes from voluntary donor contributions, is not in line with Security Council mandates.

Programming to sustain peace must receive more predictable funding, including from assessed contributions[57] and from instruments such as the Peacebuilding Fund and multi-year pooled funding. The AGE report proposes that the Peacebuilding Fund receive core funding equivalent to 1 percent of the total UN peace operations budget.[58] Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture only take note of this proposal while encouraging member states to continue making voluntary contributions to the fund. They do, however, call for a report from the next secretary-general with options for "increasing, restructuring and better prioritizing funding dedicated to United Nations peacebuilding activities, including through assessed and voluntary contributions, with a view to ensuring sustainable financing."[59] While changes in financing arrange-

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53 United Nations, Decision Number 2008/24 of the Secretary-General in the Policy Committee on Integration, June 25, 2008.

54 United Nations, *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict: Independent Report of the Senior Advisory Group*, March 2011.

55 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 26; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 26.

56 United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, p. 26.

57 The original report of the Civilian Capacities initiative had already suggested channeling mission funds to national or local actors; UN agencies, funds and programs; or external partners based on the principle of comparative advantage.

58 United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, p. 55.

59 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 30; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 30.

Box 5. Managing transitions

The UN Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown and Withdrawal, which the UN Integration Steering Group adopted on February 4, 2013, provides strategic guidance to improve planning and management of mission withdrawals. Yet transitions and gradual drawdowns of peacekeeping missions, special political missions, and UN country teams remain challenging for the UN system as a whole—whether in Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia, or Sierra Leone. Gaps remain in the UN's ability to sustain peace through "a continuum of response and smoother transitions" between different phases of missions, as called for by the HIPPO report. And without long-term planning or financing strategies, countries affected by conflict often face a "financial cliff," where assistance and support drops off dramatically just as the peacekeeping mission exits.

While the involvement of the Peacebuilding Commission has, in some cases, helped to draw attention to countries during UN transitions—with some success in Sierra Leone, for instance—UN country teams often struggle to step up and mobilize voluntary funding to fill gaps as a mission withdraws.[60] Part of the difficulty resides in agreeing jointly with the host country on the support needed to ensure that peace can sustain itself, possibly in the form of a compact between the UN and the host government, as suggested in the HIPPO report.

A recent consultation held in Monrovia, Liberia, on March 31, 2016, hosted by the Government of Liberia and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), warned that the upcoming UNMIL drawdown and exit from the Security Council's agenda could leave some conflict drivers unaddressed, risking relapse. It further revealed that the multilateral political and funding architecture does not adequately reflect the cyclical nature of conflict and the need for sustained attention beyond the peacekeeping phase.[61] The UN and the host country should devise a bridging strategy early enough in the exit planning process to ensure that mission withdrawal does not unwittingly weaken the fragile foundations of self-sustaining peace.

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ments will inevitably face stiff challenges in the UN's Fifth Committee budget negotiations, this request provides an important platform for the UN system to comprehensively analyze current funding constraints and encourage creative thinking on how to overcome them.

Current funding arrangements and budget processes also reduce the flexibility to design mandates that fit the specific needs of a country or context and to transition between various mission models and sizes. Because peacekeeping missions are funded through the peacekeeping support account, while political missions rely on the regular budget (both are also supported by extra-budgetary voluntary contributions from donors), peacekeeping responses are sometimes undertaken when alternative lighter or more gradual interventions would be more appropriate. Funding

mechanisms should support use of a continuum or spectrum of tailored responses.

To facilitate more tailored responses, the HIPPO report calls for a single "peace operations account" to finance all peace operations (whether peacekeeping or special political missions) and their related activities. However, member states remain divided, and it was left to the next secretary-general to push for a decision on this critical issue. Existing recommendations on the funding and backstopping of special political missions,[62] originally requested in General Assembly Resolution 259 in December 2010, have been mired in the Fifth Committee for several years.[63]

Building on a strategic and collaborative approach to partnerships, the UN and the World Bank should cooperate in a more predictable and

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60   Megan Price and Lina Titulaer, "Beyond Transitions: UNDP's Role before, during and after UN Mission Withdrawal," Clingendael Institute, September 2013.

61   See "Key Messages from the Monrovia Consultation," Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), ACCORD, NUPI, and DHF, March 31, 2016, available at http://www.un.org/pga/70/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2016/01/Monrovia_consultation_2016_HLTD.pdf .

62   United Nations, *Review of Arrangements for Funding and Backstopping Special Political Missions: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. A/66/340, October 12, 2011.

63   United Nations, *Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations*.

institutionalized way and, as called for in Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture, strengthen their collaboration in conflict-affected countries.[64] Both entities, as well as regional development banks, could undertake joint public expenditure reviews in the security and justice sectors to enhance their effectiveness and transparency. They could also further reinforce their joint support to building the capacity of national institutions and local civil society networks to enable them, for instance, to sustainably assist women and girls affected by armed conflict and post-conflict situations.[65]

Indeed, the three reviews contrast the long-term effects of gender equality on peacefulness with the dearth of funding for gender-focused initiatives. The AGE report and the Global Study stress the importance of attaining or, preferably, exceeding the goal of earmarking 15 percent of all peace and security funding to projects promoting gender equality. While efforts to endorse this initiative did not make it through the peacebuilding negotiations, Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 encourage the secretary-general to promote the gender dimensions of peacebuilding, including by delivering gender-sensitive and gender-targeted programming.[66]

Beyond mobilization of resources, financing encompasses using financial instruments, risk management, and agreements between national and international partners (often discussed in the form of compacts) to articulate priorities and commitments.[67] Effective financing will require policy communities to collectively recognize that building sustainable peace is a slow, iterative process with long time scales that is most likely to succeed when supported by vertical and horizontal coalitions with a shared vision. The reviews encourage using innovative approaches to financing at the country and regional levels and creating enlarged funding platforms that bring together diverse donors and actors to pool resources in order to share and mitigate risk and maximize impact.[68]

ACCOUNTABILITY, LEADERSHIP, AND GOVERNANCE

All three reviews directly link the overarching message on accountability and governance to leadership. Improving leadership, including by changing the process for selecting high-ranking UN officials, could help professionalize the organization, while a transparent recruitment system based on merit and expertise could help bring further accountability.[69] Individuals leading peace operations should be held accountable for how effectively they implement achievable mandates. Heads of mission, in turn, should be liable for meeting performance indicators, in particular on gender equality and the protection of women from abuse by UN staff. Performance indicators should also center on efforts to promote the participation of women and the use of gender-sensitive analysis in designing and implementing programs.

Several recent developments have sent strong messages about accountability. In August 2015, the secretary-general ordered Babacar Gaye, his special representative in the Central African Republic, to resign following sexual abuse by peacekeepers. In March 2016, the Security Council adopted its first-ever resolution on sexual abuse by peacekeepers, including a decision to repatriate military or police units "where there is credible evidence of widespread or systemic sexual exploitation and abuse."[70] The secretary-general and member states alike need to sustain and act upon these efforts.

The three peace and security reviews call for high-level structural changes to ensure greater accountability in the future. The HIPPO report points to a 2004 proposal by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to create an additional deputy secretary-general position responsible for peace and security. However, the current secretary-general left it to his successor to

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64   UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 20; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 20.

65   United Nations, *Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, p. 167.

66   UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 22; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 22.

67   Sigrid Gruener, ed., *Six Goals for Strenthening the UN's Ability to Sustain Peace*, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Development Dialogue Paper no. 14, March 2016.

68   United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, p. 87; UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 20; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 20.

69   Eli Stamnes and Kari M. Osland, "Synthesis Report: Reviewing UN Peace Operations, the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the Implementation of UNSCR 1325," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2016, p. 46.

70   UN Security Council Resolution 2272 (March 11, 2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2272.

consider this recommendation. The Global Study calls for considering a new assistant secretary-general position at UN Women to deal with crises, conflict, and emergencies, as well as a senior gender adviser in the office of every special representative. The latter recommendation was endorsed by the secretary-general and by the Security Council in Resolution 2242.

Past experience, however, shows that such high-level proposals can, in the end, produce new layers of bureaucracy and generate new turf battles instead of producing more accountability. The driving force behind any such decision should be its impact on the coherence and quality of UN responses in the field. It would be more advisable to leverage existing connectors and processes—at the level of member states, the Secretariat, and the field—to achieve greater coherence, energize the UN to transact business differently across silos whenever and wherever needed, and ultimately improve the UN's overall governance and relevance.

Leveraging Synergies: Connectors and Processes for Overcoming Silos

Despite the UN's well-documented and often lamented fragmentation, member states and the UN Secretariat have, at times, been able to work across silos. To leverage the synergies identified in the reviews, the UN can build on existing connectors, activate new ones the reviews recommend, and turn ad hoc precedents of overcoming silos into practice (see Figure 3). In some cases, connectors have been funded by extra-budgetary voluntary contributions; where these connectors have proven effective, core funding—even when voluntary—should be shifted to support them in a more sustainable and predictable way.

CAPITALIZE ON EXISTING CONNECTORS

The UN system can build upon the many connectors it already has across its three thematic pillars at the level of member states, the UN Secretariat, and the field. Although the UN Charter gives the

primary responsibility for peace and security to the Security Council, the council does not have sole responsibility, and the work of the General Assembly reaches across all three pillars. In a sense, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the Human Rights Council together constitute the UN peace and security architecture, and the peacebuilding architecture is meant to play a bridging role.

Connectors at the Level of Member States

In addition to giving the secretary-general a role to play in the area of peace and security under Article 99, the UN Charter gives the General Assembly a role by allowing it to make recommendations to the Security Council. Under Articles 11 and 12, the General Assembly may "consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security," "discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member," and "call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security."[71] Article 65 also foresees both a proactive and a reactive role for ECOSOC, as it "may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request."[72]

Institutionally, although the General Assembly's First, Second, Third, and Fourth Committees fall within the thematic pillars, the powerful Fifth Committee cuts across the silos, with responsibility for administration and budgetary matters, including of specialized agencies. On the basis of the Fifth Committee's reports, the General Assembly considers and approves the UN's budget. This committee is therefore well placed to consider recommendations from the reviews on creating a single "peace operations account" and earmarking 15 percent of all peace and security funding to promoting gender equality. It is also well placed to consider the secretary-general's forthcoming report on options to increase and improve funding for peacebuilding activities through assessed and voluntary contributions, as requested in Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture.

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71 Charter of the United Nations, "Chapter IV: The General Assembly."
72 Ibid., "Chapter X: The Economic and Social Council."

Figure 3. Connectors across UN silos

Thong Nguyen

Connectors at the Level of the UN Secretariat

At the level of the UN Secretariat, a number of connectors cut across the three pillars, including the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), the Policy Committee and Management Committee, and the Senior Management Group. The CEB is chaired by the secretary-general and reports to both ECOSOC and the General Assembly, providing broad guidance and strategic direction to the UN system as a whole. It is the UN's highest-level coordination forum and includes the leadership of twenty-nine member organizations. It aims to develop and promote inter-agency priorities while maintaining its member organizations' independent mandates. The CEB operates through three committees: the High-Level Committee on Programs, the High-Level Committee on Management, and the UN Development Group.

The Executive Office of the Secretary-General has a critical leadership role to play in setting priorities for the organization as a whole. The Policy Committee and Management Committee, both established in 2015, offer thematic and country-specific guidance for executive-level decisions and address internal reform issues, respectively. The Senior Management Group brings together the heads of departments, programs, funds, and offices at the UN to exchange information and share knowledge.[73]

Beyond these structures, a number of cross-cutting policies also serve as connectors within the UN system. For example, the secretary-general's Human Rights Up Front initiative was launched in 2013 to inspire all parts of the UN system to adopt human rights and protection of civilians as core responsibilities and a way to strengthen prevention through early warning. This has been part of a positive trend of developing system-wide policies that cut across silos, which has also seen the development of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to Non-UN Security Forces, the Policy on Human Rights Screening of UN Personnel, the Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal, and the UN Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration.

Connectors at the Field Level

At the field level, the strongest connectors have been the executive representatives of the secretary-general (ERSGs)—until recently—and special representatives of the secretary-general (SRSGs), as well as "triple-hatted" deputy SRSGs. Deputy SRSGs have the authority of both a resident coordinator and a humanitarian coordinator and are responsible for coordinating between peace operations and UN country teams' longer-term development work.

Effective integration—particularly in the field—often comes down to leadership and personalities within the UN mission and agencies, funds, and programs. The secretary-general therefore holds great responsibility in selecting leaders for headquarters and field posts who will foster such integration and the HIPPO's proposed shift toward a more "field-focused and people-centered" organization. Another challenge is strengthening the resident coordinator's role in fostering integration—particularly in areas related to sustaining peace—when there is no longer an ERSG with an explicitly political mandate from the Security Council. Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture call on the secretary-general to strengthen the high-level leadership of UN country teams to absorb peacebuilding activities after mission transitions, which may open the door for resident coordinators to play a stronger role.[74]

Other important connectors include peace and development advisers, who provide policy advice to UN resident coordinators and country teams on political and institution-building issues while also reporting to DPA headquarters. The joint program between the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and DPA on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention, launched in 2004, supports national conflict prevention initiatives. Much of this support to date has gone toward deploying peace and development advisers to UN country teams in the field to help national authorities and provide them with seed funding for such prevention initiatives. Notably, many of these initiatives are funded through the Peacebuilding Fund and

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73 Policy Committee of the Secretary-General, *Manual*, June 2008.
74 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 30; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 30.

extra-budgetary voluntary funding, and they have grown considerably over the years.

The DPA Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisers, which is available to peace operations, resident coordinators, and country teams, also plays a supporting role. So too does the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections, which brings together DPKO (and its Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions), UNDP, OHCHR, UN Women, and other agencies to jointly support the rule of law and human rights. Although a headquarters structure, the UN Operations and Crisis Centre, created in 2013, brings together DPKO, DPA, UNDP, and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to facilitate responses to crises in the field. Human rights officers have already been integrated into peace operations for some time (with a dual reporting line to the OHCHR),[75] and the secretary-general's recent decision to consolidate specialized functions relating to child protection and conflict-related sexual violence within mission human rights components is welcome.[76] Nonetheless, human rights officers could, in many instances, benefit from greater political support from mission leadership.

ACTIVATE NEW CONNECTORS

New System-Wide Analysis and Planning

Beyond the above-mentioned existing connectors that should be built upon, the three reviews have led to the emergence of new connectors that will need to be activated. Following the HIPPO report, the secretary-general took the concrete action of establishing a small, centralized analysis and planning cell in his office. This cell can enhance the Secretariat's capacity to conduct and draw on conflict analysis and strategic planning across the UN system to develop options for possible whole-of-UN responses.[77] While not explicitly referencing the cell, Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture strongly endorse the need to strengthen system-wide analysis and planning and request the secretary-general to report back on these efforts.[78]

In order to act as a true connector, this cell will now need to respond to the three reviews' call for conflict analysis to systematically consider human rights and threats to civilians in addition to the political, security, social, economic, gender, and regional dimensions of conflict. In order to be effective and to transcend silos and turfs, this cell will need the political backing of the secretary-general. It will also need the backing of member states, which do not always welcome being told what they need rather than what they want to hear, particularly in regards to deploying peace operations.

Moreover, the cell will have to be staffed properly, which requires the support of the General Assembly's Fifth Committee for assessed funding, and the capacity and culture of planners from DPA, DPKO, and the UN Development Group will have to be upgraded. Parallel steps should also be taken to partner with international financial institutions, both to more strongly integrate economic analysis into UN assessments and to better factor local knowledge and community perspectives into analysis and planning (see Box 6).

Connectors within the Peace and Security Pillar

The two HIPPO recommendations this secretary-general left to his successor—to create an additional deputy secretary-general position responsible for peace and security and to have a single "peace operations account" to finance all peace operations and their related activities—also could become connectors, although primarily within the peace and security pillar. Indeed, without unified financing, governance, and decision-making structures, functions and entities with significant responsibility will likely see their authority contested from within the system.

Given the limited incentives DPKO and DPA currently have to work together, a single peace operations account could go a long way in promoting better tailored, more effective, and more accountable responses. More flexibility and interoperability between the regular assessed

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75 Initiated through a 1999 Memorandum of Understanding, this integration was strengthened by Policy Committee decision 2005/24 and formalized by the 2011 Policy on Human Rights in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions.

76 United Nations Secretary-General, *Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations*, para. 66.

77 Ibid., para. 54.

78 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 13, 30; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 13, 30.

Box 6. Uniting for joint analysis

Peace and conflict analysis and knowledge sharing provide opportunities for joint, cross-sectoral action by the UN's representatives in a country and their counterparts at headquarters. Ideally, joint analysis should also be participatory, bringing together diverse local actors to serve as analysts. Such an approach can serve as a peacebuilding initiative in itself by modeling political inclusivity and a democratic process. Joint analysis—including post-conflict needs assessments—could also focus on factors associated with peaceful and resilient societies rather than selectively on factors that drive and sustain violent acts and tend to trigger securitized responses to symptoms, with both predictable and unpredictable counterproductive effects.

A regular practice of joint peace and conflict analysis could link information gathered in a peace operation back to the UN's longer-term peacebuilding planning. For example, it could draw insights from the work of a mission's civil affairs teams, which often run community dialogues and local mediation programs. Joint analysis could also draw on UN Women's extensive work with women's peace networks in conflict countries. At the moment, the rich local knowledge those programs could collect is overlooked and rarely relayed to the SRSG in the mission or to peacebuilding and political affairs officers back in New York. Too often, this knowledge is lost once a peace operation draws down. As UN actors strive to overcome silos, knowledge management may be a good place to start.

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budget and voluntary contributions, both in the field and in headquarters, would also be welcome. The focus on financing of peace operations should also not distract from the need for member states to prioritize development budgets to prevent violent conflict and sustain peace.

Connecting with the Development Pillar

At the headquarters level, DPA's recent entry into the UN Development Group as an observer member is also a notable development in that it connects the peace and security and the sustainable development pillars moving forward. The secretary-general's request that the "the United Nations Development Group…take forward a review of current capacities of agencies, funds and programmes" to strengthen preventive and peacebuilding work is also a major opportunity. Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture take note of this request and look forward to their findings "contributing to enhancing the United Nations' capacities relating to sustaining peace."[79] The AGE report also emphasizes that the entire UN system, including development and humanitarian actors, has a responsibility, bestowed upon it by the charter, to prevent violent conflict and sustain peace.

While the General Assembly's quadrennial comprehensive policy review (QCPR) on UN operational activities for development is not a new exercise, the upcoming QCPR provides an opportunity to rethink the traditional siloed approach and to integrate, or at least better connect, more UN entities and functional areas.[80] The peacebuilding resolutions also call for better cooperation and coordination to strengthen the UN development system's contribution to peacebuilding at headquarters and in the field and explicitly reference "the overarching framework of the United Nations operational activities for development."[81] This presents an opportunity to ensure that the governance arrangements for the UN development system explicitly focus on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including in the QCPR.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has the potential to become the most powerful connector between the UN's pillars. The SDGs signal a commitment by member states to address some of the social, political, governance, and economic factors, such as exclusion and corruption, that impede sustainable development. They should, in turn, encourage the UN system to overcome silos.[82] Indeed, the 2030 Agenda, with its

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79   UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 17; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 17.

80   The QCPR is the mechanism through which the General Assembly assesses the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and impact of UN operational activities for development and establishes system-wide policy orientations for development cooperation. See http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/qcpr.shtml .

81   UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 16; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 16.

82   One example is the Chief Executives Board's (CEB) forthcoming process around the UN system's engagement with the SDGs.

seventeen goals and 169 targets, integrates the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. The SDGs build on the key lesson from the Millennium Development Goals: sustained systemic change and long-term development cannot be achieved through single-sector goals and approaches. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda therefore presents a unique opportunity for overcoming traditional silos and for more cross-sectoral decision making (see Box 7).[83]

BUILD ON PRECEDENTS

Beyond existing and potential connectors, recent years have seen an increasing number of precedents of member states coming together to work across structural divides or enable the UN system to do so in response to specific challenges. Such positive precedents should be studied, built on, and turned into practice so that the next time the world organization faces a challenge that does not fall squarely within one of its pillars, a timely and effective response is not hampered by its very architecture. Member states, together with the UN Secretariat, should also nurture the emerging consensus on sustaining peace and on systemic coherence and integration. This could include, inter alia, discussing programmatic, administrative, and financial measures to enable the UN system at headquarters and in the field to work together differently in support of sustainable peace and development.

Security Council

In the Security Council, several debates and presidential statements have already married the three pillars. In February 2011, Brazil organized a Security Council debate on Interlinkages between Peace, Security and Development that attracted great attention. The background note stated that the "Security Council must take into account social and development issues in its deliberations in order to ensure an effective transition to peace."[84] In 2014, the Security Council pledged, in Resolution 2171, to better use a system-wide approach to prevent conflict. It also reiterated the "need for a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and sustainable peace, which comprises operational and structural measures for the prevention of armed conflict and addresses its root causes, including through…promoting sustained economic growth, poverty eradication, social development, sustainable development, national reconciliation, good governance, democracy, gender equality and respect for, and protection of, human rights."[85]

In January 2015, Chile, as president of the Security Council, established another precedent by convening a day-long debate on inclusive development and peace and security. This debate resulted in a presidential statement reiterating that "in order to support a country to emerge sustainably

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Box 7. Saying no to silos in the SDG negotiations

Throughout the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in September 2015, one of the main criteria for member states was integration and noncompetition with the other goals. Goals would not be considered in isolation from each other, and targets would not be adopted if they contradicted those in another area of work. While there are seventeen SDGs, the negotiators viewed them all as indivisible.

This approach guided negotiations toward an integrated framework—the outcome is a set of goals woven together into a holistic agenda. Individual goals are not viewed as falling in the domain of only one UN entity or department, and realizing them will require the UN to work across its charter. As the secretary-general has remarked, "No agency owns a goal." Instead, each goal contains targets across the UN's pillars and requires member states, the Secretariat, and the UN in the field to work as one. Because, in practice, UN agencies tend to focus on certain goals as their particular domain, new funding mechanisms could incentivize truly cooperative approaches across the UN system.

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83 UN Economic and Social Council, "Breaking the Silos: Cross-Sectoral Partnerships for Advancing the Sustainable Development Goals," March 31, 2016.

84 "Security Council Discusses Poverty and Under-Development as Root of Conflict," UN News Centre, February 11, 2011, available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37519#.VxgXePkrIdV .

85 UN Security Council Resolution 2171 (August 21, 2014), UN Doc. S/RES/2171.

from conflict, there is a need for a comprehensive and integrated approach that incorporates and strengthens coherence between political, security, development, human rights and rule of law activities."[86] The resolution on youth, peace, and security adopted on December 9, 2015, is another example of the Security Council integrating development issues such as youth education and employment.

The push for this type of integration has not always received universal support, and some of these issues are tied to a bigger debate over Security Council reform. In November 2015, for example, the United Kingdom tried to organize a Security Council debate on "peaceful societies and conflict prevention" that made a direct connection between conflict prevention and SDG 16 on the promotion of peaceful societies, justice, and inclusive institutions for sustainable development. This effort received some pushback from member states wary of the Security Council encroaching upon areas they viewed as falling within the exclusive competence of the General Assembly and ECOSOC. The majority of Security Council members nonetheless called for both integrating the development and conflict prevention agendas and cooperating with the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and other UN agencies and international institutions. In the end, the ministerial-level open debate on November 17, 2015, was renamed "Security, Development and the Root Causes of Conflict" to address such concerns, and it did not result in a presidential statement.[87]

Economic and Social Council

A number of ECOSOC initiatives have also contributed to building bridges between the various pillars of the UN. Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on Guinea-Bissau (created in 2002), Burundi (created in 2003), and Haiti (created in 1999 in response to a request by the Security Council under Article 65 of the UN Charter and reactivated in 2004) set out to help define long-term programs of support for these countries emerging from conflict.

The mandates of the first two groups have been terminated, as these countries' peacebuilding challenges are now being addressed by the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). However, ECOSOC continues to provide advice on Haiti and has involved the ECOSOC president and the SRSG in Haiti in the group's work. This work has demonstrated that ECOSOC can leverage attention and funding for conflict-affected countries—not only for peace operations but also for development, governance, and human rights initiatives.[88]

Peacebuilding Commission

The PBC has held a number of joint meetings with ECOSOC on issues such as youth and conflict, as well as conversations on the need for a longer-term positioning of the UN development system and for a forum for citizen action. In Resolutions 60/180 and 61/16, the General Assembly supported such regular interactions and underlined the value of ECOSOC's experience in post-conflict peacebuilding and its ability to increase coherence between the development and the peace and security pillars.[89] The PBC is mandated to report to both the Security Council and the General Assembly (see Box 8).

The newly minted resolutions on the peacebuilding architecture, which establish "sustaining peace" as a new unifying framework, may enable the PBC to realize some of its bridging potential. As the incoming chair of the PBC in January 2016, Kenya expressed its intention to promote coordinated and sustained engagement with the General Assembly and ECOSOC around the SDGs and to analyze the PBC's role as a bridge between the three principal organs of the UN (the General Assembly, the Security Council, and ECOSOC).[90]

Human Rights Council

Better awareness of the PBC's work among members of the Human Rights Council—particularly when passing resolutions on countries on the PBC and the Security Council's agendas and

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86 United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2015/3, January 19, 2015.

87 "UN Security Council Discusses Links with 2030 Agenda," International Institute for Sustainable Development Reporting Services, November 17, 2015, available at http://sd.iisd.org/news/un-security-council-discusses-links-with-2030-agenda/ .

88 UN Economic and Social Council, "Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Recovery," available at www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/peacebuilding.shtml .

89 General Assembly Resolution 60/180 (December 30, 2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180; General Assembly Resolution 61/16 (January 9, 2007), UN Doc. A/RES/61/16.

90 Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations, "Letter of Intent of the Incoming Chair of the UN Peacebuilding Commission for 2016 Chairmanship of Kenya," January 21, 2016.

Box 8. Resolutions 2282 and 70/262: Updating the mandate of the PBC

There is hope that the new "sustaining peace" resolutions may enable the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to take an overdue step. When the PBC was established in 2005, it set out to "bring together all relevant actors" to mobilize resources, sustain attention, and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery. While the PBC's founding resolution tasked it with helping to improve the coordination of all actors— within and outside the UN—on particular post-conflict countries, the PBC has yet to play this role effectively (as both its five-year and ten-year reviews found).[91] As the latter report recommended, "The PBC should become the advisory 'bridge' between the relevant intergovernmental organs it was always intended to be."[92]

This issue is taken up in the new peacebuilding resolutions, which elaborate on the functions of the PBC set out in its original mandate. Much of the new language focuses on improving coordination and integration, noting the links between the UN's three foundational pillars and stressing the PBC's role as a bridge between the UN's principal organs in each area. The two resolutions call on the PBC to realize this bridging role by sharing advice on coherence and priorities, broadening its strategic convening role, and working in greater cooperation with the Security Council, General Assembly, and ECOSOC.

The resolutions seek to elevate the responsibility for peacebuilding to include all parts of the UN and feature strong links to the development system and a strengthened role for the leadership of UN country teams to take on peacebuilding. Sustaining peace as a cross-cutting issue may also open opportunities for implementing the recommendations of the HIPPO report, including its recommendations to support peacebuilding and political programs during transitions and to recognize the peacebuilding roles of peacekeepers.

Looking ahead, the resolutions also task PBC members with revisiting and revising their working methods. Member states will need to continue coming together to interpret the resolutions in a progressive way, ensuring that the PBC translates these rhetorical gains into its daily practice. The PBC has recently benefitted from strong chairs (Brazil in 2014 and Sweden in 2015), with Kenya taking the helm this year. These member states are outspoken on the need for greater coherence and a stronger preventive role for the PBC. Given Kenya's past co-chairmanship of the Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals, it is particularly well-placed to make concrete linkages between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the work of the PBC.

carrying out the Universal Periodic Review[93]— could also help improve coherence between the UN pillars. Special procedures mandate-holders (including special rapporteurs, special representatives, working groups, and independent experts with either thematic or country-specific mandates) and commissions of inquiry should also be better integrated into discussions in New York beyond the Third Committee and their recommendations better factored into the work of the PBC and the UN peace and security organs, especially in discussions relating to economic, social, and cultural rights.[94]

Transacting Business Differently

As member states have increasingly, out of necessity, started to transact business differently across silos on an ad hoc basis, the UN system itself will need to identify precedents of responding creatively to challenges not easily addressed by one part of the system alone. The UN system was not designed to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Nor was it designed to implement the secretary general's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, should member states endorse it during the June 2016 Global Counter-

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91 General Assembly Resolution 60/180 (December 30, 2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180.

92 United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, p. 8.

93 The Universal Periodic Review was established when the Human Rights Council was created on March 15, 2006, by UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251. This mandated the council to "undertake a universal periodic review, based on objective and reliable information, of the fulfilment by each State of its human rights obligations and commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal treatment with respect to all States."

94 Quaker United Nations Office and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, "Report on Linking Human Rights, Peace and Security in Preparation for the High-Level Thematic Debate on International Peace and Security in May 2016," February 12, 2016.

Terrorism Strategy Review.

The UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) and the joint mission of the UN and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons have demonstrated that the UN system can work together across silos to deliver effective operational partnerships in the midst of emergencies. In these instances, the UN, although not adequately configured or equipped, was viewed as the only option for leading an international response. It managed to leverage funding and technical expertise across silos and from different parts of the system (see Box 9). According to one UN expert reflecting on these cases, "Urgency assures flexibility."

While UN reform is slow, parts of the system can be empowered to better manage crises in the interim. The UN Secretariat, together with member states, could therefore consider developing criteria for giving the secretary-general special authority to use assessed contributions and UN assets beyond peace operations in exceptional circumstances, as he did for the Ebola response.

Conclusion: The Way Forward

The three major reviews of UN peace operations, the UN peacebuilding architecture, and the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security present clear opportunities to recommit the organization as a whole to making itself "fit for purpose" and able to respond to challenges and crises more effectively. As the secretary-general put it, "The various reviews and initiatives recognize that we cannot continue to address problems in separate or unrelated silos; we need to find the linkages among the reviews and work together so that the recommendations add up together to more than the sum of their parts."[95] In response to this need, this report is designed to help "make sense of it all" by identifying and analyzing common themes, interlinkages, and synergies across these reviews. Where warranted, the report offers suggestions for the way forward on the basis of findings and conclusions from recent empirical research.

This report argues that the UN as a whole should

Box 9. Lessons from UNMEER

The UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), established in September 2014, is an example of how, in the context of a rapidly developing and complex crisis, the UN can provide a whole-of-system response. An overarching approach to the Ebola crisis was required, and the mission was mandated "to develop and implement a comprehensive system-wide response framework."[96] As the situation in West Africa changed, UNMEER went through three distinct phases. First, it focused on responding rapidly to the crisis and meeting immediate needs. It subsequently consolidated its response by coordinating and further decentralizing. Finally, as Ebola cases became more dispersed, it aimed at more technical refinements to its response. This sequenced approach exemplifies the UN's capacity to adapt as an emergency situation evolves and to deliver results when given the flexibility it needs.

The leadership structure of the mission also offers lessons for effective coordination and quick reaction. The secretary-general's executive management ensured quick action, strong direction, and oversight; according to the secretary-general's lessons learned report, mission leadership was empowered by "direct access and communication with the Secretary-General's office to escalate issues for immediate political or operational intervention."[97] Mission leadership accessed guidance from the World Health Organization (WHO) and other technical agencies. Its work was complemented by that of Ebola crisis managers in each of the affected countries who interfaced with governments and served as representatives to donors. UNMEER's flexibility, partnerships, and effective leadership (both executive and management) were key aspects of its response to unanticipated challenges that increased its impact, strategic action, and relevance.

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95 Ban Ki-moon, speech at IPI event, New York, October 23, 2015, available at www.ipinst.org/2015/10/the-future-of-global-governance-a-commitment-to-action#8 .

96 UN Secretary-General, *Lessons Learned Exercise on the Coordination Activities of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response*, UN Doc. A/70/737, March 4, 2016, para. 7.

97 Ibid., para. 20.

leverage synergies to capitalize on existing and new connectors and build on precedents in order to energize the organization to transact business differently and provide integrated responses to the world's interconnected problems. This will require the UN to organize and present its work differently and member states to change the way they engage with UN bodies and structures on issues of peace and security, development, and human rights, building on past best practices and leveraging emerging policy consensus. Integration will need to go beyond rhetoric; bold integration within and across relevant UN pillars and entities, where and when it adds value, will be needed. Better incentive structures, financial approaches, and instruments, as well as strong and visionary leadership are key to success.

The UN General Assembly's High-Level Thematic Debate on the UN, Peace and Security from May 10 to 11, 2016, together with two additional high-level debates on sustainable development and human rights, offer critical opportunities to harness the common narrative required to make change happen. Other upcoming events, such as the World Humanitarian Summit, can also contribute to solidifying the emerging message of sustaining peace across silos.

Past UN reform efforts teach us that change, however incremental, requires sustained engagement by a critical mass of member states. It also requires bold and catalytic leadership from the secretary-general and president of the General Assembly around a clear strategic vision linked to a limited number of very concrete proposals for the next secretary-general to carry forward during her first eighteen months in office. Finally, it requires member states or groups of member states to champion reform as they try to deliver on their commitments under these parallel but interlinked global agendas.[98]

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98 Francesco Mancini, "Managing Change at the United Nations: Lessons from Recent Initiatives," International Peace Institute, October 2015.

Appendix

Interlinkages among the Three Reviews

|	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operation (HIPPO) report	Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) report	Global Study on Resolution 1325
Sustaining peace and prevention	• The separation between peace-keeping, peacemaking, and peace-building is artificial. The timeline of a conflict cannot be split into neatly distinct phases, as conflicts are complex and cyclical in nature. • An inter-agency approach is needed for "inclusive and equitable development activities as an essential contribution to conflict prevention." • Conflict analysis must not be limited to security threats but should take a more holistic, developmental approach (e.g., including dynamics and drivers of corruption in country analyses and addressing environmental threats). • Prevention and mediation need to be brought back to the fore of discussions on UN peace operations. • Member states have not sufficiently invested in addressing root causes of conflict, and the UN still lacks a "culture of prevention."	• Peacebuilding should be a principle that flows through all UN engagements—before, during, and after violent conflicts—rather than being marginalized. • Local, participatory assessment is crucial to informing peacebuilding program design and giving a more holistic approach to assessing risks in a conflict environment. • Joint conflict analysis should be gender-sensitive and map not only sources of violence but also peaceful actors (linking DPKO mission intelligence, civil affairs teams, local mediation programs, and peace-building planning). • "Building national leadership is an integral part of a reconciliation and nation-building agenda." • Greater emphasis must be put on prevention.	• Conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding need to be seen as part of a continuum, with transitions between them neither linear nor strictly sequential. • New evidence demonstrates the benefits of inclusive processes to the long-term sustainability of peace. • "Prevention of conflict must be the priority, not the use of force." • The participation of women at all levels is key to the operational effectiveness, success, and sustainability of peace processes and peacebuilding efforts. Women are key agents in shoring up the resilience of local communities against the spread of conflict. • The gap between humanitarian and development aid must be bridged with increased investment in "resilience, conflict resolution and peacebuilding that more firmly targets long-term development outcomes."

	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operation (HIPPO) report	Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) report	Global Study on Resolution 1325
Gender equality and women's participation	• The inclusion of women in higher ranks is essential to improve accountability and governance. • The Secretariat and missions must carry out gender-sensitive analysis, more women must be appointed to mission leadership positions, and a senior gender adviser must be located in the Office of the SRSG to make sure gender perspectives are integrated into mission activities. Structural factors that prevent women's recruitment and professional advancement must be reviewed.	• Efforts must be scaled up to surpass the secretary-general's 15 percent "gender marker" for financing to peacebuilding approaches that promote gender equality. • Women's political participation and leadership must be expanded "beyond the peace table" to recognize women as active participants in society. • Sexual and gender-based violence is not only a war strategy but a central tactic of terror used to displace refugees and internally displaced persons.	• Any reforms of peace operations and peacebuilding must include gender equality and women's leadership as central ingredients • Women's participation in leadership is crucial to ensure that initiatives are tailored to specific contexts, transformative, and sustainable in the long term. • An assistant secretary-general should be appointed at UN Women. • There should be a senior gender adviser in the office of every SRSG, with hybrid technical gender experts in thematic units. • "Across the board, 15% of all funding for peace and security [should] be earmarked for programmes impacting women." • Resolution 1325 is a human rights mandate.
Collaborative and strategic partnerships	• Partnerships with the AU should be improved, and support to AU peace support operations should be enabled when authorized by the Security Council—including through more predictable financing. • "Partnerships will be essential to future success in the face of long-running and new crises." A strong global and regional partnership for peace and security is needed to meet	• Partnerships within the UN (outside of the formal entities of the peace-building architecture) and with other stakeholders must be formed, as "the territory in between crisis response and long-term development remains, for the most part, unchartered." • The UN must recognize the importance of regional approaches to peacebuilding as this relates to	• Partnerships with bilateral, regional, and multilateral agencies can help successfully apply women, peace, and security resolutions at the national level through political and sometimes financial support.

	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operation (HIPPO) report	Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) report	Global Study on Resolution 1325
	future challenges of emerging crises. • "Partnerships with other actors, coordinated under strong and responsible national leadership, will be essential." • Reporting structures must be developed between the UN and regional organizations.	ownership and legitimacy. The UN and regional organizations should form intergovernmental partnerships.	
People-centered approaches	• There should be a shift toward a people-centered approach, including through engagement with local actors and those affected by conflict. This is essential for peace to be sustainable, as "those on the receiving end" need to lead the way to recovery and peace. This can also improve proper conflict monitoring and local ownership of protection mechanisms. • More specific mandates are needed so that inclusive approaches in UN programs and missions do not remain dependent on individuals appointed and their personal commitment to such issues.	• Inclusion is central to sustainable peace because of its link to long-term national ownership of peace processes: "Peace needs to emerge organically from within society, addressing the multiple concerns and aspirations of different sectors, and seeking common ground so that all feel invested in strategies, policies and mechanisms that offer the way forward." • Inclusive national ownership "implies participation by community groups, women's platforms and representatives, youth, labour organizations, political parties, the private sector and domestic civil society, including under-represented groups." • Context-specific mandates are needed. • Leadership must take the approach of encouraging a sense of common purpose between elites and the	• Dealing with "new wars/new threats" that disproportionately harm women requires inclusive approaches to sustainably resolve the challenges. • A people-centered approach should include the recognition of women's leadership. Women's participation is necessary to the success of peace programs and the durability of peace and political change. • Context-specific mandates are needed. • Member states, the UN, and civil society must create partnerships to be able to build infrastructures for peace. Working with affected women and girls when designing strategies is key to harness their local knowledge and community-level networks for information sharing.

	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operation (HIPPO) report	Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) report	Global Study on Resolution 1325
		broader society. • However, "much as peace cannot be imposed from the outside, peace cannot simply be imposed by domestic elites or authoritarian governments on populations that lack even minimal trust in their leadership."	
Integration and coherence	• To enhance strategic analysis of conflict dynamics on all levels, field actors must be empowered in relation to headquarters. A small analysis and planning cell in the office of the secretary-general could help with this.	• The UN system remains deeply fragmented. UN silos are a systemic challenge due to their enshrinement in the UN Charter. • Breaking silos means breaking out of a sequential or sectoral approach to peace and conflict. • Conversations in headquarters fail to consider operational, field-based mechanisms and lessons, running the risk of conflating peacebuilding with technical interventions. • The UN system should develop a common strategy for peacebuilding that integrates the strategic planning instruments of UN country teams.	• Greater integration, complementarity, and coherence on women, peace, and security is needed between peace missions, UN Women, and UN country teams. This could be done by developing common implementation frameworks. • More formal partnerships should be explored between key entities with technical gender expertise in conflict and post-conflict settings, including DPKO, DPA, and UN Women. • Joint conflict analysis should be gender-sensitive and address opportunities as well as risks. Rich local knowledge from UN Women's extensive work with women's peace networks in conflict countries is largely overlooked.

	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operation (HIPPO) report	Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) report	Global Study on Resolution 1325
Financing	• The financing of the Peacebuilding Fund, particularly of its fast-track procedures, must be scaled up. • Early-alert systems must be strengthened through more reliable financing in the regular budget, such as financing of mediation and electoral support through the peacekeeping account. • Missions and UN country teams need a better set of financing arrangements to help them deliver together and deliver more effectively. This should include scaled up support for the Peacebuilding Fund, better capital-ized pooled funds at the country level, and programming funding for mandated tasks in support of peace consolidation within mission budgets.	• Funding should be more predictable, specifically through use of assessed contributions for programmatic activities. Strategic partnerships and pooling funding between the UN, World Bank, and other bilateral and multilateral financial institutions could maximize impact and share risk. • The Peacebuilding Support Office can be reinforced by being sufficiently financed from the regular budget. • More detailed and accurate country-by-country estimates of the overall funding needs for sustaining peace over the longer term must be prepared.	• Predictable and sustainable funding is a prerequisite for the effective realization of the women, peace, and security agenda at both the national and the international levels. To guarantee this, comprehensive and realistic costing of national action plans must be carried out from the planning stage, and specific funding must be earmarked for their implementation. • Aid focused on gender equality is unpredictable. To be made more efficient, it could be made timelier, untied from other kinds of aid, aligned with national priorities, and made to target underfinanced sectors.
Accountability and governance	• Accountability in the selection of mission leadership must be strengthened, for instance by establishing an ad hoc advisory group composed of former senior field leaders. The inclusion of women in higher ranks is essential to improve accountability and governance. • Leadership capacities and authority should be increased.	• The secretary-general should ensure continuity in senior leadership and personnel through the different phases of engagement, from preven-tive action to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. • Leadership capacities and authority should be increased. • Intergovernmental cooperation is an essential step toward strength-	• Member states need to take on the responsibility for implementation if the agenda is to see more progress in the coming years. Currently, there are neither mechanisms for accountability nor budgets available for real implementation. • Perpetrators of grave crimes against women should be held accountable. Such justice must also be transfor-mative, so it addresses not only

	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operation (HIPPO) report	Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) report	Global Study on Resolution 1325
	• Transparency in local procurement must be improved by "updating and revising the existing rules and regulations to prioritize local capacities." • Accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse should be strengthened. • A victims-assistance program should be established to support victims and children born as a result of sexual exploitation and abuse.	ening the accountability of member states.	singular violations but the underlying inequalities that render women and girls vulnerable in times of conflict. Important tools include criminal justice proceedings, reparations, and truth and reconciliation processes.

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20 May 2016

Excellency,

It is my pleasure to enclose herewith the outcome document from the High-Level Thematic Debate entitled "A World of Risks – A New Commitment for Peace", which I organized on 10 and 11 May 2016. The outcome document, which I am pleased to share with the membership for further consideration, contains my conclusions and observations from this well-attended event, including my intention as a concrete follow-up to the event to invite the Secretary-General to brief Member States on the current state of implementation of the pertinent recommendations outlined in the recent peace and security reviews and relevant resolutions, details of which will be announced in due course.

I take this opportunity to again express my sincere gratitude to all who participated in the High-Level Thematic Debate as well as the preparatory process.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Mogens Lykketoft

To all Permanent Representatives
and Permanent Observers to the United Nations
New York

19 May 2016

Conclusions and Observations
by the President of the seventieth session of the UN General Assembly

On 10 and 11 May 2016, members of the General Assembly – many at the level of Foreign Minister – gathered together with the chairs of the most recent peace and security reviews, a wide range of active or retired senior officials of the United Nations, representatives from academia, civil society representatives and other stakeholders for a strategic reflection on contemporary threats and challenges to international peace and security. We looked at commonalities and interlinkages between policy areas, including the Sustainable Development Goals and we discussed ways to enhance the relevance and effectiveness of the UN in this area at a time when the Organization is considering who – as the next Secretary-General – will lead it in this and other equally vital tasks.

From two days of lively and spontaneous debate, I have drawn up a few chief conclusions and observations that I wish to share with the membership for further consideration.

Conclusions:

- An invitation to member states committed to leading by example, to continue to champion efficient and effective mandate implementation, fostering policy and normative developments where needed, particularly to advance the primacy of conflict prevention, to ensure that UN peace operations are adequately equipped and financed, and to ensure engagement with civil society and the private sector;

- An encouragement to those member states to consider organising an event on the same matter in the margins of the General Debate in September 2016, complementing other relevant initiatives, including those aimed at fostering the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the high-level meeting of the General Assembly to address large movements of refugees and migrants;

- A recommendation to members to further reflect on tools and means for the Organization and the Secretariat to respond in meaningful ways to the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in various contexts where the UN is confronted with this increasingly complex phenomenon, particularly where peace operations are deployed;

- An invitation to the Secretary-General to brief the membership on the current state of implementation of the pertinent recommendations outlined in the recent peace and

security reviews and relevant resolutions (peace operations, peacebuilding, women, peace and security);

- A recommendation to the next Secretary-General to outline his / her vision of the new realities of the peace and security landscape and proposals to enhance the relevance and effectiveness of the UN in this field. This could include benchmarks regarding the implementation of recommendations outlined in the peace and security reviews and relevant resolutions – not least those review recommendations directed to the next Secretary-General, as well as further proposals to adapt the UN peace and security instruments to a changing context.

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Observations:

1.   Over two days of general debate and interactive sessions – reflecting also contributions from more than a dozen regional workshops and building on on-going and recently concluded intergovernmental negotiation processes (peacebuilding, C34,– amongst others) – the high-level thematic debate fostered rich and extensive exchanges. These extended from the importance of recognizing significant achievements when key actors and member states cooperate and coordinate to acknowledging shortcomings and standstill among and between member states and/or the UN system.

2.   The key importance of continued attention to the matter of Security Council reform, bearing in mind the on-going inter-governmental negotiations, was evident and underlined throughout.

3.   Likewise, it was recognized that the next Secretary-General has a window of opportunity early in his or her term to seek and achieve much needed efficiency gains and streamlining while addressing resolutely well-identified institutional and structural shortcomings of the Organization.

4.   The deliberations highlighted a number of key issues that – taken together – echo a shortlist of widely shared aspirations and concerns for member states, including that today's threats and growing geopolitical tensions have resulted in multiple challenges for the Organization.

5.   The lack of adequate tools and capacity to protect civilians in conflict, to respond effectively to new forms of complex conflicts - especially in the Middle East; to address international terrorism, as well as other challenges with a clear security dimension such as large-scale epidemics, climate change and large displacement of populations, has undermined trust in the Organization's ability to fully deliver on its role in maintaining peace.

6.   These are challenges that call for responsible leadership and accountability at multiple levels – a call that numerous participants made during the debate. It is crucial that member states live up to their obligations to refrain from the use of force or the threat of the use of force in international relations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law.

7.   The United Nations plays – and should continue to play – a crucial role in the maintenance of international peace and security. It was a consistent message from participants

that on the occasion of its seventieth anniversary, it is essential that we collectively reaffirm our commitment to the Charter, stress our commitment to work through the United Nations to meet common challenges, and enhance the ability of the Organization to confront evolving threats and challenges to peace and security. This involves firm commitments to sustaining peace – also in the longer term – including making available the financial resources to doing so.

8.   Concrete action is required to strengthen the ability of the United Nations to confront those threats and challenges. This will require that the United Nations continually emphasize its diplomatic and preventive functions, seek new partnerships at political and operational level, and explore effective mechanisms for mandate implementation. In the light of recent allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by the very UN forces that are deployed to protect civilians, it is of utmost urgency – and numerous contributors made this point – to restore the credibility, reputation as well as performance and accountability of UN missions and operations on the ground. This also requires that member states provide the needed capacities and capabilities to enable effective mandate implementation.

9.   The recent reviews of UN peace operations, the peacebuilding architecture, and women's contributions to peace and security, among others, were all timely and widely welcomed by participants. Member states would be expected to lead by example and demonstrate their sustained engagement in support of those reviews. They will need to continue to champion the reviews' recommendations and help ensure that constraints and challenges are turned into opportunities for the United Nations. The membership and the Secretary-General should continue to be seized of the implementation of the recommendations and to improve the Organization in order to be maximally effective and efficient, including at UN Headquarters.

10.   The next Secretary-General in particular should continue to emphasize the need to sustain peace across the whole spectrum from prevention to recovery, as well as the primacy of the political framework in the search for peace. S/he will also need to appoint special representatives of the highest integrity and diplomatic skill to lead peace efforts, continue to address gender issues, and promote the role of women in peace and security, both in policy and in leadership positions, and ensure the Security Council and members' support to peace efforts.

11.   Throughout the debate, it was repeatedly stressed that renewed attention to upstream prevention as part of sustaining peace requires effective strategic analysis. It will also require tightening the range of tools available – including a feed-back loop from planning and analysis through implementation, monitoring and evaluation to adaption – as well as the evidence of which preventative approaches work. In addition, fragmentation should be addressed including by enhancing the Peacebuilding Commission's role as a bridge between the Assembly and the Council as well as by debating with member states the spectrum of operations and functions that are needed to suit different circumstances on the ground and the complementary roles of the three pillars of the UN system in prevention.

12.   Be it through UN managed missions and operations, efforts pursued in cooperation with regional organizations, or multi-national actions authorized by the Security Council, the search for conflict resolution must be grounded in an overall political framework.

13.   The emphasis on a political framework is also essential in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism. While the UN is not currently structured or equipped to counter terrorist entities when encountered in mission environments, it is likely that more and more conflicts will contain an element of terrorist threat or host a terrorist-affiliated organization. It

will therefore be of utmost importance that the Secretary-General and member states continue to deliberate about how, in concrete ways, the UN could effectively contribute to the international coordination, prevention and response to terrorism and violent extremism and about the capacities and doctrines required for the UN to provide an effective response – in addition to existing frameworks and policies, including sanctions.

14. Ensuring that peace operations are in sync with today's demands and expectations requires placing people at the heart of their engagement. Many interventions during the two days of debate made clear that civilians are the main stakeholders of peace operations, with the most to gain from their successes and the most to lose from their failures. Communities should be front and center in decision-making. Placing people at the center means also that peace operations are accountable to the people they are meant to serve.

15. For such people-centered approaches to become a reality, a fundamental transformation in practice and culture is needed – one that will address the lack of a clear and effective interplay between diplomatic, security and developmental efforts both within the Secretariat and with agencies, funds and programs, and international financial institutions. Due attention must be paid to establishing sound budgetary and management mechanisms for context-specific and local approaches to analysis, planning and monitoring for prevention, protection, resilience and peacebuilding.

16. While numerous participants underlined the need to achieve greater cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, crucial challenges such as mobilizing predictable funding and adopting clearer lines of responsibility needed to be addressed urgently in order to make subsidiarity and partnerships more effective and strategic.

17. Member states and the UN system need to acknowledge the increasing contributions of civil society and the private sector to protection, peace efforts and peacebuilding undertakings and to develop more long-term and effective ways to partner with these stakeholders in ways consistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

18. The full range of the Sustainable Development Goals is an essential corollary to efforts in pursuit of peace and security. Preventing the next wave of conflict will require innovation in supporting member states' efforts to solidify their own work on inclusive political institutions, on strengthening the rule of law and on inclusive justice.

19. Large-scale displacement may be a consequence of instability or feed into new or existing tensions. Properly responding to these flows in the longer term will require focus on addressing the underlying root causes, whether it is conflict, economic hardship, climate change, political exclusion or human rights violations. It will also require a constructive sense of global partnership to both realize the benefits and manage the costs associated with migration and refugee flows.

20. All three recent reviews contain practical recommendations on organizational and structural changes as well as administrative and financial issues that may be implemented either in the short or longer term to help achieve all those objectives. The next Secretary-General will have a special responsibility to follow up with member states, fostering consensus, and seeking both long-term, sustained commitment and support to targeted policies and actions.

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The UN at 70—Celebration, or Commemoration?

Or: The Case for Re-Tooling the UN's Conflict Management Capacity

By Bruce D. Jones

As the UN turns 70, should we be celebrating or commemorating? Two and a half decades of important progress since the end of the Cold War suggest the former; great power deadlock in Ukraine and Syria (with its attendant humanitarian catastrophe) suggest the later. The balance arguably lies in whether the UN can initiate the kind of re-tooling that adapted the UN for the post-Cold War era. Then the challenge was to meet new geopolitical opportunities and take on new roles in internal conflict; now the challenge is to confront complex crises unfolding on a fraught geopolitical landscape.

Since its founding the UN has played a range of conflict management roles in different settings. In conflicts with low geopolitical salience, the UN has been a supportive actor in mediation, the leading actor in peacekeeping and humanitarian response, and a participant in peacebuilding. In conflict with higher geopolitical salience, the UN has also *contributed* to conflict management, often combining forces both figuratively and literally with NATO, the EU, and coalitions who are willing to invest the manpower and resources to produce peace and security outcomes. And in proxy wars or conflicts where the largest military powers are closely engaged, those powers have sometimes turned to the UN to help freeze the conflicts or de-escalate proxy tensions. Will the UN be able to perform these functions in the years ahead? Or will it lapse back into the kind of paralysis that characterized much of the Cold War?

This question arises during important shifts in the nature and location of conflict. During the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s violence and insecurity was concentrated in internal conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa and at the peripheries of the major continents—in the Balkans, Haiti, Timor Leste, etc. In all of these regions conflict has declined substantially, though the challenges that remain are large and enduring (e.g. in D.R. Congo and Sudan). They are also costly, at a moment when resources for the UN are shrinking. In one region of the world, the Middle East, violence and insecurity are rising: the region confronts in internal war but also inter-state conflict, as well as sub-state and trans-national violence. And most conflicts in the Middle East (and North Africa) have terrorist entities as combatants, which poses challenges to the UN.

The second form of rising insecurity is geopolitical. Already we have seen a form of attenuated proxy war in the Ukraine and direct support to war-fighting in Syria by both the great powers and regional powers. The deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations and rising tensions between the China, the U.S. and other east Asian powers, especially in maritime Asia, bode ill for international security. Of course, there are some issues on which there are underlying shared interests, like aspects of proliferation and terrorism. Even here, though, shared interests do not necessarily translate into shared approaches, as has been brutally evident in Syria.

Against these difficulties there is a silver lining for the UN, in the form of a growing number of states with the capacity to make effective contributions to peace and security. Many of these are states that have grown economically but are still far from having the military capacity to act beyond their neighborhoods. Their diplomatic reach exceeds their military grasp. Because this is so, and for reasons of status, these states have a strong interest in working through the UN, often the only tool accessible for them to project capacity beyond their neighborhoods (within their neighborhoods, some of these states have access to effective regional organizations). These states are a resource and the question of whether the UN is an effective source of peace and security in the coming period will depend heavily on how these countries engage the UN and whether the UN learns how to mobilize their capacity.

In short: If the UN is going to be useful in conflict management and peace and security in the coming period, it has to pull off a multi-part retooling:

- Increase the efficiency of its operational capacity to sustain large field operations for peacekeeping and humanitarian response;
- Streamline its bureaucracy to aid in more integrated policy and operations between preventive, peacekeeping and peacebuilding work
- Create new platforms that allow a wider set of states to contribute more, both operationally and in the political and diplomatic management of conflicts;
- Increase its ability to contribute to conflict management in the Middle East, including in cases where terrorist actors are present, either by building its own operational capacity, through deeper partnerships with more capable organizations (though there are few of these), or by more consistently utilizing multi-national arrangements;
- Position itself diplomatically to be useful to the great powers when they seek to de-conflict themselves from proxy entanglements or from escalating tensions.

The efficacy and efficiency of UN-led peacekeeping

An international audience reading about the UN in early 2016 will have predominant in their minds the blockages in UN Security Council over Syria and Ukraine; and may scoff the notion of strengthening or reforming UN conflict management functions. However, P5 tensions over those two geopolitically significant conflicts obscure the fact that the United Nations still has 138,000 personnel on the field in 39 missions, an all-time high. Unfortunately, new security challenges and new resource constraints mean that both resources available for such operations and political support for UN roles is likely to shrink, putting a premium on the efficacy and efficiency of UN operations.

On the question low geopolitical conflicts, the recent High-level Panel on Peace Operations provides the essential guide; the challenge is implementation. Gains are likely to come most quickly in four areas: in improving planning, in reinforcing the political frameworks for peace keeping, in rapid deployment of field headquarters, and in augmenting the efficiency of management tools.

The UN needs no new authorities, no new capacities, and no new budgets to augment civilian planning; it simply needs creativity and will on the part of its most senior leadership. Similarly, for reinforcing the political framework for operations: it's a matter of vital policy that peacekeeping operations should be conducted in support of a political framework, or a political agreement, or in pursuit of one. The two most important variables here are the attitudes of the P5/regional powers, and the quality and the creativity of the special representatives that the SG deploys to lead UN missions. This is another area where gender issues will be particularly important, as leadership from the top will help ensure that gender issues are prioritized throughout the UN response.

It will take more political will by member states to return to an earlier situation of the UN having available to it a rapidly deployable headquarters and planning tool. In Ethiopia/Eritrea, and other contexts, the UN made very effective use of such a mechanism in the form of the European-supported Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). A revived capacity could be broadened to include a wider set of aspiring powers.

The UN can also do more with regional organizations, where they are effective, and with the World Bank; and this may be particularly important for prevention. A theme that should run throughout the preventive work is inclusion; everything we know about conflict suggests that inclusive governance and inclusive economies are essential to conflict avoidance.

A fourth step, and one extremely important for efficiency, but requiring more political negotiation among member states, entails a greater flexibility for the Department of Field Support (DFS), and greater flexibility in its interaction with the more bureaucratic, headquarters-focused Department of Management (DM). As will streamlining the bureaucratic arrangements between DPA, DPKO, and UNDP, and – finally – forging an effective relationship with the World Bank, to make for more integrated peacebuilding efforts at all parts of the conflict cycle. It may require substantial changes to Secretariat arrangements and even more so to the hard divisions between various UN budgets. This will not be an easy lift, but incoming Secretaries-General

have a honeymoon period in which, historically, they have been able to execute important bureaucratic changes with tacit support from the membership.

That is a lot to take on. But if we think about how the UN can contribute to conflict management in more complex, more geopolitically fraught settings, then we have to look more deeply at two other issues: the question of operating in settings (of which there will be a growing number) where terrorist entities are operating; and the involvement and participation of rising powers in policy and mandate making functions.

Contributing to Conflict Management in Higher Geopolitical Settings

If the UN is going to meet contemporary security challenges, it will have to have access to the capability of the widest possible range of actors: the major African and South Asian states that have become the bedrock contributors of the large, but relatively low-capability forces that the UN now fields; high-end and enabling capabilities from European contributors; and an increasingly sophisticated set of force capabilities and enabling capabilities from states that have not historically used the UN to project power status or force.

The High-Level Report touches on this issue but in a modest way, as have the members of the P5, who, when they've opened up to light consultations, haven't seen much impact and thus resist further reform. That is not a way to drive political change. The UN is going to have to go much deeper on reform of its machinery to seriously involve aspiring countries if the latter are to take up new roles and put serious resources into the organization and its operations. That's an important agenda for the coming Secretary General, who confronts now a set of activist states who want to do more, who can do are, and who are frustrated by a lack of reform at the UN.

Of course, the broader question of Security Council reform is germane to this; but there is much the UN can do short of Charter reform to meet the appetite of rising powers for more engagement. The first and most obvious is for the new incoming Secretary-General to use senior positions in the UN Secretariat for political and diplomatic figures from the non-European, non-P5 powers. That may create some tensions with OECD states who frequently claim such roles, but that is a balance that the new secretary general will have to strike.

The second way a wider set of states can participate in a more serious manner is through their own contributions to peacekeeping. This is a decision in their hands. Brazil has been providing force commanders in Haiti, using its own region as a testing ground, but then going farther afield and putting a force commander in the eastern Congo, even in the context of a controversial and complicated mission with a stabilization presence. This is an important part of how Brazil will build influence in the UN. The other aspiring powers will simply have to take this step themselves if they want to see more influence.

A third step, and one that lies in the hands of the P5, is to engage the aspiring powers on policy. Here, one option would be to revive the Brazilian concept of responsibilities while protecting—an argument that when the Security Council authorizes other actors to use force, it should do so under a policy framework where the "responsibility to protect" (R2P) is embedded in a wider concept of the responsible use of force. Re-engagement on this issue would go some distance to creating a legitimate political framework around UN Security Council authorization decisions, which would enable a far wider set of capabilities to be deployed under a political framework. It would helpfully create a more legitimate framework for the authorization of multi-national forces, which may be crucial to confront today's complex conflicts.

Tackling more complex conflicts and conflicts involving terrorist entities

Indeed, the debate around UN conflict management tends to focus on the traditional "blue helmet" operations, that is, operations managed centrally by the UN Secretariat. There's a powerful alternative in the UN's toolkit, namely UN-mandated multi-national forces (MNF). These are operations that fly under a UN banner but are led and commanded by an individual state, rather than the UN Secretariat. As the UN conflicts more complex conflicts with stronger armies, stronger rebel forces and sophisticated terrorist entities, it may be necessary to put more emphasis on using this option, and some of its variants.

Friends of the UN should undertake a detailed examination of the range of alternatives available to the UN—from blue helmet operations to multi-national forces to so-called hybrid operations (where the UN

and a regional organization fuse their forces into a single structure). Such a study would enable the member states to better support and more firmly encourage the UN to explore a variety of options when confronted with an emerging conflict.

Another tool in the UN's potential quiver is to ask the most capable military powers to provide over-the-horizon guarantees to more traditional UN operations. This would add confidence to potential contributors. And to anticipate the criticism that this is an unrealistic ask of the top-powers: the United States did exactly this in the early days of the Kosovo crisis, mounting an over-the-horizon extraction force that provided guarantees to the unarmed Kosovo Verification Mission established by the OSCE. Over-the-horizon guarantees would be eminently feasible in a context like Libya, for example.

Finally, the UN will have to engage in a deeper examination of its current high degree of conservatism in its role in confronting trans-national terrorist organizations in the conflict theatres in which it's deployed. The High-level Panel tackled this issue, and rightly insisted that the current UN is not the right mechanism to undertake counter-terrorism operations. That's surely true of the present: currently configured, currently managed, currently mandated peacekeeping missions are not particularly well suited to taking robust counter-terrorism operations, or even really robust counter-insurgency operations.

But looking forward, we need a deeper answer to the question: if not the UN, who? The risk of the Security Council not taking this on is that of un-restrained unilateral action by states, with seriously destabilizing consequences. There is no consensus on this issue in the Secretariat; in member state missions to the UN; or in the international community. But the simple fact of the matter is that we confront a growing number of conflicts where terrorism is a central part of the reality and there are few organizations other than the UN with the operational or legal authority to mount peacekeeping operations. How we grapple with this thorny challenge will be as consequential for the UN's next twenty years as was the decision in the early 1990s to enter into internal wars, breaking with the long UN tradition of limiting itself to inter-positional roles.

De-confliction of Great Power Tensions

Finally, how then can the UN be relevant to the management of tensions between the top military powers? How can it serve as a mechanism for de-confliction or mitigation when the top powers find themselves butting up against one another or risking conflict?

If the UN evolved in the way detailed above, with more capable machinery built on a wider political coalition comprised by both European states and aspirational powers, then there is a greater chance that the top powers will be able to identify their interests in, and have confidence using, this tool to deescalate tensions. The participation of both the European and the aspiring powers is important because the top military powers have important bilateral interests with all those actors. Where a UN mechanism has the confidence and participation of such states the top powers will be more hesitant to ignore it than they would a device primarily confined to lower geopolitical contexts. This may matter a great deal for the period we are entering.

An important silver lining is the shared P5+ consensus on limiting nuclear proliferation. This has led to critically important major power cooperation through the UN on Iran, and increasingly on North Korea. Such P5+ diplomatic mechanisms are an important part of how the UN can contribute to peace and security in today's environment.

Are there other parts of geopolitical challenge where the UNSC could, in principle, help slow the upwards spiral of tensions? Let's first acknowledge that the most important issues—China's strategic perspective and economic/resource claims in the East and South China Seas, Russia's search for a security architecture that limits Western influence on its border, America's sustained naval role in the Pacific and its sustained political/economic/military roles in Russia's backyard—are ones that fall squarely into the realm of bilateral relations and perhaps bilateral arms control regimes, as aspects of the Soviet-American relationship did during the Cold War. But specific crises or incidents within this challenges, incidents that could generate unwanted escalation of tensions, could be the subject of UN contribution. There could be value added, for

example, if there were a standing incident review mechanism, established under the UNSC, on which an aggrieved country could call in the case of a maritime accident or incident to give an impartial assessment of the facts of the case, to push solutions towards diplomacy and arbitration, rather than military escalation. The search for *ad hoc* mechanisms is an alternative but one that leaves tense states scrambling for diplomatic options at a moment of crisis. Standing mechanisms established under UNSC authority would give the major powers tools for de-confliction, time for diplomacy.

Of course, another aspect of rising geopolitical tensions is the concern that P5 tensions will restrict UN action, including in cases of high levels of violence. On this, the French have introduced their proposal that the P5 should voluntary restrict their use of the veto when the UN seeks to confront instances of mass atrocity crimes or humanitarian crises. Were such incidents to occur only in low geopolitical settings, perhaps the P5 would agree; the problem is that such situations also occur in places where the P5 have high geopolitical stakes, and are highly unlikely to agree to unfetter the UN. But what if we narrowed this proposal to the question of the establishment of UN operations? In other words, each P5 nation would agree to voluntarily restrict its use of the veto in circumstances where we confront the risk of mass atrocity *and* (the combination is critical) the Secretary General proposes to establish a *UN* operation—not handing the operation off to a coalition, NATO or to a unilateral actor. Why is this different? Because UN missions report back to the UNSC and that body holds the power to renew the operations; and so in restricting veto use in the establishment of a mission, the P5 are not giving up their ability to shape policy or manage the UN's engagement in that situation. Instead, they would retain that capacity on a continuing basis. Even this suggestion is ambitious, but by contrast to the wider proposal it may have a slim chance of being considered.

Of course, it is evident that it will not be the Secretary General her or himself that will determine the position of the UN in the coming period. The top powers, the major economies, and the aspiring powers will either choose to craft the UN into an effective tool and use it to manage their tensions, or not.

But there is an important interaction between the Secretary-General and these powers. And at present, the Secretary-General has only a limited ability to understand and interact with that wider set of powers, beyond the New York missions. Over the Cold War period, successive Secretaries-General have understood the need to maintain a more direct relationship to Washington and to have an Assistant-Secretary-General level official in his office assisting in that function. As the number of decisive powers grows, replicating that model is not an option. But the Secretary-General could establish an (informal) International Affairs Advisory Board comprised of former senior officials or prominent policy scholars to assist her (or just possibly him…) in tracking both the evolution of conflict and security but also the dynamics of the relationship between the major powers, a dynamic that will shape the options available to the UN.

Taken together, these four sets of issues—increasing the efficiency of existing operations; preparing for more complex roles, perhaps through multilateral arrangements; more directly engaging a wider set of states; and re-positioning the UN for the new realities of geopolitics—could help re-tool the UN for the coming era. There is no doubt that we will need an effective UN; whether we will have one is the challenge in front of us.

Working Together for Peace: Synergies and Connectors for Implementing the 2015 UN Reviews

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Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

AGE	Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture
AU	African Union
CEB	Chief Executives Board for Coordination
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ERSG	Executive Representative of the Secretary-General
GA	General Assembly
HIPPO	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PGA	President of the UN General Assembly
QCPR	Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review
SC	Security Council
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SG	Secretary-General
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UN	United Nations
UNDG	UN Development Group
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNMEER	UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia

Executive Summary

The United Nations carried out three major reviews in 2015 on peace operations, the peacebuilding architecture, and the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security. Like the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the World Humanitarian Summit, the reviews were inspired by the need to strengthen the effectiveness, coherence, and relevance of the seventy-year-old UN peace and security architecture to make it better "fit for purpose" and able to respond more effectively to today's complex and interconnected crises.

In preparation for the UN General Assembly's High-Level Thematic Debate on the UN, Peace and Security from May 10 to 11, 2016, this report aims to help member states and other stakeholders "make sense of it all" by identifying and analyzing common themes, interlinkages, and synergies emerging from these reviews, particularly in four areas: (1) sustaining peace and prevention; (2) gender equality and women's participation; (3) collaborative and strategic partnerships; and (4) people-centered approaches.

It also aims to identify and analyze key enablers for operationalizing the reviews' policy recommendations in three areas: (1) integration and coherence; (2) financing; and (3) accountability, leadership, and governance.

While recognizing the limitations imposed by the silos entrenched in the UN Charter's three foundational pillars (peace and security, development, and human rights), this report points to a number of existing connectors and processes through which member states and the UN Secretariat have worked across these silos to bridge policy differences and address pressing challenges. Recent examples include the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement on climate change, and the response to the Ebola emergency.

At the operational level, the UN system has also developed new cross-cutting policies and capacities, such as peace and development advisers, that enable its entities to work differently across systemic divides. There is hope that the newly minted Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the peacebuilding architecture, which coin "sustaining peace" as a new unifying framework, could enable the Peacebuilding Commission to engage in prevention and realize its bridging potential. This report argues that the UN as a whole should build on past best practices and successful precedents, acknowledge and make full use of existing connectors, and create new connectors to help energize the organization to transact business differently and provide integrated responses to the world's interconnected problems.

This will require the UN to organize and present its work differently in the field and at headquarters under the leadership of the next secretary-general. It will also require member states to change the way they engage with and incentivize UN bodies, structures, and mechanisms in order to build on and consolidate emerging policy consensus and bring about incremental, practical changes (both political and financial) on issues of peace and security, development, and human rights. Building on the momentum the three peace and security reviews achieved in engaging member states, the next secretary-general could put forward a limited number of very concrete proposals during her first eighteen months in office. Member states or groups of member states could champion these proposals as they try to deliver holistically on their commitments under these parallel but interlinked global agendas.

Introduction

In recent years, the world has faced a series of crises that have challenged global peace and security and raised questions about the United Nations' capacity to respond. While the first decade of the twenty-first century brought a decline in the number of violent conflicts, the last few years have witnessed a wave of new conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. At the same time, old conflicts have rekindled and sparked new violence in the Central Africa Republic, Mali, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Yemen. The rise of extremist groups such as the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) and Boko Haram and the spread of transnational criminal networks have placed civilians at greater risk and challenged existing response mechanisms and policies. In 2014, nearly 60 million people were forcibly displaced, a four-fold increase in four years.[1] In 2014 and 2015,

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1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *World at War—UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014*, 2015.

the spread of Ebola in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the resurgence of great and regional power rivalries, and new complex forms of conflict placed further stress on the international system.

Yet in 2015, amidst these crises, the UN system came together to achieve landmark outcomes. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on climate change were adopted with an unprecedented sense of ownership by member states and their people, which accounts for their now accepted universal standing.[2] The UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), moreover, demonstrated that the system can work together across silos to deliver an effective operational partnership in the face of emergencies. However, these examples of collective response remain the exception rather than the norm. The nature of crises today demands a multilateral system that can respond to transnational threats and regional spillovers, prioritize prevention—including national- and local-level prevention and peacebuilding capacities—and effectively partner with a greater diversity of actors both at headquarters and in the field. How, then, can the UN remain relevant and credible and contribute to effective multilateralism in matters of peace and security?

In 2015, on the occasion of its seventieth year of existence, the UN undertook a comprehensive assessment of its peace and security work. Three major policy reviews were completed on peace operations (the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations), peacebuilding (the Advisory Group of Experts), and the implementation of the women, peace, and security agenda (the Global Study). (See Figure 1 for an overview of the milestones and outcome documents produced by each review, as well as other key multilateral processes, Box 1 for an overview of the genesis and mandate of each of the three reviews, and the Appendix for a table summarizing key recommendations from the three reviews.)

Box 1. Genesis and mandates of the three reviews

Peace operations: On October 31, 2014, the secretary-general announced the establishment of a sixteen-member High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) to address the perceived need to reform peace operations and make them fit to address contemporary challenges. This exercise built on the 2000 Brahimi Report and the 2008 Capstone Doctrine. Chaired by former President of Timor-Leste José Ramos-Horta and vice-chaired by Ameerah Haq of Bangladesh, the panel presented its report on June 16, 2015.

Peacebuilding: On December 15, 2014, the presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council asked the secretary-general to nominate up to seven experts to form an Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) to review the UN peacebuilding architecture, ten years after its creation. Chaired by Ambassador Gert Rosenthal of Guatemala, the group was tasked with conducting a policy and institutional review of the peacebuilding architecture and developing recommendations based on this work. The AGE submitted its report on June 30, 2015, for the General Assembly and the Security Council to consider through an inter - governmental process.

Women, peace, and security: On October 18, 2013, in Resolution 2122, the Security Council invited the secretary-general to commission a study on the implementation of Resolution 1325 to inform a high-level review that would coincide with the resolution's fifteenth anniversary in October 2015. In response, the secretary-general appointed a high-level advisory group of seventeen experts led by former UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women Radhika Coomaraswamy of Sri Lanka. Following a series of global consultations, the Global Study was launched on October 14, 2015.

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2 Independent Commission on Multilateralism, "The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Addressing Climate Change," Discussion Paper, February 2016, available at www.icm2016.org/the-2030-agenda-for-sustainable-development-and-addressing-climate-change .

Figure 1. Timeline of review processes and outcomes

The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) released its report, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People*, in June 2015. This was followed by the secretary-general's report on the future of peace operations, outlining his agenda and "priorities and key actions" to move forward the panel's recommendations by the end of 2016.[3] The UN General Assembly adopted a procedural resolution taking note with appreciation of the secretary-general's initiative to strengthen the UN system.[4] It has also begun examining recommendations from the HIPPO and the secretary-general's reports within its various committees, including the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34). Meanwhile, on November 20, 2015, the secretary-general briefed the Security Council on his action plan for taking forward the recommendations in the HIPPO report. The Security Council subsequently took note of those recommendations and, following a wide-ranging debate, issued a presidential statement.[5]

The Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (AGE) also released its report, *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, in June 2015.[6] The report was followed by intergovernmental negotiations co-facilitated by Angola and Australia and was discussed in an open debate in the Security Council on February 23, 2016. This resulted in identical Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the peacebuilding architecture, adopted on April 27, 2016 (Resolutions 2282 and 70/262, respectively).[7]

The Global Study on Women, Peace and Security, for its part, produced a report in October 2015 entitled *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*.[8] The secretary-general's 2015 report on women, peace, and security and Security Council Resolution 2242 take up many of the report's recommendations, as well as those made by the HIPPO on gender issues.[9]

These three reviews offer ideas for the future global governance of the UN's peace and security work and beyond, together producing nearly 600 pages of analysis and over 300 recommendations. As these review processes were conducted on separate but related tracks, it is critical to reflect on linkages and highlight synergies between them so that their combined effect stimulates the multilateral system to organize its peace and security architecture differently and to address the twenty-first century's urgent and interconnected threats more holistically.

To that end, President of the General Assembly (PGA) Mogens Lykketoft is convening a High-Level Thematic Debate on the UN, Peace and Security from May 10 to 11, 2016, to encourage member states and other actors to consider key messages from the reviews on the overall effectiveness of the UN's work in these areas. The PGA's objective is to help the UN move beyond the vaguely defined "need for change" and focus instead on concrete steps to realize change within a reasonable timeframe.

In referring to this high-level thematic debate, the PGA indicated that "ensuring synergy and coherence between these three reviews will promote a holistic reflection on matters that are clearly interconnected."[10] The three reviews, coupled with the process for selecting and appointing the next UN secretary-general, provide genuine opportunities to revitalize the role of the UN in matters of peace and security.

In analyzing the linkages and potential synergies between the reviews, this report is not meant to

3   United Nations, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace—Politics, Partnership, and People: Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, June 16, 2015; United Nations Secretary-General, *The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations*, UN Doc. A/70/357–S/2015/682, September 2, 2015, paras. 15, 94, 95.

4   General Assembly Resolution 70/6 (November 12, 2015), UN Doc. A/RES/70/6.

5   United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2015/22, November 25, 2015.

6   United Nations, *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, UN Doc. A/69/968–S/2015/490, June 30, 2015.

7   Youssef Mahmoud and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, "With New Resolutions, Sustaining Peace Sits at Heart of UN Architecture," *Global Observatory*, April 29, 2016; Security Council Resolution 2282 (April 27, 2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2282; General Assembly Resolution 70/262 (April 27, 2016), UN Doc. A/RES/70/262.

8   UN Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, October 12, 2015.

9   United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security*, UN Doc. S/2015/716, September 16, 2015; UN Security Council Resolution 2242 (October 13, 2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2242.

10 Mogens Lykketoft, opening remarks at the General Assembly plenary debate on strengthening of the UN system, New York, October 12, 2015.

preempt the outcomes of the PGA's high-level debate, nor the agenda of the next secretary-general. Instead, it is essentially a primer, providing a number of guideposts to help process the reviews and suggesting possible ways forward. It first presents common themes, interlinkages, and synergies across these reviews. It then suggests key enablers for operationalizing the reviews' shared recommendations and points to existing connectors through which member states and the UN Secretariat have been able—in at least some instances—to work across silos, as well as precedents for doing so. It concludes that the UN as a whole—including both member states and the Secretariat—should build on these best practices, leverage emerging policy consensus, and create new connectors that will energize the organization to work across silos and provide integrated responses to the world's interconnected problems.

Common Themes and Interlinkages across the Three Reviews

This report identifies four common themes that have emerged from the three reviews: (1) sustaining peace and prevention; (2) gender equality and women's participation; (3) collaborative and strategic partnerships; and (4) people-centered approaches. These four areas may provide the foundation for a more effective and less fragmented UN system and energize member states to transact business differently across the three UN pillars.

SUSTAINING PEACE AND PREVENTION

"Sustaining peace" is a new term embraced by the reviews as an overarching framework to guide the wide spectrum of UN peace and security work. Sustaining peace means putting member states and their populations in the lead, putting politics and political solutions front and center, giving prevention an uncontested home, and leveraging the UN's three foundational pillars in a mutually reinforcing way. Resolutions 2282 and 70/262, both passed on April 27, 2016, define sustaining peace as including "activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escala-

tion, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development."[11] Sustaining peace is an inherently political process that spans prevention, mediation, conflict management and resolution, and integrated approaches to peacebuilding. It aims to ensure national ownership through inclusivity while sustaining international attention and assistance.

This new terminology takes "peacebuilding" out of the erroneous time horizon constraints it has been subject to since the 1990s, when it was considered a "post-conflict" exercise to be implemented by outsiders. "Prevention is not something to be turned on and off," said UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at the Security Council's first High-Level Debate on Security, Development and the Root Causes of Conflict in November 2015.[12] The reviews emphasize that building peace is an ongoing undertaking—before, during, and after conflict—a concept endorsed in Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture and echoing previous agreements, such as Security Council Resolution 2171 on conflict prevention.

In addition to moving beyond this sequential approach, sustaining peace means breaking out of sectoral approaches to peace and conflict and better integrating the UN's three foundational pillars (peace and security, development, and human rights) and their respective governance structures. Both the HIPPO and the AGE reports underscore the importance of creating the conditions for sustainable peace and sustainable development, with pointed references to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—in particular Goal 16 calling for the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for durable development. This also explains the emphasis that all three reviews place on the role of UN country teams in helping member states deliver on their commitment to sustaining peace as a function of inclusive governance and equitable development.

Regarding human rights, the HIPPO report recommends ensuring coherence between the UN's human rights and protection functions. This

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11 Security Council Resolution 2282; General Assembly Resolution 70/262.
12 UN Secretary-General, remarks to Security Council Open Debate on Security, Development and the Root Causes of Conflicts, New York, November 17, 2015.

recommendation illustrates the tendency to view human rights as primarily civil and political in the context of peace operations, when they should also be economic and social, as well as the tendency for human rights work to focus on protection, when it should also focus on prevention. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has increasingly been seeking to integrate human rights with peace and security by considering how violations of economic, social, and cultural rights may serve as early-warning indicators for conflict and how grievances from non-enjoyment of such rights can be triggers of conflict.

For sustaining peace to gain traction as a conceptual, strategic, and practical approach, the UN needs to address a number of long-identified deficits.[13] These include the need to avoid technical and supply-driven approaches, to respect nationally identified priorities, and to interact inclusively with local actors—particularly women and youth beyond capital cities and elite groups. Sustaining peace encompasses supporting inclusive national and local mechanisms for conflict prevention and institutions that address drivers of violence and build resilience. Where development and exclusion have left people behind and sowed the seeds of violence, well-targeted assistance can address risk factors, such as inequality and marginalization, at the most critical moments.[14] However, the increasingly dangerous asymmetric environments where peace operations are deployed make the above tasks hard to implement, particularly when extremist groups scorn compromise and have vested interests in fanning conflict.

Perhaps the most crucial lesson the UN has learned and needs to implement is the necessity of prevention. In recent years, international crisis management has overwhelmingly emphasized reaction rather than prevention, and responses have been largely military rather than political. Military engagements or technical solutions, while necessary to protect civilians, will not restore and sustain peace; missions should be guided primarily by politics. Implementation of the reviews must involve tangibly shifting efforts and resources toward prevention.

GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION

The importance of the women, peace, and security agenda for the UN's work as a whole is a cornerstone of the 2015 reviews. The reviews consider this agenda critical to the success of peace programs, the durability of peace and political change, and equality (see Box 2). For the UN, increasing women's participation is also a prerequisite to realizing the HIPPO report's call for a people-centered approach. Already, inclusive mechanisms created by Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions—such as procedures for representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to speak in the Security Council—have been used by a broad range of civil society actors, male and female, on many issues.

The Global Study on Resolution 1325 calls on member states to empower women throughout peace and transition processes "to bring the benefits of inclusiveness, representativeness, and diversity."[15] It also emphasizes that localizing approaches to inclusive and participatory processes is crucial to the success of national and international peace efforts.

At UN headquarters, the women, peace, and security agenda may have a unique role to play as a strategic connector because of its cross-cutting nature. The agenda has achieved both normative and operational targets across the fragmented organs and departments of the UN system; it is meant to inform staffing and analysis in peace operations, human rights investigations and accountability, and strategies to prevent violent extremism, as well as to lay the foundations for sustainable development. Yet for its potential to be realized, greater commitment in planning and budgeting is required; out of all funding for peace and security, only 2 percent is allocated to gender issues.[16]

Currently, whether a UN program or mission takes an inclusive approach is largely dependent on the leadership appointed and their personal commitment to engage women and non-state

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13 See Cedric de Coning, "From Peacebuilding to Sustaining Peace: Implications of Complexity for Resilience and Sustainability," *Resilience* (March 16, 2016).
14 Youssef Mahmoud, "A Ripe Moment for Change at the UN?" *Global Observatory*, March 9, 2016.
15 UN Women, *Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, p. 47.
16 Ibid.

Box 2. Women and sustaining peace

The positive impact of gender equality on peace, security, and development was often cited in all three reviews, despite the lagging implementation of Resolution 1325 in many areas. In recent years, there is mounting evidence that women's participation is not only a right but is necessary to sustain peace and political solutions after conflict. Countries with higher gender equality indicators are less likely to go to war with their neighbors, to be in poor standing in the international community, or to face crime and violence at home. Gender equality is a better indicator of a state's peacefulness than other factors like democracy, religion, or gross domestic product (GDP).[17] Women's decision-making power is directly related to the likelihood of violence, and one comparative analysis found that an increased percentage of women in parliament reduces the risk of civil war. Moreover, a number of empirical studies highlight that gender inequality can serve as a predictor of armed conflict—both between and within states.[18]

When it comes to mediation and peace processes, inclusion of a range of actors—especially pro-peace and nonviolent women's groups—can generate political will and increase the chance of reaching a sustainable agreement. Peace agreements that include women as negotiators or mediators have been 20 percent more likely to last at least two years and 35 percent more likely to last 15 years.[19] Despite increasing calls for women's participation, progress has been slow, and only 2 percent of mediators and 9 percent of negotiators in official peace talks between 1992 and 2011 were women.[20]

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peacebuilders or to coordinate with regional actors. All three reviews pointed to the need for mandates more specifically calling for inclusive approaches and for both the UN and its member states to be held accountable for their commitments in this area.

The latest Security Council resolution on women, peace, and security (Resolution 2242), which takes into account the findings of the Global Study and the HIPPO report, urges the secretary-general to put forth a new strategy to double the number of women in peacekeeping in the next five years. It also, once again, calls on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to scale up and roll out their gender analysis and technical gender expertise across the mission cycle, from mandate to drawdown.[21] As recommended in the AGE report, the Peacebuilding Commission is developing a gender strategy aimed at identifying entry points to strengthen its emphasis on women's participation and gender equality in its country-

specific engagement.[22]

COLLABORATIVE AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS

The three reviews highlight the need to develop strong global and regional partnerships for peace and security, to promote regionally led and legitimate approaches to peacebuilding, and to implement commitments related to women, peace, and security. While the UN is a state membership body, it functions in an international ecosystem that includes states, international and regional organizations, private sector actors, and international and local civil society organizations. In many conflict settings, civil society is more present than the state or intergovernmental organizations. In others, terrorists, traffickers, and organized criminal networks operate across borders, in some cases redefining them. In this multi-stakeholder global governance network, the UN can catalyze, convene, and coordinate increasingly diverse partners inside the UN system (across sectors) and beyond (with civil society and private sector actors)

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17 Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, and Chad F. Emmett, *Sex & World Peace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

18 Erik Melander, "Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 4 (2005); Mary Caprioli, "Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 2 (2005). Cited in Marie O'Reilly, "Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Societies," Institute for Inclusive Security, October 2015.

19 Quantitative findings by Laurel Stone, published in Marie O'Reilly, Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, and Thania Paffenholz, "Reimagining Peacemaking: Women's Roles in Peace Processes," International Peace Institute, 2015.

20 UN Women, "Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence," October 2012.

21 UN Security Council Resolution 2242 (October 13, 2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2242.

22 United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, para. 183.

to respond to crises.[23]

Although the UN cannot single-handedly address all peace and security challenges, it can facilitate partnerships that lead to more coherent international action in support of inclusive national and local peace, reconciliation, and reconstruction initiatives. In particular, a stronger global-regional peace and security partnership is needed. Regional organizations increasingly have improved sector-specific guidance and strategic planning tools that integrate gender perspectives, including tools for early warning, mediation, security sector reform, transitional justice, and preventing violent extremism.[24] These tools can enable global, regional, and national cooperation and collaboration.[25] The UN and regional organizations must achieve a better division of labor under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to enable the Security Council to call upon a more resilient and capable network of actors to respond to future threats.[26] As every regional organization is different, such partnerships will also be different in nature.

The African Union (AU) is a key partner for the UN, and fostering a strategic relationship between the UN Security Council, the AU Peace and Security Council, and African regional economic communities is an important step toward developing a common vision.[27] Such collaboration should go beyond operational coordination and support and beyond peace operations; it should establish avenues to share learning and exchange information—such as on gender-sensitive analysis, planning, and programming—and to develop a shared understanding of issues. The UN has sought to bolster its regional approach through regional political offices and envoys, from Africa to Central Asia (see Box 3). Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture also call on the Peacebuilding Support Office and the AU Commission to engage in regular desk-to-desk exchanges and joint initiatives.[28]

Other important partners for the UN include international financial institutions (explored below) and research institutions and think tanks—especially those in the Global South. The latter, in particular, can help develop more comprehensive analysis and new thinking.[29] Strategic, collaborative, and financial partnerships will thus be an essential feature of international governance in the future and will be critical to successful prevention, peace operations, and peacebuilding.

PEOPLE-CENTERED APPROACHES

To understand how to prevent conflict and sustain peace in each unique context, the UN must engage with local people already working against violence and for peace in their communities. While a "people-centered approach" was a main feature of the HIPPO report and was present in all three reviews, it is not a new idea; engaging with "we the peoples" is as old as the UN Charter. Still, the reviews consider inclusive engagement to be one of the fundamental shifts the organization must undertake to make its field missions fit for purpose.[30] At the same time, both the AGE report and the Global Study caution that inclusivity should not be reduced to a box-ticking exercise.[31] This call for inclusivity is echoed in several current UN agendas—most recently and visibly in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which pledges to "leave no one behind."[32]

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23 United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, p. 32.

24 The term "countering violent extremism" (CVE) is also used, but the UN secretary-general opted for the term "preventing violent extremism" (PVE) in his December 2015 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (UN Doc. A/70/674–A/70/675), which the General Assembly adopted by consensus on February 12, 2016 in Resolution 70/254. In this resolution, member states stressed that "it is essential to address the threat posed by violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism" and recognized that "violent extremism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group." They welcomed the secretary-general's initiative, took note of his plan of action, and decided to consider it further, including at the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy review in June. UN General Assembly Resolution 70/254 (February 12, 2016), UN Doc. A/RES/70/254.

25 UN Women, *Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, p. 257.

26 United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, p. 28.

27 Cedric de Coning, Ashraf Swelam, Priyal Singh, and Natasja Rupesinghe, "African Regional Consultation on the UN General Assembly Debate on UN, Peace and Security," NUPI, Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), March 4, 2016, p. 8.

28 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 19; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 19.

29 United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, p. 177.

30 United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, p. 14.

31 See, for example, United Nations, *Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, pp. 145, 169, 328.

32 UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 (September 25, 2015), UN Doc. A/RES/70/1.

Box 3. Regional integration through UN regional offices and envoys

In recent years, the addition of UN regional offices and the creation of regional envoy posts have come in response to the need to respond to conflict through global-regional partnerships. UN regional offices have increasingly been recognized as an important and cost-effective operational tool (their annual budgets range from $3 to $10 million) not only to carry out the organization's prevention mandate but also to develop collective longer-term responses to transnational challenges. UN regional offices have made singular contributions to mediation efforts, particularly in Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, and Mauritania, where they worked collaboratively and effectively with regional and subregional organizations.[33] Establishing additional UN regional offices could help maintain a focus on conflict prevention across borders through better analysis and support to dialogue and reconciliation processes.[34]

As the secretary-general puts it, "transforming peace operations into instruments that can address regional dimensions of conflict requires a mind-set change across the Organization."[35] UN engagement in countries such as Mali and Somalia and in regions like the Sahel and the Great Lakes has taken on multiple forms: peacekeeping operations; regional offices and special envoys; and agencies, funds, and programs. These all plan and operate alongside one another, requiring significant efforts to maintain coherence. In a welcome step, in January 2016 the Security Council approved the merger of the UN Office for West Africa with the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel. This merger expands the duties of the renamed UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), building on a mandate that already cut across peace and security, human rights, and governance in the region.[36]

Still, much of the UN system is constrained to country-specific, state-centric mandates and programs. Developing a unified interface to bring together teams from the DPKO and DPA in the same regional groupings with their "clients"—the host countries and the UN field missions, whether peacekeeping missions, special political missions, or UN country teams—could help address these constraints.[37]

There are a number of reasons for this renewed attention to people-centered approaches to peace operations and peacebuilding. First, in a multi-stakeholder world, most threats to peace and security are driven from below and cannot be solved by governments alone. The state is a necessary but not a sufficient partner in this endeavor, particularly if it is weak, absent from certain parts of its territory, captured by elites, or not trusted by its people. State-centric, prescriptive peacebuilding focused on building state capacity has shown its limitations in places like the Central African Republic and South Sudan.[38] Elite peace deals have also revealed their weaknesses, and Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture highlight the importance of broad and inclusive national ownership of peace agreements and transition processes "to ensure that the needs of all segments of society are taken into account."[39]

In practice, working closely with local communities enables missions to monitor how local people experience and perceive the impact of peace operations and ensures that these operations do not unwittingly harm those they are deployed to serve and protect.[40] These actors have a critical role to play in improving the UN's conflict analysis and in mapping peace resources that can help prevent violence and resolve conflict before it becomes entrenched. For peace to be sustainable, those on the receiving end need to lead the way. The reviews

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33 Charles T. Call, "UN Mediation and the Politics of Transition after Constitutional Crises," International Peace Institute, February 2012.

34 Civil Society Dialogue Network, "The 2015 UN Reviews: Civil Society Perspectives on EU Implementation," Brussels Meeting Report, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, February 1, 2016, p. 4.

35 United Nations Secretary-General, *Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations*, para. 23.

36 United Nations, Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2016/88, January 28, 2016.

37 Arthur Boutellis, "Driving the System Apart? A Study of United Nations Integration and Integrated Strategic Planning," International Peace Institute, August 2013.

38 United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, p. 17.

39 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 3; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 3.

40 See, for example, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, "Understanding and Integrating Local Perceptions in Multi-Dimensional UN Peacekeeping," 2013.

make a number of recommendations to this end, mostly on processes and mechanisms to meaningfully engage local communities at various stages of the mission cycle (see Box 4). As the reviews highlight, in most fragile and conflict-affected states, youth make up half the population yet often have few or no avenues to participate in decision making.[41] It is essential to engage young people as a key stakeholder group that has the potential to have a positive impact on peace and security rather than viewing them as a challenge or potential threat.[42]

Compelling as these reasons may be, the implementation of people-centered approaches is not without challenges or risks. First, it is not always easy to identify civil society representatives who are outside of elite circles and genuinely speak on behalf of local people. Therefore, questions of who, when, and how to engage become central. Second, reaching out to communities associated with insurgents can put UN personnel at risk. Third, peace operations' direct engagement with civil society organizations can raise concerns with the host government if it views the mission as interfering with its sovereign relationship with its people.[43] Finally, it remains challenging to rigorously analyze local realities before planning engagement strategies.[44]

However, the reviews made cogent recommendations on how best to overcome these obstacles, as many national and international NGOs have done in the past. The central challenge remains to ensure that local engagement is not treated merely as a box-ticking exercise or a technical indicator left to specialists but as a key component of political

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Box 4. Supporting local knowledge for peace

Multilateral policymakers and field officials are increasingly committed to civil society participation but often find they still do not have the tools or mechanisms required to make it happen in a regular, structured way.[45] Many international NGOs have sought to provide this guidance, such as in the Local First approach from Peace Direct, the analytic tool Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts from World Vision, and the Better Peace Tool on inclusive mediation from the International Civil Society Action Network.[46] These are just a few examples of the many tested approaches that organizations large and small have developed to make partnerships with local and national actors more consistent and effective.[47] Supporting local knowledge and community-level peacebuilders is critical, not only to achieve broader participation but also to better analyze what is working locally in order to build on—rather than undermine—these initiatives, and ultimately to sustain peace.

The Secretariat and field missions have followed suit and embarked on a number of initiatives to standardize and systematize local engagement processes and practices, which are already in use in several missions. Civil affairs teams and programs are often the primary interface between the mission and local people, and their initiatives, such as community dialogues and local mediation programs, can play an important peacebuilding role at the local level. These initiatives should be supported in the long term rather than abandoned at the time of mission drawdown. In addition to commissioning surveys on local perceptions, each mission should have a broader community engagement strategy to inform its overall political strategy, including during transitions. This approach should be developed in cooperation and consultation with local civil society actors and regularly shared and reviewed with local communities.[48]

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41 See, for example, United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, pp. 16, 22; United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, pp. 32, 53, 77.

42 UN Security Council Resolution 2250 (December 9, 2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2250.

43 See Cedric de Coning, John Karlsrud, and Paul Troost, "Towards More People-Centric Peace Operations: From 'Extension of State Authority' to 'Strengthening Inclusive State-Society Relations,'" *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 4, no. 1 (2015), pp. 1–13.

44 United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, pp. 77–78.

45 Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, ed., "Leveraging Local Knowledge for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Africa," International Peace Institute, March 2015, p. 2.

46 To access these tools, see www.actlocalfirst.org , www.participate-mstc.net , and www.betterpeacetool.org .

47 For more on inclusivity in peacebuilding, see Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, "Inclusive Peacebuilding: Recognised but Not Realized," Development Dialogue Paper no. 63, December 2015.

48 "Civil Society Recommendations for the Reviews of UN Peace Operations and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture," New York Peacebuilding Group, March 2015.

decision making in the field and in headquarters.

Operationalizing the Reviews: Key Areas for UN Action

The operational recommendations put forward by the reviews can be broadly grouped in three areas for action: (1) integration and coherence; (2) financing; and (3) accountability, leadership, and governance. Several key challenges and opportunities in each area are explored below, followed by the existing connectors and processes through which both member states and the UN Secretariat have been able—in some instances—to overcome fragmentation and work across silos to address today's complex and interconnected global challenges.

INTEGRATION AND COHERENCE

At an open debate of the Security Council in February 2016 on the review of the peacebuilding architecture, a number of member states made the point that "unless we succeed in breaking the silos within our governments, between the UN principal organs, and between and within the UN Secretariat, agencies, funds and programs, we will fail the peoples that we are mandated to serve."[49] The UN's largest silos have their origins in the UN Charter, which entrenches the organization's three founding pillars of work (see Figure 2). The charter tasks the Security Council with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." It tasks the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with making recommendations to the General Assembly, member states, and UN agencies on "international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters" and "for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights."[50] Over time, the UN Secretariat developed within these silos and created new and further siloed institutions within each pillar, such as the DPKO and DPA. Specialized agencies, funds, and programs have also sometimes reinforced these silos in their own internal organi-

zation and structure, such as standalone units dealing with conflict.

Over the last twenty-five years, the UN has undertaken a series of institutional innovations to promote integration and greater coherence in engaging with realities on the ground. The UN has developed a comprehensive body of integration-related policies and planning tools and has experimented with many forms and levels of integration. Much of this drive for integration emerged from the peacekeeping failures of the 1990s and the realization that various parts of the UN were acting separately and, at times, at cross-purposes.

While member states and UN staff alike frequently discuss and use the term "integration" as a guiding principle, it encompasses different processes (e.g., within the Secretariat versus among the Secretariat and UN agencies, funds, and programs), different levels (e.g., in the UN Secretariat versus in field missions and offices), and different outcomes. The UN has taken the integration agenda further than many other organizations and "whole-of-government" approaches, particularly in the field, including through its 2006 Delivering as One initiative in the development arena.[51] However, integration now faces a number of obstacles, ranging from persisting structural and financial impediments to the lack of incentives and rewards.[52]

Looking ahead, the 2015 reviews have the potential to renew this drive for greater coherence. Two rhetorical shifts are critical markers of this push: (1) adopting the term "peace operations" to denote the full spectrum of responses, rather than perpetuating the bureaucratic turfs of and silos between peacekeeping, special political missions, and UN country teams; and (2) investing in "sustaining peace" as a shared responsibility across the organization before, during, and after conflict. As described in the following section on financing, predictable and pooled funding could also greatly incentivize system coherence. The need to recognize the primacy of politics and better analyze and plan across the silos, as discussed below, are also important drivers.

49 Joint Statement by Ukraine, Egypt, and Spain at a UN Security Council Open Debate on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, February 23, 2016.

50 Charter of the United Nations, "Preamble," "Chapter I: Purposes and Principles," and "Chapter III: Organs," 1945.

51 United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment*, November 20, 2006, UN Doc. A/61/583.

52 For a detailed study of UN Integration, see Boutellis, "Driving the System Apart? A Study of United Nations Integration and Integrated Strategic Planning."

Figure 2. Silos in the UN system

Peace and Security | **Sustainable Development** | **Human Rights**

Member States

General Assembly
5th and 6th Committees

1st and 4th Committees | 2nd Committee | 3rd Committee

Security Council | Economic and Social Council | Human Rights Council

UN Secretariat

Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB)
High-Level Committee on Programmes (HLCP), High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM), and the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) [see below]

Executive Office of the Secretary General
Policy Committee, Management Committee, and Senior Management Group
New Analysis & Planning Cell

Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS) | Department of Political Affairs (DPA) | UNDG — UN Agencies, Funds, and Programs | Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

Field Level

Peacekeeping Operations | Special Political Missions | Resident Coordinators and Country Teams | Human Rights Components and Special Rapporteurs

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Looking ahead, the focus of the next secretary-general's integration drive should be more at the strategic than the structural level. Strategic integration means following certain policy principles, such as analyzing and planning as one and integrating only where it matters and adds value. Structural changes are secondary and can take different forms to reflect evolving and contextual needs and circumstances. Simply put, "form follows function," a guiding principle suggested by the June 2008 UN Policy Committee decision on integration.[53] Future integration will also need to be field- and client-oriented rather than headquarters-focused and will need to recognize that the UN's "clients" are not only host states but also the people.

The next secretary-general will therefore need to build a compelling narrative—accompanied by concrete incentives—on the value and relevance of UN integration and coherence that both the UN bureaucracy and member states can support. Reforms should go beyond headquarters structures to also focus on the coherence and quality of the UN response in the field. Such reforms would challenge established power structures and the risk-averse behaviors and mindsets of individuals, departments, and member states. The AGE report argues powerfully that the responsibility to realize integration lies with member states, which, some argue, tend to blame the system for its lack of coherence while helping to perpetuate siloed approaches and competition within the system through their funding practices and internal divisions.

FINANCING

The UN's fragmentation is mirrored in, and arguably driven by, its financing arrangements. For instance, peace operations deployed with multi-dimensional mandates have large budgets dedicated almost entirely to running the mission itself, with little for programs to support the host government and communities. Earlier recommendations on civilian capacity deployment calling for more flexibility to use a mission's budget to respond to crises and changing circumstances and for channeling budgets to fund short-term programmatic activities have not been acted upon.[54] Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture recognize the importance of funding for the peacebuilding components of relevant UN missions, including during mission drawdown and transitions, when inadequate support can increase the risk of relapse (see Box 5).[55] Inadequate financing perpetuates an expectations gap often detrimental to perceptions of UN missions on the ground.

To close this expectations gap, close cooperation between UN actors on the ground is urgently needed. Yet the UN Secretariat and UN agencies, funds, and programs face structural disincentives to working together and, in some cases, prohibitions against pooling their funding streams.[56] Furthermore, they are not always ready or able to prioritize key aspects of building peace, particularly if their funding, which comes from voluntary donor contributions, is not in line with Security Council mandates.

Programming to sustain peace must receive more predictable funding, including from assessed contributions[57] and from instruments such as the Peacebuilding Fund and multi-year pooled funding. The AGE report proposes that the Peacebuilding Fund receive core funding equivalent to 1 percent of the total UN peace operations budget.[58] Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture only take note of this proposal while encouraging member states to continue making voluntary contributions to the fund. They do, however, call for a report from the next secretary-general with options for "increasing, restructuring and better prioritizing funding dedicated to United Nations peacebuilding activities, including through assessed and voluntary contributions, with a view to ensuring sustainable financing."[59] While changes in financing arrange-

53   United Nations, Decision Number 2008/24 of the Secretary-General in the Policy Committee on Integration, June 25, 2008.

54   United Nations, *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict: Independent Report of the Senior Advisory Group*, March 2011.

55   UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 26; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 26.

56   United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, p. 26.

57   The original report of the Civilian Capacities initiative had already suggested channeling mission funds to national or local actors; UN agencies, funds and programs; or external partners based on the principle of comparative advantage.

58   United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, p. 55.

59   UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 30; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 30.

Box 5. Managing transitions

The UN Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown and Withdrawal, which the UN Integration Steering Group adopted on February 4, 2013, provides strategic guidance to improve planning and management of mission withdrawals. Yet transitions and gradual drawdowns of peacekeeping missions, special political missions, and UN country teams remain challenging for the UN system as a whole—whether in Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia, or Sierra Leone. Gaps remain in the UN's ability to sustain peace through "a continuum of response and smoother transitions" between different phases of missions, as called for by the HIPPO report. And without long-term planning or financing strategies, countries affected by conflict often face a "financial cliff," where assistance and support drops off dramatically just as the peacekeeping mission exits.

While the involvement of the Peacebuilding Commission has, in some cases, helped to draw attention to countries during UN transitions—with some success in Sierra Leone, for instance—UN country teams often struggle to step up and mobilize voluntary funding to fill gaps as a mission withdraws.[60] Part of the difficulty resides in agreeing jointly with the host country on the support needed to ensure that peace can sustain itself, possibly in the form of a compact between the UN and the host government, as suggested in the HIPPO report.

A recent consultation held in Monrovia, Liberia, on March 31, 2016, hosted by the Government of Liberia and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), warned that the upcoming UNMIL drawdown and exit from the Security Council's agenda could leave some conflict drivers unaddressed, risking relapse. It further revealed that the multilateral political and funding architecture does not adequately reflect the cyclical nature of conflict and the need for sustained attention beyond the peacekeeping phase.[61] The UN and the host country should devise a bridging strategy early enough in the exit planning process to ensure that mission withdrawal does not unwittingly weaken the fragile foundations of self-sustaining peace.

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ments will inevitably face stiff challenges in the UN's Fifth Committee budget negotiations, this request provides an important platform for the UN system to comprehensively analyze current funding constraints and encourage creative thinking on how to overcome them.

Current funding arrangements and budget processes also reduce the flexibility to design mandates that fit the specific needs of a country or context and to transition between various mission models and sizes. Because peacekeeping missions are funded through the peacekeeping support account, while political missions rely on the regular budget (both are also supported by extra-budgetary voluntary contributions from donors), peacekeeping responses are sometimes undertaken when alternative lighter or more gradual interventions would be more appropriate. Funding

mechanisms should support use of a continuum or spectrum of tailored responses.

To facilitate more tailored responses, the HIPPO report calls for a single "peace operations account" to finance all peace operations (whether peacekeeping or special political missions) and their related activities. However, member states remain divided, and it was left to the next secretary-general to push for a decision on this critical issue. Existing recommendations on the funding and backstopping of special political missions,[62] originally requested in General Assembly Resolution 259 in December 2010, have been mired in the Fifth Committee for several years.[63]

Building on a strategic and collaborative approach to partnerships, the UN and the World Bank should cooperate in a more predictable and

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60 Megan Price and Lina Titulaer, "Beyond Transitions: UNDP's Role before, during and after UN Mission Withdrawal," Clingendael Institute, September 2013.

61 See "Key Messages from the Monrovia Consultation," Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), ACCORD, NUPI, and DHF, March 31, 2016, available at http://www.un.org/pga/70/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2016/01/Monrovia_consultation_2016_HLTD.pdf .

62 United Nations, *Review of Arrangements for Funding and Backstopping Special Political Missions: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. A/66/340, October 12, 2011.

63 United Nations, *Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.*

institutionalized way and, as called for in Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture, strengthen their collaboration in conflict-affected countries.[64] Both entities, as well as regional development banks, could undertake joint public expenditure reviews in the security and justice sectors to enhance their effectiveness and transparency. They could also further reinforce their joint support to building the capacity of national institutions and local civil society networks to enable them, for instance, to sustainably assist women and girls affected by armed conflict and post-conflict situations.[65]

Indeed, the three reviews contrast the long-term effects of gender equality on peacefulness with the dearth of funding for gender-focused initiatives. The AGE report and the Global Study stress the importance of attaining or, preferably, exceeding the goal of earmarking 15 percent of all peace and security funding to projects promoting gender equality. While efforts to endorse this initiative did not make it through the peacebuilding negotiations, Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 encourage the secretary-general to promote the gender dimensions of peacebuilding, including by delivering gender-sensitive and gender-targeted programming.[66]

Beyond mobilization of resources, financing encompasses using financial instruments, risk management, and agreements between national and international partners (often discussed in the form of compacts) to articulate priorities and commitments.[67] Effective financing will require policy communities to collectively recognize that building sustainable peace is a slow, iterative process with long time scales that is most likely to succeed when supported by vertical and horizontal coalitions with a shared vision. The reviews encourage using innovative approaches to financing at the country and regional levels and creating enlarged funding platforms that bring together diverse donors and actors to pool resources in order to share and mitigate risk and maximize impact.[68]

ACCOUNTABILITY, LEADERSHIP, AND GOVERNANCE

All three reviews directly link the overarching message on accountability and governance to leadership. Improving leadership, including by changing the process for selecting high-ranking UN officials, could help professionalize the organization, while a transparent recruitment system based on merit and expertise could help bring further accountability.[69] Individuals leading peace operations should be held accountable for how effectively they implement achievable mandates. Heads of mission, in turn, should be liable for meeting performance indicators, in particular on gender equality and the protection of women from abuse by UN staff. Performance indicators should also center on efforts to promote the participation of women and the use of gender-sensitive analysis in designing and implementing programs.

Several recent developments have sent strong messages about accountability. In August 2015, the secretary-general ordered Babacar Gaye, his special representative in the Central African Republic, to resign following sexual abuse by peacekeepers. In March 2016, the Security Council adopted its first-ever resolution on sexual abuse by peacekeepers, including a decision to repatriate military or police units "where there is credible evidence of widespread or systemic sexual exploitation and abuse."[70] The secretary-general and member states alike need to sustain and act upon these efforts.

The three peace and security reviews call for high-level structural changes to ensure greater accountability in the future. The HIPPO report points to a 2004 proposal by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to create an additional deputy secretary-general position responsible for peace and security. However, the current secretary-general left it to his successor to

64   UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 20; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 20.

65   United Nations, *Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, p. 167.

66   UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 22; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 22.

67   Sigrid Gruener, ed., *Six Goals for Strenthening the UN's Ability to Sustain Peace*, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Development Dialogue Paper no. 14, March 2016.

68   United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, p. 87; UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 20; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 20.

69   Eli Stamnes and Kari M. Osland, "Synthesis Report: Reviewing UN Peace Operations, the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the Implementation of UNSCR 1325," Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2016, p. 46.

70   UN Security Council Resolution 2272 (March 11, 2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2272.

consider this recommendation. The Global Study calls for considering a new assistant secretary-general position at UN Women to deal with crises, conflict, and emergencies, as well as a senior gender adviser in the office of every special representative. The latter recommendation was endorsed by the secretary-general and by the Security Council in Resolution 2242.

Past experience, however, shows that such high-level proposals can, in the end, produce new layers of bureaucracy and generate new turf battles instead of producing more accountability. The driving force behind any such decision should be its impact on the coherence and quality of UN responses in the field. It would be more advisable to leverage existing connectors and processes—at the level of member states, the Secretariat, and the field—to achieve greater coherence, energize the UN to transact business differently across silos whenever and wherever needed, and ultimately improve the UN's overall governance and relevance.

Leveraging Synergies: Connectors and Processes for Overcoming Silos

Despite the UN's well-documented and often lamented fragmentation, member states and the UN Secretariat have, at times, been able to work across silos. To leverage the synergies identified in the reviews, the UN can build on existing connectors, activate new ones the reviews recommend, and turn ad hoc precedents of overcoming silos into practice (see Figure 3). In some cases, connectors have been funded by extra-budgetary voluntary contributions; where these connectors have proven effective, core funding—even when voluntary—should be shifted to support them in a more sustainable and predictable way.

CAPITALIZE ON EXISTING CONNECTORS

The UN system can build upon the many connectors it already has across its three thematic pillars at the level of member states, the UN Secretariat, and the field. Although the UN Charter gives the primary responsibility for peace and security to the Security Council, the council does not have sole responsibility, and the work of the General Assembly reaches across all three pillars. In a sense, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the Human Rights Council together constitute the UN peace and security architecture, and the peacebuilding architecture is meant to play a bridging role.

Connectors at the Level of Member States

In addition to giving the secretary-general a role to play in the area of peace and security under Article 99, the UN Charter gives the General Assembly a role by allowing it to make recommendations to the Security Council. Under Articles 11 and 12, the General Assembly may "consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security," "discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member," and "call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security."[71] Article 65 also foresees both a proactive and a reactive role for ECOSOC, as it "may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request."[72]

Institutionally, although the General Assembly's First, Second, Third, and Fourth Committees fall within the thematic pillars, the powerful Fifth Committee cuts across the silos, with responsibility for administration and budgetary matters, including of specialized agencies. On the basis of the Fifth Committee's reports, the General Assembly considers and approves the UN's budget. This committee is therefore well placed to consider recommendations from the reviews on creating a single "peace operations account" and earmarking 15 percent of all peace and security funding to promoting gender equality. It is also well placed to consider the secretary-general's forthcoming report on options to increase and improve funding for peacebuilding activities through assessed and voluntary contributions, as requested in Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture.

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71 Charter of the United Nations, "Chapter IV: The General Assembly."
72 Ibid., "Chapter X: The Economic and Social Council."

Figure 3. Connectors across UN silos

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Connectors at the Level of the UN Secretariat

At the level of the UN Secretariat, a number of connectors cut across the three pillars, including the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), the Policy Committee and Management Committee, and the Senior Management Group. The CEB is chaired by the secretary-general and reports to both ECOSOC and the General Assembly, providing broad guidance and strategic direction to the UN system as a whole. It is the UN's highest-level coordination forum and includes the leadership of twenty-nine member organizations. It aims to develop and promote inter-agency priorities while maintaining its member organizations' independent mandates. The CEB operates through three committees: the High-Level Committee on Programs, the High-Level Committee on Management, and the UN Development Group.

The Executive Office of the Secretary-General has a critical leadership role to play in setting priorities for the organization as a whole. The Policy Committee and Management Committee, both established in 2015, offer thematic and country-specific guidance for executive-level decisions and address internal reform issues, respectively. The Senior Management Group brings together the heads of departments, programs, funds, and offices at the UN to exchange information and share knowledge.[73]

Beyond these structures, a number of cross-cutting policies also serve as connectors within the UN system. For example, the secretary-general's Human Rights Up Front initiative was launched in 2013 to inspire all parts of the UN system to adopt human rights and protection of civilians as core responsibilities and a way to strengthen prevention through early warning. This has been part of a positive trend of developing system-wide policies that cut across silos, which has also seen the development of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to Non-UN Security Forces, the Policy on Human Rights Screening of UN Personnel, the Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal, and the UN Policy for Post-Conflict Employment

Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration.

Connectors at the Field Level

At the field level, the strongest connectors have been the executive representatives of the secretary-general (ERSGs)—until recently—and special representatives of the secretary-general (SRSGs), as well as "triple-hatted" deputy SRSGs. Deputy SRSGs have the authority of both a resident coordinator and a humanitarian coordinator and are responsible for coordinating between peace operations and UN country teams' longer-term development work.

Effective integration—particularly in the field—often comes down to leadership and personalities within the UN mission and agencies, funds, and programs. The secretary-general therefore holds great responsibility in selecting leaders for headquarters and field posts who will foster such integration and the HIPPO's proposed shift toward a more "field-focused and people-centered" organization. Another challenge is strengthening the resident coordinator's role in fostering integration—particularly in areas related to sustaining peace—when there is no longer an ERSG with an explicitly political mandate from the Security Council. Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture call on the secretary-general to strengthen the high-level leadership of UN country teams to absorb peacebuilding activities after mission transitions, which may open the door for resident coordinators to play a stronger role.[74]

Other important connectors include peace and development advisers, who provide policy advice to UN resident coordinators and country teams on political and institution-building issues while also reporting to DPA headquarters. The joint program between the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and DPA on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention, launched in 2004, supports national conflict prevention initiatives. Much of this support to date has gone toward deploying peace and development advisers to UN country teams in the field to help national authorities and provide them with seed funding for such prevention initiatives. Notably, many of these initiatives are funded through the Peacebuilding Fund and

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73 Policy Committee of the Secretary-General, *Manual*, June 2008.
74 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 30; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 30.

extra-budgetary voluntary funding, and they have grown considerably over the years.

The DPA Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisers, which is available to peace operations, resident coordinators, and country teams, also plays a supporting role. So too does the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections, which brings together DPKO (and its Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions), UNDP, OHCHR, UN Women, and other agencies to jointly support the rule of law and human rights. Although a headquarters structure, the UN Operations and Crisis Centre, created in 2013, brings together DPKO, DPA, UNDP, and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to facilitate responses to crises in the field. Human rights officers have already been integrated into peace operations for some time (with a dual reporting line to the OHCHR),[75] and the secretary-general's recent decision to consolidate specialized functions relating to child protection and conflict-related sexual violence within mission human rights components is welcome.[76] Nonetheless, human rights officers could, in many instances, benefit from greater political support from mission leadership.

ACTIVATE NEW CONNECTORS

New System-Wide Analysis and Planning

Beyond the above-mentioned existing connectors that should be built upon, the three reviews have led to the emergence of new connectors that will need to be activated. Following the HIPPO report, the secretary-general took the concrete action of establishing a small, centralized analysis and planning cell in his office. This cell can enhance the Secretariat's capacity to conduct and draw on conflict analysis and strategic planning across the UN system to develop options for possible whole-of-UN responses.[77] While not explicitly referencing the cell, Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture strongly endorse the need to strengthen system-wide analysis and planning and request the secretary-general to report back on these efforts.[78]

In order to act as a true connector, this cell will now need to respond to the three reviews' call for conflict analysis to systematically consider human rights and threats to civilians in addition to the political, security, social, economic, gender, and regional dimensions of conflict. In order to be effective and to transcend silos and turfs, this cell will need the political backing of the secretary-general. It will also need the backing of member states, which do not always welcome being told what they need rather than what they want to hear, particularly in regards to deploying peace operations.

Moreover, the cell will have to be staffed properly, which requires the support of the General Assembly's Fifth Committee for assessed funding, and the capacity and culture of planners from DPA, DPKO, and the UN Development Group will have to be upgraded. Parallel steps should also be taken to partner with international financial institutions, both to more strongly integrate economic analysis into UN assessments and to better factor local knowledge and community perspectives into analysis and planning (see Box 6).

Connectors within the Peace and Security Pillar

The two HIPPO recommendations this secretary-general left to his successor—to create an additional deputy secretary-general position responsible for peace and security and to have a single "peace operations account" to finance all peace operations and their related activities—also could become connectors, although primarily within the peace and security pillar. Indeed, without unified financing, governance, and decision-making structures, functions and entities with significant responsibility will likely see their authority contested from within the system.

Given the limited incentives DPKO and DPA currently have to work together, a single peace operations account could go a long way in promoting better tailored, more effective, and more accountable responses. More flexibility and interoperability between the regular assessed

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75 Initiated through a 1999 Memorandum of Understanding, this integration was strengthened by Policy Committee decision 2005/24 and formalized by the 2011 Policy on Human Rights in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions.

76 United Nations Secretary-General, *Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations*, para. 66.

77 Ibid., para. 54.

78 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 13, 30; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 13, 30.

Box 6. Uniting for joint analysis

Peace and conflict analysis and knowledge sharing provide opportunities for joint, cross-sectoral action by the UN's representatives in a country and their counterparts at headquarters. Ideally, joint analysis should also be participatory, bringing together diverse local actors to serve as analysts. Such an approach can serve as a peacebuilding initiative in itself by modeling political inclusivity and a democratic process. Joint analysis—including post-conflict needs assessments—could also focus on factors associated with peaceful and resilient societies rather than selectively on factors that drive and sustain violent acts and tend to trigger securitized responses to symptoms, with both predictable and unpredictable counterproductive effects.

A regular practice of joint peace and conflict analysis could link information gathered in a peace operation back to the UN's longer-term peacebuilding planning. For example, it could draw insights from the work of a mission's civil affairs teams, which often run community dialogues and local mediation programs. Joint analysis could also draw on UN Women's extensive work with women's peace networks in conflict countries. At the moment, the rich local knowledge those programs could collect is overlooked and rarely relayed to the SRSG in the mission or to peacebuilding and political affairs officers back in New York. Too often, this knowledge is lost once a peace operation draws down. As UN actors strive to overcome silos, knowledge management may be a good place to start.

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budget and voluntary contributions, both in the field and in headquarters, would also be welcome. The focus on financing of peace operations should also not distract from the need for member states to prioritize development budgets to prevent violent conflict and sustain peace.

Connecting with the Development Pillar

At the headquarters level, DPA's recent entry into the UN Development Group as an observer member is also a notable development in that it connects the peace and security and the sustainable development pillars moving forward. The secretary-general's request that the "the United Nations Development Group…take forward a review of current capacities of agencies, funds and programmes" to strengthen preventive and peacebuilding work is also a major opportunity. Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture take note of this request and look forward to their findings "contributing to enhancing the United Nations' capacities relating to sustaining peace."[79] The AGE report also emphasizes that the entire UN system, including development and humanitarian actors, has a responsibility, bestowed upon it by the charter, to prevent violent conflict and sustain peace.

While the General Assembly's quadrennial comprehensive policy review (QCPR) on UN operational activities for development is not a new exercise, the upcoming QCPR provides an opportunity to rethink the traditional siloed approach and to integrate, or at least better connect, more UN entities and functional areas.[80] The peacebuilding resolutions also call for better cooperation and coordination to strengthen the UN development system's contribution to peacebuilding at headquarters and in the field and explicitly reference "the overarching framework of the United Nations operational activities for development."[81] This presents an opportunity to ensure that the governance arrangements for the UN development system explicitly focus on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including in the QCPR.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has the potential to become the most powerful connector between the UN's pillars. The SDGs signal a commitment by member states to address some of the social, political, governance, and economic factors, such as exclusion and corruption, that impede sustainable development. They should, in turn, encourage the UN system to overcome silos.[82] Indeed, the 2030 Agenda, with its

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79 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 17; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 17.

80 The QCPR is the mechanism through which the General Assembly assesses the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and impact of UN operational activities for development and establishes system-wide policy orientations for development cooperation. See http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/qcpr.shtml .

81 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 16; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 16.

82 One example is the Chief Executives Board's (CEB) forthcoming process around the UN system's engagement with the SDGs.

seventeen goals and 169 targets, integrates the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. The SDGs build on the key lesson from the Millennium Development Goals: sustained systemic change and long-term development cannot be achieved through single-sector goals and approaches. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda therefore presents a unique opportunity for overcoming traditional silos and for more cross-sectoral decision making (see Box 7).[83]

BUILD ON PRECEDENTS

Beyond existing and potential connectors, recent years have seen an increasing number of precedents of member states coming together to work across structural divides or enable the UN system to do so in response to specific challenges. Such positive precedents should be studied, built on, and turned into practice so that the next time the world organization faces a challenge that does not fall squarely within one of its pillars, a timely and effective response is not hampered by its very architecture. Member states, together with the UN Secretariat, should also nurture the emerging consensus on sustaining peace and on systemic coherence and integration. This could include, inter alia, discussing programmatic, administrative, and financial measures to enable the UN system at headquarters and in the field to work together differently in support of sustainable peace and development.

Security Council

In the Security Council, several debates and presidential statements have already married the three pillars. In February 2011, Brazil organized a Security Council debate on Interlinkages between Peace, Security and Development that attracted great attention. The background note stated that the "Security Council must take into account social and development issues in its deliberations in order to ensure an effective transition to peace."[84] In 2014, the Security Council pledged, in Resolution 2171, to better use a system-wide approach to prevent conflict. It also reiterated the "need for a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and sustainable peace, which comprises operational and structural measures for the prevention of armed conflict and addresses its root causes, including through…promoting sustained economic growth, poverty eradication, social development, sustainable development, national reconciliation, good governance, democracy, gender equality and respect for, and protection of, human rights."[85]

In January 2015, Chile, as president of the Security Council, established another precedent by convening a day-long debate on inclusive development and peace and security. This debate resulted in a presidential statement reiterating that "in order to support a country to emerge sustainably

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Box 7. Saying no to silos in the SDG negotiations

Throughout the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in September 2015, one of the main criteria for member states was integration and noncompetition with the other goals. Goals would not be considered in isolation from each other, and targets would not be adopted if they contradicted those in another area of work. While there are seventeen SDGs, the negotiators viewed them all as indivisible.

This approach guided negotiations toward an integrated framework—the outcome is a set of goals woven together into a holistic agenda. Individual goals are not viewed as falling in the domain of only one UN entity or department, and realizing them will require the UN to work across its charter. As the secretary-general has remarked, "No agency owns a goal." Instead, each goal contains targets across the UN's pillars and requires member states, the Secretariat, and the UN in the field to work as one. Because, in practice, UN agencies tend to focus on certain goals as their particular domain, new funding mechanisms could incentivize truly cooperative approaches across the UN system.

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83 UN Economic and Social Council, "Breaking the Silos: Cross-Sectoral Partnerships for Advancing the Sustainable Development Goals," March 31, 2016.

84 "Security Council Discusses Poverty and Under-Development as Root of Conflict," UN News Centre, February 11, 2011, available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37519#.VxgXePkrIdV .

85 UN Security Council Resolution 2171 (August 21, 2014), UN Doc. S/RES/2171.

from conflict, there is a need for a comprehensive and integrated approach that incorporates and strengthens coherence between political, security, development, human rights and rule of law activities."[86] The resolution on youth, peace, and security adopted on December 9, 2015, is another example of the Security Council integrating development issues such as youth education and employment.

The push for this type of integration has not always received universal support, and some of these issues are tied to a bigger debate over Security Council reform. In November 2015, for example, the United Kingdom tried to organize a Security Council debate on "peaceful societies and conflict prevention" that made a direct connection between conflict prevention and SDG 16 on the promotion of peaceful societies, justice, and inclusive institutions for sustainable development. This effort received some pushback from member states wary of the Security Council encroaching upon areas they viewed as falling within the exclusive competence of the General Assembly and ECOSOC. The majority of Security Council members nonetheless called for both integrating the development and conflict prevention agendas and cooperating with the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and other UN agencies and international institutions. In the end, the ministerial-level open debate on November 17, 2015, was renamed "Security, Development and the Root Causes of Conflict" to address such concerns, and it did not result in a presidential statement.[87]

Economic and Social Council

A number of ECOSOC initiatives have also contributed to building bridges between the various pillars of the UN. Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on Guinea-Bissau (created in 2002), Burundi (created in 2003), and Haiti (created in 1999 in response to a request by the Security Council under Article 65 of the UN Charter and reactivated in 2004) set out to help define long-term programs of support for these countries emerging from conflict.

The mandates of the first two groups have been terminated, as these countries' peacebuilding challenges are now being addressed by the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). However, ECOSOC continues to provide advice on Haiti and has involved the ECOSOC president and the SRSG in Haiti in the group's work. This work has demonstrated that ECOSOC can leverage attention and funding for conflict-affected countries—not only for peace operations but also for development, governance, and human rights initiatives.[88]

Peacebuilding Commission

The PBC has held a number of joint meetings with ECOSOC on issues such as youth and conflict, as well as conversations on the need for a longer-term positioning of the UN development system and for a forum for citizen action. In Resolutions 60/180 and 61/16, the General Assembly supported such regular interactions and underlined the value of ECOSOC's experience in post-conflict peacebuilding and its ability to increase coherence between the development and the peace and security pillars.[89] The PBC is mandated to report to both the Security Council and the General Assembly (see Box 8).

The newly minted resolutions on the peacebuilding architecture, which establish "sustaining peace" as a new unifying framework, may enable the PBC to realize some of its bridging potential. As the incoming chair of the PBC in January 2016, Kenya expressed its intention to promote coordinated and sustained engagement with the General Assembly and ECOSOC around the SDGs and to analyze the PBC's role as a bridge between the three principal organs of the UN (the General Assembly, the Security Council, and ECOSOC).[90]

Human Rights Council

Better awareness of the PBC's work among members of the Human Rights Council—particularly when passing resolutions on countries on the PBC and the Security Council's agendas and

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86 United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2015/3, January 19, 2015.

87 "UN Security Council Discusses Links with 2030 Agenda," International Institute for Sustainable Development Reporting Services, November 17, 2015, available at http://sd.iisd.org/news/un-security-council-discusses-links-with-2030-agenda/ .

88 UN Economic and Social Council, "Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Recovery," available at www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/peacebuilding.shtml .

89 General Assembly Resolution 60/180 (December 30, 2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180; General Assembly Resolution 61/16 (January 9, 2007), UN Doc. A/RES/61/16.

90 Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations, "Letter of Intent of the Incoming Chair of the UN Peacebuilding Commission for 2016 Chairmanship of Kenya," January 21, 2016.

Box 8. Resolutions 2282 and 70/262: Updating the mandate of the PBC

There is hope that the new "sustaining peace" resolutions may enable the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to take an overdue step. When the PBC was established in 2005, it set out to "bring together all relevant actors" to mobilize resources, sustain attention, and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery. While the PBC's founding resolution tasked it with helping to improve the coordination of all actors— within and outside the UN—on particular post-conflict countries, the PBC has yet to play this role effectively (as both its five-year and ten-year reviews found).[91] As the latter report recommended, "The PBC should become the advisory 'bridge' between the relevant intergovernmental organs it was always intended to be."[92]

This issue is taken up in the new peacebuilding resolutions, which elaborate on the functions of the PBC set out in its original mandate. Much of the new language focuses on improving coordination and integration, noting the links between the UN's three foundational pillars and stressing the PBC's role as a bridge between the UN's principal organs in each area. The two resolutions call on the PBC to realize this bridging role by sharing advice on coherence and priorities, broadening its strategic convening role, and working in greater cooperation with the Security Council, General Assembly, and ECOSOC.

The resolutions seek to elevate the responsibility for peacebuilding to include all parts of the UN and feature strong links to the development system and a strengthened role for the leadership of UN country teams to take on peacebuilding. Sustaining peace as a cross-cutting issue may also open opportunities for implementing the recommendations of the HIPPO report, including its recommendations to support peacebuilding and political programs during transitions and to recognize the peacebuilding roles of peacekeepers.

Looking ahead, the resolutions also task PBC members with revisiting and revising their working methods. Member states will need to continue coming together to interpret the resolutions in a progressive way, ensuring that the PBC translates these rhetorical gains into its daily practice. The PBC has recently benefitted from strong chairs (Brazil in 2014 and Sweden in 2015), with Kenya taking the helm this year. These member states are outspoken on the need for greater coherence and a stronger preventive role for the PBC. Given Kenya's past co-chairmanship of the Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals, it is particularly well-placed to make concrete linkages between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the work of the PBC.

carrying out the Universal Periodic Review[93]— could also help improve coherence between the UN pillars. Special procedures mandate-holders (including special rapporteurs, special representatives, working groups, and independent experts with either thematic or country-specific mandates) and commissions of inquiry should also be better integrated into discussions in New York beyond the Third Committee and their recommendations better factored into the work of the PBC and the UN peace and security organs, especially in discussions relating to economic, social, and cultural rights.[94]

Transacting Business Differently

As member states have increasingly, out of necessity, started to transact business differently across silos on an ad hoc basis, the UN system itself will need to identify precedents of responding creatively to challenges not easily addressed by one part of the system alone. The UN system was not designed to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Nor was it designed to implement the secretary general's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, should member states endorse it during the June 2016 Global Counter-

91   General Assembly Resolution 60/180 (December 30, 2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180.

92   United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture*, p. 8.

93   The Universal Periodic Review was established when the Human Rights Council was created on March 15, 2006, by UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251. This mandated the council to "undertake a universal periodic review, based on objective and reliable information, of the fulfilment by each State of its human rights obligations and commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal treatment with respect to all States."

94   Quaker United Nations Office and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, "Report on Linking Human Rights, Peace and Security in Preparation for the High-Level Thematic Debate on International Peace and Security in May 2016," February 12, 2016.

Terrorism Strategy Review.

The UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) and the joint mission of the UN and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons have demonstrated that the UN system can work together across silos to deliver effective operational partnerships in the midst of emergencies. In these instances, the UN, although not adequately configured or equipped, was viewed as the only option for leading an international response. It managed to leverage funding and technical expertise across silos and from different parts of the system (see Box 9). According to one UN expert reflecting on these cases, "Urgency assures flexibility."

While UN reform is slow, parts of the system can be empowered to better manage crises in the interim. The UN Secretariat, together with member states, could therefore consider developing criteria for giving the secretary-general special authority to use assessed contributions and UN assets beyond peace operations in exceptional circumstances, as he did for the Ebola response.

Conclusion: The Way Forward

The three major reviews of UN peace operations, the UN peacebuilding architecture, and the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security present clear opportunities to recommit the organization as a whole to making itself "fit for purpose" and able to respond to challenges and crises more effectively. As the secretary-general put it, "The various reviews and initiatives recognize that we cannot continue to address problems in separate or unrelated silos; we need to find the linkages among the reviews and work together so that the recommendations add up together to more than the sum of their parts."[95] In response to this need, this report is designed to help "make sense of it all" by identifying and analyzing common themes, interlinkages, and synergies across these reviews. Where warranted, the report offers suggestions for the way forward on the basis of findings and conclusions from recent empirical research.

This report argues that the UN as a whole should

Box 9. Lessons from UNMEER

The UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), established in September 2014, is an example of how, in the context of a rapidly developing and complex crisis, the UN can provide a whole-of-system response. An overarching approach to the Ebola crisis was required, and the mission was mandated "to develop and implement a comprehensive system-wide response framework."[96] As the situation in West Africa changed, UNMEER went through three distinct phases. First, it focused on responding rapidly to the crisis and meeting immediate needs. It subsequently consolidated its response by coordinating and further decentralizing. Finally, as Ebola cases became more dispersed, it aimed at more technical refinements to its response. This sequenced approach exemplifies the UN's capacity to adapt as an emergency situation evolves and to deliver results when given the flexibility it needs.

The leadership structure of the mission also offers lessons for effective coordination and quick reaction. The secretary-general's executive management ensured quick action, strong direction, and oversight; according to the secretary-general's lessons learned report, mission leadership was empowered by "direct access and communication with the Secretary-General's office to escalate issues for immediate political or operational intervention."[97] Mission leadership accessed guidance from the World Health Organization (WHO) and other technical agencies. Its work was complemented by that of Ebola crisis managers in each of the affected countries who interfaced with governments and served as representatives to donors. UNMEER's flexibility, partnerships, and effective leadership (both executive and management) were key aspects of its response to unanticipated challenges that increased its impact, strategic action, and relevance.

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95 Ban Ki-moon, speech at IPI event, New York, October 23, 2015, available at www.ipinst.org/2015/10/the-future-of-global-governance-a-commitment-to-action#8 .

96 UN Secretary-General, *Lessons Learned Exercise on the Coordination Activities of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response*, UN Doc. A/70/737, March 4, 2016, para. 7.

97 Ibid., para. 20.

leverage synergies to capitalize on existing and new connectors and build on precedents in order to energize the organization to transact business differently and provide integrated responses to the world's interconnected problems. This will require the UN to organize and present its work differently and member states to change the way they engage with UN bodies and structures on issues of peace and security, development, and human rights, building on past best practices and leveraging emerging policy consensus. Integration will need to go beyond rhetoric; bold integration within and across relevant UN pillars and entities, where and when it adds value, will be needed. Better incentive structures, financial approaches, and instruments, as well as strong and visionary leadership are key to success.

The UN General Assembly's High-Level Thematic Debate on the UN, Peace and Security from May 10 to 11, 2016, together with two additional high-level debates on sustainable development and human rights, offer critical opportunities to harness the common narrative required to make change happen. Other upcoming events, such as the World Humanitarian Summit, can also contribute to solidifying the emerging message of sustaining peace across silos.

Past UN reform efforts teach us that change, however incremental, requires sustained engagement by a critical mass of member states. It also requires bold and catalytic leadership from the secretary-general and president of the General Assembly around a clear strategic vision linked to a limited number of very concrete proposals for the next secretary-general to carry forward during her first eighteen months in office. Finally, it requires member states or groups of member states to champion reform as they try to deliver on their commitments under these parallel but interlinked global agendas.[98]

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98 Francesco Mancini, "Managing Change at the United Nations: Lessons from Recent Initiatives," International Peace Institute, October 2015.

Appendix

Interlinkages among the Three Reviews

|	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operation (HIPPO) report	Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) report	Global Study on Resolution 1325
Sustaining peace and prevention	• The separation between peace-keeping, peacemaking, and peace-building is artificial. The timeline of a conflict cannot be split into neatly distinct phases, as conflicts are complex and cyclical in nature. • An inter-agency approach is needed for "inclusive and equitable deve-lopment activities as an essential contribution to conflict prevention." • Conflict analysis must not be limited to security threats but should take a more holistic, developmental approach (e.g., including dynamics and drivers of corruption in country analyses and addressing environmental threats). • Prevention and mediation need to be brought back to the fore of discussions on UN peace operations. • Member states have not sufficiently invested in addressing root causes of conflict, and the UN still lacks a "culture of prevention."	• Peacebuilding should be a principle that flows through all UN engage-ments—before, during, and after violent conflicts—rather than being marginalized. • Local, participatory assessment is crucial to informing peacebuilding program design and giving a more holistic approach to assessing risks in a conflict environment. • Joint conflict analysis should be gender-sensitive and map not only sources of violence but also peaceful actors (linking DPKO mission intelligence, civil affairs teams, local mediation programs, and peace-building planning). • "Building national leadership is an integral part of a reconciliation and nation-building agenda." • Greater emphasis must be put on prevention.	• Conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding need to be seen as part of a continuum, with transi-tions between them neither linear nor strictly sequential. • New evidence demonstrates the benefits of inclusive processes to the long-term sustainability of peace. • "Prevention of conflict must be the priority, not the use of force." • The participation of women at all levels is key to the operational effectiveness, success, and sustain-ability of peace processes and peacebuilding efforts. Women are key agents in shoring up the resilience of local communities against the spread of conflict. • The gap between humanitarian and development aid must be bridged with increased investment in "resilience, conflict resolution and peacebuilding that more firmly targets long-term development outcomes."

	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operation (HIPPO) report	Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) report	Global Study on Resolution 1325
Gender equality and women's participation	• The inclusion of women in higher ranks is essential to improve accountability and governance. • The Secretariat and missions must carry out gender-sensitive analysis, more women must be appointed to mission leadership positions, and a senior gender adviser must be located in the Office of the SRSG to make sure gender perspectives are integrated into mission activities. Structural factors that prevent women's recruitment and professional advancement must be reviewed.	• Efforts must be scaled up to surpass the secretary-general's 15 percent "gender marker" for financing to peacebuilding approaches that promote gender equality. • Women's political participation and leadership must be expanded "beyond the peace table" to recognize women as active participants in society. • Sexual and gender-based violence is not only a war strategy but a central tactic of terror used to displace refugees and internally displaced persons.	• Any reforms of peace operations and peacebuilding must include gender equality and women's leadership as central ingredients • Women's participation in leadership is crucial to ensure that initiatives are tailored to specific contexts, transformative, and sustainable in the long term. • An assistant secretary-general should be appointed at UN Women. • There should be a senior gender adviser in the office of every SRSG, with hybrid technical gender experts in thematic units. • "Across the board, 15% of all funding for peace and security [should] be earmarked for programmes impacting women." • Resolution 1325 is a human rights mandate.
Collaborative and strategic partnerships	• Partnerships with the AU should be improved, and support to AU peace support operations should be enabled when authorized by the Security Council—including through more predictable financing. • "Partnerships will be essential to future success in the face of long-running and new crises." A strong global and regional partnership for peace and security is needed to meet	• Partnerships within the UN (outside of the formal entities of the peacebuilding architecture) and with other stakeholders must be formed, as "the territory in between crisis response and long-term development remains, for the most part, unchartered." • The UN must recognize the importance of regional approaches to peacebuilding as this relates to	• Partnerships with bilateral, regional, and multilateral agencies can help successfully apply women, peace, and security resolutions at the national level through political and sometimes financial support.

	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operation (HIPPO) report	Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) report	Global Study on Resolution 1325
	future challenges of emerging crises. • "Partnerships with other actors, coordinated under strong and responsible national leadership, will be essential." • Reporting structures must be developed between the UN and regional organizations.	ownership and legitimacy. The UN and regional organizations should form intergovernmental partnerships.	
People-centered approaches	• There should be a shift toward a people-centered approach, including through engagement with local actors and those affected by conflict. This is essential for peace to be sustainable, as "those on the receiving end" need to lead the way to recovery and peace. This can also improve proper conflict monitoring and local ownership of protection mechanisms. • More specific mandates are needed so that inclusive approaches in UN programs and missions do not remain dependent on individuals appointed and their personal commitment to such issues.	• Inclusion is central to sustainable peace because of its link to long-term national ownership of peace processes: "Peace needs to emerge organically from within society, addressing the multiple concerns and aspirations of different sectors, and seeking common ground so that all feel invested in strategies, policies and mechanisms that offer the way forward." • Inclusive national ownership "implies participation by community groups, women's platforms and representatives, youth, labour organizations, political parties, the private sector and domestic civil society, including under-represented groups." • Context-specific mandates are needed. • Leadership must take the approach of encouraging a sense of common purpose between elites and the	• Dealing with "new wars/new threats" that disproportionately harm women requires inclusive approaches to sustainably resolve the challenges. • A people-centered approach should include the recognition of women's leadership. Women's participation is necessary to the success of peace programs and the durability of peace and political change. • Context-specific mandates are needed. • Member states, the UN, and civil society must create partnerships to be able to build infrastructures for peace. Working with affected women and girls when designing strategies is key to harness their local knowledge and community-level networks for information sharing.

	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operation (HIPPO) report	Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) report	Global Study on Resolution 1325
		broader society. • However, "much as peace cannot be imposed from the outside, peace cannot simply be imposed by domestic elites or authoritarian governments on populations that lack even minimal trust in their leadership."	
Integration and coherence	• To enhance strategic analysis of conflict dynamics on all levels, field actors must be empowered in relation to headquarters. A small analysis and planning cell in the office of the secretary-general could help with this.	• The UN system remains deeply fragmented. UN silos are a systemic challenge due to their enshrinement in the UN Charter. • Breaking silos means breaking out of a sequential or sectoral approach to peace and conflict. • Conversations in headquarters fail to consider operational, field-based mechanisms and lessons, running the risk of conflating peacebuilding with technical interventions. • The UN system should develop a common strategy for peacebuilding that integrates the strategic planning instruments of UN country teams.	• Greater integration, complementarity, and coherence on women, peace, and security is needed between peace missions, UN Women, and UN country teams. This could be done by developing common implementation frameworks. • More formal partnerships should be explored between key entities with technical gender expertise in conflict and post-conflict settings, including DPKO, DPA, and UN Women. • Joint conflict analysis should be gender-sensitive and address opportunities as well as risks. Rich local knowledge from UN Women's extensive work with women's peace networks in conflict countries is largely overlooked.

	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operation (HIPPO) report	Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) report	Global Study on Resolution 1325
Financing	• The financing of the Peacebuilding Fund, particularly of its fast-track procedures, must be scaled up. • Early-alert systems must be strengthened through more reliable financing in the regular budget, such as financing of mediation and electoral support through the peacekeeping account. • Missions and UN country teams need a better set of financing arrangements to help them deliver together and deliver more effectively. This should include scaled up support for the Peacebuilding Fund, better capital-ized pooled funds at the country level, and programming funding for mandated tasks in support of peace consolidation within mission budgets.	• Funding should be more predictable, specifically through use of assessed contributions for programmatic activities. Strategic partnerships and pooling funding between the UN, World Bank, and other bilateral and multilateral financial institutions could maximize impact and share risk. • The Peacebuilding Support Office can be reinforced by being sufficiently financed from the regular budget. • More detailed and accurate country-by-country estimates of the overall funding needs for sustaining peace over the longer term must be prepared.	• Predictable and sustainable funding is a prerequisite for the effective realization of the women, peace, and security agenda at both the national and the international levels. To guarantee this, comprehensive and realistic costing of national action plans must be carried out from the planning stage, and specific funding must be earmarked for their implementation. • Aid focused on gender equality is unpredictable. To be made more efficient, it could be made timelier, untied from other kinds of aid, aligned with national priorities, and made to target underfinanced sectors.
Accountability and governance	• Accountability in the selection of mission leadership must be strengthened, for instance by establishing an ad hoc advisory group composed of former senior field leaders. The inclusion of women in higher ranks is essential to improve accountability and governance. • Leadership capacities and authority should be increased.	• The secretary-general should ensure continuity in senior leadership and personnel through the different phases of engagement, from preven-tive action to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. • Leadership capacities and authority should be increased. • Intergovernmental cooperation is an essential step toward strength-	• Member states need to take on the responsibility for implementation if the agenda is to see more progress in the coming years. Currently, there are neither mechanisms for accountability nor budgets available for real implementation. • Perpetrators of grave crimes against women should be held accountable. Such justice must also be transfor-mative, so it addresses not only

	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operation (HIPPO) report	Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) report	Global Study on Resolution 1325
	- Transparency in local procurement must be improved by "updating and revising the existing rules and regulations to prioritize local capacities." - Accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse should be strengthened. - A victims-assistance program should be established to support victims and children born as a result of sexual exploitation and abuse.	ening the accountability of member states.	singular violations but the underlying inequalities that render women and girls vulnerable in times of conflict. Important tools include criminal justice proceedings, reparations, and truth and reconciliation processes.

The **INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE** (IPI) is an independent, international not-for-profit think tank dedicated to managing risk and building resilience to promote peace, security, and sustainable development. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy research, strategic analysis, publishing, and convening. With staff from more than twenty countries and a broad range of academic fields, IPI has offices facing United Nations headquarters in New York and offices in Vienna and Manama.

www.ipinst.org   **www.theglobalobservatory.org**

Future of Peace and Security: Interlinkages in a Complex World

WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM

Future of Peace and Security

Interlinkages in a Complex World

How do we renew our commitment to peace? Proceeding from international calamity to calamity, people are left increasingly pessimistic about the future of international security and the ability of states to respond. Surveying the current state of peace and security, the landscape looks bleak: wars rage across the Middle East, tensions simmer in Asia, parts of Africa sees an upsurge in political violence, and millions of people are fleeing their homes. The European integration project is in the midst of its largest crisis to date and the global governance system is under pressure. A wave of terrorist attacks across the world and the "weaponization" of economic policies and opening access to lethal technologies are globalizing and democratising the battlefield. The uncertainty that has become a feature of our time shows no sign of letting up.

Among the main dimensions characterising today's peace and security landscape, **seven drivers** in particular stand out:

Demographics

Urbanisation, people on the move and youth bulges are impacting international security and are the ultimate stress-test to existing governance models

Large-scale movements of people globally, especially from countries affected by conflict, is revealing profound vulnerabilities in our response and governance systems. The upgrading of the "built environment" with network technology (e.g. the Internet of Things) is importing a new range of vulnerabilities. Mass urbanisation and the concentration of productive industry in urban areas increases the importance of fostering and strengthening the role of cities as frontline responders to security threats.

Food and Nutrition Security

Future of Peace and Security

Infrastructure

Economic Growth and Social Inclusion

Environment and Natural Resource Security

Fourth Industrial Revolution

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Resources

Growing competition over access to resources in increasing tensions

Strategic competition between states increases the likelihood that geopolitical influence will be brought to bear on the market mechanisms that allocate resources. Meanwhile, technological innovation will change patterns of demand for resources, creating winners and losers among resource dependent economies.

Climate change is also likely to intensify conflict over some resources. Finally, extraction and delivery of resources is threatened by general instability or a reversal of globalization.

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Mining and Metals

Manufacturing

Geo-economics

Future of
Peace and Security

Fourth Industrial
Revolution

Chemistry, Advanced Materials
and Biotechnology

Trade and FDI

Governance

Poor governance, corruption and short-sighted leadership are limiting growth and destabilizing societies

Technological and social changes are moving at a pace that leaves established political and regulatory institutions unable to function effectively. Confidence in the international system is waning – while demands on preventive actions are increasing: the difficulty of achieving consensus and the lack of a common platform and narrative of what's at stake compounds the challenge of governing global public goods and managing globalization.

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Future of Government

Migration

Justice

Future of Peace and Security

Infrastructure

Risk and Resilience

Fourth Industrial Revolution

Social Cohesion

Feelings of social exclusion, mistrust and marginalization are threatening social stability

The erosion of people`s sense of common identity with the state, or re-direction of loyalty to other communities, carries the potential for major systemic disruption in the field of peace and security. The effects of growing inequality in industrialized and emerging economies will be felt across many issue areas, including security. The role of the city, as a "common ground" actor, will become more important.

Future of Government

Education

Entrepreneurship

Future of Peace and Security

Migration

Emerging Multinationals

Sustainable Development

WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM

Geopolitics

Competition among powers for political and economic influence is raising tensions

The general consensus of the immediate post-Cold War era is giving way to a form of international relations based on a competitive view of states' interests and divergent visions of the global hierarchy. As states contend using a mixture of diplomatic, financial, commercial and military means, the line between competition and conflict is increasingly blurred. Technological innovations are laying the foundation for new "arms races" that aggravate the risks to geopolitical stability.

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Arctic

Oil and Gas

Space

Future of Peace and Security

Aviation and Travel

Migration

Supply Chain and Transportation

Technology

Emerging technologies are creating security challenges, but also providing opportunities to solve them

The Fourth Industrial Revolution will change the scale and character of conflict. Technological innovations often have dual (military and civil) uses, causing proliferation problems and challenging the monopoly of states on the legitimate use of force. As technology extends humankind's reach into new regions like the seabed and space, the avoidance of conflicts depends on equally rapid advances in governance and normative structures.

Nuclear Security

Innovation

Chemistry, Advanced Materials and Biotechnology

Future of Peace and Security

Space

Values

Artificial Intelligence and Robotics

WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM

Hybrid Threats

Changing threat scenarios are arising from a more interconnected world

Hybrid modes of conflict seek to get around established laws and conventions of war by blurring the distinctions between military and civilian actors, and take advantage of deniable or proxy forces in order avoid the cost of open warfare and escalation. Rapid technological advances in the information domain are facilitating these changes in the conduct of warfare. For example, an aggressor exploits the lack of trust in established governance structures by manipulating social media in cyberspace. The result is to confuse and manipulate perceptions and narratives in ways that undermine the adversary, but also inflict long term damage on social cohesion and the ability to govern in the common interest.

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Future of the Internet

Illicit Economy

Social Media

Future of
Peace and Security

Information
Technology

Artificial Intelligence
and Robotics

Internet Governance

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COMMITTED TO
IMPROVING THE STATE
OF THE WORLD

The future of peace and security: Interlinkages in a complex world

In its 70th year, the UN General Assembly is organising a high level discussion on the future of international peace and security in a World of Risks. How do we renew our commitment to peace? Proceeding from international calamity to calamity, people are left increasingly pessimistic about the future of international security and the ability of states to respond. Concerned about developments, over the last year, the World Economic Forum brought together a wide range of public and private sector stakeholders engaged in responding to international risks, aiming to address present and future challenges to peace and security. This brief is based on the Forum's Risk Report and does not attempt to prescribe how the UN should respond to these threats. Instead, it provides three scenarios as food for thought, aiming to spur a discussion on how the future might look if current trends are allowed to continue unchecked.

Surveying the current state of peace and security, the landscape looks bleak: wars rage across the Middle East, tensions simmer in Asia, parts of Africa see an upsurge in political violence, and millions of people are fleeing their homes. The European integration project is in the midst of its largest crisis to date. A wave of terrorist attacks across the world and the "weaponization" of economic policies are globalizing the battlefield. The geopolitical uncertainty that has become a feature of our time shows no sign of letting up. Among the main dimensions characterising today`s peace and security landscape, three in particular stand out: The first is the return of geopolitical competition between strong states with divergent interests and visions of world order. The second is our failure to anticipate and manage emerging security risks that stem from new technologies. The third is a failure of adaptation in our institutions of governance, leading to a spectrum of problems from a breakdown in trust between rulers and ruled, state fragility and ultimately state failure.

The three phenomena are connected in ways that reinforce challenges for peace and security. When instability leads to the breakdown of the existing order, it creates opportunities for other forces to exploit. Non-state actors are increasingly empowered by easier access to technological innovations, or engaged as proxies in a hybrid war. In both cases the intersection of these trends makes it all the more difficult to craft effective responses, and so conflicts tend to fester and spread.

The potential for rapid and radical change raises fundamental questions about planning and preparedness and what can happen if we fail to get it right. To understand the forces behind the transformations, the World Economic Forum initiated a year-long consultation drawing on the expertise of over 280 leaders in six regions, to identify the key drivers, globally and regionally, shaping the changing international security landscape. These are not intended to be predictions, but plausible trajectories that can usefully challenge current thinking and serve as a call to a new commitment to peace.

The three scenarios may come across as somewhat dystopian, especially when combined, because they are extrapolations of existing, negative trends. The world does not need to arrive at these dystopias, however. Our collective knowledge, connectedness, technological advances and social innovations present endless opportunities to change the outcome and shape a more secure world, given strong leadership and the right decisions being taken at the international level. To create a new commitment to peace there is a need to cast new light on decisions that need to be taken today to help change the trajectory we are on and improve the outcome.

"Walled cities" Central state governance fails to meet the challenges of service provision, leading more and more people to switch to private sector providers, at least those who can still afford it. Clean water and even fresh air – previously treated as public goods - become preciously traded commodities. The retreat of government as the guarantor of basic services leaves society increasingly polarised between socio-economic elites and an impoverished class with little social mobility. Demographic mobility increases as large groups migrate in search of a living. Refugee camps expand and become permanent. However, their youth are increasingly drawn into gangs and virtual groups hostile to `the system`. A shrinking class of taxpayers demands protection and accepts a more authoritarian rule as the price of keeping order. Walls go up. This works in the districts they identify as socially and economically critical, i.e. major cities. Outside the metaphorical (or physical) walls, gangs seize territory and govern as un-recognized `states`. For actual states, domestic threats have become so intense that they have little capacity to engage in collective security action through international or regional organizations, which gradually wither away. Responsibility for governance and service provision of all kinds moves away from national governments towards the more successful city-states, which manage to connect to each other and thrive as an archipelago of islands in a sea of disorder.

"Strong regions" As relatively larger shares of wealth accumulate in the South and East, power shifts to regional hegemons that consolidate spheres of influence and replace sovereign states as the principle unit of global order. The system is held together by mutual respect among strong leaders, who emphasise the pursuit of narrowly defined national interests over global commons. Governments make increasingly effective use of surveillance and high-tech media systems to control the population with manufactured historical narratives and exaggerated projections of external threats, emphasising themes of ethnic or religious difference. New regional institutions are set up that fragment trade and the global commons. As these come to dominate international relations, the old UN and Bretton Woods institutions of global governance wither away. In parallel, efforts to control global warming are dropped in favour of unilateral measures to adapt to the changes. There are efficiency losses in the retreat from globalization, but elites mostly convince their people that this is an acceptable price to pay for stability. The private sector loses its independence as inter-regional trade is limited and they come increasingly under the informal control of the new regional governance institutions.

"War and Peace": Established powers remain in denial about the implications of power shifts and impact of technological change. Global trade falls and the major economies stagnate. The old key states of the world order turn inward and abandon collective action such as peacekeeping, rule-making and policing of the global commons, and policies to protect the environment. A growing sense of lawlessness encourages emerging powers test the status quo, sometimes with tacit or open encouragement from their major power allies. Finally, unable to resolve competing visions of world order and geo-political interest, a proxy war draws two of the great powers into major conventional conflict. The nuclear taboo is respected, but despite dragging in a number of third party allies both sides fail to gain an advantage, achieving only mutual exhaustion. As an uneasy peace emerges, people`s minds return to the question of what kinds of norms and structures are needed to govern international relations. Eager to restore global trade, private sector institutions take the lead, focusing on modest rules to govern peaceful use of the global commons. Leadership positions in these new bodies are taken not by civil servants but by double-hatting industry and civil society leaders. The urgency of restoring the world`s economic health makes trade and investment relations a priority, and the social or `values` agenda, such as promotion of universal human rights, takes a back seat. Indeed the notion of a universal set of values to which all peoples should aspire is abandoned as a paradigm of world order. A considerable amount of inequality emerges but is broadly accepted as the price of peace.

For more information please contact Anja Kaspersen, Head of International Security and Member of the Executive Board anja.kaspersen@weforum.org and Philip Shelter Jones, Practice Lead International Security Philip.Shetler-Jones@weforum.org

CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY
CURRENT TRENDS AS OBSERVED IN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND STATISTICS

Mr. Alexandre Marc, Chief Specialist, Fragility, Conflict and Violence World Bank Group

WORLD BANK GROUP
Fragility, Conflict & Violence

In the 21st century, conflicts have increased sharply since 2010

Global trends in armed conflict, 1946-2014

Source: Center for Systemic Peace 2014

Source: Uppsala Conflict Database and Global Terrorism Database

- In 2015 the number of ongoing conflicts increased to 50 compared to 41 in 2014 (Institute of Economics and Peace)

Battle deaths are now largely concentrated in Middle East

Figure 4: Bubble map of battle deaths, 2014

Source:Gates et. al. "Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2014." (PRIO Conflict Trends, January 2016).

World record in forced displacement since WWII

Displacement Figures 1950-2014

By end-2014, 59.5 million people were forcibly displaced
- 19.5 million refugees
- 38 million IDPs

Conflicts are increasingly affecting civilians

Source: Center for Systemic Peace 2014

Interpersonal violence and gang violence kill much more people than political violence

- Interpersonal violence exacts a high human cost

Half a million people are killed by interpersonal violence each year;

That's **1300** people a day

And **nine times** the number of lives lost in open warfare

Interpersonal violence and political violence tend to be increasingly interrelated, particularly where institutions are weak and social norms have become tolerant of violence.

Mexico (Organized Crime Related Killings)
Afghanistan (civilian, police and military deaths)

2007: 2826 / 2489
2008: 6837 / 3101
2009: 9614 / 3343
2010: 15273 / 4167
2011: 16800 / 4724
2012: 12903 (projection) / 6656

Sources: Justice in Mexico; UNAMA; The Brookings Institution

Source: Center for Systemic Peace 2014

Interpersonal violence seems to be declining but remains very high in some regions

Figure 4: Trends in estimated rates of homicide by country income status, 2000–2012, world

Homicide rate in Central America

Source: Global status report on violence prevention 2014

Source: UNODC Global Study on Homicide

Gender based violence remains very high, with negative consequences for both societies and economies

- 1 in 3 women in the world have experienced physical or sexual violence—mostly by an intimate partner (World Health Organization)

- 2 in 3 victims of intimate partner/family related homicide are women (United Nations Statistics Division, The World's Women 2015)

- It is estimated that close to 90% of current war casualties are civilians, the majority of whom are women and children, compared to a century ago when 90% of those who lost their lives were military personnel

- Contextual factors, such as humanitarian crises, including conflict and post-conflict situations, may increase women's vulnerability to violence (UN Women)

Violence and conflict do not affect all regions the same way

Battle deaths over 300 from 2010-2014
Source: UCDP data

Homicide rate over 11 (per 100,000 people)
Source: UNODC 2014

9

Conflicts and violence are persistent and often extremely costly

- Many countries and subnational areas now face cycles of repeated violence, weak governance, and instability. (WDR 2011)

- 90 percent of the last decade's civil wars occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the last 30 years. (WDR 2011)

- The aggregate economic and financial cost of conflict in 2014 was estimated to be $14.3 billion, or 13.4% of the global economy (Institute for Economics and Peace)

- More than half of all states affected by ongoing conflicts are also affected by protracted armed conflicts persisting for more than 10 years (Center for Systemic Peace)

Conflict In most cases crosses borders

WEST AFRICA REGION
CONFLICT SYSTEMS

Democratization and institutional transition can increase conflict

Global Trends in Governance, 1946-2014

Source: Center for Systemic Peace 2014

Polity and the Onset of Political Instability, 1955-2006

Source: Center for Systemic Peace 2014

Multiple dimensions of conflict and violence

How various drivers of conflict combined to create and sustain the conditions for civil war in Ivory Coast in the 2000s

Conflict and violence have multiple dimensions

Dimensions of major conflicts between 2000-2014

Source: FCV CCSA analysis

Legend:
- Subregional/Lagging region issues
- Land
- Violent ideology
- Electoral/Competition for central power
- Migration/population movement
- Trafficking in drugs/arms
- Resources/minerals/extractives
- Identity/Horizontal inequality
- Regional spillovers

- Dimensions of conflict charted across all 21st century conflicts resulting in more than 300 battle deaths per country.
- A multiplicity of different drivers can come together to create a major open conflict.

GDP per capita is not a strong correlate of conflict

Sources: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, World Bank WDI database, WB list of Fragile Situations FY16

The poor are increasingly concentrated in countries affected by violence

Source: DEC Policy Research Report, 2014

Share of global poor

— World Bank FCS (FY14)   — OECD Fragile States List

Prolonged conflict keeps countries poor

Poverty headcount (% of population living below $1.25 a day)

- Countries affected by major violence
- Countries affected by minor violence
- Countries with negligible or no violence

- a civil war costs a medium-sized developing country the equivalent of 30 years of GDP growth
- it takes 20 years for trade levels to return to pre-war levels

MESSAGE FROM CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC NEVER THIS AGAIN !!!

Policy Brief
Setting the Stage for the UNGA's High-Level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace and Security:
Reflections and Key Messages from Regional Meetings
by
Ashraf Swelam, Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Cedric De Coning & Karim Hafez[1]

On its 70th anniversary, the United Nations (UN) finds itself at a crossroads. Old and new threats, challenges and risks to international peace and security are increasingly testing the ability of the organization and the efficacy of the instruments available to it as it attempts to fulfil its primary promise: to *"save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".*

Against this backdrop, timely and potentially groundbreaking reviews of UN peacekeeping[2], peacebuilding[3], and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325[4] were carried out in 2015 to take stock of UN involvement in peace and security and to recommend reforms for the future of the global peace and security architecture. Although the reviews were initiated independently of each other, they produced notable synergies and shared recommendations on a host of vital reforms. If implemented, these recommendations would enhance the relevance, coherence and effectiveness of the UN, working in partnership with member states and regional organizations to prevent, manage and resolve conflict, as well as to build and sustain peace.

To draw conclusions from the larger picture in which the outcomes of the reviews connect, the President of the General Assembly (PGA), Mogens Lykketoft, has taken the initiative of organizing a "High-Level Thematic Debate (HLTD) of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on UN, Peace and Security". The debate aims, in the words of the PGA, to move beyond "vaguely defined need for change" to focus on practical and concrete steps to effect that change. Scheduled for 10-11 May 2016, the debate will provide a platform for member states to reflect on the recommendations of the reviews, with the aim of identifying synergies, bridging gaps, and easing potential tensions. The ultimate objective of this initiative is to identify priority areas and to present recommendations for systemic and realistic reforms at the UN that enjoy the support of the majority of its members.

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[1] Ashraf Swelam is the Director of the Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA). Cedric De Coning is a Senior Researcher at Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and Senior Advisor for the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). Adriana Abdenur is a Fellow at Instituto Igarapé in Rio de Janeiro. Karim Hafez is a researcher at CCCPA.

[2] United Nations, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace - Politics, Partnerships and People: Report of the High Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/446.

[3] United Nations, The Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/65/7.

[4] UN Women, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325.

Leading up to the HLTD, a series of regional and international expert meetings, consultations, workshops and retreats were organized in five continents[5], with the objective of informing the HLTD. While varying in formats, the events were closely coordinated with the office of the PGA, and addressed a jointly developed set of themes and questions. They brought together hundreds of officials from national governments, regional and international organizations, with experts, academics, and representatives of civil society and the private sector. Viewed together, the recommendations that they collectively produced build upon bottom-up perspectives on the UN's future involvement in peace and security.

This brief does not attempt to summarize the outcomes of those regional meetings[6]. Instead, it tries to distill and highlight a few key messages and recommendations that emerged during these regional meetings, informed in great part by the recommendations put forward by the UN reviews, but not limited to them. It also aims to identify recurrent recommendations put forward during the regional meetings for operationalizing the major points of the UN review, with a particular focus on institutional reform and financing. These key messages are:
1. The Primacy of Politics; Prevention, Resolving Conflict & Sustaining Peace.
2. Democracy at the UN: Security Council Reform & Revitalizing the General Assembly.
3. Cooperation and Partnerships.
4. People-Centered Approach: Enhancing National Ownership.
5. Women, Peace and Security.
6. Institutional Reform.
7. Sustainable and Predictable Financing.

The Primacy of Politics; Prevention, Resolving Conflict & Sustaining Peace

Without exception, all regional discussions reiterated the call of the UN reviews for a paradigm shift that emphasizes the "primacy of politics" in leading the wide spectrum of UN peace and security interventions, ranging from conflict prevention, management and resolution, to peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

In this regard, "sustaining peace" - another term introduced by the reviews - was highlighted over and again as an appropriate overarching framework to guide all UN interventions, with an emphasis on "prevention", rather than "reaction", and an equal emphasis on a "continuum" of interventions, rather than the current sequential approach. As defined by the recent UNSC and the UNGA's resolutions 2282 and 70/262[7], "sustaining peace" emphasizes the importance of prevention, especially by addressing the root causes of conflict. It also frees peacebuilding from its erroneous characterization as a "post-conflict" endeavor. In addition to setting the stage for post-conflict reconstruction and development, peacebuilding must be equally regarded as a means of preventing and resolving conflict, as well as catalyzing efforts for addressing its root causes. In addition, the "sustaining peace" approach was also viewed as a positive driver for integration that can overcome fragmentation and address the silos hindering coherence amongst the three pillars of UN work: peace and security, development, and human rights, as well as their respective governance structures.

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5 Africa, Asia, Europe, North and South America.
6 For a list of these events and their outcome documents, see www.un.org/pga/70/events/hltd-peace-and-security/views-from-the-field-and-civil-society.
[7] Passed on 27 April 2016.

The regional consultations emphasized the need for the UN and its member states to recommit to the peaceful settlement of disputes as per Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The use of force should be an option of last resort, and when employed it should be in the service of a political strategy that seeks a viable and sustainable political settlement.

Participants in the regional discussions were of the opinion that the current emphasis on managing, rather than resolving, conflicts has led to protracted crises, with damaging consequences for the countries and regions involved in the conflicts, as well as the credibility of the UN. In deploying tools available to it in the pursuit of political settlements, the UNSC and the Secretariat must shift from a mentality of "conflict management" to an emphasis on "conflict resolution."

Democracy at the UN: Security Council Reform & Revitalizing the General Assembly

All regional consultations, without exception, highlighted that the unrepresentative nature of the UNSC is a major obstacle to the reform of the UN peace and security architecture. Deep frustration has been echoed for the lack of political will to address the issue, including membership of the Council and the veto power. The Arab African and Latin meetings, in particular, highlighted the unsustainable lack of permanent Arab, African and Latin American representation on the UNSC.

Preparatory meetings reluctantly recognized that as reform of the Security Council, including expanding its membership, is unlikely to be achieved in the short- term, other steps need to be taken to compensate for this lack of participatory decision-making in the UNSC. In this context, the regional consultations yielded suggestions, such as enhancing cooperation between the UNSC and regional organizations, and consulting troop and police contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) in the decision-making process.

The issue of revitalizing the UN General Assembly as the main body of the Organization—one that gives legitimacy to the UN's actions and decisions - has been echoed in all regional consultations, without exception. Participants in the Arab, African and Latin American consultations all expressed acute frustration at the lack of the UN Security Council reform, and all highlighted the need to empower the UN General Assembly to be able to effectively act in the realm of peace and security.

The African, Arab, European and Latin American consultations affirmed that the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is best placed to steer the organization away from military responses towards a "culture of prevention," and they highlighted that the UNGA's role in reconciling the interests of the P5 is key for a more balanced and representative UN peace and security architecture.

Preparatory meetings also underlined the importance of reviving and implementing UNGA resolution 337 A (Uniting for Peace) and UNGA resolution A/691007 (Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly). If implemented, these resolutions would empower the UNGA to respond to conflict where the UNSC has failed to act.

Cooperation and Partnerships

All regional consultations highlighted the importance of strengthening UN and regional cooperation, as an integral part of reforming the global peace and security architecture. The discussions highlighted that, while the international peace and security field is crowded with state and non-state

actors, the UN is uniquely positioned to pursue and incentivize strategic partnerships that lead to timely, coherent and effective international response.

Partnerships with regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, most notably with the African Union (AU) and the League of Arab States (LAS), received considerable attention. The recommendation by the UN reviews for the UNSC to cooperate more closely with regional organizations in a new peacekeeping partnership was welcomed. The African and Arab, as well as the European and Latin American, consultations demonstrated considerable political willingness by these regions and their respective organizations to engage in meaningful partnerships with the UN. A common call that emerged, however, was for moving beyond capacity-building, information sharing and exchanges of views, towards a more strategic partnership between the UN and regional organizations.

Other important partnerships were highlighted during the regional consultations. On one hand, trilateral cooperation between the UNSC, the Secretariat and major troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) was underlined as one of the most important partnerships in peacekeeping. TCCs/PCCs must play an important role not only in mandate design, review and extension, but also in doctrinal and policy development. This is crucial for the effectiveness of the UN response. On the other hand, partnerships with international/regional financial institutions, the private sector and civil society organizations are all crucial elements for sustaining peace.

People-Centered Approach: Enhancing national ownership

National ownership must be seen as a benchmark for the work of the United Nations in peace and security. It requires inclusive engagement with a wide variety of local actors, not only governments. This inclusiveness would allow UN missions and country teams to better analyze each conflict and its root causes, to tap into local resources for peace, and to monitor and evaluate the impact of UN interventions. For national ownership to be meaningful, it should not be treated as a box-ticking exercise.

The Arab and African consultations underlined that elections tend to be seen by the UN and the international community as the main indicator of national ownership of peace processes. Instead of a narrow focus on elections, the consultations called for an approach that emphasizes participatory democracy throughout the governance cycle. The consultations also pointed out that in situations where societies lack the institutional capacity to manage local and national disputes, rushing into elections prematurely can sometimes be a "driver of conflict."

Women, Peace and Security

A common key message, reiterated across the regional discussions, was the importance of regarding women as a "driver of sustainable peace." Women's participation in peace processes and agreements result in a more durable peace. It is also a precondition for achieving national ownership, inclusivity and the people-centered approach, suggested by the UN reviews

The regional discussions cautioned, however, against reducing the women, peace and security agenda to appointing women to high-level positions in the UN Secretariat and missions or to insist on the participation of women for purposes of checking the box of representation. The discussions called instead for using the cross-cutting nature of the women, peace and security agenda in New York and in the field to integrate the organization's work and achieving synergies across the silos of the UN system. The Women, Peace and Security agenda must be mainstreamed into national institutions through

concrete and effective mechanisms like National Action Plans. The Latin American consultation in particular stressed the need for more action to end impunity with all sexual and gender-based crime.

Institutional Reform

To achieve all the above, one of the strongest messages voiced in all regional meetings was the call to transform the way the UN works so that it can escape from the silos in which it appears to be trapped.

On the strategic and policy level, this translated into a clear call for both UN member states and the Secretariat to build on the momentum created by their recent successes, most notably the adoption of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, to work together across silos in the face of mounting threats to peace and security. As mentioned previously, the concept of "sustaining peace" was repeatedly referred to as a potential new organizing principle.

On the operational level, an integrated response was highlighted as a must. All regional meetings identified the "fragmentation" of UN system, both at the headquarters and in the field, as the biggest risk to the organization's future relevance, coherence and effectiveness. It was also singled out as the most daunting and pressing task to be carried out by the new UN Secretary General (UNSG). The next UNSG must champion a set of concrete, ambitious, yet practical, reform proposals that would: a) garner the support of the majority of member states; and b) incentivize the various parts of the UN system to work together in more a coherent way.

Sustainable and Predictable Financing

Regional consultations addressed the issue of predictable and sustainable financing. Funding for the continuum of peace interventions must be predictable, including from the UN's assessed contributions and voluntary contributions.

Regional discussions also addressed financial arrangements as one of the major impediments to achieving UN system-wide integration and coherence. Structural disincentives and prohibitions on pooling of funding streams must be overcome. At the same time that financing streams must be increased, the UN must be more effective in identifying and promoting innovative approaches to peace and security, for instance by providing greater support to South-South and triangular cooperation and helping stakeholders better integrate these modalities into broader efforts to prevent conflict and promote peace.

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High-Level Thematic: "A World of Risks - A New Commitment for Peace"

Related events

United Nations Peace Operations 2020: The UN Reviews and Their Implications for Tomorrows' Missions

When: 8-9 May 2016

Where: The Roosevelt Hotel & United Nations, New York

Organizers: The International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations and the Permanent Mission of Sweden

Additional information:

THE CHALLENGES FORUM - 20 Years of Cooperation in Support of UN Peace Operations

United Nations Peace Operations 2020:
The United Nations Reviews and Their Implications for Tomorrow's Missions[1]

#CF20 - The Roosevelt Hotel and UN Delegates Dining Room, UN HQ, New York, 8-9 May, 2016

The Challenges Forum Event *United Nations Peace Operations 2020: The United Nations Reviews and Their Implications for Tomorrow's Missions* will mark 20 years of cooperation in support of United Nations (UN) peace operations. The meeting will be co-hosted by the Permanent Missions to the UN of Armenia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Sweden and the United States.[2] The event will be organized in conjunction with, but separate from, the General Assembly High-level Thematic Debate on *UN, Peace and Security* on 10-11 May.

Initiated in 1996, the aim of the Challenges Forum has remained steadfast. The purpose is to contribute to better analysis, planning, conduct and evaluation of multidimensional peace operations, and secondly, to strengthen and broaden the international network of actors involved in and supporting UN peace operations.

The Partnership has grown incrementally over the years and consists today of 22 countries and 47 Partner Organizations, including major Troop, Police, Civilian Personnel- and Financial Contributing Countries, and the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.[3] The Partner Organizations come from six continents, and represent governmental, practitioners' and academic perspectives from a broad spectra of countries of the Global South and North alike (see www.challengesforum.org).

Recognizing the challenges, but also drawing on the achievements made in recent years by UN peace operations, the focus of the 20th Anniversary Forum will be on highlighting progress and identifying areas of UN peace operations which need further consideration, attention and support. The meeting will be inspired by the findings of the recent high-level and expert reviews; *'Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnership and People'* by the High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO); *'The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations'* by the UN Secretary-General; *'Challenge of Sustaining Peace' by the* Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture; *'Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace – A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325'; 'Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for*

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[1] The Challenges Forum uses the term " peace operations" since 2000 to encompass missions included in the Brahimi Report definition: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as well as more robust interventions under UN Security Council mandates. Further, the Forum convenes discussions with regional organizations, having their own sets of terminology, thus "peace operations" is used as an umbrella concept to enable an inclusive mulitorganizational dialogue.

[2] Recent and coming Hosts of Challenges Forum events, the Chair of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping and the Forum Coordinator.

Sustainable Development', and 'Performance Peacekeeping' by the UN Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in Peacekeeping.

The forthcoming Challenges Forum's 20th Anniversary will seek to build on the results of the above reviews as well as the outcomes of the Challenges Forum's first deliberations on and assessments of them during 2015. A high-level Challenges Forum Seminar hosted in Washington D.C. in June 2015 addressed the implications of the HIPPO Report on strategic communications in support of UN peace operations. The Challenges Annual Forum 2015 held in October in Yerevan focused on the reviews and their implications for institution- and capacity-building for peace. The outcome and possibilities generated at the Leaders Peacekeeping Summit held during the previous week were also assessed. A number of background papers, occasional papers and policy briefs analysing the implications of the UN reviews on various aspects for future missions were developed by the Challenges Forum in 2015 and early 2016, which will also feed into the 20th Anniversary Forum.

In essence, bearing in mind the greater context and reforms related to peace and security, seeking to integrate a more preventative approach across issues and processes, exploring solutions that are more people- and field-centred in design, and emphasising the need for partnerships to be strengthened at all levels, the Challenges Forum will zoom in on what these and other key developments mean for the following questions: a) How can implementation of the reviews' recommendations be systematically followed up on by the broader international peace operations community – what could effective models for benchmarking possibly look like? b) What are the challenges and priorities for peace operations partnerships between the UN and Regional Organizations? c) What should be done to improve the safety and security of UN and associated personnel in UN peace operations? d) What is required to effectively implement Security Council resolution 1325 in and by peace operations – in particular through strategic gender mainstreaming and the empowerment of women in the field? e) What are the implications for UN peace operations doctrine and guidelines? And how can effective implementation of recently developed doctrine and guidance be achieved, including guidance pertaining to addressing sexual exploitation and abuse? f) What are the implications for required capabilities and capacity building for future missions - military, police & civilian? Related to this, the Forum will take stock of the current status of and coming requirements generated through the Leaders Peacekeeping Summits process on capabilities generation, in which some 50 countries last year pledged significant, new, and concrete support for UN peace operations. The next summit is coming up in London in September – what is required to move the capability and capacity-building effort forward?

In essence, the Challenges Forum's 20th Anniversary will consist of a series of high-level and interactive conversations focusing on the UN reviews' findings and what they mean for today's and tomorrow's peace operations in a selection of specific areas where the Challenges Forum Partnership has been particularly active and involved during recent years. Background papers for the Forum is currently being developed and will be circulated to participants prior to the meeting.

A short summary of the conversations will be made available during the General Assembly High-level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace and Security, which commences on the following day. A Challenges Forum Report highlighting key points of the Forum event will also be produced. All Member States involved in UN peacekeeping operations and key actors in the international peace operations community will be invited. Further, in the wake of the first UN Security Council resolution on 'Youth, Peace and Security', we are delighted that our new cooperation with the World Federation of UN Associations is already bearing fruit. A small number of young future leaders from the WFUNA Network with a specific interest in UN peace operations will participate in the 20th Anniversary.

An exhibition on *Telling the Story of UN Peace Operations* has been developed in collaboration with Färgfabriken and the UN Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support. The exhibition will have an early launch during the Reception on 9 May in the Delegates Dining Room before opening on the 10 May to be displayed outside the General Assembly Hall in the Visitors Lobby until 16 June, 2016.

<u>Sunday, 8 May</u>

08.00 – 09.00	Registration

09.00 – 10.30 Opening and Welcome

Chair:	H.E. Mr Mohammad Taisir Masadeh, Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriate Affairs of Jordan, Former Force Commander, UNMEE, Jordan
Key Notes:	H.E. Mr Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, UN General Micael Bydén, Chief of Defence, Sweden
Speakers:	H.E. Mr Dian Triansyah Djani, Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the UN
	Mr Anthony A. Bosah, Chargé d'affairs, Permanent Representation of Nigeria to the UN, Chair of the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations
	Mr Peter Iitchev, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russia Federation to the UN
	Ms Victoria Holt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, United States
	Ms Annika Hilding-Norberg, Director and Founder, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

10.30 – 11.00	Coffee and Group Photo

11.00 - 12.45 Conversation 1 on The Reviews' Findings, Effective Implementation and the Strengthening of UN Peace Operations – What Priorities and Models for Follow Up?

Facilitator:	Dr Sarah Cliffe, Director, Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, United Kingdom
Panel:	Dr William Durch, Senior Adviser, Challenges Forum, Distinguished Fellow, Stimson Center, Former Director, Brahimi Report, United States (background paper)
	Mr Anis Bajwa, Member, Peacebuilding Architecture Review, Pakistan
	Mr Alexander Ilitchev, Member, High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Russia
	Lt. Gen. Abhijit Guha, Member, High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, and Senior Member, United Service Institution of India, India
	Ms Mavic Cabrera-Balleza, International Coordinator, Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, Phillipines

13.00 – 14.45	**Working Luncheon – Conversation 2 on The Peacekeeping Summit and Coming Ministerial Meeting: Current Status, Follow Up and Requirements**
Facilitator:	H.E. Ms Victoria Holt, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, United States
Panel:	Representative, Department for Peacekeeping Operations or Field Support, UN (tbc)
	H.E. Mr Liu Jieye, Permanent Representative of China to the UN (tbc)
	Mr Andy Rachmianto, Director, International Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia
	Commissioner Ann-Marie Orler, Head, Division for International Affairs, Swedish Police
	H.E. Mr Matthew Rycroft, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the UN

15.00 – 16.45	**Conversation 3 on The Reviews and What are the Challenges and Priorities for Peace Operations Partnerships Between the UN and Regional Organizations?**
Facilitator:	Mr Amr Aljowaily, Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister for UN Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt
Panel:	Dr Cedric de Coning, Senior Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Senior Fellow, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, South Africa (background paper)
	H.E.Mr El-Ghassim Wane, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, UN
	H.E. Mr Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Director-General, Directorate for UN and International Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France
	Prof. Ugur Güngör, Center for Strategic Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey
	Dr Benyamin Poghosian, Deputy Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence Research University, Armenia

17.00-17.30	**Concluding Remarks**
Chair:	Mr Sven-Eric Söder, Director-General, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden
Speaker:	H.E. Mr Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, Permanent Representative of Armenia to the UN
	H.E. Mr Syed Akbaruddin, Permanent Representative of India to the UN (tbc)

Monday 9 May

09.00 – 10.45	**Conversation 4 on The Reviews and What Should be Done to Improve the Safety and Security of UN and Associated Personnel in UN Peace Operations?**
Facilitator:	H.E. Mr Motohide Yoshikawa, Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN
Panel:	Mr William R. Phillips, Former Chief of Staff, MINUSMA, now Integration Project, Department for Safety and Security, UN (background paper)
	Ms Fadzai Gwaradzimba, Assistant Secretary-General, Department for Safety and Security, UN
	Mr Greg Hinds, Police Commissioner, UNMIL
	H.E. Lt Gen (Retd) Javed Zia, Ambassador of Pakistan to Tripoli, Libya

10.45- 11.15	Coffee

11.15 – 13.00	**Conversation 5 on Effective Implementation of SCR 1325 in and by Peace Operations: Empowering Women in the Field – What Now?**
Facilitator:	H.E. Mr Michael Grant, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN, Chair of the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations Working Group, Canada
Panel:	Dr Louise Olsson, Senior Adviser, Gender and SCR 1325, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden (background paper)
	Ms Riana Paneras, Senior Researcher, Peace Operations and Peace Building Division, Institute for Security Studies, Former Police Commissioner, UNAMID, South Africa
	Ms Gwendolyn Myers, Founder and Executive Director, Messengers of Peace-Liberia Inc (MOP), Global Shaper, World Economic Forum, Liberia
	Mr Alan Ryan, Executive Director, Australian Civil-Military Centre, Australia

13.15 – 15.00	**Working Luncheon – Conversation 6 on The Reviews and Their Implications for UN Peace Operations Doctrine and Guidelines – and How can Effective Implementation of Developed Doctrine and Guidance be Achieved?**
Facilitator:	Ms Jane Holl Lute, Special Coordinator on improving the UN Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Former Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, and Chair of the UN Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation, UN (tbc)
Panel:	Mr David Haeri, Chief, Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training, Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, UN (tbc)
	Mr Stefan Feller, Police Adviser, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, UN
	H.E. Mr Mohammad Taisir Masadeh, Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriate Affairs of Jordan, Former Force Commander, UNMEE, Jordan
	Dr Kari M Osland, Head, Research Group on Peace and Coflict, Norweigan Institute of International Affairs, Norway

15.15 - 16.45	**Conversation 7 on The Reviews and What are the Implications for Capabilities and Capacity-building for Future Missions - Military, Police & Civilian?**
Facilitator:	Dr Almut Wieland-Karimi, Director, Center on International Peace Operations, Germany
Panel:	H.E. Mr Martin Garcia Moritán, Permanent Representative of Argentina to the UN (tbc)
	Dr Carl Ungerer, Head, Leadership, Crisis Management and Conflict Program, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland
	Mr Andrew Carpenter, Chief, Strategic Policy and Development Section, Police Division, UN (tbc)
	Maj. Gen. Li Tiantian, Director General, Peacekeeping Affairs Office, Ministry of National Defence, China (tbc)
	Ms Julie Sanda, Head, Department of Conflict, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Studies, National Defence College, Nigeria

16.45 – 17.30	**Concluding Remarks and Looking Ahead**
Chair:	H.E. Mr Michael Grant, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN, Chair of the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations Working Group, Canada
Speakers:	H.E. Mr Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, UN (tbc)
	Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Patron, Challenges Forum, President, International Crisis Group, France
	Mr Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General, Rule of Law and Security Institutions, UN
	Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director and Founder, Challenges Forum

18.30-20.30   **Reception on the Occasion of the Challenges Forum Event on *United Nations Peace Operations 2020: The United Nations Reviews and their Implications for Tomorrows Missions*, the forthcoming General Assembly High-Level Thematic Debate on *United Nations, Peace and Security* and Launch of the Exhibition on *Telling the Story of United Nations Peace Operations***

Venue: Delegates Dining Room, United Nations Headquarters

Host: H.E. Mr Olof Skoog, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the UN

Remarks: H.E. Ms Margot Wallström, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sweden

     H.E. Mr Mogens Lykketoft, President of the General Assembly of the UN

     H.E. Mr Jan Eliasson, Deputy Secretary-General of the UN

     H.E. Baroness Anleay of St Johns DBE, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Prime Ministers' Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict, United Kingdom

     H.E. Ms Samantha Power, Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN

9 May – 16 June **Exhibition on Telling the Story of United Nations Peace Operations**
An exhibition on *Telling the Story of UN Peace Operations* has been developed by the Challenges Forum in collaboration with the UN Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support and the art foundation Färgfabriken. The exhibition will have an early launch during the Reception on 9 May in the Delegates Dining Room before opening on the 10 May outside the General Assembly Hall in the Visitors Lobby. The exhibition is part of a work strand on *Strategic Communication for the New Era of Peace Operations*[4] pursued in cooperation with the UN Departments for Peacekeeping and Field Support and is based on issues addressed by the Challenges Forum Partnership over the years and as high-lighted in the recent UN Reviews and the General Assembly High-level Thematic Debate on *United Nations, Peace and Security*.

Challenges Forum Background Papers for 8-9 May Event:
- 'Implementing 'Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: An Approach to benchmarking HIPPO recommendations in five key areas', Dr William Durch.
- 'Challenges and Priorities for Peace Operations Partnerships between the UN and Regional Organizations- the African Union example', Dr Cedric de Coning.
- 'Leading the Way to a More Equal Peace: Senior Management and Gender Mainstreaming', Dr Louise Olsson.
- 'The UN Reviews and What Should be Done to Improve the Safety and Security of UN and Associated Personnel in UN Peace Operations?', Mr William Philips.

Recent Challenges Forum Publications Analyzing the Implications of the UN Reviews on Future Missions.
- 'Institution-building as a Bridge Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Connecting the Security and Peace Nexus', Ms Leanne Smith, Challenges Forum Policy Brief 2016:1.
- 'Strategic Communication: A Political and Operational Requisite for Successful Peace Operations', Maj. Gen. Robert Gordon and Mr Peter Loge, Challenges Forum Occasional Paper 7: 2015.
- 'Capacity to Protect Civilians: Rhetoric or Reality?', Ms Hilde F Johnson, Challenges Forum Policy Brief 2015:4.

- 'Implementing the HIPPO Report: Sustaining Peace as a New Imperative', Mr Alexander Ilitchev, Challenges Forum Policy Brief 2015:5.
- 'Institution- and Capacity-building for Peace: Implications of the UN Reviews on Future Missions', Challenges Annual Forum 2015 Report, (Stockholm 2016), based on the Annual Forum 2015 hosted by Armenia: the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5-6 October, 2015. The report contains analysis of the Reviews and 23 recommendations.
- 'Call for Change and Early Actions to "Save Succeeding Generations From the Scourge of War"', Dr Gagik Hovhannisyan and Dr Jibecke Joensson, Challenges Forum Background Paper, Challenges Annual Forum 2015.
- 'Strategic Communications for the New Era of UN Peace Operations', Challenges Forum Policy Brief 2015:1 based on a workshop hosted by the United States Institute for Peace and the Folke Bernadotte Academy in cooperation with the US Department of State, US Department of Defence, the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations, and the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, in Washington D.C. on 23 June 2015.
- 'Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations', Challenges Forum Concluding Report presented to the UN Secretary-General on 26 January 2015. The Report presented the results of four work strands on 'Peace Operations under New Conditions' co-chaired by ZIF, Germany, and USI, India; 'Policies, Principles and Guidelines' co-chaired by NDU, Pakistan and US Army PKSOI, United States; 'Authority, Command and Control' co-chaired by the Ministry of Defence, France and National Defence College, Nigeria; 'Impact Assessment and Evaluation' co-chaired by the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria and the Pearson Centre, Canada.

Institution- and Capacity-building for Peace: Implications of the UN's Review Panels' Recommendations for Future Missions

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CHALLENGES FORUM PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS

Argentina: Ministry of Defence in cooperation with Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz

Armenia: The Institute for National Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defence

Australia: Australian Civil-Military Centre

Canada: Global Affairs Canada

China: China Institute for International Strategic Studies in cooperation with the Ministry of National Defence

Egypt: Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa

France: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence

Germany: Center for International Peace Operations in cooperation with the German Federal Foreign Office

India: United Services Institution of India

Indonesia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Jordan: Institute of Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Jordan Public Security Directorate and Peacekeeping Operations Training Centre

Nigeria: National Defence College in cooperation with the Nigerian Army, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Pakistan: National Defence University in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence

Russian Federation: Center for Euro-Atlantic Security of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in cooperation with the Center for Political and International Studies

South Africa: Institute for Security Studies

Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy, Armed Forces, National Police and National Prison and Probation Service

Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Security Policy in cooperation with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports

Turkey: Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the Armed Forces and National Police

United Kingdom: Foreign and Commonwealth Office in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development

United States: Department of State, Department of Defense, United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and United States Institute of Peace

International Secretariat: Folke Bernadotte Academy

Institution- and Capacity-building for Peace: Implications of the UN's Review Panels' Recommendations for Future Missions

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Preface

The Challenges Annual Forum 2015 took place during a particularly challenging time for the international community, with wide-spread brutal and often fatal violence taking place in a number of conflicts and countries around the world. Terrible hardships have been threatening the lives and livelihoods of millions of people throughout the year, resulting in the United Nations (UN) Refugee Agency reporting on record levels of worldwide displacement as war and persecution increase. No country or person in the world stands unaffected by these developments.

But the Challenges Annual Forum 2015 also took place during a historic time for UN peace operations. Only a few days earlier, an unprecedented number of pledges for UN peacekeeping, which exceeded all expectations, had been made at UN headquarters in New York during a Leaders' Peacekeeping Summit convened by the United States in cooperation with the UN Secretary-General and a number of UN Member States. In addition, the opening of the UN General Assembly had just concluded, which included a high-level two day debate on the Maintenance of Peace and Security as part of the commemoration of the seventieth anniversary of the United Nations. Furthermore, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping was preparing for its 2016 annual session.

2015 saw the conclusion of a number of milestone reviews on key elements of UN peace operations. First, the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) released its major Review in early June with over 125 recommendations. Shortly thereafter, the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture of the Advisory Group of Experts was published, also this Report containing a large number of recommendations. Third, in the wake of the UN General Assembly the UN Secretary-General issued his Report on the implementation of a selection of HIPPO recommendations, outlining the future of UN peace operations primarily during his remaining time in office. Fourth, the all-important Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 was finalised by a High-Level Advisory Group in close collaboration with UN Women; offering important new evidence, ideas and good practices on the power of engaging and empowering women in peace and security. Fifth,

the General Assembly formally adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development along with a set of new Global Goals, of which number 16 confirms the interconnectedness of peace, security and development. Together, these critical summits, meetings, reviews, reports and studies have created a momentum for UN peace operations where there is a real possibility of a major influx of new capacities and capabilities, at the same time as there is an opportunity to make great use of insightful analysis and solid recommendations.

Against this background, the Challenges Annual Forum 2015 sought to make a start in the important work that follows in terms of implementation and devising optimal ways for shaping and reforming UN peace operations for the future. And what better place to start these discussions than in Armenia, a country that recently increased its support to UN peacekeeping significantly by deploying troops to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon in 2014, as well as to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali in 2015, and made important pledges at the 2015 Leaders' Peacekeeping Summit. Armenia is also investing increasingly in theoretical and methodological developments aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of UN peace operations through its Institute for National Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia,[1] which generously hosted the Challenges Annual Forum 2015 in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia.

The Challenges Annual Forum focused on a central issue to modern peace operations that is relevant across all the reviews listed above, namely institution- and capacity-building for peace. Whilst institution- and capacity-building have been included in certain peacekeeping operation mandates since the 1990s, they have recently become not only standard, but a core part of multidimensional peace operations. At the same time, the complex operating and security environments that these missions are deployed into make it increasingly challenging for the UN to engage in capacity- and institution-building activities on the ground. This raises some serious questions for UN peacekeeping that the Challenges Forum participants tried to identify and begin to answer in Yerevan, with a particular focus on: the changing and increasing demands on UN Police and Security Sector Reform, the need for better coordinated approaches, planning and leadership, and the key role of strategic communications, as well as of ensuring ownership, inclusivity and participation.

To support the discussions, four background papers had been commissioned

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[1] www.mil.am/en/institutions/60 (accessed 15 March 2016).

for the Annual Forum to trigger a dynamic and results-oriented dialogue, two of which were written by members of the HIPPO - Hilde F. Johnson and Alexander Ilitchev on the 'Capacity to Protect Civilians' and 'Sustaining Peace as a New Imperative' respectively. Leanne Smith, Chief of the UN Policy and Best Practices Section of the UN Departments of Peacekeeping and Field Support, authored a paper on 'Institution- and Capacity-building as a Bridge Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding'. Dr. Gagik Hovhannisyan, Counsellor at the Ministry of Affairs of Armenia, and Dr. Jibecke Joensson with the Challenges Forum Secretariat wrote a paper on 'Early Actions to Save Succeeding Generations from the Scourge of War'.[2]

The aim of the 2015 Forum reflects the steadfast purpose of the Challenges Forum during its 19 years of Partnership namely to improve the analysis, planning, conduct and evaluation of multidimensional peace operations. Equally important is the Partnership's dedication to strengthening and broadening the international network of actors involved in supporting UN peace operations. As such, partners represent a global network of 47 peace operations departments and organizations from 22 countries. The Forum constitute a strategic and dynamic platform for constructive dialogue among leading policymakers, practitioners, academics and increasingly also non-governmental organizations on key issues and developments in peace operations.

This Report presents the findings of the Challenges Annual Forum 2015. It provides a comprehensive overview of the outcomes of the recent reviews relevant to institution- and capacity-building for peace, and indicates which areas urgently require more attention as well as presents some ideas with regards to the actions that could be taken to those ends. A table of targeted recommendations is included in the beginning of the Report, reflecting not a general consensus but ideas and suggestions that were voiced and discussed by Forum participants throughout the two-days of deliberations and discussions in Yerevan, in both plenary and break-out sessions dedicated to specific case-studies including South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Liberia.

What became clear during the Annual Forum was that despite all the current serious and complex challenges that UN peace operations are facing, peacekeeping has arguable never been more important, nor has it benefited from more support from the UN Member States. There is no doubt that peace operations are currently experiencing a certain momentum that has the potential to go beyond generating unprecedented pledges for peacekeeping,

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[2] The background papers are available on the Challenges Forum website: www.challengesforum.org (accessed 17 March 2016).

and extend to important reforms that can help adapt practice to future threats and thereby enhance the effectiveness of missions on the ground.

The fact that during these difficult, complex and somewhat confusing times for international peace and security, peace operations are increasing in both numbers and scope, sends a clear message about the UN and its operations still being the best available tool to address violent threats and keep, as well as make, and build peace. It should also reassure us about the international community's continued commitment to multilateralism and to not only saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war, but also to provide them with peace.

We would like to express our appreciation to all involved in making the Challenges Annual Forum 2015 possible and most productive. First, we would like to thank the Armenian Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs for supporting and co-hosting the 2015 Annual Forum with the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia. Second, we would like to thank all the chairs, speakers and participants for their invaluable contributions to the deliberations. Third, we appreciate the contributions by the authors of the background papers for helping to frame our discussions and outline a number of questions for reflection in preparation for the Forum. Finally, but not least, we would like to recognize in particular our colleagues Dr Benyamin Poghosyan, Deputy Head of Research at the INSS, Mr Levon Ayvazyan, Head of the Armenian Ministry of Defence Policy Department, HE Ambassador Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, Permanent Representative of Armenia to the UN, Dr Jibecke Joensson, Acting Head of Peace Operations Policy and Best Practices at the Challenges Forum Secretariat, and Lisa Sharland, Analyst with the Australian Strategic Policy Centre, and an Adviser with the Challenges Forum, who all played central roles in making the 2015 Annual Forum a true success. We believe that the reflections and recommendations presented in the Report may provide important insights and inputs to the historical ongoing work of reviewing and reforming UN peace operations for future threats. And we look very much forward to reflecting on the progress that has been made on these and other recommendations in 2016.

Maj. Gen. Dr Hayk S. Kotanjian   Annika Hilding Norberg
Head   Director and Founder
Institute for National Strategic Studies   Challenges Forum
Ministry of Defence of Armenia   Folke Bernadotte Academy

Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BINUCA	UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
CAR	Central African Republic
CLA	Community Liaison Assistant
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
C-34	United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EOSG	Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General
FPU	Formed Police Unit
HIPPO	High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MINUSCA	United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUSCO	United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
ONUCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PCC	Police Contributing Country
POC	Protection of Civilians
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SPM	Special Political Mission
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan

UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNSC	United Nations Security Council resolution

Executive Summary

The Challenges Annual Forum 2015 was hosted on 5-6 October in Yerevan by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Armenian Ministry of Defence, in cooperation with the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. More than 100 participants from Challenges Forum Partner Organizations, the United Nations (UN) and civil society took part in the dialogue over two days. Opened by the Armenian Ministers of Defence and of Foreign Affairs, it was the first Challenges Annual Forum hosted by the Armenian Partners. The theme was 'Institution- and Capacity-building for Peace: Implications of the UN Review Panels' Recommendations for Future Missions'.

The Annual Forum took place at a historical juncture in efforts to improve, strengthen and reform UN peace operations through a series of reviews. These included reports from the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), the Advisory Group on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture and the Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325. Each of these Reports provided substantive recommendations to improve the approach of peace operations and the UN system more broadly in undertaking institution- and capacity-building activities. Furthermore, the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals in September 2015 signalled the important relationship between peace, security and development.

Moreover, the Forum discussions were timely, taking place immediately following the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping in September 2015, where more than 50 countries and regional organizations pledged personnel, equipment and enablers to support current and future peace operations. These developments have the potential to greatly improve different dimensions of UN peacekeeping, provided Member States follow through on their commitments.

In order to address the recommendations and findings emerging from these major review and reform processes, the Challenges Annual Forum focused on trends, challenges and opportunities emerging from the three above mentioned Reports, with a focus on commonalities and differences. Each

of the review Reports identified findings and recommendations that are of relevance to institution- and capacity-building, whether in the context of supporting mandated tasks, deploying personnel and capabilities, or planning for exits and transitions. Drawing on the priorities set out in the HIPPO Report, the importance of politics, people and partnerships was a consistent theme throughout the Annual Forum discussions.

Recognising the important role that peacekeepers can play as early peacebuilders, the discussions also focused on the role that institution-building could take in bridging the gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding by connecting the security and peace nexus. Discussions were informed by case-studies of peace operations in three different phases: start-up working with a transitional government (Central African Republic); crisis and reconfiguration (South Sudan); and transition and draw-down (Liberia).

While the Reports present a significant opportunity for reform, discussions analysed some of the challenges and impediments to institution-building as well. These included a lack of financial support (important to programmatic funding and activities such as Security Sector Reform), limited or unavailable resources (including military enablers and capabilities, gender advisers and civil affairs support at UN headquarters), and a lack of coordination and coherence (both with international stakeholders, and local authorities and partners). In this context, the reviews offered useful recommendations to address some of these challenges.

The findings and conclusions of the Challenges Forum 2015 provide some insights into the views and perspectives of peacekeeping stakeholders on the changes that are emerging in UN peace operations. This is particularly opportune as the UN prepares to engage in a series of intergovernmental processes to consider the recommendations and identify priorities for implementation, including through the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34), the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Plenary of the General Assembly. Many of the issues under discussion during the Challenges Forum 2015 may be of interest to these discussions.

The Challenges Annual Forum 20 year Anniversary in 2016 will provide a further opportunity to continue the discussion and identify priorities ahead of the UN General Assembly High-Level Thematic Debate on 'UN, Peace and Security' to be held on 10-11 May 2016.

Summary of Recommendations

Discussions during the Challenges Annual Forum 2015 identified several recommendations to improve institution- and capacity-building in UN peace operations. These are intended to build on the recommendations emerging from the review panels and their Reports on UN peace operations and identify specific areas of practical and targeted reforms, which may support those broader implementation processes. For each of the recommendations, a range of different stakeholders that may be in a position to action or initiate the suggested work have also been identified. However, given the focus of the discussions on institution- and capacity-building, in many instances, a greater range of stakeholders—including host authorities, civil society and field personnel—will need to be actively engaged and involved in efforts in order to take forward these recommendations.

The recommendations attempt to address gaps in policy, planning, training and coordination, and may be of interest to Member States ahead of inter-governmental discussions on the next steps throughout 2016.

Session 1: Implement Reforms to Improve UN Peace Operations

NO	RECOMMENDATION	FOR POSSIBLE ACTION[3]
1	Engage troop and police contributing countries from the planning and formulation phase of mission mandating in order to ensure they are clear on the mission expectations and objectives.	**UNSC | Member States**
2	Develop guidance to support the UN Security Council with sequenced mandating for UN peace operations, drawing on lessons learned and best practices from field missions.	**EOSG | DPKO/DFS | DPA**
3	Foster a sound narrative and engaging story of the objectives, challenges and achievements of UN peace operations to share with international stakeholders to enhance ongoing, as well as generate new commitments and support.	**DPKO/DFS | DPA | Challenges Forum Partnership | Member States**

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[3] UN Security Council (UNSC), Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG), Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS), Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), Police Contributing Countries (PCCs), UN Security Council (UNSC).

NO	RECOMMENDATION	FOR POSSIBLE ACTION
4	Drawing on lessons learned from field missions and troop and police contributing countries, review the rules and systems in place to manage military assets in peace operations in order to identify whether there are circumstances where they should be under military command instead of civilian management.	**DPKO/DFS**
5	Identify lessons learned on capacity-building initiatives from the work of gender advisers in UN peace operations, including efforts to support the development of national action plans to implement UNSCR 1325.	**UN Women | DPKO/DFS | DPA | Think Tanks | Challenges Forum Partnership**
6	Through further analysis and discussion among stakeholders, explore the value of including the protection of civilians as a principal of peacekeeping.	**Challenges Forum Partnership | TCCs & PCCs | UNSC | DPKO/DFS**
7	Identify recommendations from the HIPPO Report that have not been included in the SG's Report in order to prioritise issues that should be contemplated for further Member State consideration and support over the next 12-18 months.	**Think Tanks | Challenges Forum Partnership | DPKO/DFS**
8	In addition to identifying troop and police commitments to UN peace operations, the UN with the active support of Member States should seek to identify other areas of support to sustaining peace (eg diplomatic engagement, support to regional organizations).	**UN Security Council | Member States | DPKO/DFS | DPA**
9	Undertake a mapping exercise on the pledges and commitments made by countries at the Peacekeeping Leaders' summits in 2014 and 2015, in order to identify commitments that have been fulfilled and to develop a clear picture on demand versus supply against present gap lists.	**DPKO/DFS | Challenges Forum Partnership | Think Tanks**
10	Utilise the UN Police Chiefs conference in 2016 and the outcome of the independent review of the UN Police Division to enhance the understanding of, and the awareness about, the different roles and functions of UNPOL in peace operations, in order to generate a diverse range of commitments, training programs and financial support among Member States.	**DPKO | Group of Friends of UN Police | Member States | Challenges Forum Partnership**

Session 2:   Improve Support to the UN Peacebuilding Architecture

NO	RECOMMENDATION	FOR POSSIBLE ACTION
11	Analyse how UN regional offices can support and contribute to the work of UN peace operations, particularly in relation to transnational threats.	**DPKO/DFS	DPA	Think Tanks**
12	Engage with Member States and regional organizations (such as the African Union) on the operationalisation of the strategic policing framework in order to share lessons learned and support the development of regional and other policing initiatives.	**DPKO	UNDP	Challenges Forum Partnership**
13	Identify lessons learned on capacity-building and peacebuilding from the deployment of special political missions, including an examination of broader lessons learned on the role of police components in peace operations.	**DPA	DPKO/DFS	Challenges Forum Partnership	Think Tanks**

Session 3:   Undertake Effective Institution-building

NO	RECOMMENDATION	FOR POSSIBLE ACTION
14	Analyse lessons on Police and Security Sector Reform SSR to identify comparative advantages that different actors involved in UN peace operations provide, as well as mechanisms to improve coordination and sustainability of Police and SSReform programs throughout the life-cycle of a mission. This should include a review of the standing police capacity so as to enhance rapid deployment.	**DPKO	DPA	UNDP	Challenges Forum Partnership**
15	Engage Member States, regional organizations and host countries in dialogue on lessons learned from SSR support and capacity-building programs (including police sector reform), in order to identify gaps in coordination, assessment and planning, mandating, as well as financial support.	**Challenges Forum Partnership	DPKO/DFS**
16	Develop guidance and request streamlined reporting to ensure missions routinely involve local actors in institution-building efforts without necessarily increasing missions' reporting burden. (See also recommendation 22)	**DPKO/DFS	DPA**

NO	RECOMMENDATION	FOR POSSIBLE ACTION
17	Include (rather than just consult) local actors in assessment and planning teams, and involve them in monitoring and evaluation.	DPKO/DFS | DPA
18	Consider establishing advisory boards to foster feedback and input from religious, academic, traditional and civil-society leaders.	DPKO/DFS | DPA | Mission leadership (SRSGs)

Session 4: Opportunities and Challenges to Connect the Security and Peace Nexus

NO	RECOMMENDATION	FOR POSSIBLE ACTION
19	Increase the resourcing and support available to the Civil Affairs Unit in UN headquarters in New York.	Member States
20	Drawing on lessons learned from political engagement by the UNSC, Member States and regional organizations, develop guidance around compacts focusing on the need to find political solutions and ensure there is greater trust between the host government and the peace operation in terms of meeting the Security Council objectives.	DPKO/DFS | DPA | Challenges Forum Partnership
21	Direct missions to create comprehensive strategic communications plans to engage with local populations, host authorities and the international community.	UNSC | DPKO/DFS
22	Rationalise reporting lines for peace operations through an integrated reporting framework and ensure there is focus on tracking qualitative progress (ie impact) over quantitative exercises (ie activities).	DPKO/DFS | DPA
23	Promote and operationalise the existing integrative assessment tool in the field so as to improve the benchmarking of progress and ensure more results-based transition plans.	DPKO/DFS | DPA | Member States

1. Introduction

Opening Remarks and Welcome: Major General Dr Hayk S. Kotanjian, Head, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, Armenia, Member of the CSTO Academic-Expert Council; Dr Seyran Ohanyan, Minister of Defence, Armenia; Dr Edward Nalbandian, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Armenia; Mr Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations; H.E.Mr Petko Draganov, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia; Professor Alexander Nikitin, Director, Centre for Euro-Atlantic Security, MGIMO-University, Russia, Chief Researcher, Institute for World Economy and International Relations, Member of the CSTO Academic-Expert Council; Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director and Founder, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

The Challenges Annual Forum 2015 was hosted on 5-6 October in Yerevan by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Armenian Ministry of Defence, in cooperation with the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. More than 100 participants from Challenges Forum Partner Organizations took part in the dialogue over two days, including policymakers, practitioners and various experts from the United Nations (UN), Member States, academia and civil society. The theme for the Annual Forum was 'Institution- and Capacity-building for Peace: Implications of the UN Review Panels' Recommendations for Future Missions'. Background papers (available online)[4], presentations and discussions examined the findings of several international reviews of issues related to UN peace operations, including:

- 'Uniting our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnership and People: Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations' (HIPPO)[5], as well as the UN Secretary-General's response to that Report 'The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations'[6];

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[4] The background papers prepared for the forum are available online via the Challenges Forum website: www.challengesforum.org (accessed 16 December 2015).
[5] United Nations, Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, A/70/95-S/2015/446, 17 June 2015 (hereafter 'HIPPO Report').
[6] United Nations, The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/357-S/2015/682, 2 September 2015.

- 'Challenges of Sustaining Peace', Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture[7];

- 'Global Study on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325'[8]; and

- 'Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Peace'.[9]

The discussions provided a timely opportunity to discuss points of convergence and difference among each of these reviews. All of them had a common purpose of analysing developments that had taken place within the last 10 or 15 years, in order to identify key challenges and opportunities for reform. Furthermore, each of the reviews identified findings and recommendations that were of relevance to UN peace operations, whether in the context of supporting mandated tasks (that support early peacebuilding), deploying personnel and capabilities (such as gender advisers, women protection advisers and police, justice or corrections officers), or planning for exits and transitions (that require coordination with the UN Country Team, donors and other stakeholders).

While each review had separate aims and objectives, participants agreed that there needs to be a comprehensive approach to address their findings and recommendations. This requires new thinking and different approaches in order to overcome institutional silos—an aspect that is particularly important if the United Nations, regional organizations and international stakeholders are going to improve the effectiveness of UN peace operations when it comes to institution- and capacity-building. As one panellist noted, understanding the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is an essential part of those efforts.

The reviews provide strategic and reflective analysis for the international community at a critical juncture for UN peace operations, with one panellist noting that the reviews present a 'historical opportunity'. The international system has struggled to maintain its effectiveness and uphold peace and security during a period of staggering growth in the number of deployed peacekeepers in the last decade. More than 125,000 personnel

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[7] United Nations, Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, A/69/968-S/2015/490, 30 June 2015 (hereafter 'Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture').

[8] Referred to hereafter as 'Global Study on UNSCR 1325'.

[9] For the outcome document adopted by the UN General Assembly, see United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 70/1 (2015), A/RES/70/1 (2015), 21 October 2015.

are deployed to 16 UN peacekeeping missions, with a budget of just over USD 9 billion. Of those personnel, more than 95 per cent are deployed into contexts that have a protection of civilians (POC) mandate. The number of armed conflicts has tripled since 2008, with more than 60 million civilians displaced as a consequence of ongoing conflicts. This continues to place an unprecedented amount of pressure on the UN system, both for UN peacekeepers (which are required to protect an increasing number of displaced civilians in their areas of operation) and the wider operation of humanitarian and development activities.

At the same time, UN peace operations continue to face a growing range of complex and challenging threats. Armed groups and spoilers present a threat in contexts such as South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali and the Middle East. The UN is increasingly a target and can no longer rely on its unique international legitimacy as a means of protection. Furthermore, many efforts to address international conflict are often taking place outside the confines of UN operations—such as the international efforts against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—but would likely have longer-term implications for future UN engagement. These challenges require partnership and a global approach.

Efforts to address these threats have also been compounded by a lack of political consensus on the future direction of UN peacekeeping, limited resources and capabilities, as well as financial constraints. The Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping—which took place on 28 September 2015 in New York, the week prior to the Annual Forum—resulted in pledges and commitments from more than 50 countries and regional organizations to UN peacekeeping. Many participants were of the view that the Summit presented the UN with an unprecedented opportunity to draw on a wider range of personnel and capabilities for peace operations, which stands in contrast to efforts over the last decade to generate the necessary military, police and other enablers to new and existing missions. Countries taking part in the Summit agreed on a joint declaration, signalling mutual commitment and support in addressing some of the ongoing challenges to UN peacekeeping.[10]

[10] Declaration of Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping, the Governments of Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Fiji, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Turkey, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Ukraine, United States, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Vietnam, 28 September 2015, see https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/declaration-leaders-summit-peacekeeping (accessed 1 April 2016).

The UN is in the process of analysing and reflecting on the reviews, in order to develop what one panellist referred to as the '2030 agenda' when it comes to peace operations. The HIPPO Report and in the subsequent Secretary-General's Report on the peace operations review set out an ambitious agenda of reforms, aimed at making peace operations more modern, more accountable and more responsive to the needs of those deployed in the field and the civilians they protect. In order for the reviews to comprehensively address some of these challenges, panellists noted the need to focus efforts on some of the key themes identified in the reviews-politics, people and partnerships. Furthermore, if the reviews are going to be complementary, mutually reinforcing and improve the approach of UN peace operations to institution- and capacity-building, then the UN system and the international community need to take a coherent and integrated approach to these efforts.

Armenia's Engagement in UN Peace Operations

Armenia has been actively engaged in developing peacekeeping capabilities since 2001, deploying military personnel to multinational operations in Iraq (January 2005 – October 2008), as well as to the NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. More recently, Armenia has committed personnel to the UN and its peacekeeping operations in Lebanon (since November 2014) and Mali (since July 2015). As of November 2015, Armenia had 34 personnel deployed to UN peacekeeping operations.

Armenia continues to identify opportunities to increase its contribution and involvement in peacekeeping operations. The President of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, joined more than 50 World Leaders in making pledges to current and future UN peace operations at the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping held on 28 September 2015 in New York. Armenia committed to deploying an Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices company, as well as a Level II hospital to UN peacekeeping operations. Armenia took part in a meeting of Foreign Ministers on the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) peacekeeping missions on 1 October in New York. Attendance and pledges made at these events, along with the hosting of the Challenges Annual Forum 2015, demonstrate Armenia's substantive commitment to peacekeeping. It is supported in these efforts through international cooperation and bilateral partnerships with a range of countries, including that of the United States, Greece, Italy and Germany. The Challenges Annual Forum 2015 also marked the informal launch of Armenia's first National Defence Research University.

In addition to preparing and deploying personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, Armenia is supporting the development of theoretical and methodological approaches to peacekeeping operations. In 2014, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) organised an International Strategic Policy Forum on 'Integration of National and Regional Peacekeeping Capacities into the Global System of Peace Operations'. The forum was attended by senior officials from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Secretariat and Joint Staff, CSTO Member States, as well as representatives from China, Israel, South Africa, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the OSCE and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Armenia assumed the chairmanship of the CSTO in September 2015 and is continuing to use that role to support the development of peacekeeping capabilities, including through the memorandum that was signed between the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the CSTO in 2012.

As a peacekeeping contributor, Armenia has expressed support for many of the reforms underway to support improvements to UN peacekeeping, including recommendations emerging from the Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations. Recommendations of particular priority for Armenia include the importance of political solutions to achieving lasting peace, the need for mediation and prevention of conflicts and the importance of mission mandates being situation-specific, rather than based on general approaches or templates.

Politics, People and Partnerships

Political solutions are central to lasting peace. This was one of the four essential shifts identified in the HIPPO Report, which noted that 'politics must drive the design of and implementation of peace operations'[11]. If that momentum falters, then the international community must assist in getting political efforts on track. The situations in South Sudan and the Central African Republic have illustrated the need for inclusive political processes in order to overcome ethnic and sectarian tensions that have contributed to the ongoing cycle of conflict. The importance of fostering inclusive national ownership — which entails a wide spectrum of national actors including women and young people — was identified as one of the critical determinants of success for sustainable peace in the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture.

One of the key challenges for peace operations is identifying a political end state in a country that a mission is deployedinto. Peace operations are by

[11] HIPPO Report, p.10.

their nature only intended to be transitory to support a country in its efforts to establish peace. But it is often unclear under what conditions a peace operation should leave. In some instances, the mission has little choice but to depart when requested by the host government. However, in most cases, it is a negotiated process among the host government, the UN Security Council and in some cases, the broader international community and regional organizations. Key questions include: What are the conditions that should be in place before peace operations leave? And how do we know when those conditions are met and we can move beyond the presence of a peace operation?

As one panellist noted, the answers to these questions are both technical and political in nature (as noted in the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture). Technical in that there are decades of lessons to draw on when it comes to institution- and capacity-building in the context of UN peace operations. These have resulted in guidance, training and best practices in areas such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and establishing the rule of law and governance institutions. Nonetheless, these lessons have also demonstrated that each situation is different, requiring a context-specific approach that is responsive to the political environment that a mission is deployed into and guided by national processes and ownership. Technical expertise is therefore needed to support reforms that are of inherently political nature.

Another consistent theme across the reviews was the need for peace operations to take a more people-centered approach. For example, the HIPPO Report stated that peace operations need to be more field-focused and people-centred. This means that the UN needs to adopt an approach that is responsive to the needs of those deployed in the field, and that missions themselves need to focus on serving and protecting those that they have been mandated to assist. Putting people at the centre of peace operations means engaging with local communities to monitor and understand the impact of peace operations. This will ensure greater support for more inclusive peace processes as well as more calibrated approaches to addressing the protection needs of civilians. Women's participation is a key component of these processes, both in terms of participation in peace operations and in understanding the needs and concerns of women in situations of conflict.

Adopting a people-centered approach is essential to developing institutional capacities. Peace operations need to have an understanding of the informal mechanisms that are often in place to manage conflict and societal disputes. International actors frequently overlook these mechanisms in their rush to

provide assistance, ignoring critical domestic actors. In order to overcome these challenges, peace operations need to support the development of institutions that respond to the specific needs and concerns of the population. Improved analysis and planning could support the ability of peace operations to understand conflict at the local level.

Discussions focused on the importance of partnerships as an integral component of peace operations. Different partnerships contribute to and support the implementation of mandates for UN peace operations. The triangular partnership between the UN Security Council, troop and police contributing countries and the UN Secretariat is integral to successful peace operations. But establishing longer-term sustainable peace also requires ongoing partnerships between peacekeeping missions, host authorities, international donors and in many instances, regional and sub-regional organizations. Partnerships are particularly critical in efforts to undertake institution- and capacity-building, as these activities rely heavily on funding and technical expertise that is usually not available in peace operations. This requires a coherent and integrated approach among all stakeholders involved in supporting these activities.

Partnerships with Regional Organizations: The CSTO and the UN

The HIPPO Report notes the importance of regional partnerships in efforts to improve peacekeeping reform. The UN continues to engage with regional organizations to develop partnerships in an effort to support the development of regional peacekeeping capabilities.

The relationship with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is under development. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DKO) signed a memorandum of understanding with the CSTO Secretariat on 28 September 2012. Part of this cooperation includes sharing materials on peacekeeping policies and standards, providing briefings and supporting the development of the CSTO's standby force (4,000 personnel). Member countries of the CSTO are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.

The CSTO regularly conducts peacekeeping exercises among member countries. In September 2015, Armenia hosted Nerushimoe Bratsvo (Unbreakable Brotherhood)—a joint exercise of CSTO peacekeeping forces. The exercise included 600 military personnel, with representatives from the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as UN DPKO. Belarus is scheduled to hold the next CSTO peacekeeping exercise in 2016.

Coherence and Integration

Participants agreed that efforts to establish sustainable peace are often impeded by fragmentation in the UN system, therefore a collective effort is required to overcome these institutional obstacles and develop a coherent approach. This is particularly important in the context of UN peace operations, given the substantive role they have in facilitating political dialogue among the national and local authorities and armed groups, protecting civilians in the absence of host state capacity or willingness, and supporting early peacebuilding tasks, including developing rule of law and governance institutions and reforming the security sector. However, these efforts are often complicated due to the myriad of international, regional and national actors involved, with each stakeholder having different aims and objectives on the ground. This means that building synergies and aligning national priorities is not always as straightforward as it first appears, particularly in contexts where a national political process is failing, broken or absent.

Consequently, UN peace operations have an important role in facilitating a coherent and integrated approach to institution- and capacity-building across the UN system and broader international community. Yet silos and historical divisions within the UN system often add to the difficulty of developing a comprehensive and coherent approach to these efforts. For example, analysis and planning is often conducted within different departments and agencies within the system. In order to address this fragmentation and ensure the UN system undertakes a more comprehensive approach to strategic analysis and planning, the HIPPO Report recommended the Secretary-General to establish a small strategic analysis and planning capacity.[12]

Another factor compounding coherence across the system is the resourcing within the UN Secretariat. As one panellist noted, the UN Secretariat often lacks the necessary personnel and resources to support the work of peace operations in the field. It was argued that the UN Secretariat itself needs to be strengthened if it is to support peace operations in carrying out their mandated tasks. Member States could consider providing further support to these efforts, in order to support the ongoing development of comprehensive guidance, training standards, analysis and planning or operational support. This is particularly important in the context of supporting civilian capacities

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[12] HIPPO Report, pp.57-59.

such as civil affairs, as well as the gender divisions in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) (as recommended in the Global Study on Security Council Resolution 1325).

In addition to coherence across the UN system, there is also a need for greater cooperation and coherence with regional organizations. At times, regional and sub-regional organizations have several comparative advantages over the UN. This includes drawing on local and regional expertise on a conflict situation (e.g. the Intergovernmental Authority for Development in South Sudan), which is likely to provide more political leverage and legitimacy among some actors and spoilers to the conflict. In some instances, regional organizations are more willing to deploy into environments where the UN is reluctant or unwilling (e.g. the African Union (AU) in Somalia), or to enhance the capabilities of a UN mission (e.g. the European Union (EU) Training Mission in the Central African Republic). However, there are also significant limitations, including access to sustainable funding and logistics support. As a consequence, the UN is often working in parallel with regional organizations. The HIPPO Report noted the importance of strengthening global and regional partnerships, in order to improve burden-sharing between the UN and regional organizations. This is particularly important for the UN's relationship with the AU, given the number of peacekeeping missions deployed on the continent. But it also signalled a growing awareness of the need to have a more comprehensive approach to engaging with other regional and multilateral organizations such as the EU, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the OSCE and CSTO. With a more coherent and integrated approach to peace operations, regional organizations could be better placed to assist with burden-sharing when it comes to mobilising forces to deploy to peace operations, supporting political engagement and facilitating training and capacity-building activities alongside UN peace operations.

Participants agreed that the Challenges Forum Partnership is an important vehicle in supporting ongoing efforts to develop a more coherent and integrated approach among these different entities—regional, subregional and bilateral stakeholders—when it comes to institution- and capacity-building.

Challenges Forum's Engagement on Strategic Communication in Peace Operations

On 23 June 2015, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) co-hosted a Challenges Forum Workshop on 'Strategic Communications for a New Era of Peace Operations' in Washington DC in close consultation with the US Department of State, US Department of Defense, US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and UN DPKO and DFS. The workshop gathered representatives from governments, international organizations, academia and the private sector to discuss ways to improve strategic communications in UN peace operations.

The workshop was timely, taking place following the release of the Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN peacekeeping[13] and only days after the launch of the HIPPO Report. The HIPPO Report included the following specific recommendation on strategic communications: 'The Secretariat and missions should put in place at every stage of the mission lifecycle strategies for planning, recruitment, resourcing of mission communications teams aimed at ensuring interactive two-way communications with local people and ensuring UN peace operations use modern and appropriate communications, approaches and technologies'.

Discussions during the workshop identified the importance of developing a sound narrative and engaging story about the work of UN peace operations. In particular mission contexts, strategic communications was identified as an essential prerequisite for success with a three-fold purpose to inform, influence and protect. The key role of digital media in these efforts was underlined.

The Challenges Forum Partnership took forward recommendations that emerged from the workshop presented in a Policy Brief.[14]

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[13] United Nations, Performance Peacekeeping: Final Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping, 22 December 2014.
[14] Challenges Forum, 'Strategic Communications for the New Era of Peace Operations', Policy Brief 2015:1.

2. High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: Current Trends, Challenges and Opportunities

Background Paper: Hilde E. Johnson, 'Capacity to Protect Civilians: Rhetoric or Reality?';
Chair: Mr Alexander Ilitchev, Member of the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Independent Panel
on Peace Operations, Russia; **Panellists:** Ms Hilde F. Johnson, Member of the UN Secretary-General's
High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Norway; Lt. Gen. Abhijit Guha, Member of
the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, India; Dr Gagik
Hovhannisyan, Counsellor, Department of Arms Control and International Security, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Armenia; Dr Alan Ryan, Executive Director, Australian Civil-Military Centre.

Over the last year the international community has engaged in a process
to extensively review UN peace operations. The review presents a historical
opportunity for the United Nations. It is the most significant attempt at
reforming UN peace operations in over 15 years and it comes at a time when
the international community is attempting to address a range of global,
transnational and complex threats.

Discussions in this session focused on suggested reforms in the HIPPO
Report where there could be tangible impact in the next few years.[15] These
included the protection of civilians (in terms of managing expectations
and the need for capabilities to carry out mandates); the role of the
Security Council, the UN Secretariat and other stakeholders in mandate
development; force generation and rapid deployment; as well as the role of
UN peace operations in implementing the women, peace and security agenda
(drawing also on the findings of the Global Study on the implementation
of Security Council Resolution 1325). All participants were in agreement
that the HIPPO Report offered important recommendations to improve
the effectiveness of UN peace operations, but that the success of the reforms
would ultimately be dependent on implementation and that the support of
Member States would be critical to these efforts.

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[15] See, for example, Alexander Ilitchev, 'Implementing the HIPPO Report: Sustaining Peace as a New Imperative', Background Paper
(Challenges Forum, October 2015).

High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations Report

The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) was appointed in October 2014 by the UN Secretary-General with the aim of comprehensively reviewing the direction of UN peace operations. The panel subsequently issued its Report 'Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People' in June 2015.

The Report identified four fundamental shifts that were essential to improving peace operations:

- 'Politics must drive the design and implementation of peace operations'

- 'The full spectrum of United Nations peace operations must be used more flexibly to respond to changing needs on the ground'

- 'A stronger, more inclusive peace and security partnership is needed for the future'

- 'The United Nations Secretariat must become more field-focused and United Nations peace operations must be more people-centred'

The Secretary-General reported back on the findings in the HIPPO Report in September 2015, identifying several recommendations as priorities to take forward over the next 12 months.

Recommendations are expected to be considered through various intergovernmental mechanisms, including the Security Council and General Assembly (including the Fourth Committee, Fifth Committee and Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations) throughout 2016.

The UN General Assembly held a debate on the findings of both Reports on 12 October 2015 and subsequently adopted a procedural resolution (A/RES/70/6) taking note of the HIPPO and Secretary-General's Reports and deciding that the respective bodies of the General Assembly would give consideration to the recommendations during its seventieth session.

The Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement in November 2015 (S/PRST/2015/22) following its consideration of some aspects of the HIPPO Report, although this made no commitment to any of the recommendations, only expressing its intention to continue giving them consideration.

Principles and Protection of Civilians

Protection of civilians (POC) is at the core of the work of the United Nations, including the work of peace operations. As the HIPPO Report acknowledged, there has been substantive progress in developing norms and frameworks in this area. The UN was ahead of Member States when it came to developing peacekeeping guidance to support military components.[16] Over the last few years, the UN Secretariat has developed: an operational concept, a policy on the POC; implementing guidelines for military components on UN peacekeeping missions; and a policy on POC in peacekeeping. Missions are now expected to develop their own POC strategies and mechanisms to implement this guidance and ensure all mission components understand their roles and responsibilities when it comes to POC. These are positive developments. However, despite this progress and as the HIPPO Report noted, results on the ground remain inconsistent and mixed.

One of the challenges raised by the panellists related to engaging with the host government on efforts to protect the civilian population. Peace operations are planned and deployed on the assumption that the host government has primary responsibility for the protection of civilians. However, as one panellist noted, this is often a slogan rather than a reality. This is one of the biggest challenges for peace operations. For example, in South Sudan, the mission effectively had responsibility to protect hundreds of thousands of civilians on POC sites, due to a lack of willingness and capacity by the host government to do so in the context of ongoing ethnic violence. These type of situations are placing enormous pressure on peace operations and require new thinking on how to engage in political dialogue and capacity-building initiatives with the host government in these settings.

In the context of peace operations, efforts to establish a protective environment rely heavily on capacity-building activities undertaken by peacekeepers and bilateral partners, particularly when it comes to developing institutions such as national police services. Unfortunately, projects to engage in capacity-building initiatives with police are often supply- rather than demand-driven. They focus on individual police officers instead of aligning with the broader needs of the country. So approaches tend to have limited impact in building resilient institutions capable of delivering protection to civilians. This is compounded by an absence of long-term investment in such projects. The six-month rotations within missions are not conducive

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[16] Challenges Forum, Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations (Stockholm, 2014).

to longer-term capacity-building. Those that are being recruited into police peacekeeping roles usually do not have the training or knowledge to transfer skills or build policing institutions.

The role of peace operations in supporting SSR remains an ongoing challenge to broader protection of civilian efforts. As one of the background papers noted: 'To consolidate and sustain peace in a country, reforms of the security sector may be the most critical intervention'.[17] It was argued that the UN has the ability to perform a more substantive role in coordinating and supporting SSR efforts. Those activities are usually undertaken bilaterally and with minimal transparency. As a consequence, they are often ill-planned, supply-driven and fail to respond to the needs of the country. Improved SSR coordination could assist in building security institutions that are prepared, trained and equipped to better protect civilians. If those efforts were to succeed however, then UN peace operations would need to have the capacity to draw on more programmatic funding to support these activities (which was one of the recommendations made in the HIPPO Report)[18].

Nonetheless, even if peace operations were resourced and prepared to undertake SSR activities, there is an inherent challenge in this work if the host government is complicit in civil war or committing human rights abuses. For example, in South Sudan, the UN Security Council removed most peacebuilding elements in the mandate following the outbreak of civil war. This has complicated ongoing efforts to protect civilians and highlighted the centrality of political solutions in any efforts to protect civilians and build sustainable peace.

The ability of peace operations to project force and provide physical protection to civilians also remains an ongoing challenge. As one panellist noted, size matters when it comes to peace operations. Those deployed to countries with a small geographical territory are more likely to succeed, as they have a greater capability to extend their reach and have a much better ratio between peacekeepers and square kilometres. However, most peacekeeping operations are operating with significant resource constraints. For example, in South Sudan, at least 60 per cent of the country is inaccessible during the rainy season.[19] Even if there were no concerns about access restrictions, limited numbers of enablers such as helicopters made it difficult to maintain a presence in different parts of the country and project

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[17] Hilde E. Johnson, 'Capacity to Protect Civilians: Rhetoric or Reality?', Background Paper (Challenges Forum, October 2015).
[18] HIPPO Report, p.98.
[19] Johnson, 2015.

force to protect civilians. This was often further compounded by the lacking of willingness of troops to deploy to certain areas, undertake risk and use force when necessary.[20]

Mismatches between resources and capabilities, along with mediocre performance by some peacekeepers, remain an ongoing challenge to providing physical protection to civilians. In order to address some of the different views among stakeholders and emphasise the centrality of POC to the work of peace operations, one panellist suggested that the peacekeeping principles (consent of the host authorities, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate) should be revised to include protection of civilians as a core obligation. This would remove disputes and potential loopholes that are used by troop and police contributing countries when it comes to obligations to protect civilians. There were differing views on this point, as some participants argued that the Security Council authorisation to use force to protect civilians was very clear. The presence of the mission does not absolve the host government, nor does it absolve the mission from taking on anyone who may pose a threat to civilians.

Despite many of these challenges, there are positive developments taking place to protect civilians. However, information about these successful efforts to protect civilians are often not being communicated effectively to the local population, or host authorities, nor to the international community. This is one of the reasons why the HIPPO Report identified the need for better strategic communications in UN peace operations. This would go beyond the role of traditional public information roles and take a more strategic approach to identifying audiences and messages that would communicate the work that the peace operations are undertaking to protect civilians, as well as broader mandate implementation. Initiatives that engage a wide cross-section of the population and utilise modern technology would form an important part of these efforts. Furthermore, strategic communications could also assist in managing expectations about the activities that a peace operation can undertake to protect civilians, addressing some of the concerns about limited resources and capabilities to deliver protection across wide-geographic areas.

There were some differing views among the panellists regarding the central role of governments in protecting civilians, particularly in the context of non-recognised states. As one panellist noted, in disputed territories, there is still

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[20] Johnson, 2015.

an obligation for institutions and individuals to uphold human rights and protect civilians. These obligations is embedded in international instruments. Efforts to support institution- and capacity-building in these contexts— particularly when it comes to raising awareness and developing capacities to protect civilians—need to be actively considered. It was suggested that peace operations could draw lessons from these situations in terms of working within complex political environments, but also noted that at the same time, the international community has to invest more in resolving these situations.

UN Policy on Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping

The DPKO/DFS Policy on 'The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping' was issued on 1 April 2015. Its purpose is to provide the conceptual framework, guiding principles, and key considerations for the implementation of protection of civilians (POC) mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

The policy builds on years of work to develop a conceptual framework on POC in peacekeeping, responding to requests of the Security Council (through resolution 1894) and the C-34 (through yearly reports). These documents include the Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians, the DPKO/DFS Protection of Civilians Resources and Capabilities Matrix, a DPKO/DFS Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies, and a DPKO/DFS Comparative Study on Protection of Civilians Coordination Mechanisms.

The policy provides background to the evolution of POC in peacekeeping and further articulates the different responses expected of peacekeeping missions in situations where civilians are under threat of physical violence, drawing on the three tiers established in the operational concept (protection through political process, dialogue and engagement; provision of physical protection; and establishment of a protective environment).

Mandate Development and Implementation

Mandates for peace operations set the strategic direction of a mission. However one of the key challenges for the Security Council in designing mandates is minimising the gap between the aspirations of the international community and the realities on the ground.

First and foremost, the Security Council requires information and analysis on the country situation where it may be considering deploying a peace operation. In many instances, peace operations are deployed into contexts

rapidly and with limited time to draw on information about the needs of the country, particularly when it comes to institution-building. Failure to address these gaps from the outset can have long-term implications on the overall success of the mission. This is one of the reasons why the HIPPO Report identified the need to develop a core capacity to provide strategic analysis within the Secretary-General's office. Such a system-wide capacity could assist in overcoming stovepipes within the system. It could enable the delivery of more timely information for decision-making in the UN system, which provides recommendations to the Security Council ahead of mandate formulation.

Phasing and sequencing aspects of mission mandates would also provide more time for the Security Council to draw on this analysis and match it to the reality of the resources and capabilities available to deploy to a mission (another recommendation in the HIPPO Report)[21]. In order to optimise this process, however, the Security Council would need to engage with other major stakeholders that will have responsibility for delivering on the mandate. This should include current and potential troop and police contributing countries as early on in the mandate development process as possible.

Although there are already routine mechanisms in place to facilitate engagement between troop and police contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat in the form of triangular cooperation, these meetings often do not result in a practical and frank exchange among stakeholders. As one panellist noted, if you select troop contributors early enough in the mandating process, then you will have personnel that are aligned with a particular mandate, rather than responding to it. These systems need to be improved in order to establish trust among the stakeholders and ensure that there is not a mismatch between mandates and their implementation.

Force Generation and Rapid Deployment

The rapid deployment of UN peacekeepers is essential to consolidating early security gains and setting the conditions for institution-building activities to take place. Yet this is an area where the UN system has historically struggled. New and reconfigured missions in Mali, South Sudan and the Central African Republic have still not generated personnel to meet their authorised

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[21] HIPPO Report, pp.60-61.

ceilings of military and police personnel, despite authorisation taking place at least 12 months earlier. These delays are a symptom of problems within the UN system, as well as the political commitment and willingness of troop and police contributing countries to commit in a timely manner to peacekeeping operations. Ad hoc solutions are often the standard approach, despite mechanisms being in place to identify Member State commitments. Planning commonly starts from what is available rather than what is needed. This has to change.

Several recommendations have been proposed in the HIPPO Report to address these challenges, included the development of a UN 'vanguard' capability, rapid deployment headquarters, financial and political incentives, specialist support packages, inter-mission cooperation and the use of national and regional standby arrangements. While there are technical aspects to force generation, it is also an inherently political exercise and needs to be approached in that manner. Member States also need to remain engaged in improving the system.

In 2015 there have been several positive developments to improve force generation and rapid deployment. The UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System replaced the UN Standby Arrangements System in July, supported by a Strategic Force Generation Cell in DPKO. Combined with the pledges made at the 2015 Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping, these reforms have the potential to improve force generation to UN peace operations. But it also requires more strategic engagement and commitments from potential troop and police contributors. Pledges at the Summit need to be followed up on and Member States need to be held accountable for their commitments (it was suggested a mapping exercise may assist). Systems that enable Member States to provide short or medium term specialist capabilities during the start-up phase of a mission could act as key enablers, at a time when missions would benefit from early security gains. These could include specialist engineering capabilities, as well as medical and mobility enablers. Triangular partnerships—between the UN Secretariat, a troop contributing country and third country—could support capacity-building in this regard.

Ultimately, if peace operations are going to be most effective in the field in delivering on their mandates and capitalising on early gains from rapid deployment, then these initiatives also need to be supported by reforms to address issues that have an impact on operations in the field. Some of the concerns that were identified included the existing accommodation standards

(as the use of hardware structures often impede mobility), command and control of military assets (which remain subject to civilian control and standards, limiting their use and effectiveness) and reform of logistics systems (that would allow for better mobility and responsiveness). Improving these processes would enable better delivery on mandated tasks, including protection of civilians (particularly in remote areas), as well as engagement with local communities, which are an essential component of longer-term institution-building.

Leaders' Peacekeeping Summit – September 2015

A Leaders' Summit on UN Peacekeeping was held in New York on 28 September 2015. The event was co-hosted by US President Obama and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in cooperation with the Heads of States of Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Rwanda and Uruguay. More than 50 world leaders took part in the Summit. The Summit was a follow-up to a similar event in September 2014, which was initiated by US Vice President Biden. It also drew on a series of regional meetings that had been held throughout 2015 in Ethiopia, the Netherlands, Uruguay and Indonesia.

According to the United States, pledges for the event exceeded expectations. These included more than 40,000 military and police personnel, 40 helicopters, 30 infantry units, 15 engineering companies as well as several other high end enablers. The US government utilised the forum to announce that it had developed a new Presidential Directive on peace operations – the first one in over 20 years.

More than 40 countries associated themselves with a political declaration at the Summit in support of UN peacekeeping. In that declaration, countries recommitted themselves to the reform of peace operations; acknowledged that the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations was a mutual responsibility among Member States; expressed support for ongoing peacekeeping reform efforts; affirmed support for conduct and discipline and called for an end to sexual exploitation and abuse; underlined that protection of civilians was a shared and solemn responsibility (taking note of the best practices set out in the Kigali Principles); expressed commitment to the safety and security of peacekeepers and acknowledged the critical role of regional and sub-regional organizations in these efforts.

The United Kingdom is expected to host the next annual summit in 2016. Work is also underway within the newly established Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to identify ways to integrate and absorb the pledges and match them against current and future needs in peace operations.

Opportunities for Women, Peace and Security

Participants agreed that the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda in peace operations has been mixed over the last 15 years. While there have been significant improvements to the gender responsiveness and capabilities in peace operations, it has not always been a priority. For example, the HIPPO Report noted that it was often referred to as a 'women's issue' rather than being viewed as a peace and security issue; there was a lack of mission funding to support gender-related activities (which had an operational impact on the ability of missions to engage with the local population); and there was an inconsistent approach among mission leadership to the issue (which could affect prioritisation). Similarly, the Global Study on UNSCR 1325 noted that much of the progress that had been achieved in implementing the UNSCR 1325 agenda had been measured in a series of 'firsts' rather than 'standard practice'.[22] In the context of peace operations, the study recommended that the gender divisions of DPKO and DPA be strengthened, and that there should be a D1 level gender adviser in the office of every Special Representative of the Secretary-General in a mission, complementing some of the recommendations in the HIPPO Report.[23]

Member States have a particularly important role in supporting the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda. Several countries have developed national action plans and strategies for the domestic context. Some argued that these national commitments are a signal that a country is willing to lead on the issue internationally. This was particularly important in the context of peace operations, where the UN relies on Member States to offer female military and police personnel to peace operations. This requires countries to have national strategies increasing the recruitment and retention of women into these security fields. Increasing the number of uniformed female peacekeepers remains an ongoing challenge and one entirely dependent on the support of Member States to operationalise.

Several participants noted that the UN has the ability to be a leader on the issue of women, peace and security. The Security Council has articulated a substantive normative framework to guide these processes. But it requires leadership and political commitment to implement these recommendations, something which is often lacking, at least at senior levels in peace operations.

[22] Global Study on UNSCR 1325, p.14.
[23] Global Study on UNSCR 1325, p.17

One of the recommendations emerging from the HIPPO Report was that leadership compacts between the Secretary-General and heads of mission consequently specify performance indicators in relation to gender.[24]

Nevertheless, regardless of any political commitment to implement the women, peace and security agenda, the real determinant is often in the provision of funding and resources for missions. Gender units in the UN Secretariat need to be adequately resourced to provide support to gender advisers in the field, as well as to develop policy, guidance and training materials to support peace operations in carrying out these tasks. Peace operations also need advice integrated across different components in the field to ensure that approaches to cross-cutting issues such as SSR, DDR, rule of law and governance, and POC, are inclusive and gender-sensitive. Similarly, missions need more female personnel in their military, police and civilian components to facilitate engagement with women across a range of fields and within local communities. Rather than being viewed as a peripheral issue, such approaches need to be integrated more comprehensively into mission planning, analysis and force generation as a core capability requirement.

If these reforms were embraced by Member States, then they have a real opportunity to ensure that peace operations are more responsive to gender needs and more inclusive of women. This in turn would support the ability of UN peace operations to develop sustainable and inclusive institutions, which are critical to preventing relapse into conflict.

Engaging Member States on Peace Operations Reform

Member State support is critical to any effort or initiative to reform peace operations. The recommendations emerging from the HIPPO Report and other reviews have been directed at a range of stakeholders, both within and external to the UN system and external to it. Different aspects of each of the reviews will be considered separately within different UN executive, legislative, financial and policy bodies. In the case of the HIPPO Report, the Security Council, Fifth Committee, Fourth Committee and Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) are all expected to engage in debate and discussion around the recommendations that should be implemented.

Some reforms will be easier than others to implement, which was in part reflected in the recommendations that the Secretary-General chose to take

[24] HIPPO Report, pp.80-81.

forward in his Report in response to the HIPPO Report. As one panellist noted, those reforms that were not picked up in the Secretary-General's Report need to be noted and considered as well. Some issues identified in this regard include addressing recruitment processes among civilian staff, command and control issues related to military assets, the recruitment of leaders (which is not an entirely independent nor impartial process), procurement process reform and a more robust approach to enforcing accountability in addressing sexual exploitation and abuse. These initiatives need to be pushed by Member States. It also requires the UN Secretariat to be forthright in identifying reforms that are urgently needed.

For most troop and police contributing countries, the C-34 session in 2016 presents an opportunity to identify areas of consensus on the HIPPO Report for potential implementation. It was agreed that the process would not be easy and that there would be resistance to many of the proposed reforms. But it is an important process in ensuring that peacekeeping continues to have the political consensus and support that is needed to be most effective as a partnership.

Global Study on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325)

The adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1325 was a landmark development in the year 2000, recognising that the participation of women and inclusion of gender perspectives were critical to the maintenance international of peace and security. At the time of the Forum ,the Security Council had adopted six further resolutions on women and peace and security (resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106 and 2122).

Resolution 2122 (adopted in 2013) invited the UN Secretary-General to conduct a review on the implementation of resolution 1325 in the 15 years since its adoption. Led by Radhika Coomaraswamy, the High-level Advisory Group for the study commissioned research papers and conducted a series of consultations and surveys to support the review.

The Report was released in September 2015. It noted that significant developments have taken place globally in the time since resolution 1325 was adopted. However, while significant normative progress has taken place to advance the agenda, implementation is still yet to become standard practice.

As requested in resolution 2122, the Secretary-General reported back on the findings of the Global Study as part the annual report on report on women, peace and security to the Security Council.

Role of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34)

The UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) has a central role in facilitating discussions among Member States on peacekeeping, particularly troop and police contributing countries. It was established in 1964 by the UN General Assembly and as of 2015, had 147 members, as well as observers such as the African Union and NATO.

Members of the C-34 negotiate an annual report each year on a range of peacekeeping issues, providing a series of requests and recommendations to the UN Secretariat and wider membership on peacekeeping policy. The Secretary-General reports back to the C-34 every year, with an update on how requests have progressed. Meetings of the C-34 are often convened throughout the year to facilitate briefings and discussions with officials on peacekeeping developments in the field or to present reports or policies.

The remit and objectives of the C-34 have not always been clear. It is generally tasked—on an annual basis—to make a comprehensive review of all aspects of peacekeeping operations. However differences on approach in terms of negotiating the annual report brought the committee to complete gridlock in 2013. In many ways, this development was reflective of broader disagreements and challenges that were plaguing UN peacekeeping operations more broadly.

It is unclear how the C-34 may decide to take up the issues raised in the HIPPO Report during its deliberations over the annual report in 2016. Some have suggested that the C-34 should seek to consider the HIPPO Report as a whole and avoid approaches that will select some recommendations over others. Yet this is likely to create a challenge, as some of the issues discussed in the Report are not directly relevant to the deliberations of the committee (e.g. Special Political Missions). Regardless of the approach by Member States, early ongoing engagement and communication between the UN Secretariat, the Chair of the Working Group (Canada's Deputy Permanent Representative) and members of the committee will be critical to maintaining momentum and ensuring the C-34 has a constructive role in supporting the implementation of recommendations in the HIPPO Report. Member States will also need to be cognisant of the recommendations in the other reviews—namely of the Peacebuilding Architecture and the Global Study on SCR 1325 – which present some issues for consideration in terms of UN peacekeeping policy.

3. Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture: Current Trends, Opportunities and Challenges

Background Paper: Mr Alexander Ilitchev, 'Implementing the HIPPO Report: Sustaining Peace as a New Imperative'; **Chair:** Mr Amr Aljowaily, Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister for United Nations Affairs, Egypt; **Panellists:** H.E. Mr Petko Draganov, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; Mr Stefan Feller, Police Adviser, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations; Ms Sarah Hearn, Associate Director, Senior Fellow, Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, United Kingdom; Dr Alexander Tsinker, President of the International Expert Center for Electoral Systems, Director for East European States and Commonwealth of Independent States Institute, Israel.

The concept of peacebuilding within the UN system was addressed in each of the three reviews taking place in 2015. In addition to the Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Peacebuilding Architecture—which focused exclusively on challenges and opportunities to reform the UN's peacebuilding architecture 10 years after its founding—the HIPPO and UNSCR 1325 Reports both addressed the concept of peacebuilding within their respective mandates. The report card on the UN's efforts to address peacebuilding needs was not entirely positive. While there had been some success in the last decade to improve the UN's investment in peacebuilding, there were also gaping holes in the UN's organizational approach to peacebuilding. Peacebuilding was often considered as an 'afterthought'. This resulted not only from systemic institutional challenges, but more importantly, from a misunderstanding of the nature of peacebuilding.

Discussions in this session focused on a range of areas where the UN should concentrate its efforts to support peacebuilding, particularly in the context of peace operations. This included a need to work more specifically on conflict prevention (a finding shared by the peacebuilding review and HIPPO Report); invest adequately in capacities that support institution-building such as policing; and foster national ownership and engagement with local communities and civil societies to support peacebuilding efforts at the grassroots.

UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review 2015

The UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review is in progress following a request by the Presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council. The review marks 10 years since the establishment of some of the key institutional bodies on peacebuilding, namely the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Support Office.

The review process is intended to involve two stages. In the first stage, the Secretary-General appointed an Advisory Group of Experts to prepare a review report. That Report was released in June 2015 and was considered as part of the comprehensive discussions during the Challenges Annual Forum. The second stage underway involves an inter-governmental process, co-facilitated by the Permanent Representatives of Australia and Angola to the United Nations.

The Review that was finalised in June 2015 reminds the UN and its Member States that sustaining peace is amongst the core tasks outlined in the UN Charter and therefore, must be the principle that flows through all of the organization's engagement rather than being marginalised. The urgency for the UN to systematically address the fragmentation between the actors who hold the many pieces of the peacebuilding puzzles is emphasised. The Review introduces a wider, broader and deeper comprehensive concept of 'sustaining peace' as absolutely fundamental for the UN to address the changing global and increasingly complex and volatile context for conflict and peacebuilding. It also assesses the UN's achievements in this area thus far, and presents concrete proposal for how to:

- Promote coherence at the intergovernmental level;

- improve the peacebuilding capability of the United Nations system;

- partner for sustaining peace;

- secure more predictable peacebuilding financing; and

- improve leadership and broaden inclusion.

Peacebuilding Concepts and Tools

Peacebuilding is a complex concept with different interpretations among the various actors involved. There is the notion of peacebuilding as a broad concept—a part of the 'arc' that stretches from conflict prevention, to peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. Then there is the peacebuilding architecture, which includes institutional

entities established as part of the outcomes of the World Summit in 2005, such as the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). However, as the Report on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture noted, the architecture is much broader than just these entities. Then there are some of the tools which assist in mobilising efforts in support of peacebuilding, including peacekeeping operations, special political missions, envoys of the Secretary-General, as well as the funds, programs and agencies that make up the UN Country Teams. Many of those institutional tools are supported by Member States through the contribution of personnel (military, police and civilians), financial support to UN entities, as well as donor support through bilateral relationships with the host country and the engagement of regional and sub-regional organizations.

Peacekeeping is one of the most utilised tools at the disposal of the Security Council to support early peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries. The Council has significant influence over the timing and prioritisation of tasks that may support early peacebuilding activities, such as the authorised levels of police personnel and the engagement of peace operations in tasks that support early peacebuilding such as the rule of law, SSR, DDR, as well as the deployment of gender and women protection advisors. Yet peacebuilding efforts can be supported at a much earlier stage by the Security Council and the Secretary-General if there was a more concerted effort to draw on early warning and preventive tools.

Conflict Prevention and Preventive Diplomacy

Conflict prevention is at the core of the UN's work. Preventive diplomacy today is conducted by a broad array of actors and tools. As several participants noted, the UN Charter provides authority to draw on, with Chapter VI referring to the Pacific Settlement of Disputes. Furthermore, some of that authority is entrusted to the Secretary-General through articles 98 and 99 of the UN Charter, which provide authority to bring matters which may threaten international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council. In practice, there are several different mechanisms in the UN system that can be drawn on to support conflict prevention offices. These include the appointment of envoys through the Secretary-General's good offices, and field presences such as UN regional offices and special political missions (which is a term also used to broadly capture all of the aforementioned

conflict prevention tools). Each of these mechanisms can act independently in preventive diplomacy efforts working with Member States and regional organizations, or in many cases, work alongside and in support of the work of UN peacekeeping missions.

Regional offices perform an important role in preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding efforts. The UN currently has three regional offices: the United Nations for West Africa (UNOWA), the United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia. These regional offices are usually led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and are often established at the initiative of the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Security Council. For example, the Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia was established in 2007 in parallel with the closure of the UN Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding and became operational in 2008. It supports the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in building conflict prevention capacities. The centre works to build trust among Member States to enhance international partnerships to counter terrorism and violent extremism, drug-trafficking and other forms of transnational organised crime.

The mandates for regional offices can vary but they often broadly support a range of initiatives intended to support preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. They can facilitate discrete consultations with Member States and regional organizations in situations of emerging conflict. For example, the United Nations for the Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia played an important role during the crisis in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. The HIPPO Report recommended the establishment of further regional offices, in consultation with Member States, noting the value these offices can provide to conflict prevention and mediation.[25] The Secretary-General has expressed his interest in establishing further offices in North Africa, West Asia and Southern Africa.[26] Like the offices already established in West and Central Africa, if utilised effectively, further offices have the potential to assist regional coordination in support of the work of UN peace operations, particularly when it comes to addressing transnational and cross-border threats.

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[25] HIPPO Report, p.36.
[26] United Nations, Overall Policy Matters Pertaining to Special Political Missions, Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/400, 30 September 2015.

Regional organizations can also complement the work of UN mechanisms when it comes to preventive diplomacy. One example that was noted was the work that the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is undertaking in Nagorno Karabakh. The OSCE supports the activities of the Minsk Group, which is intended to find a political solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. As one panellist noted, it is important that there is an understanding of which organizations are leading these negotiations and how they are facilitating these processes. While efforts to find a political solution to the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh remain ongoing, it demonstrates that regional organizations can complement the work of the UN when it comes to conflict prevention efforts, with such organizations often having a better understanding of the regional dynamics and political concerns involved.

In addition to the work on regional approaches, the UN also has the ability to deploy other special political missions (SPMs) that can support peacebuilding activities. As the HIPPO Report noted, these tools fall within the full spectrum of UN peace operations, providing for a broader continuum of responses, particularly when it comes to conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts. In many cases, some SPMs have military and police components deployed, albeit in much smaller numbers and usually in advisory capacities, but they can undertake many of the same tasks when it comes to political engagement, capacity-building and conflict prevention. Furthermore, SPMs often perform a critical role either following the conclusion of a peace agreement, or as the follow-on operation after the draw-down of a peacekeeping operation. They may also be deployed alongside a regional peace or multilateral operation to provide political support. In this regard, and as the Secretary-General has noted, they often have core peacebuilding mandates.[27] In drawing lessons on the engagement of UN peace operations, SPMs provide a lot of lessons. Efforts should be made to draw more extensively on these lessons, beyond discussions over technical and financial support—which although important—distract from the broader value of a more streamlined approach when it comes to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities.

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[27] UN, Overall Policy Matters Pertaining to Special Political Missions, A/70/400, 2015.

United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia

The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia was established in 2007 and became operational in 2008. Its establishment took place at the same time as the phasing out of the United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding.

The Centre was established to undertake the following functions: liaise with governments in the region on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; monitor and analyse situations in order to inform the Secretary-General on conflict prevention efforts; maintain contact with relevant regional organizations on peacemaking efforts; provide leadership on preventive activities of UN country teams in the region; and maintain close contact with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to ensure comprehensive analysis on the region.

The Centre works in close cooperation with Central Asian governments as well as regional organizations to enhance international partnerships, prevent terrorism, combat violent extremism and prevent drug-trafficking and other forms of transnational-organised crime.

Police and Capacity-building

Police play a central role in peacebuilding in the context of UN peace operations. They manage public safety, protect the civilian population, build the capacity of national police, and in extreme situations may undertake executive policing functions. Even more importantly in today's evolving global environment, they contribute to efforts to address transnational threats, terrorism and violent extremism. Yet despite their consistent engagement in UN peace operations for more than 50 years, there are still challenges in setting consistent standards and recruiting appropriately qualified personnel—both formed police units (FPUs) and individual police officers (UNPOL). These impediments have an impact on the ability of peace operations to support longer-term peacebuilding efforts, particularly when it comes to protecting civilians, capacity-building and coordination to build nationally resilient police services.

Efforts are underway within the Secretariat to better guide the work of UN policing. The first layer of work involves the development of a Strategic Guidance Framework (SGF) on policing. One of the aims of the framework

is to support the work of police components in multilateral operations to enhance sustainable peacebuilding efforts. The value of this framework was recognised by the UN Security Council, with the adoption of the first policing resolution in 2014 (resolution 2185). The first component of this framework was completed in 2014 with the issuance of the Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions. The DPKO/Department of Field Support (DFS) Guidelines on Policy and Capacity Building provide further instruction to support police components in their efforts to undertake capacity-building. Several participants noted that the framework links to longer-term efforts to build sustainable peace, particularly the aims of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16. However, one of the key challenges for the operationalisation of the framework will be funding to support its implementation. For this reason, the HIPPO Report stressed not only the importance of finalising the framework to provide policy and guidance on core policing functions, but also to ensure that there are proposals for resources to address its implementation.

Police perform a fundamental role in building trust and confidence among the local community and with national authorities. As one panellist subsequently noted, windows of opportunity for building trust open and close, therefore they need to be acted upon when they arise. Strength and accountability of institutions can often be the most significant factor in the onset of further violence. One way UN police build trust among the local community is through providing protection (in cases where the national police authorities are unwilling or unable to do so). For example, in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), UNPOL is tasked with providing security to the more than 180,000 civilians currently residing in POC sites across the country. However, their primary role is usually to work with the national authorities to build the capacity of the local police and law enforcement services and ensure they meet the highest standards possible.

Building the capacity of national police and law enforcement institutions is a highly political process as it touches upon many aspects of national sovereignty. Efforts may be undermined by a difficult relationship with the host government, as demonstrated by the events in South Sudan, where UNMISS withdrew most of its capacity-building engagement due to the outbreak of civil war. Furthermore, UN police are often confronted with corruption, serious and organized crime, collapsed rule of law institutions and terrorism or other forms of globalised crime. This requires not only the right expertise and ability to transfer knowledge, but also listening

to national counterparts about their needs in order to support national ownership of the process. It takes at least two generations to change rule of law institutions, therefore the work of UN police needs to be built on thorough foundations, with the support of the peace operations as well as other stakeholders such as bilateral donors. Coordination, particularly in terms of prioritised and sustainable funding support, is critical to ensuring police reform remains sustainable after a mission has transitioned or exited from the country. The external review of the UN Police Division—requested by the Secretary General to inform his 2016 Report on UN policing—is likely to formulate further recommendations to support the activities of headquarters in guiding the work of UNPOL components in the field.[28]

UN Guidelines on Police and Capacity-building

The DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Police and Capacity-building were issued on 1 April 2015.[29] The guidelines are intended to 'spell out the fundamental principles and approaches to police capacity-building and development in post-conflict countries and other crisis situations. The Guidelines form the first set of subsidiary guidance below the DPKO/DFS Policy on Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions.

The guidelines identify a series of fundamental principles for police components, namely:

- 'Win multi-party, cross societal consensus on police reform'

- 'Put the host state government and police in the lead'

- 'Address behaviours, build a culture of accountability'

- 'Broaden reform beyond police: justice and corrections'

- 'Insist on standards and benchmarks'

- 'Comprehensive integration of women's rights and gender equality commitments'

- 'Praise and encourage but do not shy away from critical feedback'

Building on these fundamental principles, the guidelines outline a series of processes to undertake police capacity-building and development.

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[28] UN, The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, A/70/357-S/2015/682, 2015, p.30.
[29] A Challenges Forum Workshop hosted by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the UN DPKO Police Division on UN Policing and Capacity-building and Development in March 2014 resulted in these first thematic guidelines of the Strategic Guidance Framework.

The planned 2016 conference of Member State Police Chiefs may provide a further opportunity to generate awareness, commitments and financial support for the work of UN police in peace operations.

Broad and Inclusive National Ownership

Any effort to undertake peacebuilding in a country emerging from conflict needs to be nationally owned and inclusive across society. The Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Peacebuilding Architecture noted that 'inclusive national ownership' was a 'critical determinant of success' in peacebuilding.[30] But the Report also noted that there can be risks to acceding to processes which encourage national ownership which is led by the government, to the exclusion of other groups. National ownership therefore incorporates not only the views or priorities of the host government, but those of the wider community. This is why the Report argued for 'inclusive national ownership', which entails 'participation by community groups, women's platforms and representatives, youth, labour organizations, political parties, the private sector and civil society, including under-represented groups'. For the UN system, this means supporting efforts to 'broaden ownership', with efforts to engage civil society, youth and women, and to utilise tools to enhance communication, including social media.

One of the capacities available to UN peace operations to facilitate national ownership is the deployment of civil affairs officers and community liaison assistants. The UN Secretariat is currently undertaking a series of projects in conjunction with peace operations to draw on lessons and identify ways that civil affairs can support local and national consultations in support of peacebuilding. This includes a project examining how to engage civil society, as well as another looking at what role peace operations should be undertaking when it comes to extending state authority (if any). Further analysis is also underway on the value of community liaisons assistants (CLAs). CLAs are nationals that are usually recruited from the communities where a peacekeeping mission is engaging. Preliminary findings from that review suggest that CLAs are an incredibly useful resource to peace operations, particularly in terms of improving understanding and awareness about local community needs. Such activities act as a useful bridge to inform how peace operations might enhance inclusive national ownership in support of peacebuilding activities.

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[30] Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture Report, p.8

Beyond the granular discussion of resources that support national ownership, participants also examined the relationship between the newly adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and how these can support peacebuilding efforts by UN peace operations. The SDGs build on the Millennium Development Goals and identify a series of targets to be achieved by 2030. One of the strengths of the process that led to the adoption of the SDGs is that it was led by developing countries. This ownership is particularly important given that it is those countries that will have responsibility for taking forward the goals, with the support of the international community.

Sustainable Development Goals

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted in September 2015 by UN Member States after several years of preparations and negotiations. The '2030 Agenda' is intended to address a range of challenges that threaten sustainable development. It includes 17 SDGs and 169 targets as part of the ambitious agenda for implementation over the next 15 years.

The '2030 agenda' sets out a series of mechanisms for implementation, with targets identified under each of the 17 goals. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (financing for sustainable development) is intended to form an integral part of the implementation process. In terms of follow-up and monitoring, this is expected to be a nationally-led and owned process, guided by a set of global indicators under development, with reporting from the Secretary-General and the UN system, and with regular high-level political engagement through the General Assembly (every four years).

The SDGs build on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and address those aspects that remain unfinished. The MDGs were adopted in the year 2000 and were intended to provide a framework for development, with a series of targets to be met by 2015. However, progress was uneven in some places (eg Africa and other developing countries) and many targets were not on track to be met. The SDGs are aimed to address some aspects that the MDGs failed to achieve.

Of the 17 SDGs adopted, goal 16 is of most direct relevance to the work of UN peace operations, stating: 'Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels'.

Importantly, the SDGs recognise the interrelated nature of peace, security and development. SDG 16 calls for peace, justice and strong institutions. There were some fears that the inclusion of this goal represented a militarisation of development. However, while there is no expectation that the peace and security system (including UN peace operations) will lead on it, SDG16 provides an opportunity to ensure that peace agreements align national priorities with these goals. It was noted that 1.5 billion people currently live in fragile states, and if progress was made on SDG 16, then that number could be brought down to only 300 million by 2030.

4. Institution-building as a Bridge Between Peacekeeping and Peace-building: Connecting the Security and Peace Nexus

Background Paper: Ms Leanne Smith, 'Institution-building as a Bridge Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Connecting the Security and Peace Nexus; **Chair:** Ms Leanne Smith, Chief, Policy and Best Practices, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations; **Panellists:** Dr Cedric de Coning, Director, Peacekeeping Programme, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Norway; Professor Alexander Nikitin, Director Centre for Euro-Atlantic Security, MGIMO-University, Russia, Chief Researcher, Institute for World Economy and International Relations, Member of the CSTO Scientific-Expert Council; Mr Bart Laan, Chief, Development and Reform, Police Component, United Nations Mission in Liberia.

Institution-building forms a central part of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. Developing effective, trusted and legitimate state institutions can enable the host government to uphold its responsibility to protect the civilian population and support the maintenance of peace and security in a country. But the concept of institution-building is complex and there are many different understandings of how it may be undertaken in the context of UN peace operations.

There has been some analysis of the role of peacekeepers as early peacebuilders. In 2011, the DPKO and the DFS developed a strategy on the contribution of UN peacekeeping to early peacebuilding, noting that peacekeepers brought several comparative advantages to early peacebuilding efforts. The strategy identified that peacekeepers supporting early peacebuilding had three key roles – 'to articulate, enable and implement peacebuilding goals'. What this means in practice is that peacekeepers (1) advance the political objectives of the peace process; (2) provide security for other actors undertaking peacebuilding tasks to operate; and (3) lay the foundations for longer-term institution-building.[31] It is this third role where

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[31] Leanne Smith, 'Institution-building as a Bridge Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Connecting the Peace and Security Nexus', Background Paper (Challenges Forum, October 2015).

peacekeepers have the most direct engagement in support of institution-building.

Throughout the discussions in this session, participants identified a range of issues emerging from the three high-level reviews of 2015 that required further consideration in the context of institution-building. These included taking a more 'people-centered' approach to peacekeeping, developing state-society relations (as a means to support extending state authority), balancing short-term security demands with longer-term peacebuilding needs (in the context of mission start-up, transition and draw-down), identifying and mobilising the right skills and capabilities, and developing a range of partnerships to support institution-building efforts.

Institution-building: Interpretations Across the Three Reviews

The high-level reviews that have taken place in 2015 have provided an opportunity to re-examine the role of UN peacekeeping in institution-building.[32] Each of the reviews identified a series of lessons learned and good practice that can be drawn on in improving the efforts of UN missions to undertake institution-building.

The HIPPO Report acknowledged that efforts to build sustainable state institutions are a long-term generational effort. It identified seven deficits when it comes to sustaining peace: the wrong mind-set (ie not responding to the needs of the country); failure to respect nationally owned priorities; supply-driven templates with technical approaches to reform efforts; failure to plan for the fiscal dimension; a focus on the capital and elites instead of those groups core to the peace process (eg ex-militias, ex-rebels and displaced persons); and failure to adopt a 'do no harm' approach which supports nationally-led reconciliation efforts and trust-building. These 'deficits' provide important lessons for the work of UN peace operations in supporting institution-building. In this context, the HIPPO Report offered a 'cautionary note' on what can be expected of UN peace operations when it comes to institution-building.[33]

The importance of long-term and sustainable investment in institution-building efforts is also emphasised in the Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Peacebuilding Architecture. The Report stated that damage

[32] Smith, 2015.
[33] Smith, 2015.

to institutions often results from protracted violent conflict that 'deepens social cleavages'.[34] This is why institution-building is not only central to peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict, but to long-term international efforts to promote development and sustainability as well. It is also why the Report noted the importance of institution-building in the 2015 Development Agenda, with Sustainable Development Goal 16 calling upon the international community to 'promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, inclusive and accountable institutions at all levels'.[35]

Similar themes are identified in the Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. The Study recognised the need for women to participate and engage in early peacebuilding efforts, as well as institutions such as the security sector. Failure to include women or consider gender perspectives in institution-building activities would result in institutions that fail to be representative and inclusive of the wider population, ultimately undermining their effectiveness in support of peace. The Study subsequently identified a range of targets to improve the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda, including in the context of UN peace operations, with many recommendations also being picked up in those respective reviews.

One consistent aspect across all the reviews was the important role that the Security Council has in articulating the strategic direction of peace operations, particularly when it comes to institution- and capacity-building. As the background paper noted, the earliest reference to these tasks in a peacekeeping mandate can be traced back to resolution 1244 for the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Some mandates, such as those in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, have included executive mandates which enabled the missions to carry out executive functions of the local authorities. Of the currently 16 deployed peacekeeping missions, it was found that there were at least 64 mandated tasks that related to capacity- or institution-building.[36] These include functions that provide some form of support to national border control, rule of law, justice and corrections, SSR and DDR, elections, national human rights institutions, extension of state authority and local governance, administration of natural resources, national dialogue and reconciliation and resettlement and internally-displaced persons (see Table 1).

[34] Report on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, p.27.
[35] Smith, 2015.
[36] Smith, 2015.

INSTITUTION–BUILDING MANDATE	MANDATED PEACEKEEPING MISSION[36]
Institution-building Mandate	Mandated Peacekeeping Mission
National Border Control/Customs/Coastguard	ONUCI, MINUSTAH
Rule of Law: Police, Corrections, Judiciary	MINUSTAH, ONUCI, UNISFA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, MINUSCA, UNMIL
SSR and DDR	UNMIL, ONUCI, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, MINUSTAH
Electoral Institutions	UNMIK, UNMIL
National Human Rights Institutions	MINUSTAH, MINUSCA
Extension of State Authority/Local Administration/Governance	UNMIK, UNMIL, ONUCI, MONUSCO, MINUSTAH
Administration of Natural Resources	UNMIL
National Dialogue and Reconciliation	MINUSCA, MINUSTAH, ONUCI, UNMIL
Resettlement and Internally Displaced People	MINUSTAH

Table 1. Extracted from Leanne Smith, 'Institution-building as a Bridge Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Connecting the Peace and Security Nexus', Background Paper (Challenges Forum, October 2015).

The UN system has developed a range of policy, guidance and training materials to support a number of these activities in peace operations. Nonetheless, the UN system still faces a number of fundamental challenges when it comes to supporting efforts to build sustainable, inclusive and resilient institutions in conflict-affected countries where it has a peace operation deployed. Some of these challenges relate to issues such as maintaining the consent of the host state while simultaneously trying to work with the host authorities to undertake institution-building activities. In some instances, missions are deployed into an environment where the conflict has not yet been resolved and efforts to undertake reconciliation are in their infancy. These contexts demonstrate that any effort to undertake institution-building is inherently political and needs to be approached in this manner.

[37] ONUCI: Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire; MINUSTAH: UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti; UNISFA: UN Interim Security Force for Abyei; MINUSMA: UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali: MONUSCO: UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNMIK: UN Interim Administration in Kosovo; UNMIL: UN Mission in Liberia; MINUSCA: UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

Taking a 'People-centered' Approach

There needs to be a paradigm shift in the way that peace operations engage with people if they are to have a more effective approach to institution-building. The HIPPO Report recommended four major shifts to improve the effectiveness of peace operations: the centrality of politics, the need for a flexible approach, a stronger and more inclusive partnership and the need for a more field-focused and people-centered approach. Many participants agreed with the need for the UN to shift its focus to the field and the needs of the local populations, particularly if peace operations were going to be more effective in supporting institution-building efforts.

One challenge is that the needs of the local population are often overlooked when it comes to planning and implementing institution-building programs. There is commonly a mismatch between what the local needs are and the programs that are put in place to support them. This may be due to a lack of communication and understanding. But more often, it is because peacekeepers and the mission deploy into a country with pre-conceived ideas and templates for what is needed. This can result in waste and generate ineffectual results. For example, when equipping local government offices, there is no point attempting to install computers if the locals do not have a reliable source of electricity. If the locals request type-writers, then there is a probably a very good reason for it.

Despite commitments within the UN system to develop national and local ownership, there is often a fundamental failure when it comes to operationalising it. Part of the challenge is identifying who speaks for the people. The obvious assumption will often be the government. But in instances where there is an outbreak of civil war (eg South Sudan) or a transitional government in a society still in conflict (eg Central African Republic), these views are not necessarily representative of the entire population. This requires a much more concerted effort from peace operations to engage the widest range of people at all levels of society in discussions about institution-building. This needs to take place at strategic, operational and tactical levels. One way to address this challenge might be the establishment of advisory boards between different stakeholders to engage with the mission. These should involve locals rather than just consulting them and should facilitate processes that enable local communities to identify their own solutions.

There is a need to ensure that missions are focused on how to support those who they are mandated to support and assist, ensuring that any progress is assessed against how it affects the lives of those affected by the conflict. This is also particularly important in efforts to develop strategies to protect civilians. In many instances, communities may already have a strong resilience for protecting themselves, so missions should ensure they do not come with pre-conceived ideas about the needs of the local population. But it also requires the mission to be engaged and ask the communities whether they feel safe. It is an ongoing process of monitoring and assessment. The needs of the local population must be at the centre of the process. It also requires engagement at all levels in support of decision-making. National professional staff— which may include civil affairs officers and community liaison assistants—can perform an important role in these efforts.

Structural and systemic challenges also need to be addressed if peace operations are going to be more people-centered in approach. As one panellist noted, donor and institution goals often take higher priority than local needs. These present challenges in situations where elections are set to external timetables (rather than against progress of reconciliation or political dialogue), programs are delivered on external donor timeframes (rather than at a pace that may be required by the local community) and training programs are quite often developed based on the capability of the supplier (rather than the needs and requirements on the ground). As the panellist went on to note, efforts need to be made to address these 'covert' challenges, within mission leadership which can provide some flexibility to implementation of programs. Member States can adopt practices which focus on local needs and provide some flexibility when providing donor support and training programs. In instances where systemic challenges cannot be addressed, then communication and expectation management among the local community can assist with mitigating some concerns.

Participants agreed with the importance of placing people at the centre of peace operations. As one panellist noted, if this approach were institutionalised it could fundamentally change how we do peace operations. But this requires a shift from a box-ticking attitude of consulting to involving local communities in efforts to plan, prepare and implement institution-building programs. It needs to draw on the strengths that already exist among national organizations, civil society and local communities. In addition, it requires a re-orientation at the systemic level, as well as among the attitudes of peacekeepers deployed on the ground.

Extending State-Society Relations

Peacekeeping operations are only deployed with the consent of the host authorities. But the relationship with the host government in many peace operation contexts is challenging and difficult. For example, in theory missions are meant to have freedom of movement to undertake their operations as part of the Status of Forces Agreement in a country. But some host governments will interfere with this operational freedom, imposing a series of access restrictions (eg South Sudan). In other cases, the host authority may be transitional and be viewed by some parties to the conflict as an illegitimate representative for the mission to be engaging with (eg Central African Republic). In these situations the host government is often not representative of many of the different groups which may act as spoilers.

Peace operations are often mandated to support the extension of state authority through tasks such as assisting the state with its responsibility to protect civilians or building the capacity of its security sector. However, this focus often ignores efforts to develop a healthy relationship within the country among the state and other actors of society. It also means investment is focused on building the capacity of state institutions, particularly at the national level, often at the expense of local mechanisms which may have a more significant role in facilitating conflict resolution and resolving disputes that fuel ongoing conflict. This led to a discussion among participants on the value of shifting focus from extending state authority to extending state-society relations.

Converging on extending state-society relations could have several benefits. Institution-building often takes many generations, beyond the life-cycle of the presence of a peace operations or other UN field presences. Facilitating the development of a strong relationship between the state, civil society and local communities may strengthen the resilience of institutions if there is relapse into conflict or a crisis in the country or another form of setback. It may also ensure that institutions are more representative of the local community, including different ethnic groups, ex-combatants, civil society and women. By supporting more consultation between the state and different parts of the society, the peace operation will be facilitating the building of trust in the institutions which are intended to protect and represent the people. This is particularly important in ensuring that institution-building efforts are sustainable and likely to extend beyond the life-cycle of a mission.

In addition to strengthening the resilience of institutions, focusing on state-

society relations may also help shift the mind-set of peace operations to prioritise engagement efforts at the sub-national and local level. While there have been efforts to de-centralise the activities of peace operations to sub-national levels (eg during the establishment of UNMISS), the international community, regional organizations and donors have tended to focus their efforts on reform of the national institutions.

By shifting the focus down to the sub-national and local level, actors could assist in addressing some of the root causes of the conflicts, which are often more localised and based on local grievances. In order for this to be most effective, peace operations will need to be resourced adequately with capacities such as civil affairs officers to support this engagement and activities and to develop plans on how to work with local communities in developing institutions that provide security, justice, governance and services. In the long-term, such shifts in focus may provide peace operations with greater latitude to continue undertaking some institution-building activities if the national authorities become difficult to engage or unfavourable partners to work with. This is particularly important if the mission presence is required to continue providing critical support to protect the civilian population (as it did in South Sudan). Such activities may also contribute to efforts to resolve conflict at the national level.

Identifying and Mobilising Needed Skills and Capabilities

Effective institution-building in the context of peace operations requires personnel that have the right skills and capabilities. However, the personnel that are often deployed to peace operations do not have the necessary capabilities to transfer skills, deliver training or provide support through project services and management. Assuming technical proficiency equates to being able to deliver capacity-building programs remains a problem in peace operations when it comes to institution-building. There is often a tendency to hire people for the skills they have, rather than their ability to transfer them.

In the context of policing, it is often assumed that experience in community policing means personnel are qualified to build policing institutions from scratch, when in reality this requires expertise in governance, administration and regulatory functions. This was a lesson learned by UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). Towards the end of the mission, the police component there recruited many non-uniformed staff into the

police component to work on legislative reform, donor coordination, gender-responsiveness and monitoring and evaluation. This enabled a more consistent and sustainable approach to institutional-building. Another lesson was when someone who had been recruited to run the local power station in order to transfer knowledge to the local Timorese, decided they were not going to help the locals as in their view the locals did not have the skills needed.

Part of the problem is that needs are not being clearly identified or they are being driven by supply rather than demand. Missions need to analyse the requirements of the host country (in consultation with local actors) and identify the resources and capabilities required. The focus in the start-up phase of peace operations tends to be on security needs (ie military and police capabilities) instead of peacebuilding activities. This is partly due to the focus of the UN Security Council, which has a tendency to ensure that security factors are addressed as a matter of priority, particularly in contexts where civilians are under threat from physical violence. This results in more focus on generating resources such as military contingents or formed police units, rather than specialised civilian capacities.

If institution-building is going to be effective from the outset of a peace operation, there needs to be adequate attention on civilian staffing needs during planning and start-up phases. This is particularly important as civilian capabilities are often in short supply (particularly from Member States) or recruitment processes can take several months to identify and hire the best qualified person. Identifying qualified national staff, particularly at the sub-national level, may also take considerable time and even then, it may be difficult to identify individuals that meet the recruitment profile. For example, MINUSCA has had difficulty recruiting community liaison assistants at the sub-national level, as there are few (if any) people from the immediate region who meet the education profile for the positions. In order to address some of these challenges, missions need to have more flexibility to generate the personnel required to undertake institution-building from the earliest phase of the mission. It is also important for missions to ensure they are hiring people who are prepared and willing to transfer their skills and knowledge to the local population, acknowledging that it is a long-term investment.

Balancing Short-term and Long-term Approaches

Many recent peace operations have been authorised or reconfigured in a very short period of time to protect the civilian population. The immediate priority is on providing security to civilians to protect them from threats of physical violence. But the UN Security Council has often recognised the need to address some capacity-building aspects in the early phases of the mission, including mainly a range of templated tasks such as SSR and DDR. Nonetheless, the routine mandate cycle has previously meant that mandate were not reviewed for close to a year, unless there was a period of crisis. Given that many missions are planned quickly, this has meant mission mandates have been developed with minimal local consultations (aside from a brief technical assessment mission) meaning they are often not well configured to support longer-term capacity-building efforts.

This is one of the reasons that the HIPPO Report recommended the Security Council consider the use of phased and sequenced mandates in its approach to peace operations.[38] A phased mandate would give the Council time (eg six months) to re-visit the initial mandate after further analysis of the requirements on the ground, ensuring it is adjusted to address the needs of the local population and support institution-building efforts. Similarly, sequencing tasks in the mandate would provide broader strategic direction from the Council on the priorities of the mission when it comes to providing security and supporting capacity-building activities. Several participants noted that this model was worth further consideration and noted that it was an approach that was likely to be adopted in the upcoming revision of UNMISS' mandate. But it was also noted that the nature of mandating peace operations presents challenges when it comes to institution-building.

Institution-building by its nature requires long-term investment. Yet this often conflicts with the short-term cycle of peace operation mandates. Most mandates are re-authorised annually, with requests for the Secretary-General to report back to the Security Council on progress against mandate implementation ranging from four months to annually. This typically means that mandate cycles place a premium on activities, rather than on long-term goals or objectives (which may take years). For example, in Liberia, this approach meant that there was repeated focus on delivering the same activities to deliver short-term results, rather than on addressing some of the complex institution-building issues, including a more cohesive legislative

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[38] HIPPO Report, p. 48.

and regulatory framework. As one panellist noted, short-term demands often took priority over long-term viability, meaning projects would often be unsustainable for the national police service. It was argued that if the long-term challenges had been addressed in Liberia—such as developing legal and regulatory frameworks, establishing civilian oversight of the police service and building sustainable corporate services—then the lifespan of UNMIL may have been shortened. Shifting focus from activities to impact, with a robust monitoring and evaluation framework, could improve the institution-building approach of peacekeeping missions and their efforts to focus on long-term goals.

Value of Different Partnerships

Partnerships are critical to institution-building, given the long-term support and investment required from various stakeholders. Peace operations are one of many actors involved in institution-building activities—and often only in the early phase of the process. In order for peace operations to be effective in providing support, they need to ensure their activities are coordinated with the UN Country Team, which is often better positioned to develop long-term programs in the country. Furthermore, there is a need to coordinate efforts among Member States and donors to ensure that there is a coherent and comprehensive approach to programs that deliver sustainable results. This is particularly important as peace operations begin to enter a transition and draw-down phase, as demonstrated by recent developments in Liberia. Failure to develop strong partnerships among the stakeholders risks undermining early gains and successes in establishing the foundations of institution-building.

Institution-building efforts also require engagement and support beyond the peace operations. Regional organizations—such as the African Union, European Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Association of Southeast Asian States, for example—have an important role to perform in supporting these efforts, whether through coordinating and generating resources, or leading the deployment of a mission. As previously noted, in some cases, regional or sub-regional organizations may be better placed than the UN to deploy personnel and expertise to a country for peacekeeping or peacebuilding support, drawing on local resources and knowledge.

Recent UN peace operations in Mali and the Central African Republic have

taken over AU-led operations, demonstrating the importance of ensuring there is cooperation and continuity between both organizations when it comes to analysis, planning and deployment. Some participants suggested that the UN did not take over in Mali and the Central African Republic because it brought comparative advantages, but simply because those missions required UN funding to continue. While this argument may be disputed, it demonstrates the difficulty in securing regional funding for peace operations. These same fiscal limitations have an impact on the ability of the region to support institution-building efforts after a peace operation has departed, making partnerships all the more critical to these efforts.

5. Effectively Connecting the Security and Peace Nexus in the Field: Challenges and Opportunities

Background Paper: Gagik Hovhannisyan and Jibecke Joensson, 'Call for Change and Early Actions to "Save Succeeding Generations From the Scourge of War"'; **Chairs:** Dr Gagik Hovhannisyan, Counsellor, Department of Arms Control and International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armenia; and Dr Jibecke Joensson, Head (Acting) Policy and Best Practices, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden.

Institution-building needs to begin at the outset of a peace operation's deployment. However, the approach of each mission needs to be context specific and responsive to the political and security situation on the ground. Peace operations in different phases of the mission life cycle present a diverse range of lessons to draw on when it comes to institution-building. In order to examine some of the challenges and opportunities emerging from the field, participants were divided into working groups to examine UN peace operations deployed to the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Liberia. Each of the missions selected for the working groups were at different stages in the mission-cycle: start-up working with a transitional government (Central African Republic); crisis and reconfiguration (South Sudan); and transition and draw-down (Liberia).

Several themes were identified to frame the discussions across the working groups.[39] Prevention was noted as a key task, drawing its foundations from the UN Charter. Missions need to develop a culture of prevention in the manner that they are planned and carry out their work. But in order for conflict prevention to be most effective, it needs to be linked to early action. This requires early warning mechanisms to be deployed from the earliest moment of a mission's deployment, often drawing on regional organizations when and where they exist to provide support. Reconciliation was also noted

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[39] For further background information, see Gagik Hovhannisyan and Jibecke Joensson, 'Call for Change and Early Actions to "Save Succeeding Generations From the Scourge of War', Background Paper (Challenges Forum, October 2015).

as a cornerstone and key to sustainable peace.

Efforts to support institution-building also require the right types of personnel, capabilities and partnerships within a peace operation. Police, justice and corrections personnel are paramount to early success and have an important role in supporting capacity-building and instilling legitimacy and trust in state institutions. Strategic communications and technology can enhance efforts to engage in dialogue with a range of stakeholders, but more work is required to examine how tools such as social media might be utilised to foster peace and increase situational awareness. Partnerships are broad ranging and can support a range of different tasks. However, further analysis is needed on the comparative advantages that the UN could bring to institution-building over other organizations and what types of partnerships could support different activities.

South Sudan

Facilitator: Dr Cedric de Coning, Director, Peacekeeping Programme, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Norway; **Rapporteur:** Mr Ashraf Swelam, Director, Cairo Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa, Egypt.

United Nations Mission in South Sudan

On 8 July 2011, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1996 authorising the deployment of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). This preceded the independence of South Sudan on 9 July 2011, following the results of a national referendum where the population voted for South Sudanese independence. In practice, UNMISS took over from the previous UN presence in Sudan (UNMIS) with a significantly reconfigured mandate.

There were high expectations within the UN system when UNMISS was authorised. The mission was deployed at the same time as the findings and outcomes of a series of different policy reviews were underway on peacekeeping, including the 'New Horizons' agenda[40]. Resolution 1996 mandated UNMISS to—among other tasks— work closely with the government to support peace consolidation, state-building and economic development, develop capacity to provide security, establish the rule of law, strengthen the security and justice sectors and protect civilians.

[40] United Nations, A New Partnership Agenda: Chartering a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping.

The security crisis that broke out in South Sudan on 15 December 2015 significantly changed the context in which UNMISS was operating. Security concerns and the immediate need to provide protection to tens of thousands of civilians on UN bases (in addition to those fleeing the civil war across the country) resulted in an increase in the number of troops and police deployed to the mission shortly thereafter (through resolution 2132). As the civil war continued, the Security Council decided to drastically reconfigure the mission mandate, recognising that UNMISS could no longer work alongside a government that was complicit in committing human rights abuses. Resolution 2155 was adopted on 27 May 2014 and shifted the mission focus from peacebuilding to activities primarily focused on the protection of civilians, including facilitating humanitarian access and monitoring and reporting on human rights abuses.

International and regional efforts continued in parallel to find a resolution to the conflict in the months that followed, resulting in the adoption of a peace agreement between the government (led by President Salva Kirr) and the opposition (led by Riek Machaar) in August 2015. Subsequently, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2241 in October 2015, outlining a series of steps and reviews needed before the Security Council adopted a more comprehensive, revised mandate to ensure UNMISS could support the implementation of the peace agreement.

At the time of writing, the Security Council was expected to adopt a new and revised mandate for UNMISS by 15 December. It is anticipated the revised mandate will focus on re-engaging in many of the institution- and capacity-building tasks which ceased as a consequence of the civil war. Yet again, UNMISS will be expected to draw on some of the best practices and findings emerging from the UN reviews supporting reform of peace operations.

The signing of the peace agreement in South Sudan in August 2015 presented challenges and opportunities for UNMISS' engagement in the country. The UN Security Council was expected to meet in October to adopt a new mandate for the mission, which would provide further direction on the future role of UNMISS. But these developments also presented some risks for longer term peace in the country. Previous efforts to implement a ceasefire had failed. The UN had no substantive role in the peace agreement—that engagement was undertaken by regional organizations such as the Inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD). This raised questions as to whether the

UN mission was the best placed instrument to support peace efforts going forward, or whether regional organizations such as IGAD or the African Union may be better positioned to take forward certain engagements. Notwithstanding the recent political developments, UNMISS continued to fulfil a critical role protecting the civilian population. More than 180,000 civilians continued to seek shelter on UN bases across the country. Even greater numbers of civilians required the protection beyond those bases, although the resources and capabilities of UNMISS to meet those expectations remained limited and impeded by a series of access restrictions as a consequence of a difficult relationship with the host government and opposition forces.

It was in this context that the working group examined some of the lessons for institution-building in South Sudan at the Challenges Annual Forum. This included examining the implications of the narrower mandate adopted by the mission in May 2014, which looked at the challenges of operating in an environment where the mission was required to protect civilians but had limitations on providing any form of capacity-building. It was a timely discussion given the opportunities presented by the peace agreement in terms of identifying potential areas of institution-building across the country going forward.

The working group identified several recommendations emerging out of recent developments in South Sudan. First, there is a need to clarify the role of UN peace operations when it comes to supporting and extending state authority. The original mandate for UNMISS adopted in July 2011 was focused on early peacebuilding tasks, in an effort to build the capacity of the host government institutions, including the security, police and justice sectors. However, with many of the host government institutions complicit in the events that took place in December 2013 and responsible for human rights violations against the civilian population, the mandate for the mission was significantly revised, removing nearly all of these capacity-building aspects. This undoubtedly contributed to a more hostile relationship with the host authorities and restricted options to support longer-term solutions to protect civilians. Although the HIPPO Report recommended that a peace operation should not be present where there is no political agreement to support, this was not possible for UNMISS given its role in the protection of civilians. More analysis is required on the types of support that peace operations can provide to support institution-building that may not include lending direct support to the host authorities (eg civil society and local

organizations).

Second, with a fragile peace agreement in place, UNMISS should be focusing its efforts on building trust and confidence among the parties. This is important both at headquarters in Juba and at the sub-national level. Civil affairs officers perform an important role in efforts to engage and build trust with the local communities by sharing information on the work of the mission, facilitating dialogues and discussions among local actors, often thereby supporting local reconciliation efforts. This can also provide the mission with a better understanding of some of the local drivers of conflict, providing a more comprehensive understanding of the security situation and the threats to civilians. Ensuring there is an adequate focus and investment in engaging at the sub-national levels in a peace operation can support the overall objectives of a mission in support of institution-building and facilitating better state-society relations.

Third, if the mandate for UNMISS is re-authorised, it needs to be realistic and focused on incremental steps in terms of supporting the peace agreement. Focus should be on re-engaging in building the capacity of the South Sudanese National Police Service and building institutions in civil society. This should also be coordinated with national and international efforts to support DDR and SSR activities.

Fourth and finally, UNMISS needs to prioritise efforts that support creating an environment where the civilian population ultimately feels safe and in the case of the POC sites, enable safe and voluntary returns. This requires institutions that are fulfilling their functions in society, including upholding the rule of law (justice institutions) and providing physical protection (police services). Underlying tensions which were fuelling the ethnic conflict need to be addressed through reconciliation and local conflict resolution initiatives. And those that had committed atrocities during the civil war also need to be held to account, ensuring there is no further impunity. Peace will ultimately result only when the civilian population has faith and trust in the government institutions that are intended to ensure their protection. The international community also needs to be willing to consider a range of options if there is a failure to implement the peace agreement, including the application of sanctions.

In conclusion, the working group noted the importance of ensuring the political agreement in South Sudan was upheld and implemented by the

parties. This will require ongoing engagement by regional organizations, including IGAD and the African Union, as well as the international community. It will also require appropriate analysis and planning by the UN Secretariat to ensure that the new mission mandate addresses the needs of the world's newest country when it comes to building institutions – many of which still need to be developed from scratch.

Liberia

Facilitator and Rapporteur: Mr Bart Laan, Chief of Development and Reform, Police Component, United Nations Mission in Liberia.

United Nations Mission in Liberia

On 19 September 2003, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1509 establishing the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Authorisation to deploy a UN peacekeeping mission to Liberia followed the signing of a peace agreement in August 2003. The peace agreement came about after years of ongoing conflict, as well as the engagement and presence of a multitude of regional and UN actors in the country intended to support peacebuilding and capacity-building activities. UNMIL thus had significant challenges to overcome in order to prevent another relapse into conflict and support efforts to build sustainable peace in Liberia.

Resolution 1509 authorised the deployment of a peace operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, with a POC mandate. UNMIL was mandated to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and peace process, support humanitarian and human rights activities and support security sector reform.

The outbreak of Ebola in Liberia in 2014 presented a significant challenge for the mission and highlighted the importance of peace operations in building resilient and responsive national institutions. The crisis delayed the expected drawdown of mission personnel at the time. UNMIL has also worked closely with the neighbouring UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire in terms of providing inter-mission cooperation and support during times of crisis.

Liberia is expected to transition and hand-over security responsibilities to the Liberian National Government by 30 June 2016 (according to the current resolution 2239).

Discussions on the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) focused on the different aspects of institution-building that require attention as a mission is in the process of transition and drawdown. UNMIL started to draw down in 2012, but was affected by the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa during 2014. This presented challenges to the operation of the mission and highlighted the importance of ensuring that the country has effective security, governance and health institutions to manage crises, which challenge not only the maintenance of peace in the country, but also regional and international security.

The mandate re-authorising UNMIL in December 2014 noted that the mission's transition needed to be completed by the end of 2016. This meant the mission had just over a year to finalise handover to the host authorities. Efforts were underway to implement the transition plan that had been in place since March 2015, however it had an overly optimistic timeline and many initiatives were already well behind schedule. In order to support preparations for an eventual transition, the mission continued to focus primarily on how to track change and progress, financial and resource allocation, and the allocation of security tasks.

Within this context, the working group focused its discussions on whether there were lessons that could be learned from the preparations to transition and drawdown in Liberia. This included identifying what was and was not working effectively, and whether there is a way to hold the mission accountable to the capacity-building mandate it has been given.

Building on those broader themes, the working group identified six key recommendations from its discussions. First, there needs to be an emphasis on integrated planning and to focus on the results that can be achieved through the application of existing tools, such as the Integrated Strategic Framework. Even though there are several policies, guidance documents and other tools in place to assist with a comprehensive planning approach to peace operations, they are largely under-utilised particularly at the mission leadership level.

Second, the UN needs to improve and rationalise the reporting lines within peace operations. There are already too many reporting demands placing pressure on missions which often involve significant duplication of efforts. Rather than requesting new reports as a means of measuring progress, the UN Secretariat and the Security Council should consider approaches to

rationalise reporting lines. One approach that was suggested was the creation of an integrated reporting framework, which could ensure that all entities were reporting through the same line so as to avoid duplication. Improved reporting would also assist the mission with its efforts to track progress across the mission. This was viewed as particularly important in the context of a mission, such as Liberia, entering a transition phase.

Third, in the context of mission drawdowns and transitions, the UN Country Team needs access to reliable and sustainable funding. Proper funding channels are essential to ensuring that the country team is able to continue supporting certain institution-building activities within the country once the peace operation leaves. This also requires coordination and engagement with bilateral partners, which are similarly undertaking activities in the country to support capacity-building activities.

Fourth, the Standing Police Capacity (SPC) needs to be enhanced to ensure it is well placed to provide assistance to capacity-building. While views in the working group differed on what the intended role and function of the SPC should be, there was broad consensus that the SPC was falling short of expectations and that these need to be clarified. Participants noted that one of the challenges for the SPC was that it relied on mission budgets to carry out capacity-building activities. It was noted that the SPC might be better placed to undertake capacity-building activities if it had other budget lines to draw on. Further improvements to the SPC would also include an improved roster system and additional mechanisms and arrangements in place with Member States to assist with deployments of police capacities.

Fifth, there is a need for timelines in the context of mission transitions and drawdowns, such as Liberia. Timelines for drawdown can guide the inclusion of certain capacity-building tasks in the mission mandate. It can also assist with analysis and planning to support the role of the UN Country Team, which will often have the lead in supporting the work of the host authorities when the mission exits.

Finally, missions require personnel with the right skill-sets to support capacity- and institution-building. For example, when deploying personnel to support building the capacity of the security or justice sectors, these individuals need to be prepared to transfer skills and knowledge and train other personnel. That often requires a very specific type of training and background. Missions also need to ensure that the personnel being deployed

to support capacity-building are meeting the needs on the ground, rather than the availability of personnel to deploy to a particular mission context.

In conclusion, the working group noted the importance of ensuring there is a sufficient relationship between the start-up and closing phase of a mission. Transitions and exits need to be considered from the very outset of deploying a peace operation, in order to ensure that the mandated objectives align with overall efforts to build sustainable and lasting institutions in the country. Some of the lessons emerging from the experience in Liberia could be applied to other mission's in the process of transition and drawdown, such as the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the UN Mission in Côte D'Ivoire (UNOCI).

Central African Republic

Facilitator: Ms Leanne Smith, Chief, Policy and Best Practices, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations; **Rapporteur:** Ms Lisa Sharland, Analyst, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Visiting Fellow, Stimson Centre, and Research Adviser, Challenges Forum, Australia.

United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)

On 10 April 2014, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2149 authorising the deployment of a UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). That same resolution requested a seamless transition from the previous UN presence, UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA). Furthermore, the mission would take over from the existing African Union deployment (MISCA) as of 15 September 2014. MINUSCA is operating in cooperation with the parallel force of French military personnel (Sangaris) as well as the European Union Training Mission (EUTM).

MINUSCA was authorised following months of sectarian violence across the country. The priority tasks of the mission under resolution 2149 included protection of civilians; support for the implementation of the transition process; facilitating humanitarian access; promoting and protecting human rights; supporting justice and the rule of law; as well as disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation. The mandate took the approach of sequencing some of the tasks, identifying a second tier of tasks if the conditions permitted. These included support for security sector reform and coordinating other aspects of international

assistance (including the work of the panel of experts). The resolution also included urgent temporary measures on an exceptional basis to maintain law and order.

The most recent mandate authorisation for MINUSCA (resolution 2217) builds on the previously mandated tasks and re-prioritises some of the existing tasks within the mission mandate (e.g supporting justice and the rule of law).

Efforts to implement the MINUSCA mandate have been hampered by ongoing sectarian violence and instability across the country. At the time of writing, planning and the conduct of elections were underway before the end of 2015.

As the UN's newest peacekeeping mission, MINUSCA has benefited from many of the best practices when it came to preparing and planning for a peace operation. The Security Council authorised the establishment of the mission in April 2014 but provided the UN six months to prepare and take over from the African Union. The mandate also drew on some early thinking regarding mandate prioritisation and sequencing. Yet MINUSCA has been plagued by several problems. The mission has still not generated the necessary military and police personnel to meet the ceilings authorised in the mandate. The political process has been struggling, with the eruption of violence in Bangui in late September 2015 challenging the capabilities of the mission and resulting in a further delay to the elections which had originally been scheduled for mid-October 2015. Many of these problems existed prior to the deployment of MINUSCA, due to the failure of dialogue and previous efforts to advance SSR and DDR.[41]

Within this context, the working group set out to examine what has been learnt from the establishment of the mission in the Central African Republic, as well as what lessons emerged from the crisis in late September. It examined four different issues: the role of the Bangui Forum, the mission mandate, efforts to address the conflict and support institution-building, as well as exploring the value of a political compact between various stakeholders.

The Bangui Forum was held in May 2015 as an exercise for developing a peacebuilding agenda. The forum brought together more than 700 leaders, including political and military representatives, armed groups and civil society. Topics discussed at the forum included the new disarmament agreement, timelines for elections and the extension of the transitional

[41] Report on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, para. 29.

government mandate, justice and reconciliation and social and economic priorities. It was part of an ongoing process of dialogue and an important part of that was an effort to build trust with and between the participants. For many members of the working group, this showed that CAR was more in a 'trust building' phase than in an 'institution-building' phase.

Nonetheless, there were some concerns that the Bangui Forum made an effort to be too inclusive. It was unclear who owned it or the outcomes that emerged, and that made it very difficult for the expectations of all participants to be met. This subsequently resulted in a narrative that had some overtones of rejecting the international community, which was problematic given the role of MINUSCA and various international stakeholders in supporting the electoral process. While the Bangui Forum was viewed as an important mechanism and process for political dialogue, it raised broader questions within the working group about how you get the balance right between inclusivity and representation, and ensuring such forums identify outcomes which will enable a political solution to the ongoing conflict.

Planning and development of the mission mandate in MINUSCA attempted to draw on best practices at the time. As one participant noted, MINUSCA had one of the best planning processes, since it was inclusive and drew together different parts of the UN system. Key elements in the mandate include protection of civilians, support to the transition and extension of state authority and technical support for elections, support for national and international justice and the rule of law, support to justice and corrections, DDR, as well as urgent temporary measures. Reflecting an effort to better prioritise and sequence the mandate, some tasks such as SSR were identified as non-core priorities, to be undertaken at a later stage. Yet despite this comprehensive approach, the mission has struggled to implement the mandate and address some of the drivers of conflict. One gap throughout the mission planning process has been a lack of understanding and local knowledge about the conflict in CAR. This has been affecting the mission's overall efforts, including its ability to engage in any institution-building efforts with the transitional government.

The crisis in Bangui in September in 2015 demonstrated that there are still many aspect of unresolved conflict in the country. It showed that considerable ethnic tensions remain between the Muslim and Christian communities, with the ex-Seleka and anti-Balaka able to mobilise quickly,

inflict violence on the civilian population and continue to destabilise the political process. There remains a vacuum of leadership. While the elections were intended to replace the transitional government, there is no guarantee that those winning the elections will be perceived as legitimate and representative among the local actors, including those that continue to generate conflict. Furthermore, there is no coordinated approach to institution-building or to manage expectations among the stakeholders when it comes to MINUSCA's approach to justice reform, DDR or SSR. This has led to misunderstanding and distrust among many of the national stakeholders.

One idea of how to address some of the political challenges was the development of a compact between the UN and the host government in the Central African Republic. This was a recommendation that emerged from the HIPPO Report in the context of articulating the responsibilities of the host government when it comes to issues such as the protection of civilians.[42] It was noted during the discussion that the idea of compacts have grown out of the development dialogue, including the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. They have the potential to help manage expectations, which is particularly important during the 'honeymoon phase' (early period) of a peace operation. If you had a compact that captured the maximum boundary of what you wish for a mission to achieve, this could be helpful. But if you add another document that needs to be negotiated from the outset, then that could be too much of a distraction. Discussions in the working group focused on the scope, inclusivity and timing of a political compact in the context of CAR, with differing views on whether it would assist in building trust and supporting the political process.

The working group identified five key recommendations from its discussions. First, the situation in CAR has demonstrated the importance of strategic communications. The Bangui Forum was an example of engaging and communicating between different local actors, the host authorities, armed groups and international actors among the international community. While the Forum was not perfect, it was a critical mechanism in an effort to build trust and communicate among actors that could shape the political and security environment.

Second, the UN needs to have a better understanding of the contexts it is deploying into. Many participants found it astonishing that despite several

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[42] HIPPO Report, p. 39, para.151.

previous UN presences in CAR, there was still a lack of understanding about the drivers of the conflict. Part of this requires talking to the right people, including those that have had a long standing presence in the country such as NGOs and representatives of civil society.

Third, the developments in CAR demonstrated the importance of local level work through civil affairs and human rights components at the sub-national levels. Civil affairs officers in particular facilitate understanding reconciliation and trust-building initiatives. Yet civil affairs officers in particular do not have the support required at UN Headquarters, with two staff supporting the work of approximately 1,000 civil affairs officers in the field. Some participants noted the need to revise the level of support being provided to the work of civil affairs officers at UN headquarters.

Fourth, it is critical that there is an international and coordinated approach among partners on security issues. One example where this has been particularly important in CAR is around the issue of DDR, where MINUSCA has been the coordinator, but not the leader. There are different visions and expectations among the stakeholders. It is unclear who is undertaking the vetting and there has been difficulties getting the armed groups engaged in the process. Managing expectations is critical. For example, expectations will need to be managed with the establishment of the special court, particularly in terms of supply and demand on funding and resources.

Finally, compacts may provide a means of articulating commitments between the Security Council, the Secretariat and the host government, thereby facilitating an improved partnership and the building of trust. But further examination and analysis is needed on what value-added a compact might provide. For example, what would it cover? Who would be a party to it? How broad would it be in application? Would it add value to the UN Security Council resolution? Would it differ conceptually to a development compact? It was agreed that these concepts need to be explored further.

The working group concluded that in order for there to be a more effective approach to institution-building in the Central African Republic, it will be important that MINUSCA manages expectations through strategic communications, engages a wider range of stakeholders and ensures it facilitates a sense of national ownership.

Key Findings and Conclusions

Effective, trusted and sustainable institutions are critical to maintaining peace and security in conflict-affected countries. While peace operations often play an important role in extending state authority, they also need to explore ways to foster and develop state-society relations. By examining the field contexts in South Sudan, Liberia and the Central African Republic, several lessons were identified to improve the institution-building activities of peace operations.

Peace operations need to deploy with the right capabilities and personnel from the outset of a mission to engage with local communities and support capacity-building. Further resources are needed at headquarters to support the work of civil affairs officers, who are vital to facilitate engagement with local communities, civil society actors and to support sub-national engagement. Missions also need to assess the capacity-building needs on the ground and identify the profiles of personnel that can address those gaps (eg those that can transfer skills, policing, administrative functions), focusing on demand rather than supply. Funding and support to the SPC and the use of the roster systems should be reviewed to ensure they are meeting the needs of peace operations, particularly in the early phase of mission deployment.

Missions also need to manage the expectations of the international and local community through more strategic communications. This includes both traditional and non-traditional media, such as social media. Closing this gap would help ensure that there is less hostility towards peace operations in situations where expectations are not being met and foster trust and confidence among the local community in terms of the activities being undertaken by the peace operation to support institution-building initiatives.

Strategic analysis and planning are critical to increasing understanding and awareness of how a peace operation can shape and influence the conflict environment it may be deploying into. Failure to understand the drivers of conflict will make a peace operation ineffective in its efforts to engage politically with the parties and identify the priorities that need to be addressed to improve the immediate security situation, including threats to the civilian population. Missions need to prepare and plan for eventual exits from the outset of their deployment. Sequencing of mandates may assist in ensuring the right priorities are addressed at different phases of the peace operation and that there is a timeline to measure progress against.

Ultimately, any efforts to support institution-building require a coordinated

and comprehensive approach among all of the stakeholders involved. This might include the development of a compact between the UN and the host authorities, which could assist in articulating the responsibilities and expectations among the parties. But the use and application of compacts needs to be analysed further to ensure they can provide support to the implementation of the mandate. Further coordination is also needed to ensure there is sustainable funding to support institution-building activities, particularly when a mission is entering the drawdown and transition phase and preparing to hand over to the UN country team or other international actors. Efforts to track the success of a mission could also be measured better with a more coordinated approach to reporting, with a more integrated reporting framework. This would require focus on developments in the field, rather than internal processes—a key recommendation emerging from the HIPPO Report.

6. Conclusions and Looking to the Future

Chair: Major General Dr Hayk S. Kotanjian, Head, Institute for Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, Armenia, Member of the CSTO Academic Expert-Council; **Panellists:** Mr Alexander Ilitchev, Member of the UN Secretary-General's Independent High-Level Panel on Peace Operations, Russia; Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director and Founder, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden; Mr Davit Tonoyan, First Deputy Minister of Defence, Armenia.

The Challenges Forum 2015 took place at a critical juncture in the reform of UN peace operations. Discussions over the two days drew on experience from a range of disciplines and highlighted the importance of a coherent, cooperative and comprehensive approach to addressing the recommendations in the reviews in order to support institution- and capacity-building in UN peace operations. Discussions demonstrated a diverse range of views and perspectives on the challenges that need to be addressed going forward. In part this was reflective of the different backgrounds and experiences of the participants. This added significant value and a different dimension to the discussions, which assisted in developing a more comprehensive and forward-looking approach to some of the challenges presented.

Participants agreed that the reviews presented a historical and unprecedented opportunity to improve the approach of the UN system and the wider international community to institution- and capacity-building. But in order for these efforts to be successful, the various stakeholders involved—the Security Council, the UN Secretariat, Member States, troop and police contributing countries, regional organizations and donors—would need to work in partnership at all levels and with one another to implement the reforms.

Peace operations provide an important vehicle for undertaking institution- and capacity-building activities in countries emerging from conflict. But they are increasingly being deployed into contexts where there are still active hostilities and no peace to keep. In these situations, peacekeepers can have a

comparative advantage over other peacebuilding actors with the ability to use force and act as a deterrent against threats to civilians. Such efforts can result in early security gains that build the space for a more substantive political dialogue. However, as demonstrated by the context in South Sudan, peace operations may be operating in environments where the host authorities, armed groups and spoilers challenge the implementation of the mission mandate, complicating efforts at undertaking early institution- and capacity-building tasks. These contexts highlight the centrality and importance of political solutions to efforts to bring about sustainable peace, something noted in both the HIPPO Report and the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture.

Efforts by peace operations to provide physical protection and establish a protective environment for civilians contribute to institution-building activities within peace operations. But concerns were expressed about the resources, capabilities and willingness of countries to engage in activities to protect civilians. The ability to establish early gains in a volatile security context is often limited as the UN Secretariat struggles to rapidly generate personnel and resources to deploy to a peacekeeping mission context. It was hoped that commitments made at the 2015 Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping, along with the establishment of improved force generation processes, will provide the UN Secretariat with more options when it comes to rapid deployment and managing the performance of troops and police in the field. If these initiatives were successful, they could assist peace operations in establishing security from the outset of a mission deployment or soon after a crisis breaks out, creating the time and space for ongoing capacity-building activities.

Security sector reform is an important component in peacekeeping mandates and a critical means for establishing security in a country (and building longer-term institutional capacity to protect civilians). However, concerns were expressed that these activities are often vastly under-resourced and lack programmatic funding. Even where donor funding is available to draw on, it is often short-term, resulting in programs that are unsustainable. Reforming the security sector, rule of law and governance institutions can take several generations and requires ongoing investment, well beyond the life-cycle of a peace operations. In many instances, missions also do not have the right expertise or capabilities to draw on. Several participants noted there are many initiatives underway to improve police training and guidance on some of these aspects, including through the policing Strategic Guidance Framework.

However, ongoing support will be required to take these reforms forward and further analysis is needed on the role that the UN system and peace operations undertake in supporting reform of the defence sector as well.

Sustainable financing and resourcing are also critical in supporting capacities at headquarters and in the field to implement activities in support of institution-building. This includes capacities such as civil affairs officers, who perform a vital role in engaging with local communities on their needs and concerns, as well as communicating mission activities. Similarly, gender advisers ensure that missions are taking a gender-sensitive approach when planning operations and activities. However, despite the important and enabling role of these capacities, they are not being prioritised nor receiving the support often required from the UN Secretariat due to a lack of dedicated funding. In order for peace operations to understand the needs of the local community, they need resources, capabilities and training to listen and engage.

The case studies of South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Liberia identified commonalities in technical approaches, but also cautioned against taking a templated approach to peace operations when it came to institution-building. Each situation requires a context-specific response, recognising that institution-building is an inherently political process. National ownership is important, but peace operations also need to focus on fostering state-society relations in order to ensure that institutions are more resilient and political sustainable in the event of crises.

In taking forward the recommendations of the reviews, Member States need to ensure that UN peace operations have the strategies and tools to support institution- and capacity-building. For example, recommendations to adopt political compacts and develop and implement strategic communications could benefit from further analysis and Member State support.

Participants agreed that the implementation of the various recommendations of the reviews will be a complex undertaking in the year ahead. Each review has different processes and constituencies to support their implementation. The Secretariat has to tell Member States what it needs and Member States have to identify their priorities. In the case of peacekeeping, the C-34 will play a pivotal role in that process, as will other bodies in the General Assembly. As one participant noted, Member States need to 'move to where the puck is'. In other words, Member States need to be proactive in

discussing and identifying reforms across all the reviews that would make UN peace operations a more effective tool in supporting institution- and capacity-building.

The Armenian hosts, concluded by underlining the importance of lessons learned and best practices, combined with sophisticated situational awareness of the host country's specific historical, cultural and political context, for the ongoing efforts to enhance the effective implementation of peace operations. The Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the First Deputy Minister of Defence noted that the discussions during the two-day Forum served as a useful starting point in identifying key recommendations and prospects for reform.

The Challenges Forum 20 year Anniversary in May 2016 will provide a further opportunity to continue these discussions and identify priorities ahead of the UN General Assembly High-Level Thematic Debate on the UN, Peace and Security on 10-11 May 2016.

Appendix 1. Programme

Monday, 5 October 2015

Opening Remarks and Welcome

Chair: Maj. Gen. Dr. Hayk S. Kotanjian, Head, Insitute for National Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, Armenia, Member of the CSTO Academic-Expert Council

Speaker: Dr Seyran Ohanyan, Minister of Defence, Armenia; Dr Edward Nalbandian, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Armenia; Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations; H.E. Mr Petko Draganov, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; Prof. Alexander Nikitin, Director, Centre for Euro-Atlantic Security, MGIMO-University, Chief Researcher, Institute for World Economy and International Relations, Member of the CSTO Academic-Expert Council, Russia; Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director and Founder, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Session 1 | Outcomes of the UNSG's Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations: Current Trends, Challenges and Opportunities

Focus: During the past year, the UN in cooperation with the international community has engaged in a comprehensive effort to review the current state of UN peace operations, the environment in which they are operating as well as the results that they are (and are not) achieving. What lessons can we learn from the UNSG's Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations and the Global Study on the implementation of SCR 1325 not only about the main challenges, but also the opportunities of peace operations? What can traditional peacekeeping achieve that robust peacekeeping cannot and vice versa, and what impact does the implementation of SCR 1325 have on the outcomes? What can (and what cannot) the UN do to fulfill its relatively newly acquired responsibility to protect civilians? Is better and clearer mandate formation a means for making UN peace operations more effective? What are the implications of the findings of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and the Global Study on the Implementation of SCR 1325 on institution- and capacity-building?

Chair: Mr Alexander Ilitchev, Member, UN Secretary-General's High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Russia **Background Paper:** Mr Richard Gowan, Associate Director, Center for International Cooperation, New York University, United Kingdom

Background Paper: Ms Hilde F. Johnson, Member, UN Secretary-General's High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Norway

Speakers: Ms Hilde F. Johnson, Member, UN Secretary-General's High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Norway; Lt. Gen. Abhijit Guha, Member, UN Secretary-General's High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, India; Dr Gagik Hovhannisyan, Counsellor, Department of Arms Control and International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armenia; Dr Alan Ryan, Executive Director, Australian Civil-Military Centre

Lunch Key Note | Update and Results from the 2015 Peacekeeping Summit

Chair: Maj. Gen. (Retd) Robert Gordon, Senior Adviser, Challenges Forum, United Kingdom

Speakers: Ms Anne A. Witkowsky, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Department of Defence, United States

Session 2 | Outcomes of the Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture: Current Trends, Challenges and Opportunities

Focus: The peacebuilding architecture has also benefited from a large review effort over the last months. What does the Panel Report reveal about the UN Peacebuilding Commission's achievements during its ten years of existence? What lessons are there to be learnt from ongoing peacebuilding initiatives, in particular about ensuring national ownership and the implementation of SCR 1325? How can the lessons learnt best be used in connection to the implementation of SDG 16? How can the UN and the international community better engage in strengthening and extending state authority in the face of the fragility of states? What means and methods does it have at its disposal to enhance institution- and capacity-building in divided societies? How can the international community's need for a common strategy for peacebuilding be reconciled with specific societies' need for a localized solution, and what role can regional organizations play therein?

Chair: Mr Amr Aljowaily, Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister for United Nations Affairs, Egypt

Background Paper: Mr Alexander Ilitchev, Member, UN Secretary-General's High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, Russia

Speakers: H.E. Mr Petko Draganov, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; Mr Stefan Feller, Police Adviser, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations; Ms Sarah Hearn, Associate Director, Senior Fellow, Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, United Kingdom; Dr Alexander Tsinker, President of the International Expert Center for Electoral Systems, Director of East European States and Commonwealth of Independent States Institute, Israel

Dinner Keynote: H.E. Mr Michael Grant, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United, Nations and Chair of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Working Group, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Canada

Tuesday, 6 October 2015

Session 3 | Institution-building as a Bridge between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Connecting the Security and Peace Nexus

Focus: The Security Council frequently references institution-building in its mandates despite the lack of a common understanding. What falls under institution-building, and what does not? How distinct is institution-building from, and how does it overlap with peacebuilding and the extension and restoration of state authority? What doctrines, policies and guidelines on institution-building for peace are there and what are the gaps? How can stabilization and the extension and restoration of state authority better be integrated into the formation of peacekeeping mandates as well as mission planning processes? What is the desired early peacebuilding "end state" in terms of safety and security? What are the lessons learned and best practices of institution-building as a connecting link in the security and peace nexus? And what role can specialized international organizations play therein?

Chair: Ms Leanne Smith, Chief, Policy and Best Practices, Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations

Background Paper: Ms Leanne Smith, Chief, Policy and Best Practices, Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations

Speakers: Dr Cedric de Coning, Director, Peacekeeping Programme, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Norway; Prof. Alexander Nikitin, Director Centre for Euro-Atlantic Security, MGIMO-University; Chief Researcher, Institute for World Economy and International Relations, Member of the CSTO Scientific-Expert Council, Russia; Mr Bart Laan, Chief, Development and Reform, Police Component, United Nations Mission in Liberia

Introduction to Working Groups Session | Effectively Connecting the Security and Peace Nexus in the Field – Challenges and Opportunities

Focus: Exploring and making recommendations on institution- and capacity-building as a way to bridge peacekeeping and peacebuilding, looking at three specific case studies - South Sudan, Central African Republic and Liberia - in three separate working groups.

Chair: Dr Jibecke Joensson, Head (Acting) of Policy and Best Practices, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden, and Dr Gagik Hovhannisyan, Counsellor, Department of Arms Control and International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armenia

Background Paper: Dr Jibecke Joensson, Head (Acting) of Policy and Best Practices, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden, and Dr Gagik Hovhannisyan, Counsellor, Department of Arms Control and International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Armenia

Working Group Facilitators

South Sudan: Dr Cedric de Coning, Director, Peacekeeping Programme, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Norway

Central African Republic: Ms Leanne Smith, Chief, Policy and Best Practices, Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, United Nations

Liberia: Mr Bart Laan, Chief of Development and Reform, Police Component, United Nations Mission in Liberia

Concluding Session | Looking to the Future

Chair: Maj. Gen. Dr. Hayk S. Kotanjian, Head, Insitute for National Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, Armenia, Member of the CSTO Academic-Expert Council

Speakers: Mr Davit Tonoyan, First Deputy Minister of Defence, Armenia; Mr Alexander Ilitchev, Member, UN Secretary-General's Independent High-Level Panel on Peace Operations, Russia; Ms Annika Hilding Norberg, Director and Founder, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

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INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR THE CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The Challenges Forum is a strategic and dynamic platform for constructive dialogue among leading policy-makers, practitioners and academics on key issues and developments in peace operations. The Forum contributes to shaping the debate by identifying critical challenges facing military, police and civilian peace operations, by promoting awareness of emerging issues, and by generating recommendations and solutions for the consideration of the broader international peace operations community. The Challenges Forum is a global endeavor, with its Partnership encompassing Partners from the Global South and North, major Troop and Police Contributing Countries as well as the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.

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Challenges Annual Forum Report 2015

Institution- and Capacity-building for Peace: Implications of the UN's Review Panels' Recommendations for Future Missions

The Challenges Annual Forum 2015 was hosted by the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the Armenian Ministry of Defence, in cooperation with the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Efforts to address the complex and diverse range of challenges facing peace operations require a complementary, coherent and integrated approach across the UN system and among international stakeholders. This is critical to ensuring that peace operations are prepared and able to support sustainable peace. The Annual Forum Report 2015 examines these challenges departing from an analysis of the recommendations and outcomes of several major reviews and developments throughout the year, including the reviews on UN peace operations, the peacebuilding architecture and the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, as well as the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals. The Forum agreed that partnerships among all stakeholders are essential to progress on the recommendations across these reviews and to improve the approach of peace operations to institution- and capacity-building.

This report comprises a comprehensive summary of the presentations, discussions and background materials of the Challenges Annual Forum 2015 on 'Institution- and Capacity-building for Peace: Implications of the UN Review Panels' Recommendations for Future Missions'. It also presents a number of targeted recommendations derived from the speakers' and participants' views on the current challenges of peace operations.

Institution-building as a Bridge Between Peacekeeping and Peace-building: Connecting the Security and Peace Nexus[1]

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) has come to understand that it is no longer possible to separate its different fields of work across i) peace and security, ii) development iii) and rule of law and human rights. These three are inextricably linked, depending on each other for sustainable peace and prosperity. The purpose of this paper is to explore what role UN peacekeeping operations can play in bringing these three very important pillars of the UN's work together, in what today are rapidly changing global, regional and local contexts.

In particular, what is the role of UN peacekeeping in institution-building across all of its mandated areas of responsibility? How does the UN work with its partners—including host governments, other UN actors and donor governments—to ensure that peacekeeping, by definition short-term interventions, contribute effectively to longer-term efforts?

This policy brief outlines recent commentary and recommendations on peacebuilding, institution-building and capacity development in UN peacekeeping and examines the diversity of such mandates provided by the Security Council. It explores the range of UN guidance available to peacekeepers in this area and draws out some of the lessons that have been learned and challenges that peacekeepers face as 'early peacebuilders' with three key roles: to articulate, enable and implement peacebuilding goals. The policy brief concludes with some reflections of ongoing challenges and opportunities.

[1] The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Challenges Forum Partnership, Secretariat or the Hosts of the Annual Forum 2015.

Background details

About the author

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INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR THE CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

What the 2015 High-Level Reviews Say About Institution-building

The range of recent high-level reviews conducted around the UN's role in peace operations, peacebuilding and women, peace and security provide an opportunity to re-examine how the role of UN peacekeeping in institution-building is conceived and what is understood from the wide ranging experience, lessons and good practices across UN missions.

The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) in its Report offers a cautionary note about what can be expected from peacekeeping operations in this area and distinguishes between peace operations' role in sustaining peace, as compared to long-term, generational efforts to strengthen state institutions.[2] The Report also warns against supply-driven and overly technical approaches to institution-building.[3] It gives examples of non-integrated capacity-building efforts by the UN and talks about the importance of partnership.[4]

The Secretary-General's Follow-Up Report on the HIPPO Report points to institutions as important vehicles for mediation and political settlements: 'Societies with effective, inclusive and accountable institutions are more likely to withstand crises and peacefully manage disputes'.[5]

The Advisory Group of Experts' Report on the 2015 Peacebuilding Review (AGE) called for retaining conflict and governance related issues in the post 2015 Development Agenda through the inclusion of Sustainable Development Goal 16, to 'promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels'. The AGE Report also realistically assesses that a cohesive nation-state and an inclusive system of governance will require enormous work in the aftermath of conflict—clearly pointing to an early role for UN peacekeeping.

The SG Report on Women, Peace and Security calls on all international partners to support national institutions of government particularly with the collection of data on incidents and trends of conflict related sexual violence as well as women, peace and security more generally.[6]

Through each of these reviews, the UN and UN peacekeeping is encouraged to take a principled, lessons-based, coordinated and practical approach to how to engage in institution-building and capacity development. At least on this issue, all three reviews are consistent in their messaging on how peacekeeping should approach this challenging task, based in large part on lessons

[2] United Nations, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People*, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/70/95-S/2015/446, 17 June 2015, para. 128.
[3] UN, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People*, A/70/95-S/2015/446, 2015, para. 132.
[4] UN, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People*, A/70/95-S/2015/446, 2015, para. 157.
[5] United Nations, *The Future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations*, Report by the Secretary-General, A/70/357-S/2015/682, 2 September 2015, para. 10.
[6] United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security,* S/2014/693, 23 September 2014, para. 82.

that the Organization has identified.

It can be argued that an important corollary to the treatment of institution-building in each of these reviews is also the importance they place on the UN making a cultural shift and adopting a new approach to how it engages with local actors and communities, beyond capital-based national governments. For example, the HIPPO Reports states that '[b]y shifting from merely consulting with local people to actively including them in their work, missions are able to monitor and respond to how local people experience in the impact of peace operations'.[7]

Linking these elements of institution-building and community engagement is essential to ensuring that the institutions that UN peace operations help to build provide the services they should to the populations they are responsible to, and that they are trusted to do so. It also provides UN peace operations with different entry points to institution-building, particularly in contexts where the conflict is not entirely over, where governments may not yet be elected nor representative, and where in some cases the institutions that are built might be, or have been, part of the unresolved conflict.

This policy brief will propose that taking a more grassroots approach to understanding and supporting state-society relations will allow for a more inclusive, effective and sustainable approach to institution-building.

...the UN and UN peacekeeping is encouraged to take a principled, lessons-based, coordinated and practical approach to how to engage in institution-building and capacity development.

Range of Institution-building and Capacity Development Mandates Provided by the Security Council

Mandates for institution-building and capacity development have been with peacekeeping for some time—perhaps the earliest direct reference being in Security Council Resolution 1244 for the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in 1999. In some cases prior to and since Resolution 1244, missions have been mandated with transitional executive or semi-executive authority which, although mandated for very good reasons, at least on a temporary basis actually substitute capacity in the countries in which the UN operates.[8]

In some ways institution-building mandates form the basis for what we now describe as multidimensional peace operations. We recall the experiences of missions such as the UN Integrated Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT) that had an explicit mandate to build institutions in Resolution 1704 (2006). However, others too have been mandated by the Council to undertake a diverse range of institution- building and capacity development roles. An extensive internal study of the peacebuilding mandates of peacekeeping

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[7] UN, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People*, A/70/95-S/2015/446, 2015, p. 14.
[8] For example UNMIK, UNMIT and today MINUSCA.

operations was completed by the Center for International Cooperation in 2010.[9]

Before delving in to those mandates it is helpful to consider how institution-building is defined, in the context of the United Nations. Most academic literature concludes that the usage of the term is too wide and diverse to be properly defined. The concept is applied somewhat differently in the areas of development, peacebuilding, rule of law, public administration and governance.[10]

The Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict directs us that:

'Institutions—defined broadly as the rules of the game and the organizations that frame and enforce them—provide the incentives and constraints that shape political, economic and social interaction. […] We must build on existing institutions to ensure that they are democratic, accountable and professional; allow those institutions to develop at their own pace and with a certain level of experimentation; and sustain institution-building efforts over decades.'[11]

The Civilian Capacities Review (2012) notes that '[s]upporting institution-building involves an inclusive process to determine priorities for the functions that build confidence between States and citizens and help to ensure sustainable peace.'[12]

Others attempt to define, from the outcome end of the efforts, what 'success' should look like. A study by the World Bank identifies a minimum of three core sets of outcomes that have to be achieved for an institution to be defined as successful namely that: (i) it is able to deliver positive results with respect to its core mandate; (ii) it possesses broad legitimacy within the country; and (iii) its operation is durable and resilient.[13]

Across the 16 current UN peacekeeping missions, an internal analysis of Security Council mandate language shows at least 64 separate mandated tasks related to institution-building and capacity development.[14] The table below shows a sample of these mandates.

Across the 16 current UN peace-keeping missions [...]at least 64 separate mandated tasks [are] related to institution-building and capacity development.

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[9] Center for International Cooperation, Peacebuilding Components of Peacekeeping Operations: A Review of Security Council Mandates, 2010

[10] See for example Mick Moore with Sheelagh Stewart and Ann Hudock, *Institution Building as a Development Assistance Method: A Review of Literature and Ideas*, SIDA Evaluation Report, Swedish International Development Authority (Skara, 1995).

[11] United Nations, *Peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/67/499-S/2012/745, 8 October 2012, paras. 43 & 44.

[12] United Nations, *Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/67/312-S/2012/645, 15 August 2012, para. 8.

[13] Lorena Viñuela, Naazneen H. Barma and Elisabeth Huybens, 'Institutions Taking Root: Building State Capacity in Challenging Contexts', in Naazneen H. Barma, Elisabeth Huybens, Lorena Viñuela eds., *Institutions Taking Root: Building State Capacity in Challenging Contexts* (World Bank Group: Washington DC, 2014), pp. 1-33.

[14] Note that this total excludes UNMISS as its mandate is now highly constrained under current political conditions. The number would be much higher under the previous mandate.

INSTITUTION-BUILDING MANDATE	MANDATED PEACEKEEPING MISSION[15]
National Border Control/Customs/Coastguard	ONUCI, MINUSTAH
Rule of Law: Police, Corrections, Judiciary	MINUSTAH, ONUCI, UNISFA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, MINUSCA, UNMIL
SSR and DDR	UNMIL, ONUCI, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, MINUSTAH
Electoral Institutions	UNMIK, UNMIL
National Human Rights Institutions	MINUSTAH, MINUSCA
Extension of State Authority/Local Administration/Governance	UNMIK, UNMIL, ONUCI, MONUSCO, MINUSTAH
Administration of Natural Resources	UNMIL
National Dialogue and Reconciliation	MINUSCA, MINUSTAH, ONUCI, UNMIL
Resettlement and IDPs	MINUSTAH

By way of example, these institution-building and capacity building mandates can include: working with national and local courts to build their capacity to deliver timely and effective justice; working with national human rights institutions to strengthen their ability to conduct credible investigations of and report on human rights violations; training police in standards of professionalism including respect for human rights and appropriate treatment of women and children; creating space for inclusive nation-wide consultations for example on truth and reconciliation; building administrative governance systems for a wide range of national and local government agencies; and supporting anti-corruption efforts.

However, given some of the new operating and security environments we find peacekeeping being deployed to, such as in Mali, DRC and South Sudan, institution-building mandates as core elements of multidimensional missions are facing some of the strongest challenges yet. How should we build institutions when the conflict is ongoing? How can we play an institution-building role when the security environment is non-permissive? How do we maintain the peacekeeping principle of impartiality if we are supporting the development of the state that continues to be a party to the conflict or continues to engage in serious human rights violations? This, for some, raises questions about whether UN peacekeeping is able to deliver on these tasks in such environments.

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[15] ONUCI: Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire; MINUSTAH: UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti; UNISFA: UN Interim Security Force for Abyei; MINUSMA: UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MONUSCO: UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNMIK: UN Interim Administration in Kosovo; UNMIL: UN Mission in Liberia; MINUSCA: UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

Range of UN Guidance and Lessons for Peace-keeping Operations on Institution-building and Capacity Development

Much guidance is available to peacekeeping personnel on institution-building and capacity development, from the strategic and broad to the specific and technical. This guidance can be found on the UN Peacekeeping Resources Hub.[16] By way of example, there is a recently approved UN Guidance Note for Effective Use and Development of National Capacity in Post-conflict Contexts (2013) that DPKO contributed to as well as an Early Peacebuilding Strategy detailed further below.[17] The UN Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions has done much work in this area of guidance development for their specific areas of responsibility, such as the DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Police Capacity Building and Development released in late 2015. DPKO has also done several lessons learned studies and internal evaluations on building institutions and capacity on specific mandate responsibilities such as policing, and for particular mission experiences, notably UNMIT.[18]

Some key lessons, reflected in such guidance include that the UN must draw on countries with their own experience of transition to assist others, especially those from the Global South. That what is the feasible within the context of national priorities should become the primary focus and quick wins need to be balanced with long-term results. Peacekeeping must engage in early and integrated planning with UN and other partners to define its institution-building role and contribution to broader efforts.

In addition to guidance and lessons specifically on institution-building, the role of peacekeeping and the importance of this issue for longer term peace-building is clearly reflected in other mainstream departmental guidance such as the Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown and Withdrawal. The Transition Policy has five key principles: i) early planning; ii) UN integration; iii) national ownership; iv) national capacity develop-ment; and v) effective communication. It considers institution- and capacity-building as key prerequisites for the effective handover of mission responsi-bilities. It states:

'All UN actors should prioritise capacity development from the outset of their presence and build on existing national capacities in all aspects of mandate implementation and support, in line with the recommendations of the Civilian Capacities Review […] this may include […] collocating UN and host government staff, where appropriate, and subject to General Assembly approval, donating UN built/owned facilities for subsequent utilisation, and

...the UN must draw on countries with their own experience of transition to assist others, especially those from the Global South.

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[16] United Nations, Peacekeeping Resource Hub [website], http://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community (Accessed 14 December 2015).
[17] United Nations, *Peace: Keep it. Build it. The Contribution of UN Peacekeeping to early peacebuilding*, A DPKO-DFS Strategy for Peacekeepers, 27 June 2011.
[18] For example DPKO-DFS Evaluation of the use of civilian police experts to support capacity-building in the National Police of Timor-Leste 2013 and UN Peacekeeping Operations in Post-Conflict Timor Leste: Accomplishments and Lessons Learned, UN Policy Best Practices Section, New York, 2005.

strengthening local procurement to the extent possible […].'[19]

Although the guidance is extensive and accessible, one area where UN peace-keeping is lacking is in the skill sets and training required to be an effective agent of institution-building and capacity development. This is more important in the peacekeeping context than in most, precisely because UN peacekeepers come from such a diverse range of backgrounds and bring their own very specific experience and perspectives to the countries in which they work. Most are specialists in the subject matter they work on—justice or policing for example—rather than being experts in building institutions or capacity development. This gap was identified in the Review on Civilian Capacities.[20]

Peacekeepers as Early Peacebuilders

In June 2011 DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) adopted a strategy to assist peacekeepers to prioritise, sequence and plan early peacebuilding tasks, including institution-building. The strategy is based around the principle that there is not a linear path from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, but that peacekeepers are in fact early peacebuilders with real comparative advantages and contributions to make to complex peacebuilding objectives.

Peacekeeping's contribution to peacebuilding hinges around three key roles: advancing the political objectives of the peace process and the mission's mandate (articulating); providing the security umbrella to allow other peacebuilding actors to function (enabling); and laying the foundation for longer term institution-building (implementing). It is in this third area that peacekeepers play a direct role in institution-building. As the Strategy notes:

'The nature and scale of a peacekeeping operation's role in the area of institution-building will depend on its mandate, the local context, the availability of resources and an assessment of the availability of capable, credible and legitimate partners within the host nation. Mandated activities should be focused, based on peacekeeping's comparative advantage and capacities to deliver effectively, tailored to achieve the clearly defined early peacebuilding benchmarks and end state, and built on pre-existing structures if these are assessed to be sufficiently accountable.'[21]

For UN peacekeeping to be successful in early peacebuilding, including institution-building, there are a number of criteria and risk factors that have to be taken into consideration. This will require political will at the

> ...peacekeepers are in fact early peacebuilders with real comparative advantages and contributions to make to complex peacebuilding objectives.

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19 United Nations, *Policy on UN Transition in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal,* 4 February 2013, para. 34.
20 United Nations, *Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict,* Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group, A/65/747-S/2011/85, 22 February 2011.
21 United Nations, *Peace: Keep it. Build it. The Contribution of UN Peacekeeping to early peacebuilding,* A DPKO-DFS Strategy for Peacekeepers, 27 June 2011, p. 4.

national, regional and international levels, and it has to include clear and achievable peacebuilding mandates supported by adequate financing. Good local knowledge is required from strategic, ongoing and holistic assessments. Strong leadership, including at the political level, is essential. Broad national ownership and capacity must be present—for this too, popular engagement in the prioritisation of peacebuilding and institution-building tasks must be ensured. As foreshadowed earlier, the HIPPO's recommendations on the need for peacekeeping missions to engage communities more widely and regularly is pertinent in this regard. As a follow up to HIPPO and as part of the UN DPKO/DFS work with the Civil Affairs components of its missions, DPKO is undertaking exploratory work to develop guidance and tools on how missions can better engage with civil society, what role peacekeeping has to play in the extension of state authority as mandated in some missions, and whether there is more room for missions to shift focus to supporting a vibrant and healthy relationship between the society and the state. These efforts are being undertaken with the missions and civil society partners.[22]

Finally, for peacekeeping's ability to have early impact, UN peacekeeping must be able to deploy rapidly to the areas most in need, with the appropriate skills and equipment as has been highlighted most recently at the 2015 Leaders' Peacekeeping Summit held on 28 September. Finally and important-ly, whatever UN peacekeeping does, it must be done in partnership, acknowl-edging the temporal role of the missions and their mandates as well as the comparative advantages of other partners in the UN system and beyond.

Challenges of UN Peacekeeping Engagment in Institution-building in Countries with Unresolved Conflict

A key dilemma for the 'early' peacebuilding role of peacekeeping when it comes to institution-building is the deployment of peacekeeping operations into contexts where the conflict may still be unresolved. In such circum-stances, reconciliation will more than likely be in the very early stages and as such the ability to ensure broad and inclusive national ownership, beyond the current elites, will be severely restricted. This goes to our ability to help devel-op strong foundations for institutions to be perceived by their populations as legitimate, representative and equitable in terms of the services they provide. For these reasons it is clear that institution-building is not merely a technical exercise but a hilghly political one, both in the short- and long-term.

> *When the UN tries to bring best practice to a country where that practice does not fit, the mission runs the risk of raising expecta-tions about what is achievable.*

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22 Cedric de Coning, 'Institution-building as a Bridge between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Connecting the Security and Peace Nexus', in Challenges Annual Forum, *Institution- and Capacity-building for Peace: Implications of the UN's Review Panels' Recommendations for Future Missions* (Yerevan, 2015).

Governance deficiencies are primarily political, especially in fragile and conflict-affected states in which political settlement is still being negotiated. Technical deficiencies in institutions certainly exist, but they are rooted in underlying political conditions and structures that prevent simple fixes.[23]

Experiences providing host governments with international technical assistance reveals that political challenges around institution-building and capacity development can also be highly sensitive, personal and have unforeseen consequences. When the UN tries to bring best practice to a country where that practice does not fit, the mission runs the risk of raising expectations about what is achievable both for the international community and the local population. When institutions are put in a place that require a level of financing that national budgets will never be able to afford, governments become reliant on continuing donor support. When international technical advisers are imposed into those national institutions who are earning dozens of times more in terms of salary than the national staff, a message is sent about double standards and encouraging a brain drain away from those national institutions to international organizations. All actors involved in post-conflict transition must be fully conscious of both intended and unintended impacts as they seek to engage in this endeavour.

'Capacity development creates "winners" and "losers" and affects power relations for better or worse. Identifying, analysing and navigating these power relations and incentive structures [...] must be undertaken carefully to arrive at politically appropriate and technically sound capacity development.'[24]

The Way Forward

The recent high-level review processes provide an opportunity to shake up the way in which the business of institution-building is conducted. For example, the Reports' support for the idea of two-phase mandating would allow for a better analysis of the situation on the ground in the countries to which the UN deploys, and for the UN to develop more tailored and appropriate institution-building based on the local context. This would help to address issues such as the right timing of investing in institutions, and which institutions, as opposed to focusing on other priority mandates such as protection of civilians, particularly in cases where the conflict not be truly over.

[23] United Nations Development Programme, *Restore or Reform? UN Support to Core Government Functions in the Aftermath of Conflict*, 2014, p.19.
[24] United Nations, *United Nations Guidance Note for Effective Use and Development of National Capacity in Post Conflict Contexts*, 29 July 2013, p. 2.

In a related sense, the HIPPO Report's requirement for better analysis, planning and reporting to the Security Council should also help the UN Security Council to determine when it should mandate an institution-building or extension of state authority role, and when the time is not yet ripe. This would be helpful in addressing concerns about institution-building mandates in unresolved conflict or insecure situations.

In terms of the acknowledged need for the UN to foster stronger state-society relations and build more inclusive and representative institutions, the Reports also foreshadow consideration of how 'compacts' between the international community and a host government of a UN peace-keeping operation might allow for an inclusive engagement across the society about what its needs are, what can be expected from its government and what role there is for the UN.

International intervention to build and sustain peace in a country coming out of conflict is often like assembling a jigsaw puzzle. The pieces come from host governments, civil society, bilateral partners, regional organizations and many parts of the UN system. Bringing those pieces together in a way that is effective and sustainable is one of the greatest challenges. Institution-building is one key section of that puzzle, and many actors play a role in contributing.

Member States have asked UN peacekeeping to also make a contribution, and it is the UN's responsibility now to ensure that what is done in this area contributes to national goals and fits neatly with the work of other partners. UN peacekeeping should push ahead in institution-building in areas where the Organization has a comparative advantage and where thorough and holistic analysis and assessment show that the timing is right.

UN peacekeeping should push ahead in institution-building in areas where the Organization has a comparative advantage and where thorough and holistic analysis and assessment show that the timing is right.

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR THE
CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Implementing the HIPPO Report: Sustaining Peace as a New Imperative?

Introduction: the Imperative to Sustain Peace

As the United Nations (UN) High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) was focusing on their encompassing review, it became of particular concern to its Members that in reverse to the gains made in the 1990s and the following decade, the number of states lapsing or relapsing into armed conflict was once again on the rise.[1] Clearly, the track record of the United Nations and the international community as a whole in helping certain countries and regions to sustain and deepen peace processes has become inadequate. This includes UN peace operations. Noting that 'UN peace operations struggle to achieve their objectives,' HIPPO called for change 'to adapt them to new circumstances and to ensure their increased effectiveness.'[2]

HIPPO therefore decided to pay closer attention to issues clustered together under the term 'sustaining peace,' even though it comprises different practical tasks and issues in every specific case.[3] Panel Members were in agreement that preventing armed conflict, including relapse into conflict, should be one of the main objectives of the UN and all other actors when dealing with peace and security. As many current conflicts are increasingly complex and follow a cyclical pattern, the traditional linear thinking related to conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding (a notion that the Panel tried to avoid as it was seen as too narrow and technical) no longer applies. In their submissions to HIPPO, Brazil called for greater efforts to remove the 'illusion of sequencing' between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and Luxembourg and Thailand considered peacebuilding and peacekeeping

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[1] See, for example, Louise Bosetti and Sebastian von Einsiedel, *Intrastate-based Armed Conflicts: Overview of global and regional trends (1990-2013)*, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research (February 2015).
[2] United Nations, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People*, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/70/95-S/2015/446, 17 June 2015, p. 9.
[3] UN, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People*, A/70/95-S/2015/446, 2015, pp. 34-41.

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complimentary and closely linked. Other Member States even encouraged the incorporation of peacebuilding tasks into a mission's first mandate.

The focus of most UN peace operations today is on operational conflict management. While their mandates tend to contain multiple tasks, the ones related to institution- and capacity-building are usually not prioritised, nor adequately resourced. Moreover, the task of addressing the root causes of the conflict, or at least its drivers, is left somewhere else. For many, such tasks should be undertaken in earnest either by other actors, or after the transformation of a peace operation into a 'peacebuilding mission.' It is, however, widely recognised that peace processes do not end after the fighting has ceased or a peace agreement has been signed, or an election has been held. Such events constitute at best major milestones, but not the conclusion of a peace process. However, the UN and other international actors have yet to fully incorporate this notion into their customary division of labour, approaches and, most importantly, practical action.

Of fundamental importance to further enhancing peace operations will be keeping issues related to sustaining peace high on the political agenda, accompanied by unabated political engagement. The HIPPO Report highlights this as a challenge of changing the mind-set of decision makers and other stakeholders towards addressing the needs of sustaining peace throughout the whole conflict cycle. There is growing consensus about moving away from peacebuilding as activities related primarily to post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. Moreover, HIPPO argues for a comprehensive understanding of sustaining peace, pointing out that it is broader than peacebuilding, while peacebuilding is broader than state-building; the latter two being distinct yet interlinked. Sustaining peace, including building institutions, altogether, is a political process.[4]

Against this background, this Policy Brief—focusing on near-term priority areas—first asks the question of whether modern peace operations should engage in national institution- and capacity-building. Second, it considers whether and how the UN could overcome the fragmentation from which, the system is currently suffering and thereby achieve a more coherent approach when trying to support the building of institutions and capacity development. Third, it looks closer at some of the opportunities and challenges that UN Police (UNPOL) is facing as the institution and authority that works closest to the people on the ground. Fourth and finally, the Brief concludes by reflecting on the prospects for the implementation of HIPPO's recommendations.

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[4] Lisa Denney, Richard Mallett and Dyan Mazurana, *Why service delivery matters for peacebuilding* (United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, February 2015). p.1.

Should Modern Peace Operations Deal with National Institution- and Capacity-building?

It is universally accepted that, as part of good governance, credible and effective national institutions are critical for sustainable peace. The experiences and lessons learned from the UN peacebuilding field missions launched between 1989 and 1999 led some researchers to conclude that institution-building should come as a first priority, accompanying efforts towards democratisation.[5] Successfully building such institutions and relevant capacities requires time (from two to three decades) even under the best of circumstances. But it is vital for the success of a peace operation to help put in motion from the outset a dedicated sustainable process. Strong political leverage, which a UN peace operation normally enjoys, with the support from the Security Council, should help to make this happen. This is equally important to help prevent the outbreak of armed conflict, stop hostilities and stabilize a situation in political terms. At the same time, the HIPPO Report cautions that expectations on institution-building often are unrealistically high and misgiving both in terms of outcomes and timelines, and the implications of this state of affairs for practice cannot be overlooked.

The need for (and challenge of) national ownership and legitimate institutions in the eyes of those that they are set up to serve is emphasised throughout the HIPPO Report, and to this end a more people-centred and field-oriented approach is called for. The need to consider—in addition to official ones—information institutions and other social mechanisms is an important message in this regard. The UN has to help the country concerned identify immediate and long-term priorities for institution- and capacity-building, as well as to work out the strategy towards their implementation. Supporting programmes and public institutions is critical for sustaining peace. Priorities in the mission's setting, therefore, must be few, based on joint assessments, coordinated and sequenced on the basis of what is realistic for the country to implement. To this end, the UN has moved away from the model of executing 'transitional authority' (like in Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor), and towards one focusing on the primary political requirements which means priorities that are 'nationally owned' and respected by international actors. There is a noteworthy argument that 'the international community can impose stability, but only the host nation population can create sustainable peace.'[6] It implies a renewed emphasis of peace operation on political approaches to peace consolidation, since 'this consolidation will have to be achieved not so much through the building of formal institutions, but rather in their absence, or while they remain largely dysfunctional.'[7]

The UN has to help the country concerned identify immediate and long-term priorities for institution- and capacity-building, as well as to work out the strategy towards their implementation.

[5] See, for example, Roland Paris, *At War's End. Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004).
[6] United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington, 2009), para. 3.3.2.
[7] Jean Arnault, *A Background to the Report of the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations*, Global Peace Operations Review, 6 August 2015, http://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/a-background-to-the-report-of-the-high-level-panel-on-peace-operations/ (accessed 29 September 2015).

The above necessitates thorough assessment by national counterparts of the country's existing capacities in critical areas of governance, presumably with the involvement and support of envisaged 'UN light teams,' in-country UN family, as well as the main multi-bilateral donors and actors, including relevant regional and sub-regional organizations. In parallel, the UN system is obligated to undertake its own integrated assessment and planning effort of the overall situation in the country for senior UN decision makers. The assessment should help devise a long-term UN strategy, including on sustaining peace in the country concerned.[8] Naturally, there should also be an implementation plan and it should be re-aligned with respective national plans. Both processes should ensure the participation of local communities, women, youth and other relevant groups and their representative organizations. Despite certain sensitivities involved, both processes should try to identify the root and underlying causes of conflict and ways to address them.

Unless and until there is clarity regarding critical gaps in national capacities, the Security Council should not be in a rush to unload the full plate of various tasks onto the mandate of a new peace operation. The growing inclination by the Security Council to entertain the phased and sequencing approach is a logical and practical way towards realistic, implementable and effective mandates. Moreover, as suggested by HIPPO, decisions by the Security Council on including specific tasks related to sustaining peace into mission mandates, should be accompanied by the necessary programmatic funds to support the best way for such decisions to be implemented on the ground.

The existence of credible and legitimate national interlocutors, as well as the selection of such interlocutors, may represent an immediate challenge for the UN. For example, in 1999, the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNAMET) initially refused to involve the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT)—an umbrella body for all Timorese resistance organizations—in handling the humanitarian crisis in the aftermath of 'Black September.'[9] Today's Libya is struggling with a problem of 'how to reassemble a functioning country after its brittle, autocratic and repressive government has been fractured and replaced with warring factions.'[10] This challenge will not go away, as countries in conflict are de facto divided communities, reflecting a breakdown of consensus about which priorities and whose needs matter. The recent agreement on a national unity government in Libya is a welcome sign that the rival political factions have realised the need to join forces in order to address the threat of Da'esh and of terrorism in general.

It should be added that HIPPO Members did discuss the possibility of 'transitional' or 'bridging' arrangements, for when a peace operation with uniformed military personnel is succeeded by a political mission focusing

Unless and until there is clarity regarding critical gaps in national capacities, the Security Council should not be in a rush to unload the full plate of various tasks onto the mandate of a new peace operation.

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[8] See United Nations, IAP Working Group, *Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook*, December 2013.
[9] Emilia Pires and Michael Francino, 'National Ownership and International Trusteeship: The Case of Timor-Leste', in James K. Boyce and Madalene O'Donnell (eds.), *Peace and the Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar Statebuilding* (Lynne Rienner Publisher: Boulder, 2007), p. 124.
[10] Carlotta Gall, 'As Frustrations With Chaos Build, So Do Calls for Help', *The New York Times*, 23 September 2015, p. A10.

on tasks relating to sustaining peace such as deepening national dialogue and inclusiveness including through institution- and capacity-building. This option appears attractive, as such a mission would maintain the political momentum and provide leverage not only for the rest of the UN system, but also for the host country and donors.

How Realistic is International Coherence Towards Conflict-affected Countries?

Fragmentation of the UN system, accompanied by the multitude of other international actors, not necessarily acting in sync with each other, have become a major obstacle in rendering effective assistance to countries affected by conflict. Achieving coherence and coordination of multiple international responses is one of the key challenges in maximising their positive impact on sustaining peace.

Given HIPPO's strong belief that the UN should enable its core strength by making all its relevant components act in coherence with each other, it recommended that the Secretary-General, with the support of Member States, make a focused effort to ensure a system-wide response to the emerging needs of countries in conflict. Overcoming UN divides requires a strong vision and leadership, both within the system itself and among Member States, to focus the Organization on supporting the countries prone to, or emerging from, armed conflict in an integrated manner. Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) should ensure that mission structures and coordination arrangements with UN Country Teams provide for an integrated approach to justice, rule of law and human rights. At the moment, however, there is no unifying body that can coordinate in a comprehensive way, UN responses on sustaining peace, including institution- and capacity-building.

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is one of the increasingly versatile and effective instruments that the system has to this end. It helps to implement a wide variety of projects, actually bringing various UN actors together in the countries where it operates. The Fund focuses on four priority areas: i) supporting the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue; ii) promoting coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict; iii) economic revitalisation and generation of peace dividends; and iv) rebuilding essential administrative services and capacities.[11]

Recently, the PBF decided to support a particularly promising border project, which originated from the UN Country Teams in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, to help improve cooperation between security providers, local authorities and communities to prevent cross-border violence and assist communities in jointly addressing interdependent needs associated with social infrastructure and natural resources. The project will work with at-risk youth to increase

[11] United Nations, *PBF at a Glance, Peacebuilding Support Office*, New York, 2015, p.2. Available at http://www.unpbf.org/wp-content/uploads/PBF-Brochure-2014-FINAL-PDF-in-English_july_2015.pdf

their level of inter-ethnic tolerance and it will support active women's participation in the identification and implementation of cross-border initiatives. But the BPF is experiencing chronic and increasing shortages of resources as donors have to meet what they consider to be more urgent needs.

And whilst the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) has become more active in galvanising and facilitating various parts of the system, it is not operational and highly limited in its capacity to meet the needs. As such, the expectations that accompanied the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005, have yet to be met. Member States may wish to revisit its mandate and modus operandi in light of the recent Report on the Peacebuilding Architecture. Rarely mentioned, but the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) is deepening its work with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in the context of the Joint UNDP-DPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention. The Department is supporting UN Country Teams in fragile contexts. The regional offices are playing an increasingly active and useful role in helping countries to sustain peace, promoting intra-regional cooperation, inclusive political arrangements, good governance and much more.[12]

With its focus on empowering the field, HIPPO suggested that the main action towards enhanced, coordinated and integrated international response should come from the host government, supported by the SRSG and/or Special Envoy. As every organization involved in sustaining peace is relying on their own eyes and ears on the ground, it is only logical to undertake a coordination effort, as well as joint assessments where each participant brings to the table their respective experience and expertise, be it finances, security or natural resources at the country level. HIPPO Members were also in agreement that the country analyses by UN peace operations should include, as appropriate, the dynamics and drivers of corruption. All of that, in the   HIPPO's view, should help develop a political roadmap, coordination framework and division of labour among relevant actors in support of national needs.

In the view of HIPPO, peace operations should pay focused attention to community dynamics, particularly in zones of conflict, deploying local offices as broadly as security conditions permit. HIPPO stressed the importance of the closest possible interaction with the communities, as well as of the support for national initiatives regarding rural and local development. Given multiple complaints during different regional consultations about UN field missions being inaccessible to local populations, HIPPO felt that it was of particular importance that missions offer their assistance to the resolution of local conflicts, and ensure regular and structured engagement with local communities, including women, youth, religious and other leaders. Moreover, a participant at the Cairo Regional Consultations, pointedly noted that 'the recurring valuable lesson is that any peacebuilding effort not anchored in

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[12] HIPPO Members, who visited Dakar, Senegal, witnessed first-hand the experiences of the UN Office for West Africa in this regard.

local community will fail.'

Despite a robust normative framework for the advancement of Women, Peace and Security, many impediments stand in the way of the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 and the six successive resolutions.[13] Chief among these is the lack of national leadership in making this agenda a political and governance priority. Missions should integrate gender expertise within all functional components requiring gender knowledge and experience, particularly when they are involved in institution- and capacity-building.

The complexity and multitude of tasks related to sustaining peace, including institution- and capacity-building, accompanied by limited resources while needs are skyrocketing, makes it imperative for the UN to act in partnership with other international, regional and individual actors. HIPPO embraced the vision of a future of greater global and regional partnership, particularly in Africa, and strongly endorsed the need for the UN to deepen its partnerships with regional and sub-regional organizations. This should enable international actors to bring together their comparative advantages and provide an integrated response throughout the conflict cycle.

...HIPPO's call for the UN to 'become a more people-centred organization in its peace operations.'

Police is the Closest Authority to the People on the Ground

Among specific substantive areas, the author recommends focusing action on police, with a particular emphasis on supporting national police development. First, this would meet HIPPO's call for the UN to 'become a more people-centred organization in its peace operations.'[14] After all, it is the police that is the closest authority to the people on the ground. Second, this is an area where the UN Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) and other actors have already made significant progress in recent years. In addition to 14,000 police deployed in the field as international staff as of early 2015, the UN used civilian experts as police specialists in Timor-Leste, specialised teams in Haiti and employed police training teams from the region to serve as UN Police, for example, in pre-crisis South Sudan. In response to demand for non-fragmented assistance by the UN system, the (now defunct) Policy Committee, chaired by the Secretary-General, decided in 2012 to create the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections (GFP) that supports assessment, planning, fundraising and delivery under the guidance of national partners and UN in-country leadership.[15] The GFP is led by the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and UNDP, with the participation of UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Office of the UN High

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[13] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), S/RES/1325(2000), 31 October 2000.
[14] UN, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People*, A/70/95-S/2015/446, 2015, p. 30.
[15] The GFP is a UN Headquarters arrangement between DPKO, UNDP and other UN partners, providing joint operational country support in the police, justice and corrections areas in post-conflict and other crisis situations.

Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UN Women. While the GFP is clearly an answer for better coordination and joined-up approaches in the field, the operationalisation of the arrangement remains a challenge. One of the reasons is that the Secretariat has no support account budget and limited resources to support GFP assignments in non-mission settings or in Special Political Missions. In DRC, the UN Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO) has been considering, together with the government, the establishment of pilot trade zones, so called 'Islands of Stability' with functioning courts, police and infrastructure.[16]

Many of the Member States provided HIPPO with views on the role of police in UN operations, which were carefully considered. Generally, it was suggested that the mandates' conceptual basis and planning capacities for policing in UN peacekeeping operations needed to be clarified and strengthened. Australia, which during its 2014 Chairmanship of the Security Council held a debate on UN Policing that resulted in a landmark thematic resolution—2185 (2014)—on the topic, along with Sweden, called for the finalisation and implementation of the DPKO/Department of Field Support (DFS) Strategic Guidance Framework for International Policing. Norway called for giving the framework priority for implementation. Germany, with its deep interest in UN Police issues, emphasised the importance of mandating police components within a wider stabilization and peacebuilding strategy. Other Member States including Australia, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the European Union (EU), highlighted the role of UN Police in building the capacity of national rule of law institutions, in close collaboration with civilian capacities in areas including Security Sector Reform (SSR), rule of law, justice and corrections.

The importance of integrated planning through the Global Focal Point was highlighted in this regard by Switzerland and Sweden. Norway called for greater specialisation in the police units deployed to peace operations, including the increased application of the specialised police teams concept, while Argentina and Sweden argued that the police component should lead in combatting transnational organized crime, rather than the military component. Norway and the EU urged for greater collaboration on SSR and capacity-building operations between UN Police and other organizations such as the EU or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as with international and regional police organizations such as INTERPOL and AFRIPOL. The United States recommended to consider, especially in light of the objective to protect civilians, whether the existing ratio of troops to police and the ratio of formed police unit to individual police officers were optimal.

HIPPO advocated for a significant change in approach to police in UN peace operations.[17] Reflecting on the accumulated UN experience in the field, the existing thinking in the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions

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[16] From the visit by a group of HIPPO Members to the DRC.
[17] UN, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People*, A/70/95-S/2015/446, 2015, pp. 54-56.

The HIPPO heard from several interlocutors the critical importance for UN Police to deploy all-female Formed Police Units[...] given their effect on local communities.

(OROLSI)/DPKO and in extensive research,[18] the above change should entail the need for the next generation of UN Police. This generation has to be better trained and equipped in terms of protecting civilians, ensuring at least a minimum of public safety and security, while making a focused effort on helping the country concerned with police reform and building its own police capacity. The latter, no doubt, will have to include training and support in dealing with transnational organized crime, violent extremism, corruption and possible new areas, including cybercrime. These efforts will have to be accompanied by support to the justice and corrections sectors. In all of that, the HIPPO stressed, justice, the rule of law and human rights are mutually reinforcing elements in the work of UN peace operations and UN Country Teams and should be addressed in an integrated way.[19] These efforts should be gender-sensitive and embrace in full the need to involve women and take into consideration their views and concerns. The HIPPO heard from several interlocutors the critical importance for UN Police to deploy all-female Formed Police Units (FPUs), as well as the need to recruit and train more women as national police officers, given their effect on local communities.

Since early 2014, a Strategic Guidance Framework (SGF) of policing has been developed, a document that describes in some detail 'what' UN Policing is and what its core tasks entail. With three out of its four main guidelines finalised, the Secretariat has begun breaking down the core tasks further into practical implementation manuals. All of this promises to provide 'a sound basis for cooperation between Member States and the Secretariat on standards, tasks and training requirements of formed police units, specialised teams and individual police officers; something which is eagerly anticipated by the PCC community.'[20] As part of the effort to operationalise the guidance produced, a significant challenge for the Police Division is to translate the documents into training, given that it has no training resources—neither staff, nor funds. In addition, as HIPPO noted, 'UN police officers are not usually trained to deliver police reform, and the UN's model of short-term police deployments is supply-driven and unsuited for capacity development.'[21] Another challenge will be the implementation of HIPPO's recommendation that UN Police strategies should be based on capacity assessments in the country, with a follow-up reflection in mission planning, staffing and recruitment. All of this requires strong support and cooperation from Member States, particularly when it comes to nominating experienced and qualified officers, conducting pre-deployment training, etc.

Despite those and other challenges, however, there is every reason to believe that decisive progress on UN Policing is not only possible, but forthcoming. Progress in this area presents a win-win situation for all concerned, but first

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[18] See, for example, Marina Caparini, *Capacity-building and Development of Host State Police: The Role of International Police*, Challenges Forum Occasional Papers No. 3 (May 2014); William Durch, *Police in UN Peace Operations: Evolving Roles and Requirements*, Challenges Forum Occasional Papers No. 4 (August 2014); Mateja Peter (ed)., *United Nations Peace Operations: Aligning Principles and Practice, A compendium of research by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*, (NUPI Report No.2, 2015).
[19] UN, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People*, A/70/95-S/2015/446, 2015, p. 54.
[20] United Nations, *The Future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations*, Report by the Secretary-General, A/70/357-S/2015/682, 2 September 2015, p. 20, para.93
[21] UN, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People*, A/70/95-S/2015/446, 2015, p. 55.

of all, for the people on the ground. Most probably, the Secretary-General will continue to experience difficulties with mobilising the required resources from PCCs, but enhanced collaboration with the regional organizations concerned, as well as with potential donors from among 'peer countries,' should help remedy this situation. The considerable pledges made at the 2015 Leaders' Peacekeeping Summit in New York in late September look quite reassuring in that regard.

The planned Police Summit in May 2016 should become a turning point towards meeting the emerging needs, with Member States and the Secretariat coming to a common understanding about UN Policing, including the practical role of police in the protection of civilians. It seems that the Group of Friends of UN Police will have to play a key mobilising role for the success of the Summit. The intention to review UN Police performance and needs before the 2016 Summit is another welcome development.

Implementation: To Be or Not to Be?

The implementation of HIPPO's recommendations is a major challenge. The scope and diversity of proposed changes to increase the effectiveness of UN peace operations, coupled with the working culture of the Secretariat and UN bodies, would indicate that most action is going to take time. Moreover, some of the ideas and proposals have been part of the already existing divides among Member States. Fully aware of all of that, HIPPO went ahead with its recommendations. The Report is not a final word on the subject, but rather an attempt to galvanise the ongoing search by Member States, the Secretary-General and other critical actors for more effective ways to prevent and resolve armed conflict and sustain peace.

At the same time, HIPPO's interaction with key stakeholders at headquarters and throughout regional consultations and thematic discussions confirmed that the time is ripe for a major overhaul of many aspects of UN peace operations. Sustaining this political momentum will be key to the implementation process. The hope is that the most interested Member States, both individually and as regional groups, become 'champions' and the driving force for reform, together with the Secretary-General.

The initial reaction to the HIPPO Report and its recommendations has been encouraging. Importantly, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) welcomed the HIPPO Report, noting among the principles for AU-UN partnership 'an integrated response to the full conflict cycle.' The UN's strategic partnership with the AU is underpinned by principles that apply to other regional partners, including consultative decision-making and appropriate common strategies for an integrated response to conflict, based on respective comparative advantages, transparency, accountability and respect for international norms and standards. The United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission are taking steps to finalise, in

The hope is that the most interested Member States, both individually and as regional groups, become 'champions' and the driving force for reform, together with the Secretary-General.

2016, a Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, which will provide a blueprint for early and continuous engagement between the organizations before, during and after conflict. It would be only logical to also foresee in that context an even stronger trilateral framework UN-AU-EU, given the scope and breadth of the cooperation of the latter with the other two organizations.

In his response to the Report, the Secretary-General stressed that unity of effort and integration must be strengthened across UN efforts in support of a mandate, including with peacebuilding activities and the UN Development Group. The Secretary-General has proposed an action plan where one of the pillars is new ways of planning and conducting peace operations to make them faster, more responsive and more accountable to the needs of countries and people in conflict, while stronger regional-global partnerships is another one. However, one should not underestimate the challenge of bringing the UN system together.

An initial analysis of the action plan by the Secretary-General shows that it focuses on what the Secretariat and the rest of the UN system are in a position to undertake or initiate on their own, but with the support from Member States and other interested actors. The Secretary-General has pledged to engage the principals of the UN on how different parts of the system can be brought together to strengthen preventive and peacebuilding work. Achieving this objective would require full support from Members of the respective Executive Boards. The Secretary-General has commissioned a review by the United Nations Development Group (although the Panel recommended an independent one) of current capacities of agencies, funds and programmes to feed into those and subsequent discussions.

Active participation of various UN partners in developing the substantive contents will be particularly important and needed in the area of national institution- and capacity-building. It should begin with setting up a process whereby specific short- and longer-term priorities for sustaining peace for every single country affected by armed conflict or prone to it are brought into the focus of the UN system and its partners. This could possibly be achieved through an institutional framework that sets up a platform for the g7+ and/or the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), possibly also in cooperation with relevant regional organizations and international financial institutions.

Of particular importance is the intention of the Secretary-General to explore with relevant host governments 'the establishment of compacts as a way to ensure understanding of our mandates and status-of-mission agreements and, as appropriate, support coordinated international engagement.'[22] While the actual contents of such compacts remains to be seen, they have been proposed by HIPPO as a practical way to ensure mutual accountability between the UN and the national authorities in question. Moreover, it would

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[22] UN, *The Future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations*, A/70/357-S/2015/682, 2015, p.14.

be useful if such compacts include concrete, time-bound and measurable benchmarks of progress, along the lines of the recent proposal for 'peacebuilding audits' even though it was put forward in the context of transforming the Peacebuilding Commission into the Peacebuilding Council.[23]

Acting on such priorities is the next step, and this is where the UN system should prove its ability to provide integrated response. It remains to be seen as to whether UN agencies, funds and programmes can be flexible enough within their existing normative and operational settings. Provided all concerned act in a coordinated fashion, we should see first tangible results in one year's time. While the serving Secretary-General, whose term expires by the end of 2016, has decided to leave proposals on restructuring of the Secretariat to his successor, there is no reason for Member States and all others concerned not to think through possible ways to re-organize the Secretariat and maybe other parts of the UN system during this time.

On the other hand, there is every reason to believe that most of the proposed operational changes related to the existing field missions and Country Teams could be initiated in the near future. However, changing administrative and particularly financial arrangements with regard to peace operations may not only require time, but also the consent of the Member States—and more importantly, their agreement on the proposed improvements. The Security Council, the General Assembly and some of its relevant bodies have begun their consideration of the HIPPO Report and the related Report of the Secretary-General. It will be incumbent on their Members to reflect in their respective Committees' own reports on issues raised by HIPPO and, hopefully, move forward towards more effective and efficient peace operations. Moreover, there are emerging signs that Security Council Members and the Secretariat have begun to take on board some of the HIPPO's recommendations and proposals. Hopefully, this will transpire, for example, in making sequenced and prioritised mandates part of the Council's regular practice.   Also, one would expect the relationship between the Secretariat and the Council, as well as between and among the relevant departments and components of the UN system, to become even closer and harmonious.

Member States and the rest of the UN system are also considering the proposals and recommendations contained in the Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, as well as the Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325.[24] Altogether, there are encouraging signs that the UN and its Members are intensifying their search for more effective action and upscaling their efforts toward armed conflict. There is a collective call for urgent change in how the international community conceives of its peace and security instruments, how they are applied and how different actors and stakeholders

[23] *Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance*, Report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice and Governance, Supported by The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the Stimson Center (June 2015) p.92   .
[24] United Nations, *The Challenges of Sustaining Peace*, The Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, and UN Women, *Preventing Conflict Transforming Justice Securing the Peace*, A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, 14 October 2015.

work together to maximise impact. Overall, provided the Secretary-General, Member States and all other actors involved remain actively engaged and focused, prospects for bringing UN peace operations to the next level of effectiveness currently look quite promising and reassuring.

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR THE
CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Capacity to Protect Civilians: Rhetoric or Reality?

Introduction: Protection of Civilians Norms and Frameworks

After the experiences of Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990's, and the United Nations (UN) failure to act, the protection of civilians (POC) has taken an increasingly prominent role in international peace operations. The first mission to be mandated with an explicit POC-mandate was the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNASIL) in 1999. While the emphasis on POC may initially have been met with reluctance, both from traditional Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) and from within the system, the concept has increasingly taken a central role in UN peace operations after the presentation of the milestone Brahimi Report in 2000.[1] More than 98 percent of military and police personnel currently deployed in peace operations have a mandate to protect civilians, as part of integrated mission-wide efforts.

Although the Security Council has recognised the progressive consideration of POC in armed conflict as a thematic issue since 1999,[2] for a number of years there was not much guidance on how such mandates should be implemented. In an independent report on the protection of civilians in the context of UN peacekeeping operations from 2009, it was made clear that missions largely lacked a clear definition of POC and suffered from poor planning and implementation of protection mandates.[3] That same year, the Security Council adopted a resolution that requested all UN missions with protection mandates to incorporate comprehensive protection strategies into overall mission implementation and contingency plans.[4] This, together with other developments, led to an increased focus on guidance to the field,

[1] United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.
[2] United Nations, Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, S/PRST/1999/6, 12 February 1999.
[3] Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor *with* Max Kelly, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges*, Independent study jointly commissioned by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York, 2009).
[4] United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1894 (2009), S/RES/1894 (2009), 11 November 2009.

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trying to improve the understanding and application of POC-mandates. In 2010 an operational concept on POC was published by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS), and the following year a Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations.[5]

Following this guidance framework and additional focus on POC by the Security Council, a POC Policy has now been developed by DPKO/DFS.[6] The intention was to strengthen POC implementation in the field, making sure that there will be a common standard across the system and that the capacities both on the civilian and military side are fit for purpose.

In all these guidelines and policy documents, as well as in most Security Council Resolutions mandating missions with POC-mandates, it is emphasised that the primary responsibility for the protection of civilians rests with the respective governments. The presence of a UN mission or other protection actors does not diminish the obligation of host governments to make every effort to protect their own civilians. However the responsibility of the host government does not dilute the obligation of UN missions to act within their capabilities when they are not willing or able to protect its citizens.

As the UN High-Level Independent Panel (HIPPO) says in its Report, significant progress has been made in promoting norms and frameworks for the protection of civilians. Yet, on the ground, the results are mixed and the gap between what is asked for and what peace operations can deliver has widened, especially in the more difficult environments.[7]

Against this background, this policy brief focuses on the UN's protection capacities, asking what this implies for civilians in the countries where the organization operates. This is related to capacity- and institution-building in host nations, in particular in the security sector. The policy brief provides a short overview of the implementation of POC-mandates in UN peace operations drawing upon the author's experience from the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) between 2011-2014 first, with a particular focus on the capacity to protect through non-military means, and second, on the capacity to provide physical protection. Third, the responsibility of the host government is elaborated upon, ending with some concluding remarks on what the next steps should be in order to further enhance the UN's capacity to protect civilians.

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
[5] The full range of activities that fall within this mandated task are set out in: United Nations, Department for Peacekeeping Operations/Department for Field Support, *Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, 2011; and the Department for Peacekeeping Operations/Department for Field Support, *Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians*, 2010.

[6] United Nations, Department for Peacekeeping Operations/Department for Field Support, *The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping*, DPKO/DFS Policy, 1 April 2015.

[7] United Nations, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnerships and People*, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 16 June 2015, p. ix.

The UN's Capacity to Protect through Non-Military Means

Protection of civilians has for many years primarily been understood in military terms, and the ultimate test confronting peace operations has been to what extent they are able to physically protect civilians under imminent threat. It is important, however, to emphasise that UN framework documents and guidance focus on several aspects of POC and include prevention through political action, as well as other civilian protection work. This is also linked to institution- and capacity-building and is included in the following three tiers:

- **Tier I: Protection through dialogue and engagement.** Activities include dialogue with a perpetrator or potential perpetrator, conflict resolution and mediation between parties to the conflict, and persuading the government and other relevant actors to intervene to protect civilians.

- **Tier II: Provision of physical protection.** Activities by police and military components involving the show or use of force to prevent, deter, pre-empt and respond to situations in which civilians are under threat of physical violence.

- **Tier III: Establishment of a protective environment.** Activities to help create a protective environment for civilians, for example through the rule of law, human rights and protection cluster activities, as well as Security Sector Reforms (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) reforms. Many of these activities are undertaken alongside or in coordination with programmes by the United Nations Country Team or Humanitarian Country Team (UNCT/HCT).[8]

In South Sudan, UNMISS developed a POC-strategy with interventions along all three Tiers outlined above in consultation with the UN and the HCT, and every State office was obliged to do the same. This proved to be an effective tool in relation to both threat assessments and the extensive work that the mission was engaged in.[9]

With the new 2015 policy, a more comprehensive approach is being advised, requesting POC operations to be implemented along four operational phases: (i) prevention, (ii) pre-emption, (iii) response and (iv) consolidation.[10] This should be reflected in a comprehensive POC action plan, including all relevant components of the mission.

While UNMISS has engaged actively on multiple fronts in prevention, peace consolidation and at times also mediation support in relation to inter-communal conflict in the country (Tier I), it has proven difficult to build the capacity of the host nation institutions to take on such critical tasks.

...the mismatch between the UNMISS' mandate and its resources were glaring, making it close to impossible for the mission to deliver on its mandate to provide physical protection to civilians under threat.

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[8] United Nations, Department for Peacekeeping Operations/Department for Field Support, *The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping*, DPKO/DFS Policy, 1 April 2015.
[9] UNMISS Protection of Civilian Strategy, approved by SRSG, 4 June 2012, since then replaced by the UNMISS Protection of Civilians Strategy, 2014/POC/1, 15 September 2014, which in turn is due for revision in 2015.
[10] United Nations, Department for Peacekeeping Operations/Department for Field Support, *The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping*, DPKO/DFS Policy, 1 April 2015, p. 9.

UNMISS has supported the relevant institutions for Tier I, the Peace Commission of South Sudan and the National Reconciliation Committee, as well as peace advisors at different administrative levels.

Although some progress has been made, the best results have not been achieved in the formal institutions of Juba, but locally. It has been most rewarding to work with leaders at state and county level, community leaders and also with religious leaders where conflicts are brewing, emerging and in some cases also escalating. The UN's collective efforts in trying to prevent or resolve inter-communal conflict has borne fruit in several instances, for example in the Equatorian States and the Tri-State Area between Unity, Warrap and Lakes States. In one instance in the latter area a large scale attack of thousands of armed youth was prevented. Tremendous efforts have been invested in the peace process in Jonglei on multiple fronts. But despite signed peace agreements this cycle of violence has shown to be very intractable and extraordinarily challenging to resolve, resulting in for example heavy-handed disarmament campaign and military operation by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).[11] Only when an UNMISS-supported Church-led peace process succeeded was it possible to achieve some stability.

Creating a protective environment (Tier III) has been another major challenge in a country awash with weapons and with significant security challenges, whether inter-communal violence or ill-disciplined and at times violent and abusive security services and forces. Some training in inter-national humanitarian law and POC has been provided to the uniformed forces, but the scale has been too limited to have any real impact.[12]

While UNMISS was from the outset mandated to support the police and rule of law institutions, strengthening them and their protection role is necessarily a long-term effort. The current timelines and methodologies of UN peace operations are not conducive for such capacity-building processes. Nevertheless, the mission has been innovative in finding new ways of using existing UN Police (UNPOL)-mechanisms to provide such institution-building, but only with fundamental reforms in the way that the UN Police Division and UNPOL operate can better results be delivered. Both these points are reflected in the HIPPO report recommendations (capacity-building and police reform).[13]

Throughout its first years, UNMISS worked on multiple fronts to strengthen a more protective environment for people and increase the respect for human rights, including through a close partnership with the Protection Cluster under the Humanitarian Country Team. Also Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) like Non-Violent Peace Force carried out very important work, strengthening communities' resilience and response, in areas of Jonglei where

Although some progress has been made, the best results have not been achieved in the formal institu-tions of Juba, but locally.

[11] United Nations, Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan*, S72012/820, 8 November 2012; and United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan*, S/2012/877, 26 November 2012.
[12] United Nations, Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan*, S/2015/296, 29 April 2015.
[13] United Nations, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnerships and People*, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations, Peace Operations, 16 June 2015, pp. 41-43.

civilians were at risk.[14] However, UN capacity-building efforts of government delivered limited results. In relation to these challenges, human rights and humanitarian institutions of the country have had few possibilities to achieve real impact, despite the best efforts of the entire UN family in building their capacity. It would primarily be through SSR and a transformation of both the SPLA and the Police Service one could see an improvement.

With the crisis that exploded on 15 December 2013, one could ask questions about the mission's efforts to prevent the crisis.[15] While not in the public domain, significant efforts were made by mission leadership to help resolve the tensions, starting already 18 months before the crisis and carried on throughout this period. Also the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)-leaders and regional leaders engaged to resolve the problems. However, none of these attempts succeeded. The failure of prevention was primarily caused by the high risk behaviour of the South Sudanese leaders themselves on all sides. It was this behaviour that led to the outbreak of violence and then civil war, which threatened the lives and livelihoods of thousands and later millions of civilians.

The warring parties in South Sudan have totally failed to protect and civilians have in many cases been systematically targeted. With its limited military capabilities, the protection challenges have been far beyond the capacity of UNMISS. The mission had to open its gates to civilians fleeing for their lives as a last resort. Tens of thousands were protected within the two UNMISS-bases in Juba in a couple of days during the 2013 crisis, and within four to five months 85 000 civilians had sought protection in eight UNMISS compounds around the country.[16] Since then, the UN has continued to report on large numbers of Internally Displaced People (IDP) who seek refuge in UNMISS POC sites during times of violent surges, citing total numbers surpassing 200 000 in June 2015; and reaching almost 180 000 in November 2015.[17]

Both prior to the crisis and during the civil war, the mismatch between UNMISS' mandate and its resources were glaring, making it close to impossible for the mission to deliver on that mandate and provide physical protection to civilians under threat. UNMISS is not the only peace operation to face this problem as HIPPO points out in its Report,[18] and it is therefore important to analyse these challenges more carefully.

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[14] For more information see: http://www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/what-we-do-mobile/south-sudan (accessed 18 November 2015).
[15] United Nations, Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan*, S/2014/158, 6 March 2014.
[16] United Nations, Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan*, S/2014/158, 6 March 2014.
[17] United Nations, Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan*, S/2015/296, 29 April 2015; United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, *Flash Human Rights Report on the Escalation of Fighting in Greater Upper Nile*, April/May 2015, 29 June 2015; and United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan*, S/2015/902, 23 November 2015.
[18] United Nations, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnerships and People*, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 16 June 2015, p. 25, para. 93-94.

Physical Protection - Rhetoric or Reality?

While a blanket protection of civilians mandate in military terms is not possible for UN-missions since the resources would never be adequate, there is still a strong expectation that military contingents act robustly and pro-actively when civilians are under threat. A recent evaluation conducted by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS),[19] has shown that these expectations are often not met, and that far too many missions are assessed as not acting to protect civilians quickly and robustly enough. In other words, many UN missions are perceived to fail in the implementation of their physical protection.

Whether this is the reason for the revised definition of the protection of civilians mandate in the new POC policy, is not known. The definition now contains the additional 'and including the use of deadly force'.[20] It is nevertheless important that this has now been specified.

The impact that this revised definition will have on the performance of the contingents will largely depend on capabilities and the contingents' own willingness to take risks. This is about resources: the numbers of troops compared to the challenge and capabilities, mobility in difficult terrain, and the flexibility and agility of the troops and their willingness to act more robustly.

In classic military thinking, one would need two to three times the number of forces that constitute a threat, to successfully counter that threat. One can compensate for the lack of numbers of troops with force multipliers such as attack helicopters and more advanced weaponry. With more of the latter, one does not need that many troops. In many cases, however, peace operations have neither of the two. Both troops and force multipliers are lacking. If you have high performance mobile and technologically advanced military units you may not need the numbers, but UN missions are normally not provided with these types of military units.

It is not without reason, therefore, that peace operations deployed to small countries are more likely to succeed than those deployed to large countries, where the protection needs in many cases are in remote areas. As HIPPO also pointed out, the resource constraints of many UN missions are dire, particularly in countries that are vast, with a difficult topography, poor infrastructure and climatic conditions, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali and South Sudan.[21]

UNMISS suffered major deficits on all of these fronts. The challenges related to the protection of civilians in South Sudan were grossly underestimated from the outset, despite the existence of a mission in this area six years prior

HIPPO is very strong in its recommendations in relation to enabling missions to deliver on their POC-mandate...

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[19] United Nations, 'Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations peace-keeping operations', A/68/787, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), 7 March 2014.
[20] United Nations, DPKO/DFS, *Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping*, 1 April 2015:5, para. 12-13.
[21] United Nations, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnerships and People*, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 16 June 2015, p. 25, para. 93, p. 59, para. 210.

to its establishment.[22]

The number of troops in UNMISS were wholly inadequate for the task, and much less than comparable missions. The mission had one soldier per 100 km, almost three times less peacekeepers compared to the territory of the next comparable UN mission.[23] In addition, as no realistic amount of troops would be enough for a large country like South Sudan, force multipliers and particularly attack helicopters, would have been essential.

Furthermore, 60 percent of the country's territory is inaccessible for six to eight months per year during the rainy season. The mission would therefore need a much more diverse set of mobility assets to have a chance to deliver on its mandate. Without means of transport on the rivers, without all-terrain vehicles that can move in the mud and the swamps, the mission has been largely dependent on aviation. The lack of proper airstrips implies that the only realistic means of transport is really helicopters.[24] This necessarily limits the numbers of troops that can be deployed and retained in remote locations significantly. In addition, the mission often times suffers from a mobility crisis due to other aviation constraints. The resource deficits have been particularly exposed in Jonglei, but the mission continues to have major challenges all over the country.

In April 2013, during a military capability review, UNMISS had problems convincing visiting colleagues of the urgent need for strengthening the capabilities of the mission on several fronts, despite the POC-challenges threatening thousands of civilians. Only when the crisis hit in December 2013 was it possible to obtain the approval for a significant strengthening of the mission's capabilities, although the surge then took unacceptably long (an equally important issue in its own right).

HIPPO is very strong in its recommendations in relation to enabling missions to deliver on their POC-mandate, both in its proposals for changing the mandating process to better tailor mandates to the needs on the ground, and in making sure that the resources and capabilities match the mandates.[25] At the same time, as more resources are critical, an equal challenge is the performance of the contingents, and their willingness to engage pro-actively in confronting threats to civilians with force. Also here, UNMISS is a relevant example to draw upon. While some contingents have shown to be risk averse, with mission leadership at times having to directly instruct a more robust response, others have delivered on the mandate pro-actively and effectively.

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[22] UNMIS, United Nations Mission in Sudan, 2005-2011.

[23] UNMISS' presentation for SPLA: *South Sudan and UNMISS*, 4 November 2013, based on DPKO-sources: UNMISS' ratio was 98:1 in late 2012. In 2011-2012, the figure was even lower. As the comparator for UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the Eastern DRC was used as this is the primary area of operations for this mission, and the ratio of territory to soldier in 2012 was 17:1. For The UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), it was 29:1, and for UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire UNOCI) it was 35:1. These comparators also do not account for the fact that UNMISS had less infantry and more engineering companies than most other missions. Even if all forces were moved to Jonglei state, UMISS would have had a ratio of 1:19, which was worse than what MONUSCO already had as its presence in Eastern DRC.

[24] Constructing air-strips was high on the mission's agenda, but the engineering companies were delayed in their deployment to the mission, and had to concentrate on building military bases, which also were lacking. This implied that the construction of new airstrips were delayed.

[25] United Nations, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnerships and People*, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, 16 June 2015, pp. 47-48, recommendations 1 and 2.

When the crisis hit in December 2013, these differences came out even more strongly. The national caveats that had been applied by some were expanded and amplified, while other contingents were undeterred and engaged in protecting civilians through impressive and courageous efforts.

As an example of the latter were the efforts in Bentiu, Unity State, when civilians were hiding in hospitals, churches and mosques. They thought they were safe, but it turned out they were not. More than 400 civilians were extracted and rescued from these locations in Bentiu under fire by a Mongolian contingent. A safe corridor was also established to bring more than 1000 people into safety. In Bentiu, this happened several times while the fighting was raging. This was in addition to the efforts that followed the protection of 40 000 civilians in the sites within the UN-base in Bentiu. This shows that results on POC can be achieved, even by an overstretched and under-resourced mission and under dire circumstances. It is also about the willingness of the troops to engage robustly and proactively within their means when they are seeing civilians under threat.

HIPPO used very strong language on the performance of peacekeepers, stating that national caveats were not acceptable and should be treated as disobedience of lawful command.[26] It is incumbent upon the UN-leadership in New York to make sure that T/PCCs do not get away with mediocre performance and the introduction of new caveats when contingents are deployed to UN missions.

POC by the Host Government - Rhetoric or Reality?

As stated in the introduction, the main responsibility for the protection of civilians will nevertheless rest with the host government. When a civil war is raging in a country, the focus has to be on respect for the Geneva Conventions, distinguishing clearly between combatants and non-combatants (i.e. civilians). This was and still is the case in South Sudan, where violations of these conventions is the rule and not the exception. In more stable settings, one should expect that the uniformed forces of a host government do their utmost to engage actively in protecting civilians. This, however, is not the case in most countries, and certainly not in South Sudan. Here lies one of the greatest paradoxes in the UN's approach to POC in its peace operations.

...results on POC can be achieved, even by an over-stretched and underresourced mission and under dire circumstances.

[26] United Nations, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnerships and People*, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, 16 June 2015, p. 28, recommendation 3.

Most peace operations from the 1990's onwards were deployed into an environment where a country had emerged from conflict, and a fragile peace agreement was to be implemented. The UN was dealing with armed forces coming out of war, loose in their structure, and at times including different militia. One could hardly talk about a professional army. While most peace operations are deployed into more complex situations these days, the characteristics of the armed forces the UN is dealing with remain the same.

Nevertheless, the principle is clear; any government has the primary responsibility to protect its own population. However, what is more surprising is that there is no systematic investment enabling host governments to take this responsibility seriously. In actual fact, no government army, whether professional conventional armies or those that have originated from liberation movements, militia or guerrilla warfare, has experience in operations that involve the protection of civilians. Military operations are usually focusing on gaining control over territory and dominating it and protecting territory when this control is threatened. And in doing so armed forces of all categories have often been the predators of the civilian population and not their protectors.

The more static modus operandi of traditional military operations is also different from protecting civilians. Most military see this typically as a job for police forces, formed police units or gendarmerie. The tactics and operations of protecting civilians usually involve highly mobile units much more similar to the more robust armed police units, such as those handling crowd control and riot control. Peacekeepers are therefore not used to such operations, either. This has not been a topic of much discussion, however.

Hardly any efforts are being made to train forces of host governments to enable them to better conduct operations to protect civilians. Very limited investment is being made in developing the numbers of formed police units that more effectively could take on such tasks. Not even UN formed police units are being properly trained in a systematic manner for such operations according to agreed standards.

That training of uniformed forces in the specifics of POC-operations, whether military or police, is not given higher priority is surprising. But more importantly, it is a great paradox that host governments are not assisted with such training programmes to enable their police and military units to develop and build the type of capacities and institutions that are needed to better protect civilians. This is a serious concern. After all, host governments are supposed to have the primary responsibility for the protection of civilians. But without such support, the principle will

remain an empty slogan.

Such POC-training programmes can only succeed, however, when they are developed as part of an overall SSR process, where fundamental issues such as professionalisation, command and control, competence and performance, and discipline and accountability are mainstreamed through the uniformed forces. Civilians will not be protected by forces and institutions that are dysfunctional and of questionable quality and where behaviour will depend on the individual commanders' whims. POC-training, which would be a natural area for the UN to invest in, will therefore never work as a standalone-measure, but will have to be imbedded in the strengthening of the institutions of the armed forces and the police.

To consolidate and sustain peace in a country, reforms of the security sector may be the most critical intervention. As HIPPO has highlighted, the security sector can be the greatest spoiler of peace.[27] Yet, this is maybe one of the largest gaps in international peace efforts. While bilaterals engage in Defense Sector Reform (DSR), often in accordance with their own strategic interests, and with minimal transparency and coordination, hardly anyone, including the UN, supports overall SSR effectively, making sure there is coherence between the reform efforts in the different security sectors.

HIPPO identified this as a major gap. While DSR is not an area where the UN is well positioned to engage, the Panel states that efforts should be made to support security sector reform in a more effective and coordinated way. Given its role in police development and DDR, the Panel states that the UN can and should play a convening and coordinating role in SSR, if so requested by the government.[28] This implies making sure coherent reform efforts take place in all security sectors. This is also affirmed in a recent Security Council Resolution on this issue.[29]

A lot will have to be done to change the way UN peace operations work. The Panel has highlighted that fundamental reforms are needed in how the United Nations Police work.[30] Moreover, in order to develop advisory functions in the SSR-area there is a need to change the way in which UN peace operations support institution-building. This is about capacity-building in one of the most difficult, yet most critical sectors.

...host governments are supposed to have the primary responsibility for the protection of civilians. But without such support, the principle will remain an empty slogan.

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[27] United Nations, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnerships and People*, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, 16 June 2015, p. 40, para. 154.
[28] United Nations, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnerships and People*, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, 16 June 2015, p. 40, para. 154.
[29] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2151 (2014), S/RES/2151(2014), 28 April 2014.
[30] United Nations, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnerships and People*, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, 16 June 2015, p. 41, para. 156-157 and recommendations 1-2, 5 and 6.

In the case of South Sudan, UNMISS had changed the approach of the UN police component entirely, and was about to roll out support to a major institutional reform of the South Sudan National Police together with partners at the time of the 2013 crisis. The commitment was strong also from the Inspector General of Police. It was different with the armed forces, however. The UN Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of UNMISS at the time was very concerned about the lack of reforms in the SPLA and raised the issue several times, both with the highest levels of government and bilaterals engaged with the Army, emphasising also the need for coherence and coordination between all actors. But the UNMISS-mandate was not strong enough in this area and there was no transparency around the support from various countries. While there were plans developed, not much happened.

The lack of reforms in the SPLA was one of the main contributing factors to the escalation of violence in December 2013. While the origin of the crisis was political, it spun out of control largely due to the tensions in the security forces, and its rapid escalation was in no doubt caused by an ethnically fragmented army. The responsibility for this rests squarely with the SPLM leadership and it illustrates how fundamental security sector reforms are.

Conclusion: Strengthening the UN's Capacities and Role in Security Sector Reform

The security sector is too important for achieving and sustaining peace to be left to random arrangements, depending on the situation in each country. At the very least, where a UN peace operation is deployed, a significant effort must be made to make sure that there is a coordinated and coherent effort in reforming the security sector by competent authorities—whether bilateral or regional arrangements—with UN-engagement as appropriate depending on the mandate. With such an investment, the UN would kill two birds with one stone, both for the efforts to consolidate peace and in relation to the protection of civilians. After all, uniformed forces of host governments are supposed to be the primary protectors of the citizens.

If the UN continues its hands-off approach in relation to security sector reform, it may impact negatively on its overall mandate in achievement of peace and security. Furthermore, given the scale of the challenge, and the fact that there are limits to what UN peace operations can do, investment in security sector reform and training in POC operations in relation to uniformed forces of host governments can help make protection a reality rather than rhetoric for civilians in many countries. Without making this a priority, physical protection is

likely to remain an illusion for the vast majority of civilians, even where the UN is present—and even when the promise of protection is widely communicated.

Against this background, the UN and its Member States, in particular the main troop and police contributing countries, have to consider ways in which, the protection of civilians can be scaled up within the UN-system, from a military, police and civilian point of view.

UN peace operations have to be significantly reformed in order to become more effective in both institution- and capacity-building, in particular in relation to the protection of civilians, both on the military and police side. In order to deliver on protection mandates, it is key for UN peace operations both to have the necessary means and be able to answer to requests from host governments to support security sector reform. The Security Council has a special responsibility to make this reality.

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High-Level Thematic: "A World of Risks - A New Commitment for Peace"

Related events

Strengthening Global-Regional Peace and Security Partnerships: The Centrality of the AU-UN Relationship

When:
10 May 2016, 8.15AM – 9.45AM

Where:
 Trygve Lie Center for Peace, Security & Development – International Peace Institute – 777 United Nations Plaza

Organizers:
The International Peace Institute, the Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Permanent Mission of Sweden

High-Level Thematic: "A World of Risks - A New Commitment for Peace"

Related events

High-level ministerial breakfast on 'The Future of the UN Peace and Security Architecture: a Continuum of Response through different stages of conflict'

When:
11 May 2016, 8.30AM – 10 AM

Where:
United Nations, New York

Organizers:
Hosted by H.E. Mr. Sameh Shoukry, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt

High-Level Thematic: "A World of Risks - A New Commitment for Peace"

Related events

High-level conversation on 'Reframing Prevention, Investing in Peace: Moving from Rhetoric to Action'

When:
11 May 2016, 1PM – 2.45PM

Where:
International Peace Institute, New York

Organizers:
The Permanent Missions to the United Nations of the Republic of Korea, Ethiopia, Norway and the International Peace Institute

High-Level Thematic: "A World of Risks - A New Commitment for Peace"

Related events

Beyond the UN Peace and Security Architecture: How can Enhanced Cooperation with Civil Society and Regional Organizations Help the UN to Fulfill its Purpose?

When:
11 May 2016, 1.15PM – 2.30PM

Where:
United Nations, New York – Conference Room 8

Organizers:
The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) & The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)

Additional information:

"Beyond the UN Peace and Security Architecture: How can Enhanced Cooperation with Civil Society and Regional Organizations Help the UN to Fulfill its Purpose?"

Side event to the High-level Thematic Debate on UN Peace and Security
"In a World of Risks: A New Commitment for Peace"

Date/Time: **11 May 2016, 13.15-14.30hrs**
Location of the Side-event: **Conference Room 8**

Organized by:
**The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) &
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)**

Co-sponsored by:
**The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN &
UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service (UN-NGLS) &
The Africa Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)**

Background:

During 2015 the UN undertook three key reviews: the UN peace operations review, the Peacebuilding Architecture Review and the Global Study on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. As the UN reflects on its working methods and the different tools and mechanisms available to address the complexity of today's challenges, it should also consider how more fluent collaboration with actors beyond the UN system would contribute to a more effective global peace and security architecture. Enhanced cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations, as well as civil society organizations with expertise in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, could help the UN to fulfill its purpose.

Regional and Sub-regional Intergovernmental Organizations (RIGOs) play an important role in the collective peace and security architecture. They are increasingly called upon to take over greater responsibilities to sustain peace and security in their respective regions and contribute to the establishment of functioning democratic institutions in post-conflict countries in transition. Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter was conceived to leverage these regional arrangements providing a framework for the relationship between the UN and RIGOs in the field of peace and security. However, it can be argued that this instrument has been underutilized and that cooperation between the UN and RIGOs remains limited.

This situation has been acknowledged by the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. UNSC [Resolution 2171 on Conflict Prevention](#) of 21 August 2014

recognizes that 'some of the tools in Chapter VI of the Charter which can be used for conflict prevention have not been fully utilized, including resorting to regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements.' The UN General Assembly, in its [resolution 68/303](#) of July 2014, also made strong reference to Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter and to the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in mediation. The resolution calls on regional organizations to continue to develop their mediation capacities. It also 'encourages the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organizations to regularly hold dialogues on mediation upon mutually agreed agendas, exchange views, information and lessons learned and improve cooperation, coordination, coherence and complementarity in specific mediation contexts (...)'

The different reviews of the UN Peace and Security architecture also constitute an important moment to examine how the UN engages with local people in civil society through its peacebuilding architecture (PBA). The founding resolutions of the PBA by the General Assembly and the Security Council recognize "the important contribution of civil society and non-governmental organizations, including women's organizations, to peacebuilding efforts." Each resolution also encourages consultations with civil society, non-governmental organizations, including women's organizations, and the private sector. However, the findings from research conducted last year by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) on the inclusiveness of the PBA suggest that these initial aspirations, despite the existence of specific policy guidelines to support them, have not translated into meaningful and consistent engagement with civil society.

The High Level Thematic Debate on Peace and Security presents an opportunity to reflect about the roles that RIGOs and CSOs can play to enhance the ownership, effectiveness and impact of conflict prevention, peace keeping and peacebuilding measures. The contribution of RIGOs and CSOs to the global peace and security architecture can be enhanced by strengthening the mechanisms of interaction and policy discussion between RIGOs, the United Nations (specifically with the UN Security Council) and civil society organizations (CSOs) with expertise in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Establishing better connections among different levels of action (global through the UN, regional through RIGOs and local through CSOs) can enhance collective efforts to prevent violent conflicts and build more resilient and democratic societies.

Objectives:

- To reflect on how to strengthen the global peacebuilding architecture through enhanced CSOs-RIGO-UN cooperation in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and explore how these relationships can boost the role of these different actors.

- To share lessons learned on the inclusiveness of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the existing spaces for the participation of civil society, in countries under the consideration of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and in New York.
- To share concrete recommendations on measures for the building of strategic partnerships between the UN, regional and sub-regional organizations and civil society.
- To highlight existing forms of consultation and collaboration that foster cooperation and experience-sharing amongst regional and sub-regional organizations with civil society organizations.

With remarks by:
- H.E. Ambassador Oh Joon, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN
- H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft, President of the General Assembly

Moderator:
- Darynell Rodríguez Torres, Programme Manager, Policy and Advocacy,
  Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)

The panel will feature:
- Louise Allen, Executive Coordinator, NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security
- Camilla Campisi, UN representative, Quaker UN office
- Cedric de Conig, Senior Advisor, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding for ACCORD & Senior Research Fellow, at Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs (NUPI)
- Massimo Tommasoli, Permanent Observer for International IDEA to the UN
- Walter Odhiambo, Executive Director, the Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa (NPI-Africa)

The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) &
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)
are pleased to invite you to a discussion on the potential of regional partnerships:

"Beyond the UN Peace and Security Architecture: How can Enhanced Cooperation with Civil Society and Regional Organizations Help the UN to fulfill its Purpose?"

Side event to the High-level Thematic Debate on UN Peace and Security
"In a World of Risks: A New Commitment for Peace"

Co-sponsored by:
The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN,
United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service (UN-NGLS) &
The Africa Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)

11 May 2016, 13.15pm - 14.30pm
Conference Room 8, **UN GA Building**
1st Avenue and E. 45th Street, New York

As the UN reflects on its tools for addressing today's complex peace and security challenges, an important question is how improved collaboration with regional and sub-regional organizations and civil society could contribute to a more effective global peace and security architecture. Join us for a discussion on how regional partnerships can enhance the ownership, effectiveness and impact of UN's conflict prevention, peace keeping and peacebuilding measures

With remarks by:
H.E. Ambassador Oh Joon, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN (tbc)
H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft, President of the General Assembly

Moderator:
Darynell Rodríguez Torres, Programme Manager, Policy and Advocacy, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)

The panel will feature:
H.E. Ambassador Smaïl Chergui, African Union, Peace and Security Commissioner (tbc)
Walter Odhiambo, Executive Director, the Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa (NPI-Africa)
Vasu Gounden, Executive Director, ACCORD
Massimo Tommasoli, Permanent Observer for International IDEA to the UN

A **light lunch** will be served from **12:45 – 13: 15 PM** in the area adjacent to the Vienna Café.
This event will be live webcast – to watch the event, please visit (**UN Web TV**)

CONFIRMATION FORM

"Beyond the UN Peace and Security Architecture:
How can Enhanced Cooperation with Civil Society and Regional Organizations
Help the UN to fulfill its Purpose?"

DATE: **Wednesday, 11 May 2016**
RECEPTION: **12:45 – 13:15 PM**
PANEL: **13:15 PM – 14:30 PM**
VENUE: **Conference Room 8, General Assembly Building**

Names of Attendees:	Titles:

Affiliation:	Contact Information:
If you have a UN Pass: Kindly return RSVP to Contact: Mr. Kieran Lettrich (k.lettrich@idea.int), Phone: + 1 (212) 286-1084, Fax: +1 (212) 286-0260	**If you _do not_ have a UN Pass:** Kindly register with UN NGLS [**HERE**]

Beyond the UN Peace and Security Architecture: How can Enhanced Cooperation with Civil Society and Regional Organizations Help the UN to fulfill its Purpose?

A side-event to the President of the General Assembly's High-level Thematic Debate on Peace and Security, organized by:

The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) &

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)

Co-sponsored by:

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN &

The Africa Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) &

UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service (UN-NGLS)

May 11, 2016, 1.15pm-2.30pm

Conference Room 8, UN Secretariat Building, 1st Avenue and E. 45th Street, New York

A light lunch will be served
Please RSVP to m.hojland@gppac.net

Background:

During 2015 the UN undertook three key reviews: the UN peace operations review, the Peacebuilding Architecture Review and the Global Study on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. As the UN reflects on its working methods and the different tools and mechanisms available to address the complexity of today's challenges, it should also consider how more fluent collaboration with actors beyond the UN system would contribute to a more effective global peace and security architecture. Enhanced cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations, as well as civil society organizations with expertise in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, could help the UN to fulfill its purpose.

Regional and Sub-regional Intergovernmental Organizations (RIGOs) play an important role in the collective peace and security architecture. They are increasingly called upon to take over greater responsibilities to sustain peace and security in their respective regions and contribute to the establishment of functioning democratic institutions in post-conflict countries in transition. Chapter

VIII of the UN Charter was conceived to leverage these regional arrangements providing a framework for the relationship between the UN and RIGOs in the field of peace and security. However, it can be argued that this instrument has been underutilized and that cooperation between the UN and RIGOs remains limited.

This situation has been acknowledged by the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. UNSC [Resolution 2171 on Conflict Prevention](#) of 21 August 2014 recognizes that 'some of the tools in Chapter VI of the Charter which can be used for conflict prevention have not been fully utilized, including resorting to regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements.' The UN General Assembly, in its [resolution 68/303](#) of July 2014, also made strong reference to Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter and to the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in mediation. The resolution calls on regional organizations to continue to develop their mediation capacities. It also 'encourages the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organizations to regularly hold dialogues on mediation upon mutually agreed agendas, exchange views, information and lessons learned and improve cooperation, coordination, coherence and complementarity in specific mediation contexts (…)'

The different reviews of the UN Peace and security architecture also constitute an important moment to examine how the UN engages with local people in civil society through its peacebuilding architecture (PBA). The founding resolutions of the PBA by the General Assembly and the Security Council recognize "the important contribution of civil society and non-governmental organizations, including women's organizations, to peacebuilding efforts." Each resolution also encourages consultations with civil society, non-governmental organizations, including women's organizations, and the private sector. However, the findings from research conducted last year by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) [on the inclusiveness of the PBA](#) suggest that these initial aspirations, despite the existence of specific policy guidelines to support them, have not translated into meaningful and consistent engagement with civil society.

The High Level Thematic Debate on Peace and Security presents an opportunity to reflect about the roles that RIGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) can play to enhance the ownership, effectiveness and impact of conflict prevention, peace keeping and peacebuilding measures. The contribution of RIGOs and CSOs to the global peace and security architecture can be enhanced by strengthening the mechanisms of interaction and policy discussion between RIGOs, the UN (specifically the Security Council) and CSOs with expertise in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Establishing better connections among different levels of action (global through the UN, regional through RIGOs and local through CSOs) can enhance collective efforts to prevent violent conflicts and build more resilient and democratic societies.

Objectives:

- To reflect on how to strengthen the global peacebuilding architecture through enhanced CSOs-RIGO-UN cooperation in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and explore how these relationships can boost the role of these different actors.
- To share lessons learned on the inclusiveness of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the existing spaces for the participation of civil society, in countries under the consideration of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and in New York.
- To share concrete recommendations on measures for the building of strategic partnerships between the UN, regional and sub-regional organizations and civil society.
- To highlight existing forms of consultation and collaboration that foster cooperation and experience-sharing amongst regional and sub-regional organizations with civil society organizations.

Agenda

Moderator: Darynell Rodríguez Torres, GPPAC

Welcoming remarks
- The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN

Panel discussion with Questions & Answers
- Walter Odhiambo, Executive Director, the Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa, NPI-Africa

- Representative of the African Union (tbc)

- Vasu Gouden, Executive Director of the African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes, ACCORD

- Massimo Tommasoli, Permanent Observer for International IDEA to the UN

Closing remarks

- The President of the General Assembly H.E. Mogens Lykketoft

FILLING THE GAP:

How civil society engagement can help the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture meet its purpose

APRIL 2015

By Camilla Campisi and
Laura Ribeiro Rodrigues Pereira

QUNO

GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR THE PREVENTION OF ARMED CONFLICT

FILLING THE GAP:

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Laura Ribeiro Rodrigues Pereira

APRIL 2015

Organisations involved in this project

The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)

GPPAC is a member led network of civil society organisations actively engaged in conflict prevention strategies and peacebuilding. The network is of global reach but constituted regionally so that the specific priorities, character and agenda of each region is catered for. An International Steering Group, made up of representatives from each region, determines the network's global priorities and advocacy work. At GPPAC's core is the belief that preventive rather than reactive strategies are best in resolving conflict, and that 'root cause' analysis and civil society inclusion in the formulation as well as implementation of peacebuilding strategies are fundamental to long-lasting conflict prevention.

GPPAC's decision to engage in this review is borne out of its commitment to the practice of inclusive peacebuilding approaches and its capacity to engage with civil society in countries under the mandate of the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture. In 2010, GPPAC also contributed to the Five-Year Review of this Architecture, in collaboration with the World Federalist Movement.

The Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO)

QUNO convenes informal, open conversations at its headquarters in New York and Geneva, providing a space where UN diplomats, staff and nongovernmental partners can work on difficult issues in a quiet, off-the-record atmosphere outside of the public eye. Since its founding in 1947, QUNO's work has been rooted in the Quaker testimonies of peace, truth, justice, equality and simplicity. QUNO understands peace as more than the absence of war and violence, recognizing the need to look for what seeds of war there may be in all social, political, and economic relationships.

QUNO's decision to engage in this review stems from an appreciation for peacebuilding as a field of practice, and a desire to see the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture realize its potential in the coming years.

Acknowledgements

Acronyms

AGE	Advisory Group of Experts
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BNUB	United Nations Office in Burundi
CAR	Central African Republic
CPPF	Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum
CSC	Country Specific Configurations
CSDN	Civil Society Dialogue Network
DDR	Disarmament, Demoblisation, and Reintegration
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EPLO	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
INGO	International Non-governmental Organisation
IPI	International Peace Institute
JSC	Joint Steering Committee
MENUB	United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NGOWG	NGO Working Group
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
OC	Organisational Committee
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
PBA	Peacebuilding Architecture
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
QUNO	Quaker United Nations Office
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UN-NGLS	United Nations Non-governmental Liaison Service
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WGLL	Working Group on Lessons Learned

Table of contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The ten-year review of the United Nation's Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA), which includes the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), is an important moment to examine how the UN engages with local people in civil society through the PBA and in wider UN peacebuilding efforts. A challenge for the UN's approach to peacebuilding in general is that it is often disconnected from the realities in the countries it is supporting: civil society can bridge this gap. Organised civil society provides the necessary link and local grounding for the PBA in all its various activities, and engaging with local civil society offers a way to make these activities more relevant, strategic and catalytic.

The founding resolutions of the PBA by the General Assembly and the Security Council recognise "the important contribution of civil society and non-governmental organisations, including women's organisations, to peacebuilding efforts."[1] Each resolution also "Encourages the Commission to consult with civil society, non-governmental organisations, including women's organisations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate."[2] However, the findings from research conducted by GPPAC and QUNO suggest that these initial aspirations, despite the existence of specific policy guidelines to support them, have not translated into meaningful and consistent engagement with civil society, including women's organisations.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the PBA's current engagement with civil society - as a purveyor of local voices - both in New York and in PBC-mandated countries. This includes engagement with local traditional leaders, academics, women's groups, youth groups, disabled groups, internally-displaced people, church groups, international and local non-governmental organisations (INGOs and NGOs), and other forms of relevant non-partisan groups. Extensive interviews were conducted with UN experts, member state diplomats, academics and INGOs in New York as well as in country by local peacebuilders in Burundi, Liberia and the Central African Republic.

This paper found that while most of those consulted for this report who are in countries on the PBC's agenda were not familiar with the work of the Commission, if better mechanisms for consultation were established, they could offer the PBA a greater understanding of the local context and access to local networks helping it to fulfill its mandate and prevent the relapse of conflict. They can also aid the UN's peacebuilding efforts more broadly. In New York, greater transparency by the PBA in its working methods and stronger strategic partnerships with civil society engaged in policy debates - particularly those that are connected with local practitioners - would further add to the capacity and accountability of the UN's peacebuilding activities.

Engaging with civil society in country can bring local knowledge and a strategic dimension to projects funded by the PBF as well as assisting with the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of these projects. The challenge is in how to ensure that this engagement is not ad hoc while also not compromising the PBA's flexibility. Supporting and liaising with suitable

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1 See General Assembly resolution 60/180, *The Peacebuilding Commission*, A/RES/60/180 (30 December 2005), available from undocs.org/ A/ RES/60/180, and Security Council resolution 1645 (20 December 2005), available at www.un.org/en/sc/ documents/resolutions/2005.shtml
2 *Ibid*.

multi-stakeholder platforms in country could be a practical way of engaging with a diverse cross section of society while minimising extra layers of administration and bureaucracy. Engaging with civil society both in New York and in country could also help improve the PBA's policies and practices related to gender. By engaging with women on all matters and not only those predetermined to be gender-related, the PBA could be more effective and relevant in countries undergoing transition.

Practical recommendations for the different organs of the PBA are outlined at the end of each chapter. They include, amongst many others, a recommendation for the PBC's Working Group on Lessons Learned to organise an annual session on recent developments in peacebuilding practice, with civil society as key participants; a recommendation for the Chairs of the Country Specific Configurations of the PBC to ensure that National Action Plans for the active participation and leadership of women in peacemaking and political processes (in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325) are part of a country's joint agreement with the PBC; and a recommendation for the PBSO to recruit or appoint a permanent member of staff to serve as a Civil Society Liaison Officer to actively seek and coordinate civil society input into various PBC processes as well as track the inclusion of civil society actors, including women and youth, in these processes.

Further overall recommendations emerging from the research findings are outlined below. They are organized under the most prominent themes that emerged during the analysis and drafting of this report.

Finally, it is important to note that although these recommendations specifically target the PBA, the need to address the issues of transparency, strategic partnerships, convening power and

mutual accountability in UN peacebuilding will likely remain a challenge for the PBC, as well as the UN in general, irrespective of the specific outcomes that emerge from the 2015 UN Peacebuilding Architecture review.

Recommendations for the review of the UN's peacebuilding architecture:

1. Transparency

The Organisational Committee of the UN Peacebuilding Commission should review its working methods with an eye to promoting transparency and accountability in the PBC's day-to-day operations, while not losing sight of the benefits of a flexible member-state mechanism. Clear guidelines and processes for the communication of the PBC's activities, such as publishing a monthly calendar of work and circulating meeting materials in advance to relevant NGOs, should be established in consultation with civil society actors. This process would also offer an opportunity for all stakeholders to engage with the PBC around how it does its work and would foster a greater sense of shared commitment to the PBC's mission. As part of this process, the terms of reference for the Chairs of the Country Specific Configurations should be updated and made public.

2. Strategic Partnerships

The PBA should systematically include civil society in its activities and seek to build strategic partnerships with civil society actors, both in New York and in country, to enhance its policy debates and contribute to strategic planning and assessments. To facilitate this, the Organisational Committee of the UN Peacebuilding Commission should revisit the 2007 Provisional Guidelines for the Participation of Civil Society in Meetings of the PBC. This process would offer a key

opportunity for all parts of the PBA to re-engage with civil society in New York and in PBC-mandated countries, and would result in greater transparency and the fostering of trust and mutual collaboration, which would benefit all actors. It would also help to establish clear guidelines for information sharing and communication between the PBA, civil society and other actors outside of the UN.

3. Convening Power

The PBC, through its Organisational Committee, Country Specific Configurations and Working Group on Lessons Learned, should take advantage of its convening power to regularly bring together different stakeholders, beyond national governments, in order to create the space for dialogue, support social cohesion, and bring attention to countries that may be at risk of relapsing into violent conflict. The PBA can work with existing civil society networks in New York and in country to identify a diverse range of participants, including women and youth.

The inclusion of civil society and focus on local knowledge in these types of discussions would be essential to understanding the full context of a country situation and identifying key drivers of violence. The PBC, in its advisory role, could then share the analysis and strategies that emerge in these discussions with the Security Council for countries on its agenda. In country, when Configuration Chairs visit their national counterparts, they should seek to use their convening power to bring together all actors, in particular civil society, including women's groups in meetings with government and the UN in order to create the space for open and inclusive dialogue.

4. Mutual Accountability

In promoting mutual accountability, the PBC should explicitly include a role for civil society and local communities in ensuring that both their governments and the UN fulfil their commitments on peacebuilding priorities and the implementation of activities. This means including civil society in the analysis of national issues, the setting of national priorities and the implementation and monitoring of peacebuilding projects. To facilitate this, the Peacebuilding Fund should require UN agencies in receipt of its funds to consult with civil society actors while developing their project proposals, actively include civil society in the monitoring and evaluation of these projects, and earmark funds for re-granting to local civil society organisations.

INTRODUCTION

"Lack of civil society inclusion is one of the PBC's greatest failings"

Member state diplomat interviewed for this report

In March 2014, Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota of Brazil, then Chair of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), told the Security Council that peacebuilding and post-conflict development must not be seen as a "technology of security," but rather that it has to be "people-centred," meaning that for efforts to be meaningful they must positively impact the lives of people. The 2015 review of the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA), which includes the PBC, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), is an opportunity to examine what a "people-centred" approach to UN peacebuilding looks like. For the PBA to effectively fulfil its mission to assist countries in their recovery from violent conflict and prevent a relapse into violence, it must gauge and measure its success through its impact on people. In practice this requires including the perspectives, strategies and practices of local people in the analysis, design, implementation and evaluation of peacebuilding projects. UN peacebuilding activities beyond the limited scope of the PBA would also benefit from similar inclusive practices.

This paper aims to bridge the gap in understanding between civil society and the UN over what constitutes peacebuilding and suggests practical ways in which civil society engagement can enhance the UN's peacebuilding approaches in the PBA and beyond. It also considers gender-sensitive peacebuilding as part and parcel of engaging in peace meaningfully; from the rebuilding of social cohesion to the rebuilding of legal institutions, the inclusion and leadership of women in identifying the problems as well

as strategising and implementing solutions is vital to the credibility of UN peacebuilding and the sustainability of the outcome. The report considers the PBA's efforts to both target women and mainstream gender in its peacebuilding work. The report includes specific recommendations for how the PBA can maximize and harness the potential of civil society expertise so that a more effective UN peacebuilding response can be had overall.

This report is being issued while three major reviews are ongoing, the review of the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture, the review of UN Peace Operations and the review of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. While these are separate processes, the secretariats and expert panel members of these reviews have acknowledged that there is an added value to exchanging information and coordinating recommendations. In relation to the inclusion of civil society in UN peacebuilding, lessons can be learned from the way in which civil society organisations focused on gender have been successful in making women's inclusion a priority for UN policy debates as well as getting gender-responsive approaches operationalised by the UN at the country level. The overall challenge is that the UN remains siloed in its approaches to peacebuilding with different departments and agencies engaging in peacebuilding activities without necessarily coordinating together, or giving much importance to the potential role of the PBA. The inclusion of civil society expertise in all three structures is key to ensuring the success of a UN peacebuilding approach that is relevant, strategic and catalytic.

I. PUTTING PEACEBUILDING ON THE UN AGENDA

"There is no shared common idea of peacebuilding within the UN"

UN staff person interviewed for this report

While the PBC is only 10 years old, the concept of UN peacebuilding goes back much further. Peacebuilding at the UN was first articulated in 1992's *An Agenda for Peace*[1] and further elaborated on in the so-called 'Brahimi Report' of 2000, named after the Chair of the review panel evaluating the UN's Peacekeeping Operations.[2] The idea for establishing a body within the UN to specifically address peacebuilding needs began to be formally articulated in the 2004 report of the High-level Panel on *Threats, Challenges and Change,* which notes "a key institutional gap: there is no place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace."[3] The idea for the PBC was further

elaborated on in Secretary-General Kofi Annan's 2005 report *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, which describes a "gaping hole" in the UN, which meant that "no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace."[4] An inter-governmental advisory body, the PBC, was officially established at the 2005 World Summit for the purposes of filling this gap.

In addition to the PBC, the World Summit also established the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), all three together comprise the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA). The original vision for the PBC, as described in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, was to "bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery."[5] It was also meant to provide "recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations."[6] The PBSO was created as part of the UN Secretariat to support the PBC, and the PBF (which is overseen by the Secretary-General) was

1 See United Nations, General Assembly, *An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, a report of the Secretary-General*, A/47/277-S/24111 (17 June 1992), available from undocs.org/A/47/277. In paragraph 21 the report defines peacebuilding as preventing the *"recurrence of violence among nations and peoples."*
2 See United Nations, General Assembly, *Identical letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects,* A/55/305-S/2000/809 (21 August 2000), available from undocs.org/A/55/305. In his identical letters, the Secretary-General included a letter addressed to him from the Chairman of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, and his report from the panel. The panel's report is better known as *The Brahimi Report* and in paragraph 13 it defines peacebuilding as *"activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war."*
3 See United Nations, General Assembly, *Note by*

the *Secretary-General,* A/59/565 (2 December 2004), paragraph 261, available from undocs.org/A/59/565.
4 See United Nations, General Assembly, *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all: report of the Secretary-General*, A/59/2005 (21 March 2005), paragraph 114, available from undocs. org/A/59/2005.
5 General Assembly Resolution, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005), paragraph 98, available from undocs.org/A/RES/60/1.
6 *Ibid.*

created to provide timely and catalytic financing for immediate peacebuilding activities and long-term recovery.

Member states in favour of a PBC saw it as a way to counterbalance the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

In the lead up to the World Summit as well as in the process of setting out its founding resolutions in the Security Council and General Assembly, negotiations around the scope and scale of the PBA were contentious.[7] Some member states were against the idea of a PBC. They felt threatened by a more inclusive inter-governmental body that could potentially offer alternative actions and support to the less-inclusive Security Council. Member states in favour of a PBC saw it as a way to counterbalance the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council. It was also a way to extend the sphere of influence of countries who contributed to UN peacekeeping operations be it through financial or logistical support, or troops on the ground.[8] The original vision for the PBC as

outlined in the High-Level Panel's report was a much more robust mechanism, and one that included a strong mandate on prevention as well as peacebuilding. However, member states saw this as politically contentious and the Secretary-General's recommendation for the creation of a PBA (one that member states adopted) opted for a mechanism that would only be engaged in post-conflict situations, ultimately limiting the potential of its impact.[9]

In July 2005, around the same period as the establishment of the PBC, civil society organisations led by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), in partnership with the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), organised a Global Conference at the UN's General Assembly, entitled *"From Reaction to Prevention: Civil Society Forging Partnerships to Prevent Violent Conflict and Build Peace."* The conference was the first informal interactive hearing to be held in the General Assembly on any issue, and over three hundred and fifty representatives from civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were in attendance. Notably, the Global Conference took place in the build-up to the 2005 World Summit when the PBC was created, yet no connection was made between this seminal meeting and the debates about the scope and scale of the Commission.

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7 See Security Council Report (2013) *The Security Council and the UN Peacebuilding Commission*, available at www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/the-security-council-and-the-un-peacebuilding-commission.php; and Hearn, S., Alejandra, K.B., Alischa, K. (2014) *The United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture: Past, Present and Future*, available at cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/un_peace_architecture.pdf; and Salomons, D. (2009) 'On the Far Side of Conflict: the UN Peacebuilding Commission as an Optical Illusion', in *United Nations Reform and Collective Security*, Cambridge University Press.
8 See Hearn, S., Alejandra, K.B., Alischa, K. (2014), in *Supra*, note 9, paragraph 4: *"Parallel attempts to reform the Security Council's permanent membership in 2005 had failed, and the PBC quickly became a safety valve for discontent. The bargains upon the founding of the PBA reflected these tensions. While officially serving as an advisory body to the Security Council and General Assembly, it had no independent authority or*

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decision making power over other bodies. Regardless, some member-states, mostly of the South, perceived the PBC as a potential opportunity to influence the Security Council and to recalibrate inequities in global governance."
9 While the PBC was intended to be a more open forum than the Security Council for discussing peace and security issues, it remains in practice more closed to engaging with civil society than the Security Council itself whose members systematically engage with civil society through mechanisms such as the NGO Working Group on the Security Council and the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security.

The conference was the first informal interactive hearing held in the General Assembly on any issue and over three hundred and fifty civil society and non-governmental organisation (NGO) representatives were in attendance.

One of the organisers for the conference, who was interviewed for this report, described how the NGOs were 'tactically blind' in the two years leading up to the global conference. Even though some of the NGOs were aware that the PBC was being negotiated behind closed doors, the lack of official civil society involvement in the process meant that none of the hundreds of civil society representatives who were in New York for the Global Conference and who specialise in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, contributed to the founding vision of the Commission. While the PBA has since issued guidelines and taken various approaches to engage with civil society, several international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) interviewed for this report trace the roots for the current lack of meaningful engagement between civil society and the PBA to the events that took place in 2005, when even those in regular contact with UN staff working on the creation of a prevention agenda were 'blindsided' by the emergence of the PBC.

Given the shaky foundations of the PBA, including its relationship with civil society, and the ongoing acknowledgement by experts both inside and outside the UN that the PBC has yet to live up to its full potential, a key approach for the PBA 2015 review is to go back to the original vision of the PBA in order to find a way forward. Much has also evolved in UN peacebuilding since the creation of the PBA and it has been acknowledged in the terms of reference for the

review that the PBA needs to be viewed in relation to the entire UN system.[10]

Some of the key developments in UN peacebuilding since 2005 include:
- The expansion of multidimensional peacekeeping[11] and special political missions,[12] including several UN peacekeeping missions with peacebuilding specific mandates. Top UN leadership in country, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, as well as Resident Coordinators are also more often involved in supporting national peacebuilding processes.
- The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 2005 and UN Security Council Resolution 2122 in 2013, which put in place a roadmap for a more systematic implementation of UNSCR 1325.[13]

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10 See United Nations, General Assembly, *Letter dated 15 December 2014 from the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General,* A/69/674–S/2014/911 (17 December 2014), available from undocs.org/A/69/674.

11 See United Nations Peacekeeping Operations website: *"Today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organisation of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law."* Available at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml

12 See United Nations Department of Political Affairs website: *"DPA-led field operations are headed by senior representatives of the Secretary-General and provide a forward platform for preventive diplomacy and other activities across a range of disciplines, to help prevent and resolve conflict or to build lasting peace in nations emerging from civil wars."* Available at www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/about/field_operations

13 The measures proposed in SCR 2122 include: the development and deployment of technical expertise for peacekeeping missions and UN mediation teams supporting peace talks; improved access to timely information and analysis on the impact of conflict on women; strengthened commitments to consult as well

Civil society at the UN General Assembly as part of the Global Conference , 2005.

- The establishment of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), which reverted back into the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support in 2014, focusing on issues related to peacebuilding and prevention.[14]
- The Joint UNDP-Department of Political Affairs Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention and its Peace and Development Advisors, who are active in many countries around the world and play a key role in supporting the UN's peacebuilding and prevention efforts by providing a local perspective and connecting with local civil society.
- The increased use of Gender Advisers by UN agencies, most notably UNDP.
- The increased role of regional and sub-regional organisations, particularly in Africa, as key interlocutors for the UN in building and sustaining peace, encouraging national ownership and developing regional action

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as include women directly in peace talks.

14 Many civil society actors that had engaged in the work of the BCPR saw its resumption into the parent policy unit within UNDP as a reversal of institutional commitment towards inclusive peacebuilding and conflict prevention on the part of UNDP.

plans for implementing UNSCR 1325.

Interestingly, the research for this report found that what the UN defines as peacebuilding and the kinds of activities this involves are different from those of local civil society, especially those who consider themselves peacebuilders. For example, the UN will focus on building legal infrastructures in the pursuit of rule of law while a local mediator will work on bringing survivors and perpetrators together in the pursuit of healing. This question of how peacebuilding is defined and operationalised inside and outside of the UN is a key area where civil society engagement can lead to improved practices and greater impact on the ground.

1. Civil society engagement in UN policy debates

Article 71 of the UN Charter gives NGOs the right to consult with the UN. It states: "the Economic and Social Council may take suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations which are concerned with matters within its competence." The fact that this article specifically refers to NGO consultation with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) means that technically, NGOs do not have the same status with other UN inter-governmental bodies such as the Security Council. Consequently, NGO engagement on peace and security issues has been historically less formal and systematic.

While the Charter for the UN allows for consultation with NGOs, what has transpired in practice, particularly over the past decade, has varied greatly. Civil society engagement with the UN also varies between consultations in New York and in country. In addition - as observed by member states, UN staff and civil society actors consulted for this report - the overall space for civil society engagement with the UN has shrunk over the past decade.

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Starting in the 1990s, there were a series of world conferences in the areas of human rights, development and the environment that focused international attention on important issues and included key roles for civil society in helping the UN to set its global agenda. This time is referenced by many as a very positive era for the coordination and collaboration between civil society and the UN. During this period, civil society, are credited with helping to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997 and the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998.

However, by 2004 the use of global conferences as a way to help shape the UN's policy agenda declined and was ultimately replaced by the use of High-Level Panels, which are seen as a much more closed process than the global conferences, making it difficult for civil society to engage meaningfully. The use of High-Level Panels continues today with the appointment of the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE), a High-Level Panel, for the review of the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture in 2015.

2. The UN's Peacebuilding Architecture

While the 2015 review of the PBA will look at peacebuilding in the wider UN system, its main focus will be the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture (PBC, PBSO, and PBF). It is therefore useful to understand the purpose and scope of the various

parts of the PBA before looking more closely at how civil society engages with the Architecture in its peacebuilding work.

The Peacebuilding Commission

The PBC is an intergovernmental advisory body that supports the UN's peace consolidation efforts in countries emerging from conflict. It is a political and non-operational body that helps focus the attention and resources of the international community on post-conflict countries in the immediate aftermath of conflict, enabling them to make the transition to sustainable peace and development. Its engagement in each individual country is by nature transitory and context-specific.

The PBC's governing body, the Organisational Committee (OC), is composed of 31 Member States,[15] with renewable terms every two years, and sets the agenda for the Commission's work (its calendar and activities). Countries currently on the PBC's agenda are: Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic (CAR), Liberia and Guinea. The elected Ambassador Chair of the OC changes each year, rotating through the various UN geographical regions. The current Chair of the OC is Sweden. A Vice-Chair is also appointed annually.

The bulk of the PBC's work is done through the Country Specific Configurations (CSCs), which are composed of a constellation of the members of the OC as well as other concerned states, often regional neighbours. CSCs are chaired

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15 Seven member states are from the Security Council, including the five permanent members, seven are elected from ECOSOC, and seven are elected from the General Assembly. Of these, five are from the top financial contributors to the UN, five are from the top troop contributors to UN peace operations. Some regional governmental organisations are also represented such as the EU and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, as are the IFM and the World Bank.

by an Ambassador of a participating country, often the Permanent Representative to the UN of that country. With the support of the PBSO, the Chairs of the CSCs oversee the development of an instrument of engagement between the government of the country in question and the PBC - this is essentially a document that highlights the priority areas for peacebuilding in that country. The role of the CSC is to ensure that the mutual commitments are met, and in addition to organising briefings in New York, the Chair often travels to the mandated country to follow up and engage with the national government. The current Chairs for the countries on the PBC's agenda are: Switzerland (Burundi), Canada (Sierra Leone), Luxembourg (Guinea), Brazil (Guinea-Bissau), Sweden (Liberia), and Morocco (CAR). CSCs also issue reviews of the instruments of engagement and Chairs are asked to brief the Security Council on countries on its agenda in open meetings, often before a mission mandate renewal or during an emergency response to a crisis. CSC Chairs do not participate in the Security Council's closed consultations.

The Working Group on Lessons Learned

The Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL) distils lessons from the UN's national and international experiences in post-conflict engagements, with the aim of developing "forward-looking lessons and recommendations for post-conflict strategies and implementations."[16] The current Chair of the WGLL is Japan.

The Peacebuilding Support Office

The PBSO was established to assist and support the PBC with strategic advice and policy guidance, administer the PBF and coordinate

peacebuilding efforts between UN agencies. The PBSO also coordinates the sharing of information between the CSCs and the UN's peacekeeping, humanitarian, development, political and mediation departments. The PBSO has three branches: Peacebuilding Commission Support; Policy, Planning and Application; and Financing for Peacebuilding. The PBSO is headed by an Assistant Secretary-General, currently Oscar Fernandez-Taranco of Argentina.

The Peacebuilding Fund

Following a request from the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Secretary-General established a Peacebuilding Fund for post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives in October 2006. The PBF is a fund of the Secretary-General but is managed by the PBSO. The PBF addresses immediate needs in countries emerging from conflict at a time when sufficient resources are not available from other funding mechanisms. It supports interventions of direct and immediate relevance to the peacebuilding process and addresses critical gaps in that process. The PBF focuses on delivering services in the very early stages of a peacebuilding process, before donor conferences are organised and funding mechanisms such as country-specific multi-donor trust funds have been set up. As of February 2014, the PBF had disbursed $443.7million USD to 21 UN entities working in the 6 PBC-mandated countries and 23 others.[17] The six countries on the PBC agenda have received about 60% of the overall funds.

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16 See United Nations Peacebuilding Commission website on its Working Group for Lessons Learned, available at hwww.un.org/en/peacebuilding/sm_ lessonslearned.shtml

17 PBSO (2014) *Independent Thematic Review on Gender for the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, March 2014.*

II. PERSPECTIVES FROM PBC-MANDATED COUNTRIES

"Peacebuilding is everybody's business."

Member state diplomat interviewed for this report

Although the PBA is a New York based body, the work it is ultimately tasked to support, goes on in the countries on its agenda, and this is where the impact of its actions can be measured. The six countries currently on the PBC's agenda are Burundi, Sierra Leone, the CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Guinea. A typical criticism of the PBA is that none of these countries have yet to 'graduate' from the PBC. In fact, two countries under the PBC's care have relapsed into conflict in 2012, Guinea-Bissau and the CAR. At the same time, no new country has joined the PBC's agenda since Guinea in 2011. Countries join the PBC by way of self-selection, often on the advice of the UN Secretary-General or the Security Council. In order to delve deeper into how the PBA engages with countries on its agenda, and in particular the special role that local civil society has played and the value added they can bring, this report carried out research with focus groups and key-informant interviews in three of the six countries on the PBC's agenda: Burundi, CAR and Liberia.[18]

1. Burundi

Burundi, along with Sierra Leone, was one of the first countries to come under the PBC's mandate in 2006, following a referral by the Security Council. Emerging from decades of conflict with the signing of the Arusha peace agreement in 2000, it was initially hoped that the PBC would marshal much needed resources for Burundi and support the country's transition to stability in several peacebuilding areas identified jointly by the government and the PBC. These included; good governance, transitional justice, security sector reform and rule of law, human rights and impunity, and land reform and socioeconomic recovery. Burundi remains on the agenda of the Security Council but has seen a shift in the kind of presence the UN maintains on the ground, from a peacekeeping mission (ONUB) to an integrated peacebuilding office (BINUB), to a further scaled-down UN office (BNUB) and most recently in January 2015, to an electoral observer mission (MENUB).

The relationship between the Burundian government and the UN has been charged at times. The PBC however, is credited with marshaling significant resources and international attention to the country, particularly thanks to the work of Ambassador Paul Seger of Switzerland as the Chair of the Burundi CSC. Prior to Switzerland, Norway and Sweden held the chairmanship of the Burundi configuration. Overall, Burundi is often cited as an example where the PBC has been able to play its role as a 'critical friend' of a national government, offering support and encouragement publically, while also being forthright with the national leadership about the challenges they face and holding them to account privately. The upcoming national elections in the summer of 2015 risk being a flashpoint for violence in the country and will test the UN and PBC's ability to prevent violent conflict in one of the longest-standing countries on its agenda. Also, Ambassador Seger will be leaving his post in New York in the summer of

18 For detailed background summaries on the UN and the PBC's involvement in these country cases see Security Council Report (2013)*, in Supra,* note 9.

2015 but Switzerland will continue to Chair the Burundi CSC.

Civil society actors consulted in this research, who had experience in engaging with the PBC, said that in light of this critical period it would have been preferable for Ambassador Seger's chairmanship to have been extended beyond the elections, and importantly, they could have brought this recommendation to his attention, or the attention of the PBSO in New York, had there been proper mechanisms established for their engagement with the PBA.

That being said, the majority of Burundian civil society representatives consulted during this research were largely unfamiliar with the work of the PBA. While the PBC's mission in Burundi is to promote peacebuilding, several participants noted that the transitional process is incomplete, in large part due to a lack of regular monitoring and feedback from a diversity of civil society actors on the progress that peacebuilding efforts have made in the country. There was a perceived failure of the UN to check-in with people and see the impact that peacebuilding activities have had on their lives. The main obstacles to stability and peace in Burundi identified by those interviewed for this report were the gaps in demobilisation and weak rule of law and good governance, particularly related to the access and management of land and the accountability of political parties, both of which are themes high on the agenda of the PBC and in its initial statement of mutual commitment with the government.

One UN expert involved in the early days of the Burundi CSC who was interviewed for this report noted that civil society from the country were quite engaged in the initial strategies and discussions with the PBC, even coming to New York as part of an official government delegation. In 2006, during the development of peacebuilding priorities for Burundi, the local organisation

In Burundi, ten focus group discussions with 93 participants, 33 of whom women, and 30 key-informant interviews were conducted in 3 of the country's 17 provinces, including those most affected by the conflict: the three provinces covered were Bujumbura Mairie, Cibitoke and Mwaro.

Focus groups and interviews were attended by representatives from civil society organisations, trade unions, local government, national government bodies, student groups, teachers and academics.

Civil society representatives included members of the nationwide forum for civil society (FORSC), National Federation of Non-state actors involved in the health sector (FENAS), election monitoring coalitions (COSOME) and faith-based groups such as the Catholic, Protestant churches and Muslims.

From government they included officials from the National Commission for Aid Coordination (CNCA), the Secretariat of Economic and Social Reforms (REFES), Security Sector Development Programme (DSS), National Electoral Commission (CENI) of 2005 elections, political leaders, former military generals, combatants and police commanders, mayors and municipal civil servants.

Biraturaba[19] organised several information sessions and consultation workshops with civil society, and with the support of GPPAC and its New York-based member, the World Federalist Movement, they participated in three CSC meetings on Burundi in October, November and December of that year. It was through Biraturaba's advocacy in New York that the participation of civil society in the Joint Steering Committee was endorsed as part of the PBC's structure in country. Over recent years, this kind of engagement with Burundian civil society has not been sustained, in part due to a lack of funding for NGOs to maintain or initiate this kind of activity.

After the drafting of this report, the security situation in Burundi deteriorated significantly. Beginning in mid-April 2015, mass demonstrations took place in Bujumbura protesting the current president's intention to run for a third term in the upcoming elections. Violence broke out with protestors clashing with police and in a general environment of fear and intimidation, including the destruction of several radio stations, tens of thousands of people fled to neighbouring countries. The lack of credible information on the ground exacerbated local fears and at the time of writing, over 105,000 people had fled the country - roughly one percent of Burundi's population. An attempted coup d'etat in mid-May led to further violence and instability. Since the political crisis began, the PBC held several emergency sessions on Burundi and the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region has been engaged in promoting dialogue between the ruling and opposition parties. The crisis proved very challenging for civil society in Burundi by further polarising opinions, and while some civil society actors were targeted following the protests, others were able to work on de-

escalating tensions at the community level. Through various networks and partnerships local civil society attempted to share their policy recommendations for reconciliation and a peaceful way forward with key actors at both national and international levels. At the time of printing, the prospects of a peaceful resolution to the crisis as well as the extent to which civil society voices have been heard and heeded remain uncertain.

2. Central African Republic

The CAR was the fourth country to be added to the agenda of the PBC when it joined in 2008. The early priority peacebuilding areas that were identified included security-sector reform, economic development, and good governance and rule of law. Since late 2012, UN peacebuilding in CAR has been significantly challenged by the renewed violence and fighting between government troops, anti-government militias and local self-defence forces, causing widespread displacement and a major humanitarian crisis. The outbreak of conflict in CAR coincided with a period of over a year and a half that there was no official Chair of the CAR CSC, following the resignation of the Belgian Ambassador Jan Grauls in June 2012.

During his time as Chair, Ambassador Grauls worked to bring attention and resources to a country that many donors had neglected. Since January 2014, Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki of Morocco has been the chair of the CAR CSC. The UN presence in country during the most recent conflict shifted dramatically from an integrated peacebuilding office (BINUCA) to a UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSCA), which was authorized by the Security Council in April 2014. Currently the situation in CAR is characterized as unstable and in general the international response is viewed as having been one of hard security

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19 See Biraturaba's website for more information about their work, available at biraturaba.org/

over peacebuilding and prevention. The lack of an official Chair during 2013 as the CAR deteriorated into widespread violence severely undermined the PBC's ability to engage. It also meant that the PBC, and peacebuilding approaches in general, became side-lined in the UN's overall response in the CAR.

Participants in CAR were not aware of the PBC as a UN body *per se*. However, they were aware that the UN is attempting to restore peace in the country as most had been consulted at one point or another by a UN staff member seeking information about their needs or their opinions, with the exception of academics and a few rural-based organisations. All participants felt strongly about the role that local civil society can play in advising the UN and other INGOs on how to read the local context, plan meaningful interventions, prioritize them, and even implement them – although most acknowledged the need to enhance their own capacity in case of the latter.

Overall, participants felt that the UN was not currently up to the task of building peace in the CAR. They felt that there are not enough peacekeeping troops on the ground and public opinion about the UN's capacity to achieve peace is low. The role of sub-regional organisations was also rarely mentioned with the exception that regional troops were assumed to better understand local culture and therefore make better decisions. They also felt that government authority is very weak and practically non-existent outside of Bangui. The adequacy of the UN's exclusive partnership with the government is therefore questioned by local people.

Since the drafting of this report, there have been some important developments in the CAR. Of particular relevance is the weeklong dialogue and negotiation process that concluded on 11 May 2015 – the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation. The Forum brought together

Research in the CAR was conducted through six focus groups with 135 participants, 38 of whom women, and seven key-informant interviews were conducted in three of the country's 14 'prefectures:' Bangui and Lobaye. A relatively low number of focus group discussions could be carried out due to the country's ongoing security situation making access to areas outside of Bangui very difficult. This was somewhat counter balanced by the inclusion of participants (mostly women) from ten different prefectures in focus groups held in Bangui, and the inclusion of residents from Bangui's 5th neighborhood and the mayor of Zemio, areas which experienced the highest levels of violence and internal displacement in the country.

Focus groups and interviews were conducted with members of civil society, government officials, international NGOs and UN staff.

Civil society participants included members of the national human rights network, the lawyers association, journalists, academia and young people from the National Youth Council.

Participants from the international community included staff at MINUSCA and the IOM.

From government, the local mayor of Zemio in the Haut-Mbomou prefecture was interviewed.

nearly 700 leaders from all areas of society; political parties, armed groups, the private sector and civil society, including women's groups, youth groups, traditional chiefs, and religious groups. Together they defined a collective vision for the country. This included: a new programme to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants from all sides, including child soldiers; a new timeline for national elections; the building of more inclusive economic institutions, particularly in the mining and agricultural sectors; and the building of new structures for justice and reconciliation at both national and local levels. The extent to which these ambitions can be concretized remains uncertain. The end of the Forum was marred by protests against the house arrest of combatants who are set to face criminal trials, and funds for the DDR initiatives are not entirely available,[20] but the fact that it relied heavily on consultations with civil society and local communities, especially those most affected by the conflict, clearly marks the desire of Central Africans to build a more peaceful and inclusive society in the future. It also bodes well for the relevance and level of local ownership of the Forum's outcomes going forward.

20 See Brookings Institute, *Africa in Focus,* 'Five takeaways from the Bangui Forum for National Reconciliation in the Central African Republic,' 15 May 2015, available at: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2015/05/15-bangui-forum-central-african-republic-copley-sy

3. Liberia

For over a decade, Liberia has been on a steady course towards peace. The implementation of the 2003 Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with the support of a robust UN peacekeeping mission, is viewed as successful and in 2010 Liberia requested to be put on the PBC's agenda with a focus on the peacebuilding priority areas of rule of law, security sector reform and national reconciliation. The intersection of gender with national reconciliation processes in Liberia is seen as particularly meaningful. Liberia joined the PBC's agenda shortly after the five-year review of the PBC. At the time, there was concerted energy and momentum around Liberia as a country on the PBC's agenda for several reasons: the United States was quite engaged, which was the first time one of the Permanent Members of the Security Council had been so dedicated to participating fully in the work of a CSC; the CSC Chair, the Jordanian Permanent Representative to the UN, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein, was quite involved and keen to visit Liberia often; and given the fact that Liberia joined just after the 2010 review, it was seen as a possible 'test case' for the recommendations and ideas that had just emerged, in particular that of the PBC operating with a 'lighter' footprint.

Prince Zeid stepped down as Chair in 2012 and was succeeded by Ambassador Staffan Tillander of Sweden. This was seen as a positive shift because of Sweden's deep engagement with Liberia as a donor. The current Chair is Ambassador Olof Skoog of Sweden, who is currently also the chair of the PBC OC. One innovative trend in recent years is the regional approach that has been taken by the four PBC countries in West Africa – particularly Sierra Leone and Liberia, with configuration chairs traveling to each other's countries of concern and organising joint meetings in New York. More

recently, the Ebola crisis has made it incredibly challenging for the PBC to engage in Liberia, although the PBC was one of the first UN bodies in New York to draw attention to the health crisis in West Africa through a regional approach. It is notable that Liberia was the first country on the PBC's agenda with an active UN peacekeeping mission (UNMIL) and the PBC is meant to play a role in its drawdown and transition to a political mission which is expected to take place in 2016.

Only three out of the 51 participants in the research were aware of the work of the PBA, one had been invited to consultations by Liberia's Peacebuilding Office, while the other two had merely seen cars marked with the label of 'Peacebuilding Fund' driving around Monrovia. The research also found that support for civil society at the local level and its inclusion in national reconciliation processes, including women's perspectives, are still wanting.

Participants had two main concerns with regards to the UN's peacebuilding structures in the country. First, they identified the gradual drawdown of support for important peace initiatives such as the Peace Committees,[21] resulting in an increasingly difficult environment for peacebuilders to operate in – as the Chairman of Bomi County Peace Committee explains:

> *"There are numerous challenges that continue to hinder the work of the peace committee in this country. The UN started the process and they are no longer supporting us. The government of Liberia has become very insensitive to this initiative and the committee is nearly falling apart. We have not been very active over the past two years and there are lots of tensions building up in the county. We want to work,*

Research in Liberia was conducted through nine focus group discussions with 51 participants, 25 of whom women, and four key-informant interviews were conducted in three of the country's 15 counties: Grand Bassa, Bomi and Monrovia.

The discussions and interviews included members of Peace Committees and national NGOs representing the interests of women, youth, children, the disabled, the environment and ex-combatants.

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21 County Peace Committees are a local initiative supported by the PBF as part of its Rule of Law portfolio.

but due to the lack of support, people are losing interest."[22]

Second, the timeline for the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers is seen as too soon. Most participants expressed concern over the military drawdown of UNMIL in June 2016.[23] People feel anxious about the withdrawal as crime rates are rising and there is a general mistrust in the capacity of the Liberian military to intervene effectively should problems arise.

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22 Mr. Yousif S. Sheriff, Chairman of Bomi County Peace Committee, Tubmanburg, Bomi County, during interview on 19 December 2014.
23 See Security Council resolution 2190, S/RES/2190 (15 December 2014), available from www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2014.shtml

The importance of communication and information sharing

The research in the CAR showed that as well as there being weak information flows at the level of the UN in New York and between the UN's in country presence and New York, MINUSCA itself was challenged by an inability to collect, analyse, record and retrieve data. Youth participants involved in the research spoke about being approached by different MINUSCA staff on numerous occasions and being asked the same questions within the space of a few weeks. They felt that this at best reflected a high turnover of staff and an inability to retain institutional knowledge, and at worse, was symptomatic of the lack of genuine intent or capacity on the part of the UN to take their issues seriously. Coupled with there being no feedback mechanisms to indicate whether public opinions were taken into account, UN consultations ended up eroding public confidence in the institution as a whole.

In relation to gender in the PBC's engagement with the CAR, only one of the 123 participants was aware of UNSCR 1325 on Women Peace and Security, he had heard it mentioned on the radio once, and none of the participants had heard of a National Action Plan to ensure women's participation in local and national dialogue, negotiations or peacebuilding activities. However, 56 participants mentioned the Constitutional requirement for women to make up 30% of all persons in public office, with two commenting that this quota was not yet met.

One participant mentioned the general participation of women in the national Joint Steering Committee for peacebuilding. This is a compelling illustration of the missing linkages between the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at country level and existing national efforts to enhance women's participation.

Although women said they had continued to be consulted as part of the UN's outreach efforts, capacity-building efforts encouraging their participation in peace processes did not always use the most suitable means of communication: *"We don't have knowledge of international ideas on the role of women or other legislation to ensure that women are represented in peacebuilding activities. It seems too complicated and abstract for us, you have to know that most of us are uneducated, we are doing what we are doing because we are mothers and wives we want our children to have a better future, to live in peace with Christians and all the population."*[24]

One of the most positive characteristics of the CAR at the moment, as noted during this research, is the willingness of civil society to be vocal and engage in matters concerning their immediate wellbeing as well as the longer-term wellbeing of their country. The Youth Council is one such example.[25] It was originally set up by the government but currently runs as a semi-independent body enjoying the sustained participation of hundreds of youth from a wide spectrum of society - their members reportedly come from diverse socio-economic, geographical and religious backgrounds. As the actions and suggestions expressed by young people in this research show, they can also be entrepreneurial. A further example of this is their ability to maximize gains from an otherwise ineffectual exercise. During a recent consultation with MINUSCA staff, the youth involved tried to use MINUSCA as an intermediary between themselves and their government. They proposed activities and suggestions directed at the government, whom they understood to be the primary partner of the UN and over whom they ordinarily have little influence.

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24 Mrs. Antoinette Megouma, resident of the 3rd district, Bangui, during interview on 9 January 2015.
25 As noted by the head of the Africa bureau of UNDP after a visit to the country in early 2015: *"The solution is youth: this country belongs to you, it is you who will have to build this nation,"* in United Nations News Center, 'Ending exclusion, empowering youth key to bridging social divide in Central African Republic-UN,' 11 February 2015, available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50059#.VQb5SbPF-Lc

4. Why engage with civil society in country: local knowledge

A challenge for the UN's approach to peacebuilding in general is that it is often disconnected from the realities in the countries it supports: civil society can bridge this gap. Organised civil society provides the necessary link and local grounding for the PBA in all its various activities, and engaging with local civil society offers a way to make these activities more relevant, strategic and catalytic. If local knowledge is seen as crucial to designing and implementing context-specific peacebuilding projects, then ensuring the vitality and independence of this knowledge is a fundamental first step. As one member state representative interviewed for this report said: *"Member states have our own limitations, civil society can speak freely."*

An empowered and robust local civil society plays an essential role in overcoming the hurdles of transition and establishing sustainable structures for democracy. They are best placed to pressure governments for change and do so in a manner that is locally owned, which can be more effective and transparent than methods used by external actors. Current discourse on post-conflict and fragile states supports this argument: as state-society relations form a key function of a stable democracy, an active civil society is central to forging and strengthening that relationship.[26] Local civil society is therefore a fundamental constituent in the transition out of conflict and fragility.

Local civil society in the CAR, Burundi and Liberia is, broadly speaking, highly knowledgeable and well versed on subjects relating to their national affairs. Civil society groups are also well networked but their networks tend to be centralized and sector-based with limited scope for cross-sectorial learning. Their capacities vary greatly based on whether they are a registered NGO, a religious group, an academic institution or a local association. However, participants from all civil society backgrounds acknowledged the need to better elaborate their knowledge to external actors and build their capacities to harness their full potential – as one participant from the Lobaye prefecture in the CAR pointed out:

"Our community would like to have a strong civil society. All the main organisations are based in Bangui and it seems that they are more credible than us because they have good training and better access to funds and interactions with international organisations and NGOs. We also want to have more training and as local people we are better placed to bring reconciliation in our community. We are better placed to give the international organisations the information they need to prevent conflict in our region and in our country."[27]

Civil society actors in this research were not only concerned with the diversity of their collective representation but also with the quality of the consultation. In the CAR for example, the UN's apparent willingness to reach out to civil society was welcomed but so far its limits have been outweighed by its benefits. The high-turnover of UN staff in country means that the same questions are often asked repeatedly of civil society because institutional memory and local connections and relationships are not maintained. In addition, the tendency to

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26 See European Center for Development and Policy Management (2012), 'Strengthening civil society? Reflections on international engagement in fragile states,' Discussion Paper No. 135, available at ecdpm. org/publications/strengthening-civil-society-reflections-international-engagement-fragile-states/

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27 Mr. Habib Soussou, 33 years old, community leader and resident of Boda, Lobaye prefecture, during interview on 13 January 2015.

pigeon-hole social groups as special-interest groups rather than confer with them as a matter of course on all questions has, at best, resulted in missed opportunities and at worse, the exacerbation of social tensions and conflict. For example, in April 2014, the UN's International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in the CAR relocated some 1,400 Muslims from the capital Bangui to Bossangoa on the border with Chad. This, in the view of the research participants, intensified the revival of an old secessionist discourse vying for the border region to become predominantly Muslim and independent from the rest of the country. Although relocation was voluntary, participants who belong to the National Youth Council believed the UN should have considered a wider range of opinions prior to the relocation. The young participants reported a difference in opinion between themselves and their elders. Had they been consulted they would have advised the UN to consider other safe haven options, helping to neutralize tensions rather than exacerbate them.

Furthermore, had they known about the ongoing consultations with the community at risk in Bangui ahead of time, the youth participants said they could have volunteered information to the IOM to give them a broader perspective. As young people constitute over 60% of the population[28] it would be prudent to consult them, if only to be aware of social divergences and fractures. Greater coordination and transparency in UN consultations with communities and civil society would therefore help the UN better understand local social dynamics and uphold its 'do no harm' principle.

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28 According to IndexMundi, an organisation specialising in country profiling, by the end of 2014, 60.7% of the Central African Republic's population was under 24 years old, data available at www.indexmundi.com/central_african_republic/demographics_profile.html

Most research participants, be they small peacebuilding organisations, academics or social groups, said they have no ambition to grow and replicate the models of national or international NGOs. What makes them so effective is precisely their sense of locality –namely the expert knowledge acquired from long-term engagement in a community. This level of history and commitment, in turn, nurtures the perception that the activities they engage in are locally owned.

These kinds of perspectives are usually missing from both strategic planning in country as well as policy debates in New York on peacebuilding, which means the UN is often missing the mark when it comes to identifying the root causes of a conflict and planning strategies and approaches that can prevent a relapse into violence. Ensuring a more diverse representation from civil society is key to making the UN's peacebuilding approaches more effective overall.

In this way, the research showed that there are two types of knowledge that civil society can offer the UN. One is their expert local information for the purposes of obtaining more acute analysis, better planning and implementation, and more realistic evaluations of peacebuilding projects. The other is their praxis – their way of *doing* peacebuilding. Civil society has strategies, practices and activities that they consider important to the building of peace in their country that fall outside of what the UN currently considers in its portfolio of peacebuilding activities. The first kind of knowledge can be shared with the UN through mechanisms for engagement; the challenge is how to devise a mechanism that is efficient yet effective, where the information is timely, precise and reliable. In the case of the latter, the UN would need to accept the challenge of learning 'from the bottom up' and bring these localized forms of peacebuilding into the fold by acknowledging their contribution to bringing about peaceful communities and supporting them.

Gender and national peacebuilding efforts

Following the electoral unrest in Liberia in 2011, Nobel Peace Laureate, Ms. Leymah Gbowee,[29] was tasked with leading a national agenda for healing and reconciliation.[30] Together with the Minister of Internal Affairs, a coordinating mechanism was established to pursue this work. The way in which the coordinating mechanism will achieve its objectives is outlined in a Strategic Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation,[31] which largely supports the government's vision outlined in the 2012 'Liberia Vision 2030' document.[32] Under Ms. Gbowee's stewardship the vision and roadmap seemed to reflect the priorities of most Liberians and the priorities outlined in the documents resonated with those stated in the course of this research. In addition, a woman leading a national peace process, one of healing and reconciliation, is a welcome practical application of SCR 1325.

However, in October 2012, Ms. Gbowee resigned from this leadership position in protest against government corruption.[33] The show of courage in her stance was well received by the participants in this research, who cited her as one of their national role models in the struggle for women's rights.[34] Most participants were also aware of international norms on Women Peace and Security thanks to a policy book published by the Liberian government. However, they also noted that while women were aware of their rights conceptually, they still lacked the legal mechanisms to actively challenge social and legal obstacles to the realization of their rights.

Despite having played a prominent role in bringing peace to the country, Liberian women stated that they continue to struggle against local attitudes, as the Director of Bassa Women Development Association explains:

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29 She received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011, alongside her compatriots Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Tawakkul Karman, for their *"non-violent struggle for the safety of women and for women's rights to full participation in peace-building work."* In their award-giving statement, the Norwegian Nobel Committee also acknowledged the importance of women's participation in political processes overall; *"We cannot achieve democracy and lasting peace in the world unless women obtain the same opportunities as men to influence developments at all levels of society."* For more information see NobelPrize.org, at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2011/press.html

30 As part of her leadership of this initiative, on 7 March 2012, Ms. Gbowee briefed the Liberia configuration on the PBC's potential role as a liaison between the UN, funders and the Liberian government, highlighting the convening power of the PBC and its potential. She said: *"If the UN [meaning the PBC] can 'nudge' certain actors and institutions, this could facilitate the process immensely and push institutions to act."* Detailed notes on this session of the Liberia configuration can be found on the BetterPeace.org website at www.betterpeace.org/node/2035

31 See United Nations Country Team Liberia, *A Strategic Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding, and Reconciliation June 2012-July 2030,* available at www.lern.ushahidi.com/media/uploads/page/3/Reconciliation%20Roadmap%20Draft%203-W.pdf

32 See Government of Liberia, Liberia National Vision, Draft Report, 25 November 2012, available at http://cdcliberia.org/Vision_2030_draft.pdf. This document acknowledges Liberia as a "divided society" and attempts a root cause analysis of the problem and a conceptual way forward.

33 See British Broadcasting Corporation, 'Liberia laureate Gbowee chides Sirleaf on corruption,' 8 October 2012, available at www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19876111

34 Participants cited not only their president Ms. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and the Nobel Prize Laureate Ms. Leymah Gbowee, but also the prominent activist Ms. Martha Karnga, head of BAWODA women's association, who took part in this research.

"The history of peacebuilding in Liberia has been attributed to women's involvement to a larger extent. It is clear that Liberian women played a very crucial role during the civil war. Our strategy for this is to continue to raise awareness about women's empowerment, educate more girls and encourage women to take up leadership roles in society, from the bottom to the top. Part of this is raising awareness about the Gender Equality Bill. We want the Bill to pass so that women can change the status quo of their lives. Men don't want women to compete with them on anything – they say that when a woman is empowered, she becomes frisky. We need to change this myth. We are therefore appealing to the UN to help us initiate more training programmes for men to accept women as their partners and that together we can build a better nation."[35]

Leymah Gbowee, a leader in the Women in Peacebuilding Network, a programme that emerged from the West African Network for Peacebuilding, a GPPAC member, in 2001.

There is clearly a need for the UN to support projects promoting women's rights and participation, including equal partnerships between women and men for mutual benefit, as an integral part of its activities in Liberia. Had National Action Plans been included in Liberia's instrument of engagement with the PBC, the issues outlined in the Gender Equality Bill would have been supported by the Executive and special projects promoting the Bill could have been planned and supported. Overall, greater momentum for gender equality could have been generated both in parliament and socially.

Gender is also linked to some of the fears over the military drawdown of UNMIL on 30 June 2016.[36] The research shows that people are feeling anxious about the withdrawal as crime rates are rising and there is a general mistrust in the capacity of the Liberian military to intervene effectively should problems arise, particularly after the Ebola outbreak, which is seen by many as a security failure - a failure of containment. The rise in crime rates are viewed as a consequence of high unemployment, particularly among demobilised men, and an empowered female labour force would create more competition for unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, further isolating them from society and making them more destitute. Taking into account the impact of demobilisation on women is therefore vital in the planning of sustainable reintegration activities for both men

35 Ms. Martha Karnga, Executive Director, Bassa Women Development Association (BOWADA), Buchanan, Grand Bassa County, during interview on 10 December 2014.
36 *Supra*, note 28.

and women. As women took on highly sensitive and demanding tasks during the conflict, they feel they should be awarded equally challenging roles in the future of Liberian society. The failure of UN peacebuilding projects to tackle this head on could exacerbate social tensions across the gender line.

In Burundi participants made little mention of PBF-funded activities directly targeting gender although women are part of the Joint Steering Committee that discusses the allocation of PBF funds in the country. In theory this could allow for gender-sensitive peacebuilding beyond the project-based targeting of women as beneficiaries by including them in the analysis of the problem, which would lead to different programmatic solutions. For example, the targeting of women as beneficiaries could result in a capacity-building project on gender equality legislation aimed exclusively at women participants, while gender-sensitive programming would consider the gender aspects of Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) – such as the vulnerability of female-headed households who lost their husbands in the conflict or the challenge of reintegrating ex-combatants with their families after years of estrangement and power shifting, as women headed the household in their husbands' absence. Gender-sensitive programming would build-in solutions to women's needs as part and parcel of the overall project design. For example, women could be provided with income-generating activities that fit with their family duties in addition to those being offered to their demobilised husbands. This could avoid a rise in social tensions resulting from an unbalanced roll-out of opportunities.

In Burundi,[37] rule of law projects did not entirely provide a reliable mechanism for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and tensions, particularly related to gender and the management of land. Accusations of corruption among the judiciary and local government were common among all those who took part in the focus group discussions. The judiciary was seen as unwilling to resolve land disputes in a manner that was in line with traditional norms, often with the undue influence of a local government official or person of high social status. The failure to mitigate these tensions effectively can result in the outbreak of gender-based violence with a multiplying negative impact on women, as victims of this violence feel they cannot seek redress in these courts and are therefore more susceptible to future incidents of violence.

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37 In Liberia, rule of law was also raised as serious issues. As one participant put it in relation to land issues: *"There are so many land cases in the court that have never been prosecuted. People take other people's land and because they have power they can manipulate the court system. In this country, there is no justice for the poor."* Quote from Mr. Aaron G. V. Juakollie, National Programme Officer, Foundation for International Dignity, Monrovia, during interview on 13 January 2015.

III. THE PBA AND CIVIL SOCIETY: INCLUSION IN POLICY BUT NOT IN PRACTICE

"Rather than have small NGOs sneak through a hole in the UN fence, we need to have a well-oiled gate."

INGO representative interviewed for this report

The founding resolutions of the PBA recognize "the important contribution of civil society and non-governmental organisations, including women's organisations, to peacebuilding efforts."[38] Each resolution by the General Assembly and Security Council also "Encourages the Commission to consult with civil society, non-governmental organisations, including women's organisations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate."[39] However the research and interviews conducted for this report suggest that these initial aspirations, as well as the existence of specific guidelines and policies for civil society participation, have not necessarily translated to meaningful and consistent engagement with civil society since the founding of the PBA. This is also the case for the inclusion and mainstreaming of gender in UN peacebuilding efforts.

1. Guidelines for civil society participation

Civil society engagement with the PBA is most clearly outlined in the *Provisional Guidelines for the Participation of Civil Society in Meetings of the PBC* issued by the Organisational Committee in June 2007. The guidelines affirm the important contribution of civil society, including women and women's organisations, in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding.

It also calls on the PBC to "ensure greater participation of civil society organisations and representatives from the countries under consideration."[40]

The guidelines outline the following modalities for civil society participation in the work of the PBC:

- Civil society can make statements in formal PBC meetings at the invitation of the Chair of the OC or the Chair of a CSC, but only with the approval of the members of the OC.
- Civil society is encouraged to submit input into informal PBC meetings that may be technical or sectoral and are organised outside of the formal CSCs.
- Either before or after a CSC, civil society can participate in public informal meetings or briefings organised by the Chair, to exchange views on peacebuilding in specific country situations as well as provide input on how civil society can contribute to the implementation of recommendations by the CSC. The Chair will prepare a summary of discussion from these meetings to submit to the CSC.
- Civil society may submit written statements to the Chair of the OC, who will, working with

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38 *Supra*, note 1.
39 *Supra*, note 1.

40 See United Nations, Peacebuilding Commission, Provisional guidelines for the participation of civil society in meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission, submitted by the Chairperson on the basis of informal consultations, PBC/1/OC/12 (29 June 2007), available from undocs.org/PBC/1/OC/12

the Chair of the CSC and PBSO, share these with members of the CSC no later than one week before the relevant meeting.

Although civil society groups are able to submit input ahead of CSC meetings, as per the guidelines, if they are not participating in or knowledgeable about the member state deliberations and activities leading up to these meetings, it is difficult for them to formulate their contribution in the most strategic way. The lack of transparency in relation to CSC and OC meetings, including when they are going to take place and what the agenda will be, has meant that civil society participation, if it happens, is often limited to those organisations already based in New York. Local practitioners do not have enough knowledge ahead of time of meetings to be able to meaningfully give input or be able to be present in New York to participate, which means that their perspectives are usually lacking. This in turn reinforces the existing gap between policy and practice on peacebuilding at the UN. The only way that context specific information can circulate amongst member states is if adequate time and communication is given to civil society.[41]

It is also notable that civil society was not consulted in the development of the guidelines. Several civil society organisations based in New York met with member states and the PBSO in the run up to the guidelines being adopted and raised their concerns about the lack of an open and inclusive process in their creation, and the potential that the guidelines as they stood could negatively impact future engagement of civil

society with the PBC.[42] Concerns raised included; the need for the PBC to further vet civil society organisations that had already been granted ECOSOC accreditation, the potential lack of transparency in vetting non-ECOSOC NGOs and the lack of a 'right of reply' for civil society organisations who had been rejected by member states, that the reporting requirements are too restrictive and wouldbecome a barrier for civil society engagement, and that one week's notice for participation would not provide enough time for travel to be arranged for local partners, particularly those from more rural areas.[43]

Many civil society representatives noted that the language in the guidelines was very weak compared to other mechanisms used by the UN.

Practically, while the guidelines have existed since 2007, very few of the suggestions for engagement have been taken up by either member states or civil society. In an informal poll of member states engaged in the PBC who were consulted for this report, almost none had even heard of the civil society guidelines. The guidelines were also never reviewed six months after their creation, as called for in their founding document. It was reportedly not seen as a priority at the time and some member states felt that the PBC was adequately engaging with civil society in country. The provision in the guidelines that member states must approve which civil society organisations and representatives may attend OC meetings was recently used in the annual session of the

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41 The lack of the reliable and current information available on the PBC's website is also a factor. Civil society are unable to inform themselves of meetings that have already taken place in a reliable manner, which impacts their ability to make meaningful and timely contributions. This was a hindrance noted by the authors of this report. The PBC should therefore also ensure that the records on its website are comprehensive and up-to-date.

42 See International Service for Human Rights (2007), *The Peacebuilding Commission and the Participation of Civil Society*, Human Rights Monitor Series, New York Monitor, available at www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/0621ngoguidelines.pdf
43 *Ibid.*

PBC that took place in June 2014. The meeting included a small number of 'hand-picked' civil society participants who were proposed by the PBSO and pre-approved by all member states. This was not a transparent process and no prior discussions with civil society about the event took place, including with those selected to take part in the meeting.

Since 2007, civil society groups in New York report no improvements in their ability to formally engage with the decision-making bodies of the PBC. In fact, New York-based civil society representatives interviewed for this report signalled a trend towards greater obscurity in the mechanisms for engagement, as meetings are officially announced at the last minute and increasingly closed even to ECOSOC-accredited NGOs. The PBC's civil society guidelines also make no reference to civil society contributions to the Working Group on Lessons Learned. Notably, at the time of their creation, many civil society representatives noted that the language in the guidelines was very weak compared to other mechanisms used by the UN such as the speaking slots in ECOSOC meetings or the Arria Formula of the Security Council.[44]

2. Policies for gender-responsive peacebuilding

In 2010, the Secretary-General issued his first report on *Women's Participation in Peacebuilding*,[45] resulting in a 7-Point Action Plan[46] that has been adopted throughout the UN system to guide work on gender-responsive peacebuilding and track its progress. The Secretary General's 2010 report also pledged a financial commitment of 15% of all peacebuilding-related funds to directly target women's needs, advance equality and empower women. The PBF was tasked with implementing this quota immediately.[47]

Since 2010, the PBSO has made concerted steps towards stewarding the implementation of gender-sensitive and gender-responsive peacebuidling through various initiatives. It rolled-out the Gender Marker, a mechanism for tracking the spending of peacebuilding funds on projects that target women. As of February 2014, the Gender Marker had been applied to 281 projects across the 4 priority areas of the PBF:
- support for the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue
- promotion of co-existence and the peaceful resolution of conflict
- revitalization of the economy and peace dividends, and
- the (re)instalment of administrative services.

For example, in Liberia, the PBF funded a specialised unit within the Ministry of Justice exclusively dedicated to the prosecution of sexual crimes and gender-based violence, and the

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44 See Hawkins, V. (2006), *Getting the Peacebuilding Commission off the Ground: Including Civil Society*, Conference Report, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, available at www.fes-globalization.org/ ConferenceReports/FES_CR_NY_Peacebuilding_ Commission.pdf. More information on the working of the Security Council's Arria Formula is provided in Chapter V.

45 See United Nations, General Assembly, *Women's participation in peacebuilding: report of the Secretary-General*, A/65/354 (7 September 2010), available from undocs.org/A/65/354
46 Ibid., Annex '7-Point Action Plan,' available at www. un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/seven_point_ action_plan.pdf (GA report on women in pb)
47 *Ibid.,* paragraph 36.

training of legal professionals, including police officers, in case-handling and victim support.[48]

Applying the Gender Marker retrospectively to projects since 2007, the PBSO could state that by 2013, 10% of all PBF-funded projects exclusively targeted women.[49] It was also able to show that by 2011 over 60% of funds went to projects with a specific gender component, including activities and budget allocation for women.[50]

Although the PBSO had met its interim target of 10% by 2013, this was achieved through the tracking of the Gender Marker, which is measured in a global aggregate figure. A country-by-country breakdown is necessary for there to be any accountability and follow-up on whether these initiatives have actually had any bearing on the lives of the women they targeted. There is also the danger that the 15% global mark is achieved on the basis of a few particularly good examples so it does not accurately depict the breadth of this achievement. Without the training of staff in the purpose of gender-sensitive peacebuilding, the 15% target may also result in the unintended incentive of leaving the rest of the 85% of project funds free from having to consider or target women.

In 2011 the PBF launched its own initiative to further the push to meet the Secretary-General's 15% target globally. It launched a Gender Promotion Initiative where countries were invited to compete for funding earmarked for the promotion of women's empowerment and gender equality in post-conflict settings. Some $6.1million USD was allocated to 8 different projects in Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nepal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan and

Uganda. In late 2014, the PBF launched a second Gender Promotion Initiative following the same format and objectives but this time contributing $7.6 million USD to 9 projects in six different countries: Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Somalia.

In a further effort by the PBSO to heed the call in the Secretary-General's 2010 report on *Women's Participation in Peacebuilding* for gender to be factored into peacebuilding projects and programmes, it partnered with UN Women to implement a programme called *"Building Back Better: Gender-responsive Peacebuilding"*. The aim of this programme was essentially to facilitate the implementation of the Secretary-General's 7-Point Action Plan.[51] In the second year of this three-year programme, the PBSO summed up its work on gender and peacebuilding in the following way:

> *"This project supports international efforts to build inclusive and sustainable peace in conflict- affected countries through enabling women to participate in, and the provision of gender expertise to, key peacebuilding processes. There are longer-term, resource intensive efforts focused on the Central African Republic, Liberia and South Sudan. In the short term, PBSO and UN Women jointly supported targeted and catalytic initiatives from women's groups and the UN in Guinea, Kenya, Libya and Yemen. The partnership also established mechanisms for longer-term "light-touch" engagement with the UN Country Teams in the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, DRC, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Mali, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Sudan, which have self-nominated to*

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48 See United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, 'The PBF and Gender Equality,' 27 February 2015, available at www.unpbf.org/news/pbf-gender-promotion-initiative/
49 *Supra,* note 20, p. 50
50 *Supra*. Note 20, p. 51

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51 *Supra*, note 49, Annex '7-Point Action Plan,' available at www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/seven_point_action_plan.pdf

pilot implementation of the Seven-Point Action Plan by mapping gender-responsive peacebuilding into existing efforts."[52]

This paragraph from the PBSO's Annual Report also refers to the 'light-touch' arrangement which is deployed in Liberia and alludes to the longer-term projects to enhance women's participation in political processes implemented in the CAR and Liberia. Overall, the PBSO and PBF have made some commendable efforts since the 2010 report of the Secretary-General on *Women's Participation in Peacebuilding*, but many of the other recommendations still need to be put into practice.

3. Working Methods

In 2013, the OC issued a document entitled *"Working Methods Part (I)"*,[53] which addresses many of the concerns raised in the 2010 review of the PBC such as communications and the relationship between the field and headquarters. It also establishes for the first time a Terms of Reference for the CSC Chair. The Working Methods document recognizes civil society, including women's groups, as key interlocutors for the CSC Chair, and calls on the chairs to "Interact (bilaterally and multilaterally) with relevant civil society organisations, private sector entities and think [tanks] to bring their energy, expertise and experience in contribution to the peacebuilding process."[54]

There is a key example in the document of how civil society organisations in Burundi contributed to the early review of the PBC's engagement in the country.[55] There are also ideas on how information can be shared with CSC Chairs before and after their field visits, which includes input from civil society and NGOs, and how the CSCs might engage with a broader group of stakeholders. Although it is available on the PBC's website, this document was never formally adopted by the OC and none of the member states interviewed for this report made any mention of it as a resource. Similarly, most civil society organisations in New York are unaware of this document.

Several member states consulted for this report were surprised to learn that the Security Council's working methods and activities are overall more transparent and accessible to civil society than those of the PBC. For example, the Security Council has an extensive *Working Methods Handbook* available on their website,[56] which provides much more detailed information than the current Working Methods document of the PBC. In addition, the Security Council publishes a monthly Provisional Programme of Work,[57] which allows civil society who wish to engage with Security Council members on thematic or country specific activities the ability to plan ahead and be strategic in advance of scheduled meetings. While the PBC does publish a calendar on its website,[58] it is not forward looking - in fact, it is only updated on an ad hoc basis. Anyone outside of the UN who is interested in knowing the activities of the PBC

52 See United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (2012), *Annual Report*, p. 9, available at www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/2012PBSO-AnnualReport-Final.pdf
53 See United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, *Working Methods Part I*, (30 April 2013), available at www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/oc/PBC%20Working%20Methods%20Compendium_Part%20I_Formatted_30April2013.pdf
54 *Ibid.*

55 *Ibid.*
56 See United Nations, Security Council, *Working Methods Handbook*, available at www.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/
57 See United Nations, Security Council, Monthly Programme, available at www.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/pow/powmonthly.pdf
58 See United Nations, Peacebuilding Commission, *Activities Calendar,* available at www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/calendar.asp

must check the online calendar on a regular basis to see if any new meetings have been added rather than benefitting from a provisional monthly schedule of activities that is shared in advance. The PBC calendar also does not include the dates for the visits of CSC Chairs to countries on the PBC's agenda, which would be helpful for civil society representatives who wish to be aware of those trips both in New York and in country.

4. The 2010 review of the PBA

In 2010, as per its founding resolutions and five years since its inception (just four years of full operational form), the PBA was reviewed by a panel chaired by the Permanent Representatives of Ireland, Mexico and South Africa to the UN. The review mainly focused on the PBC and concluded that *"the hopes that accompanied the founding resolutions have yet to be realized."* [59] Some of the key issues highlighted as needing improvement were; national ownership, the importance of women's contributions, the regional dimension of peacebuilding efforts, effective communications, the links between field and headquarters, and the relationship between the PBC and the Security Council.

One of the concerns raised from the perspectives of civil society in the review was the lack of consultation by the PBC of local stakeholders in the drawing up of national peacebuilding priorities.

Civil society was broadly consulted in the review, with some informal meetings taking place in New York and policy documents being issued by a handful of INGOs. However, the extent to which these opinions were formally considered in the review is unknown, as no official mechanism for consultations with civil society existed. An external assessment of the PBA in 2010 by INGOs focused on civil society inclusion in the PBC's role in Sierra Leone and Burundi. [60] This report raised the central point that *"ownership must extend beyond the government to include meaningful civil society participation, a key component in the restoration of the social compact between the State and its people."* [61]

One of the concerns raised in the review, from the perspective of civil society, was the lack of consultation by the PBC of local stakeholders in the drawing up of national peacebuilding priorities. The review also noted that more could be done to build national capacity beyond government. It pointed out that civil society, including women, is key to the work of the CSCs. Yet, no specific channel for engagement with civil society groups was opened. In the final summary of the reports' recommendations, under the heading *"A more relevant Peacebuilding Commission,"* the review includes *"greater civil society involvement"* as one of the ways for the PBC to be more relevant. [62]

On the contribution of women, the review noted that the PBC is the first UN body to have an explicit focus on gender in its founding resolutions and yet it goes on to state that the PBC has not lived up to this strong and clear

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59 See United Nations, General Assembly, *Identical letters dated 19 July 2010 from the Permanent Representatives of Ireland, Mexico and South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council*, A/64/868–S/2010/393 (21 July 2010), available from undocs.org/A/64/868.

60 See report by GPPAC and WFM (2010), *The Peacebuilding Commission Five Year Review: The Civil Society Perspective*, p. 5, available at betterpeace.org/files/GPPAC:IGP_Civil_Society_Perspective_of_the_PBC_Review_June2010.pdf

61 *Ibid.*

62 *Supra*, note 63.

mandate. In particular, it notes in the section on national ownership and capacity issues, that *"the record regarding women's organisations is particularly thin."*[63] The 2010 review concluded with a rather stark message: *"The co-facilitators hope that the present review will serve as a wake-up call."*[64]

While the 2010 review was widely accepted as a critical yet fair assessment of the PBA, not much has been done since then to implement many of the recommendations. Given the lack of civil society engagement in its development, once the outcomes of the review were made public, actors outside of the UN could have done more to make sure the PBA implemented the recommendations, especially as they were mostly in their favour. The 2015 review of the PBA is seen as a make or break moment for the Architecture. As one member state interviewed for this research put it: *"The 2015 review is the biggest opportunity to change the PBC, if it doesn't happen now, it won't happen in the future."*

Recommendation

Ensure transparency and accountability in the PBA's policies and working methods for civil society and women's inclusion.

How:
- The PBA should review and update the Provisional Guidelines for the Participation of Civil Society in Meetings of the PBC in close consultation with civil society.
- The PBA should support and implement all of the recommendations in the Secretary-General's report on *Women's Participation in Peacebuilding* and UNSCR 1325 by, amongst other things, including the creation of National Action Plans for women's participation and leadership in decision-making and the protection of women and girls in its work with governments on the setting of national peacebuilding priorities.
- The PBA should institute working methods that foster transparency and greater engagement with civil society, in particular women and youth.

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63 *Supra*, note 63.
64 *Supra*, note 63.

IV. THE PBA AND CIVIL SOCIETY: MEASURING ITS EFFECTIVENESS

"We need to understand the nature of the conflict, civil society can do that. Until it's fully understood, we can't respond."

Member state diplomat interviewed for this report

As has been discussed in the previous chapter, policies do exist to promote the engagement and inclusion of civil society in the PBA, however the practice of putting them into good use has not necessarily taken place. Despite this, civil society has been actively engaging with the PBA in various ways since its establishment in 2005, in both formal and informal settings. The PBA has also deliberately included civil society in its activities, most notably when CSC Chairs visit countries on the PBC's agenda. Lessons can be learned from these experiences that can help improve the PBA's current working relationship with civil society, and also address persistent gaps. This chapter focuses specifically on the various parts of the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture and assesses how effective it has been in engaging with civil society in both New York and at country level. At the end of each section, specific recommendations are offered for how the PBA could improve its engagement with civil society going forward.

1. The Peacebuilding Commission

While the PBC is not operational, the bulk of the work it does is for the countries on its agenda through the Country Specific Configurations. The visits of the CSC Chairs to countries on the PBC's agenda provide both an opportunity and a challenge for civil society engagement. It has become common practice for the Chairs to meet with local civil society during their visits, however,

these meetings do not necessarily include local community representatives who are engaged in peacebuilding and offer insights and perspectives beyond that of organisations based in the capital. As noted in Chapter II, most of the people interviewed for this report in Burundi, Liberia and CAR were not aware of the PBC or that the CSC Chairs make visits to their countries. In this way, the Chair's visits can be a missed opportunity to gain a wider perspective from civil society actors and communities who are often well engaged and knowledgeable in the areas of concern for the PBC.

It has also been recognized that the level of engagement by a CSC with civil society is driven mainly by the personal interests and motivations of the individual Chairs, since there is currently no systematic process for Chairs to gather the perspectives of civil society in country or include them in meetings New York. This also speaks to the lack of a detailed Terms of Reference for the PBC Chairs, lending to the inconsistent way in which their roles are carried out in each CSC.

Chairs often rely on the UN mission or UN Country Team in country to identify which civil society actors to meet with, unfortunately, this usually means only those groups who are 'known' or present in capital are invited. As a result, meetings do not necessarily include a diverse representation of local civil society and missing are usually actors who are not based in capital.

The meaningful participation of women in local and national peacemaking and peacebuilding activities, including those supported by the PBC, is vitally important.

The meetings themselves are normally quite large and yet time restricted, sometimes 80 civil society representatives are given one hour to share their views, so that even if a less represented group is present, they may not have the opportunity to take the floor. Social dynamics, as well as the location and timing of meetings also play a role in either encouraging or discouraging women from voicing their opinion. Language can also be a barrier to participation for civil society who might only speak or work in a local language that is not used in a meeting with a CSC Chair. The reports of Chair's visits are also usually not publicly available. They are only circulated informally to members of the CSC, making it difficult for civil society groups to see if their views were taken into account or to prepare for future visits. All of these issues would need to be taken into account in order to arrange a diverse and representative consultation with civil society.

The Chair's visits have worked well when the Chair sees it as an opportunity to create a space for national dialogue. As one diplomat from a PBC country interviewed for this report said: *"The Chair's visit is important because it provides an umbrella for everyone to meet in country."* This is particularly relevant when the Chair uses his or her presence as a catalyst to bring together civil society and the national government when these interactions would not have taken place otherwise. Both Burundi and Sierra Leone were cited as examples where the CSC Chair

has played an important role in either bringing together local actors across sectoral divides, including between civil society and government, which helped to create the space for meaningful dialogue, or in elevating the voices of civil society and local actors in meetings with national government, when those perspectives would not otherwise be heard.

A 2007 study by Action Aid, CAFOD, and CARE International on the PBC's engagement in Burundi and Sierra Leone supports this notion of the PBC's role in country. It notes the increased trust and interaction between the government and civil society groups in Burundi as a result of engagement by civil society in PBC-related activities in the country, such as the process of creating Burundi's PBC strategic framework, and the initial establishment of a framework for dialogue and consultation.[65] These efforts speak to the useful convening role that Chairs can have in country and the potential impact this can have on social cohesion and dialogue.

Although the PBC's guiding principles do not refer to the need for the Chair to engage with local women during their country visits, UNSCR 2122 (2013) requires that representatives of the Security Council hold interactive meetings with local women and women's organisations during their country missions. While CSC Chairs are not always sitting members of the Security Council, they represent a subsidiary organ of the Council whose work is seen as complimentary and should therefore follow the same standards of practice. Moreover,

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65 See ActionAid, CAFOD, and CARE International (2007), *Consolidating the Peace? Views from Sierra Leone and Burundi on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission*, available at www. actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/consolidating_the_ peace_-_views_from_sierra_leone_and_burundi_on_ the_united_nations_peacebuilding_commission.pdf

the meaningful participation of women (as individuals or groups) in local and national peacemaking and peacebuilding activities, including those supported by the PBC, is vitally important. It is in itself a measure of a nation's commitment to achieving lasting peace: for engaging in processes that reflect their desired outcome (that of inclusive, sustainable peace) ensures the higher likelihood of achieving it.

In New York, engagement between civil society and the CSCs has been ad hoc. In interviews for this report, many suggested that the entry point for civil society in New York is not through the CSCs but through the OC, because it would be less likely to upset national governments. As one UN expert interviewed for this report said, civil society needs to understand the dynamics with member states; in the CSCs, they could walk into a minefield and disrupt a sensitive political process. Others noted that the CSCs is where the real work of the PBC takes place. CSCs have a wider array of tools at their disposal, they can set an agenda, and the Chairs can ultimately do more to support civil society inclusion.

Outside of the OC and CSCs, the Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL) is another potential venue for formal engagement of civil society by the PBA, particularly given the fact that over the years it has explored a wide range of issues, from youth and gender to reconciliation and rule of law. The 'experts' featured in WGLL meetings are often from UN agencies or member states. Occasionally representatives from academic institutions or the World Bank are included. Local civil society practitioners or INGOs engaged in peacebuilding are normally not featured. International NGOs in New York may attend WGLL if they have ECOSOC-accreditation but only as observers. In order to enhance the breadth and depth of the WGLL discussions, the Chair of the WGLL should more systematically engage with INGOs in New York in order to gather ideas for meeting topics

and identify expert speakers from civil society. An annual session on developments in peacebuilding practice could be another way for the WGLL to engage with a larger group of stakeholders including civil society. One focus of such a session could be the creation of indicators and benchmarks for measuring a country's progress against agreed peacebuilding objectives, which civil society could help to develop and monitor.

Making use of video conferencing is another way the PBC can improve its ability to engage with civil society. The PBC's mandate provides specific operational guiding principles on how to ensure that actors outside of New York are part of the conversations that take place in New York, further acknowledging the value of local and regional voices in its discussions. In its founding resolutions, the PBC recognized *"the importance of adopting flexible working methods, including use of video-conferencing, meetings outside of New York and other modalities, in order to provide for the active participation of those most relevant to the deliberations of the Commission."*[66]

Member states consulted for this reported noted that the use of video conferencing is harder than it seems as the challenge of knowing which civil society participants to invite to speak to a CSC remains. Without good guidelines and trusted networks for the identification and participation of civil society in PBC meetings, the use of video conferencing technology remains problematic.

In regards to both the CSCs and the OC, the suggestion was made that civil society should seek to have an informal advisory role rather than participate formally in meetings, given the general feeling of those interviewed that neither OC nor CSC formal meetings were necessarily useful for real discussion and deliberation. Informal meetings that have included PBC members and

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66 *Supra*, note 1.

Chairs have taken place at venues outside of the UN, such as Quaker House[67] and the International Peace Institute (IPI),[68] which has allowed for interaction between member states and civil society experts in off-the-record settings. These informal discussions were often viewed as much more useful than the formal PBC meetings, particularly when civil society representatives from countries on the PBC's agenda participated and could speak candidly about their experience engaging in local peacebuilding. Given that the effectiveness of the OC and CSCs is being evaluated as part of the 2015 review of the PBA, it is possible that these mechanisms will be revised, opening up different possibilities for civil society engagement, both formal and informal.

One challenge for civil society engagement with the PBA is the lack of expertise and experience that many member states have on peacebuilding practice and the role of the PBC. Several member states interviewed for this report expressed a desire to interact more frequently with civil society, both those based in New York as well as in the field, in order to gain a better understanding of peacebuilding generally and the context of the countries they are engaged in more specifically. There has been some success in the past with workshops for new members of the PBC organised by IPI and the Quaker United Nations Offices (QUNO), with support from the PBSO. The last such meeting was held in 2013, included civil society representatives and provided a space for engagement with member states. However, the challenge for these meetings is that given the informal setting, not all member states feel required or compelled to participate. More must

be done to ensure that informal workshops and trainings for PBC member states have the buy-in and support of all member states so that broader participation takes place.

There were some interviewed for this report who felt that INGO engagement with the member states of the CSCs or OC in New York was not necessary or impactful. They recommended that civil society engagement take place in country with UN agencies that are operational or in national capitals. At the same time, they recognized that if civil society actors want to influence UN peacebuilding policy, then that must happen in New York.

A member state expert who was deeply engaged with a CSC reported that in the early days of the configuration they reached out to INGOs in New York but there was not much response, and so many years later, that interaction still does not take place. The analysis offered was that INGOs in New York do not see investing time and energy in working on the PBC as worthwhile. There seems to be a general lack of INGOs in New York who follow the PBC closely. As one member state put it in regards to PBC meetings that were once open but have in recent years been closed to ECOSOC-accredited NGOs, *"We're not available, but people are not knocking on the doors either."*

It is notable that civil society in New York is not holding the PBC to account in the same way that they are with the Security Council. Many interviewed recognised that most INGOs see no need to engage with the PBC on policy matters when the Security Council is seen as a more relevant and effective body on peace and security issues. Based on the interviews for this report, this seems less due to the fact that INGOs do not see the PBC as useful but more that they are not aware of the PBC's work at all. Also, the majority of countries on the PBC's agenda are not currently in crisis and are therefore not the focus

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67 Quaker House is an informal meeting space maintained by the Quaker United Nations Office for off-the-record discussions between members of the UN community on topics related to peacebuilding and prevention of violent conflict.
68 See International Peace Institute, available at www.ipinst.org/

of INGOs working on humanitarian and human rights advocacy. The CAR has recently been an exception to this, and yet the majority of related INGO advocacy work in New York has focused on the humanitarian and human rights situation and the roll out of the UN peacekeeping mission, with very little attention paid to peacebuilding or the role of the PBC.

Recommendation

Ensure the inclusion of civil society in key discussions at policy arenas of the PBC and at various points in the strategising and monitoring of PBC activities.

How:

- The Chairs and members of the OC, CSC, and WGLL should directly consult with civil society on a regular basis and facilitate their participation in meetings in New York, as well as establish opportunities for regular engagement in country.
- Information about meetings and country visits (both before and after) should be made available widely well in advance and civil society expertise, particularly women and youth, should be sought out to help shape the agenda and priorities, and to ensure that meeting logistics enable/do not limit their participation.
- The PBC should establish a strategy to create feedback loops for civil society monitoring and assessments of its activities both in New York and in country.
- The PBC should work with INGOs in New York to help identify local partners and ensure that a diversity of perspectives is included.
- Chairs of the CSCs should ensure that National Action Plans for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the active participation and leadership of women in peacemaking and political processes are part of a country's joint agreement with the PBC.
- The WGLL should organize an annual session to update itself on recent developments in peacebuilding practice, with civil society as key participants.

The PBC and the CAR in crisis

Like in many of the PBC's strategic frameworks for peacebuilding, the framework for the CAR aspired to the principles of national ownership, an inclusive approach to planning and coordination and a sustained commitment from all stakeholders. At the end of 2014, the PBF had committed over $45 million USD[69] to peacebuilding projects under the Framework, but by mid-November 2014 the country had spiralled into a crisis with over 420,000 Central Africans seeking refuge in neighbouring countries and 410,000 being internally displaced (62,500 in Bangui and 347,500 in the provinces).[70] Ideally in a crisis situation, the PBC should play a useful role in assisting the UN to establish a feedback loop to set the right context.

Attempts to overthrow the government of President Francois Bozizé erupted in December 2012 but there was no action by the CAR CSC at that time due in large part to the absence of an official Chair of the configuration following the resignation of Ambassador Grauls of Belgium in June 2012. A new Chair was not appointed until January 2014, before which the CAR had fallen under the chairmanship of the OC Chair by default. The lack of an official Chair meant that the PBC did not use its advisory role with the Security Council adequately, nor was it able to play an active role in the prevention of a relapse into conflict in the CAR.

Internally displaced youth in Bangui's main mosque greet the convoy of the UN Secretary General as he pays them a visit on 5 April 2015.

The CAR is an example of the failure to utilise civil society analysis of the local context[71] and thus awareness of the potential for relapse into renewed violence was not given enough attention by the UN. Greater transparency in the work of the PBC and clear avenues for civil society involvement could have led to a more timely response to the impending crisis. Ideally, in a crisis situation, the PBC can play a useful role in assisting the UN to establish feedback loops that maintain a close eye on developments on the ground and provide timely information about the ever changing context. By bringing civil society to speak at a CSC meeting, either in person or by video link, the PBC and PBSO can brief the Security Council and other UN departments and agencies more effectively.

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69 See United Nations Development Programme, Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, Gateway website, available at mptf. undp.org/factsheet/fund/PB000, document downloadable at mptf.undp.org/document/download/13468
70 See United Nation, Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic*, S/2014/857 (28 November 2014), available from www.un.org/en/sc/documents/sgreports/2014.shtml
71 In the CAR, frustration with the UN's apparent misunderstanding of the situation on the ground was widespread. A representative of a local organisation based outside of Bangui, who took part in the research on 22 January 2015, explains: *"I don't understand why the United Nations and other international organisations call this conflict a 'religious conflict.' How is that possible? We know that the important dynamic is the link between natural resources in some areas of the country where the Séléka came from and where they went back to today. When you know this, you understand that the reaction against them is no religious retaliation. It has been 20 years since the UN established a presence here in the CAR and none of its data was useful in giving a better definition to the crisis? They need a better definition of the problem so that they can have a better response."*

2. The Peacebuilding Support Office

The PBSO has an important role to play in communicating to the outside world the work of the PBC and PBF. The PBSO is also meant to be a resource for both civil society and member states when it comes to technical and country specific information. The PBSO most often engages with civil society through its policy branch. The PBSO has engaged with civil society over the years in consultations on various thematic reports and policy initiatives such as work on reconciliation. The PBSO's country-focused staff have also participated as experts in informal meetings on peacebuilding outside the UN.

In a role that many interviewed felt was a key way for PBSO to add value to UN peacebuilding discussions, the PBSO has occasionally brought in outside civil society experts to advise member states in the CSCs. The most successful example of this, according to those interviewed, is the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF),[72] which has assisted the PBSO and CSCs in their work by drawing on its convening power and access to academic experts and practitioners on various country situations. These engagements have been informal and off-the-record and provided member states with a deeper analysis and understanding of local conflict dynamics in countries on the PBC's agenda. This form of expert civil society engagement has been acknowledged as valuable, however it still often excludes finer elements and details that local peacebuilding practitioners can bring to the table.

Another example is the role that PBSO played with INGOs and other UN agencies in producing the *"Guiding Principles on Young*

People's Participation in Peacebuilding"* in 2014.[73] Prior to these guidelines, there was no policy framework for youth, particularly within peace and security work at the UN, and there was very little policy language on youth in any official documents. To develop the Youth Guidelines, the PBSO, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDP and UN Women worked with INGOs including World Vision, Search for Common Ground and the United Network of Young Peacebuilders. The process of developing the Guidelines is seen as a good model for interaction between the UN and civil society. One UN expert noted that drawing up the framework between actors both inside and outside the UN took a long time but this also meant it was truly consultative and inclusive. The next step is for the Guidelines to be disseminated among peers and partners and then implemented in the field; all of which is being done through close coordination between relevant civil society actors, UN departments and UN agencies.

Information sharing and communications is another area where the PBSO can play a key role in supporting engagement with civil society. While the PBSO shares information with the PBC member states regarding upcoming meetings and activities, INGOs are not included on these mailing lists. Similarly, many documents and notes from PBC meetings are not made public or available to civil society, even though several member states interviewed did not feel that this information was particularly sensitive and could be shared more widely. The PBSO also maintains the UN Peacebuilding Community of Practice (PB-CoP) listserv, which includes practitioners from civil society and INGOs, however the topics and themes discussed on this listserv are not necessarily specific to the work of the PBC.

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72 See Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, available at www.ssrc.org/programs/cppf/

73 See Search for Common Ground (2014), *Guiding Principles on Young People's Participation in Peacebuilding*, launched in New York on 24 April 2014, text available at www.sfcg.org/guidingprinciples/

While a New York-based INGO monitored the work of the PBC at one point through the betterpeace.org website, no updates have been recorded for the past year. This is due to a lack of donor interest in the project, in large part related to the PBC's lack of engagement with civil society. The PBC's lack of transparency and openness made it difficult for civil society to articulate the outcomes arising from its monitoring of the Commission. Another resource that was once available was the Peace Building Initiative website developed by HPCR International in partnership with the PBSO and in cooperation with the Programme on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University.[74] However this project has not been active since 2009.

In New York, the lack of INGO engagement with the PBA seems less due to the fact that they do not see the PBC as a useful mechanism but more that they are not aware of the PBC's relevance to the peace and security issues that they ordinarily follow. There is no official civil society mechanism in New York that has a mission to engage with the PBC, unlike the peacebuilding networks and platforms in Brussels,[75] Geneva[76] and Washington, DC,[77] which are mandated to engage with local policy makers. In Brussels, the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) manages the Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN),[78] which is a mechanism that promotes dialogue between civil society and EU policy makers on peace and

conflict issues, and is jointly managed by EPLO, the European Commission, and the European External Action Service. The CSDN is potentially an interesting model to be emulated in the New York context, to ensure regular consultations between the PBA and civil society that would include official institutional commitment from the UN.

More recently, civil society organisations in New York have formed the New York Peacebuilding Group, which is working to bring attention to the 2015 review of the PBA as well as make links with partners in country and advise the UN and member states on peacebuilding issues more broadly.[79] In March 2015, they hosted eight civil society representatives from countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and arranged meetings between them and members of the AGE on the Review of the PBA and the High-Level Panel on the Review of UN Peace Operations, as well as UN staff (including PBSO), INGOs and member states (see text box in Chapter V). The PBSO should make more regular use of the New York Peacebuilding Group group as a way to broaden its network and assist member states with identifying civil society partners who can provide local knowledge and context analysis relevant to their work. A monitoring mechanism with similar objectives and capacities as Security Council Report[80] is needed for the PBC to become

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74 See Peacebuilding Initiative, available at www. peacebuildinginitiative.org/

75 See the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, website available at http://www.eplo.org/

76 See the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, website available at http://www.gpplatform.ch/

77 See the Alliance for Peacebuilding, website available at http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/

78 See the Civil Society Dialogue Network, information available on the website of the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office at www.eplo.org/civil-society-dialogue-network.html

79 The New York Peacebuilding Group is a gathering of organisations (the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, GPPAC, IPI, Interpeace, PAX, Peace Direct, QUNO, and World Vision) engaged on various peace-related issues at the UN and in country levels. Since September 2014 they have actively worked together to strengthen the role of civil society at the UN on peacebuilding as well as create the space for dialogue and collaboration with the UN and member states.

80 Security Council Report monitors and analyses the work of the Security Council bringing transparency to an otherwise opaque inter-governmental body. With access to insider diplomatic information, it is able to analyse the dynamics in the Council, which informs the general

more accessible to civil society and audiences outside of the UN.

Recommendation

Ensure transparency, accountability and responsiveness of the PBA to civil society.

How:

- The PBSO should recruit or appoint a PBSO staff person at the P3 or P4 level to serve as a Civil Society Liaison Officer and actively seek and coordinate civil society input into various PBC processes including OC meetings, CSC meetings, WGLL meetings, policy debates and cross-learning exercises. This person should also be tasked with tracking the inclusion of civil society actors, including women and youth, in different UN peacebuilding-related processes and their outcomes.
- The PBSO should institutionalize the position of a gender-sensitive peacebuilding expert by opening a permanent post at the P4 or P5 level for this role.
- The PBSO should work with new members of the OC to orient them to the role of INGOs and civil society in New York and in the field.

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public of trends and the expected outcomes of specific meetings and processes. They also regularly share the Council's forthcoming agenda on a monthly basis allowing for NGOs who follow the work of the Council to prepare their interventions and lobby strategies. Website available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/

The PBSO and gender-sensitive peacebuilding

When considering gender-sensitive peacebuilding, it is useful to look beyond the work of PBA to gauge the range of strategies being deployed by other UN actors. There could be scope for greater synergy and partnership between the PBSO and some of these initiatives.

In 2012, UNDP produced a draft report outlining the lessons learned from its deployment of Senior Gender Advisers to 10 crisis countries including Burundi. The report finds that this extra expert capacity enabled the Programme to move beyond piecemeal, project-based approaches to gender inclusivity, towards a more strategic impact in various areas of its work, from political participation to access to justice and livelihood issues. In all cases, the Advisers had played a central role in building an organisational culture that was informed and convinced of the relevance of addressing gender. The result was that gender was addressed in all parts of internal programming and reporting, and all programmes included working with women's groups as part of their course. The PBSO could benefit from a similar position among its staff.

In July 2013, a UN-backed declaration was signed in Bujumbura, Burundi, at the *Regional Conference on Women, Peace, Security and Development in the Great Lakes Region*. Its opening paragraph reads:

> *"We, participants of the Regional Conference on Women, Peace, Security and Development in the Great Lakes Region meeting in Bujumbura, Burundi from 9 to 11 July, 2013, organised by H.E. Mary Robinson, the UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region in Africa, Femmes Africa Solidarité and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, for women leaders to discuss and develop a road map for women's participation in the implementation of the Framework of Hope and to set a process in place for the adoption of a Regional Action Plan for the Great Lakes region for the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325."*[81]

However, the Regional Action Plan remains in need of financing and implementation. The PBF could begin to consider regional projects as well as national ones for its Gender Promotion Initiative, and consider re-granting in the way that foundations do to ensure that smaller, more targeted NGOs and women's groups also receive funding.

Mary Robinson's efforts alongside civil society groups, including women's organisations, have led to a new platform being established: the Women's Great Lakes Platform. Its objective is to ensure women's oversight and monitoring of peace agreements. The platform has endorsed the Regional Action Plan for UNSCR 1325 after painstaking consultations among cross-border and regional organisations based in Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Civil society actors played a central role in convening as well as participating in these developments, for example, the INGO Femmes Africa Solidarité helped facilitate the entire process. The PBSO could engage with this platform in an information exchange exercise to learn from some of the local strategies being devised by women

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81 See paragraph 1 of the *Bujumbura Declaration of the Regional Conference on Women, Peace, Security and Development in the Great Lakes Region Implementing the Framework of Hope and UNSCR 1325,* available at www.fasngo. org/assets/files/Great%20Lakes%202013/Bujumbura%20Regional%20Conference%20Declaration.pdf

for monitoring peace, as well as strategies for the successful engagement with local actors, and the shortcomings of certain approaches.[82]

The PBSO should ensure that the development of National Actions Plans is included in the instruments of engagement for PBC-mandated countries as a way to operationalise UNSCR 1325 or reinforce it if the country is already part of a regional plan. Civil society can arguably have greater leverage over budget allocations of National Action Plans than over regional ones but sometimes, due to political sensitivities, civil society can find better entry points at the regional level and use those to open up discussions at the national level..

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82 Many civil society actors in the region feel that the platform has in fact heightened frictions between them and did not facilitate local civil society involvement to the extent necessary to allow for their meaningful participation. As a result, the initiative lacks attachment at the local level and risks being abandoned once the initial funding cycle has ended. Irrespective of the platform's successes and failings, the PBSO would benefit from engaging with this UN-led initiative and discovering any lessons learned.

3. The Peacebuilding Fund

Within the PBA, the PBF has been the most successful in incorporating civil society expertise in various areas of its work, particularly as reflected in the 2013 review of the PBF and its 2014-2016 business plan. The PBF's most dynamic form of engagement with civil society is through their participation in the Joint Steering Committees (JSCs). These Committees are co-chaired by the national government and the UN and oversee the allocation of PBF funding.

Through its participation in the JSC in Burundi, the local peacebuilding NGO Biraturaba (also a GPPAC member) galvanized support for civil society participation in other fora such as the monitoring and evaluation clusters in the PBC Strategic Peacebuilding Framework process, as well as the technical monitoring committees of PBF-funded projects. However, by 2008, civil society taking part in these processes already expressed their dissatisfaction with the limited room for influence available in the processes. By 2010, despite having met with the PBC Chair during his country visits and submitting civil

society input to BINUB and the government[83] on a regular basis, Biraturaba staff report having developed a degree of mistrust towards the UN as a whole as they witnessed the viewpoints brought by civil society being ignored time and time again. As a result, civil society participation in UN-led activities waned with many groups, including Biraturaba, opting to work on bilateral peacebuilding initiatives instead, such as those supported by the European Union.

Indeed, the 2013 review of the PBF found that the representation by NGOs and civil society in the JSCs is *"often inadequate."*[84] The review notes: *"NGOs play a critical role in assessing and addressing peacebuilding needs from their perspective, having access to vulnerable groups and working in relevant specific regions or sectors. Moreover, they can have a key role in holding government accountable for*

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83 Biraturaba regularly organised civil society consultations on the peacebuilding aspects of the IMF's Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers for Burundi.
84 Kluyskens, J. and Clark, L. (2014), *Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund,* available at http://www.unpbf.org/wp-content/uploads/Final-Report-May-UN-PBF.pdf

effective peacebuilding actions. The Review Team recommends that PBF ensures that JSCs include NGO and/or CSO [civil society organisation] representatives."[85]

Building on the recommendations in the review, in its 2014-2016 business plan the PBF has stated it will pilot the pre-qualification of a select number of INGOs so that they can apply for PBF funds directly and not have to partner with a UN agency, as has been the practice in the past. It is not clear how widely known this initiative is within the INGO community in New York or in the field as PBF has not conducted any broad information sharing sessions with INGOs in recent. However, through its branch in the PBSO, the PBF does partner with the INGOs PeaceNexus, ACCORD and Interpeace for technical assistance including in conflict analysis. The 2013 review of the PBF found little engagement of local leaders and the local population in the PBF's project development, but a more mixed picture in its project implementation.[86] The reviewers found that PBF programming can sometimes be overly *"capital-centric"* and that it would benefit from the information, analysis and input as well as regular engagement from local actors.[87] This recognition in the review of the need to engage with local actors in programme planning and implementation is a model that would help all of the UN's peacebuilding work, not just the PBF.

The PBF's donors may not be necessarily interested in having the PBF fund INGOs directly. Some feel that for the funding to be catalytic is must be free from the administrative burden of administering hundreds of small grants. They also see that one of the important roles of the PBF is to build the peacebuilding capacities of UN agencies, not of INGOs or civil

society. The challenge is that if UN agencies do not include civil society views in project planning and proposal writing, then civil society actors cannot help set the analysis, and ultimately become simply implementers or beneficiaries rather than strategic partners.

On the governance side, the PBF's Advisory Group is composed of academics and international practitioners with expertise in various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. These academics and practitioners are not necessarily representative of local peacebuilding actors. There is a lack of transparency as to how and when the PBF's Advisory Group is activated, aside from its annual meetings and the breadth and depth of their influence on the Fund's activities. At the same time, the Advisory Group is seen as very helpful and supportive, including on gender and women's issues.

Another challenge for civil society engagement is that if a country does not have a JSC (which only those countries receiving the longer-term Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility funds will have), it is not clear how meaningfully civil society will be engaged. Similar to the PBC OC and CSC mechanisms, it was noted by those interviewed that INGOs in NewYork do not currently lobby the PBF, but they could do so in order to ensure that civil society involvement is held to account with the commitments that have been made in the PBF's business plan.

Local civil society consulted for this report voiced concern over the changing financial landscape for international peacebuilding funds. Although they welcomed the PBF's innovative approach towards funding peacebuilding in general, they noted their exclusion as direct beneficiaries, and as such, the UN's lack of commitment to preserving their independent space as civil society actors. The limits placed on funding are exacerbated by a

85 *Ibid.*
86 *Ibid.*
87 *Ibid.*

general decrease in the amount of funds available for peacebuilding work, resulting in a greater competition among peacebuilding organisations and the overall shrinking of their operational space.

Prospects are particularly stark for smaller peacebuilding NGOs and groups working on niche fields such as local mediation or non-violent education as they often also lack the absorption capacity to apply for larger grants. These kinds of groups or organisations would benefit from re-granting mechanisms allowing them to receive small grants from larger operational bodies and remain as specific as they are. In light of its mandate, the PBF could be innovative in this regard and fill the funding gap: it could designate an amount of its funds to UN counterparts to be re-granted to support these kind of peacebuilding activities throughout the country.

Should a staff person in PBSO be appointed to ensure inclusivity for all in country PBF-funded peacebuilding projects, he or she could also keep an eye on the overall cohesion of the projects and their impact on the ground, using regular civil society engagement as a sounding board which can then trigger more comprehensive evaluations if need be. This would enhance the overall performance of the UN in peacebuilding. In the case of UN peacebuilding activities in Burundi for example, it would answer one of the main criticisms of the PBF-funded projects, namely that they lacked overall cohesion and complementarity.[88]

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88 See Campbell, S.; Kayobera, L. and Nkurunziza, J. (2010) *Independent External Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund's Projects in Burundi,* available at www.unpbf.org/wp-content/uploads/Independent-Evaluation-Burundi.pdf

Recommendation

Ensure that civil society is closely engaged in strategic planning, implementation and assessments of PBF-funded projects.

How:
- The PBF should proceed with directly funding INGOs, based on its 2014-2016 business plan, including pre-qualifying INGO partners who can re-grant to smaller peacebuilding actors.
- The PBF should require UN agencies receiving funds to strategically include civil society actors in the elaboration of project proposals and encourage UN agencies to partner with civil society outside of the capital.
- The PBF should hold an annual information session with civil society actors in New York and regularly consult civil society groups in country as part of feedback on PBF-funded projects implemented by various UN agencies.
- The PBF should track the inclusion of civil society in PBF-funded projects and report on the outcomes.
- The PBF should ensure that a broad section of civil society is part of all Joint Steering Committees in country.
- The PBF should include additional representatives and local practitioners from civil society in its Advisory Group, particularly those experienced in gender-sensitive peacebuilding and youth, to provide practical, country-specific input on PBF-funded projects.

The PBF in Burundi

One of the key messages coming from the Burundi research for this report relates to the PBF and the failure to consolidate local infrastructures for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and tensions. In early 2007, the PBF allocated $35 million USD to support the consolidation of peace in Burundi through 18 projects in four main areas: Governance and Peace; Strengthening the Rule of Law in the Security Forces; Strengthening Justice and Promoting Human Rights; and Land Issues. Although the PBF projects are widely considered to have been innovative and timely, particularly in light of the fact that other bilateral and multilateral donors would have found them too risky, they lacked an overarching strategic direction to secure the desired outcomes from the projects.

A 2010 independent evaluation of PBF interventions in Burundi found that after the initial project selection, the JSC focused on the details of project design and implementation rather than on whether the projects were achieving their strategic goals or contributing to the consolidation of peace.[89] The evaluators go on to identify that, with the exception of projects targeting the National Defence Forces, *"there was no strategic coherence between projects within each sector, and little effort to achieve an aggregate complementary impact."* Five years on and it seems that no greater impact has been achieved. The results of the field research for this report support the 2010 analysis.

Had there been feedback loops in the 18 PBF-funded projects in Burundi where civil society would have been consulted on the impact of their activities on a regular basis, then realignment with changing social priorities or some programmatic adjustments could have been possible, ensuring the overall coherence in the interventions. Had there been more consultations with civil society at earlier intervals on the DDR processes in Burundi and Liberia, more realistic timeframes and contingency plans could have been developed.

One of the principles of financing short-term projects through the PBF is because the Fund is meant to be catalytic. However, if donors are not eventually supporting these short-term projects in the long-term, this creates gaps in the peacebuilding response of the UN. Civil society consulted for this report noted that in their experience, countries undergoing peace consolidation processes takea long time to stabilise and this cannot be addressed by short-term funding. For example, although demobilization has taken place in Burundi, participants in this research unanimously said the process remains unfinished. Some of the root causes of the conflict remain, such as a lack of access to livelihoods and ex-combatants who have been left particularly vulnerable. As a result, the incompleteness of their reintegration into society has led to a growing sense of insecurity amongst the population. As tensions rise in the lead up to 2015 elections, the presence of ex-combatants who have not been reintegrated presents a real threat to peace in the country. Those consulted for this report argued that the timeline for demobilisation and reintegration processes should be extended and take into account several electoral cycles.

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89 See Campbell, S.; Kayobera, L. and Nkurunziza, J. (2010) *Independent External Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund's Projects in Burundi*, available at www.unpbf.org/wp-content/uploads/Independent-Evaluation-Burundi.pdf

V. HARNESSING THE VALUE OF CIVIL SOCIETY: PRACTICALITY AND DIVERSITY

"It could prevent the scourge of war if men and women on the ground had access to decision makers to say there is a war coming"

Civil Society representative interviewed for this report

While this report has focused on the case for *why* civil society actors should be engaged, the reality remains that civil society faces difficulties in its ability to feed targeted, timely and context-specific information into the PBA and the UN's broader peacebuilding activities. This is due to several factors, including the inadequacy of the UN's community outreach initiatives and the absence of multi-stakeholder engagement at the local level, the inappropriateness of timeframes and evaluation mechanisms at the national level, and an overall lack of transparency and accountability at the international level. From civil society's point of view, the ever-increasing competition over resources and limited information networks hinders their potential as partners to the UN.

The process taken in the research for this report of sitting with and listening to local communities and civil society in countries on the PBC's agenda could serve the UN well in its peacebuilding efforts. Not only did it uncover specific issues related to UN peacebuilding, it also highlighted the innovative ways that civil society is playing a role in managing information flows that can signal the potential for violence and mitigate conflict, as well as the ways in which peacebuilding is done at a community level. What follows in this chapter is an exploration of the kinds of support and mechanisms for engagement that could be sought by the PBA and the UN more broadly, to better harness civil society's knowledge and expertise for the purposes of fine-tuning its peacebuilding approaches.

1. Engaging civil society in country

Participants in the research noted that consultations with civil society groups are currently less about national ownership and more about legitimising pre-planned interventions. As it is always the same actors who are consulted by the UN, the perception is that these actors are (even if unintentionally) pre-determined to prioritise certain issues and activities over others, and usually their priorities match that of the UN and donors. In this way they do not accurately reflect the diversity of viewpoints and peacebuilding work present in society. The result is a rubber-stamping exercise rather than an open process over which people can feel ownership. National ownership, they say, is the result of a process that has touched or involved the whole of society, especially when a country is in transition from a state of conflict or a government has won heavily contested elections. The legitimacy of such a government is by nature more *de jure* than *de facto*.

All of those interviewed for this research in PBC-mandated countries – as well as many who were interviewed in New York – agree: an active civil society is essential to the successful transition from a state of conflict to a stable democracy and they should be involved as much as possible in peacebuilding analysis, planning and implementation. The question invariably becomes one of how. Envisioning a mechanism that can incorporate all of civil society and be effective is a

daunting task. Also, the ways in which civil society can be included in discussions both in country and in New York are invariably different, so how can one mechanism cater to both? Before exploring different options to address these concerns, it can be useful to parse through some of the issues that need be considered when thinking about civil society inclusion.

It is also important to note that civil society can play an overtly political role in society.

Firstly, what is civil society? According to the World Alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS), the definition of civil society is *"the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market where people associate to advance common interests"*.[90] It is citizens rather than organisations that form the building blocks of society, particularly in post-conflict countries where – for a variety of political and practical reasons – registering organisations is not a straight forward task and social action takes shape through informal associations just as much as registered ones. As explained elsewhere, this paper takes the inclusion of civil society to mean the inclusion of voices from non-governmental organisations, both national and international in reach, local traditional leaders, academics, local community groups, women's groups, youth groups, disabled groups, internally-displaced people, as well as church groups and other religious groups.

In defining civil society, it is also important to note that civil society can play an overtly political role in society. As one member state interviewed for this report noted, *"All six countries on the PBC's agenda suffer from civil society fragmentation*

and politicisation. *There are conceptual misunderstandings and economic agendas. People look for ways to make a living so they create an NGO."*

This negative perception of civil society, coupled with the 'watch dog' role that civil society plays in many countries holding their national governments to account, is one of the reasons some member states claim they are less open to civil society inclusion in UN policy debates, including in the PBC. However, even while playing such a political role or epitomising the economic conditions of their time, civil society still serves as a mirror to the social and political changes in the country, and in this way, their views remain valuable and representative.

With such a wide range of groups and persons to consider, determining who is relevant and who is not is a complicated task. Engaging with civil society therefore requires strategic partnerships, the development of which is more an art than a science. Keeping in mind the objective of ensuring conflict sensitivity in the analysis, planning and implementation of peacebuildling work, the navigation of the civil society landscape is made a little easier. In order to identify and connect with local civil society and practitioners ahead of meetings or during policy debates, member states and UN staff can consult with INGOs such as the New York Peacebuiding Group, who can convey messages from their partners or directly facilitate the participation of local representatives.

In country, practicalities such as spoken language, access to a common base of information and proximity to the discussion venues are further considerations. A mechanism where all, including the most recluse associations, are invited to take part in dialogue and feedback processes[91]

90 Heinrich, V., and Khallaf, M. (2006), *Assessing Civil Society in Cyprus and Across the World,* The Civil Society Index, CIVICUS, available at www.civicus.org/view/media/AssessingCivilSocietyinCyprus_AcrosstheWorld.pdf

91 Casting the net widely can also have a multiplier effect on the distribution of key messages from the UN regarding its peacebuilding activities, effectively supporting its outreach efforts with local communities.

and are then left to self-select according to their capacity can work well; so long as there is someone responsible for both ensuring that information reaches remote areas and for bridging capacity gaps between different NGOs, groups and associations. Using the principle of conflict sensitivity to guide the selection of participants, this person could also take on the logistics of bringing rural-based participants to meetings in capitals, arrange video links and conference calls, and otherwise ensure that important civil society messages are conveyed in all peacebuilding discussions.[92]

Another practical mechanism for involving multiple civil society members in country is the creation of a multi-stakeholder platform. This mechanism received a lot of support from local civil society involved in this research, particularly in the CAR. Multi-stakeholder platforms are useful because they can address power disparities between participants through the very act of participation; weaker parties build their capacity 'by doing' and both weaker and stronger parties learn to trust each other as common projects take off and the extent to which they depend on one another increases. Such platforms also create the basis for better problem-solving analysis, as a boarder set of viewpoints are considered, as

well as better plans of action, as decisions and strategies are more widely accepted and better coordinated. The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, for example, is a platform where civil society, governments and donors have come together to generate better analyses and strategies for helping self-appointed fragile countries transition out of conflict. The fragility index and the donor-led 'New Deal' are, respectively, good examples of each.[93]

The downside of multi-stakeholder platforms is that they tend to have a slow start, rely heavily on a 'champion' and depend on the existence of good communication channels as well as funding for the implementation of action plans. There is a need to back-up common goals with concrete action in order to build momentum in the platform, so the pressure to yield dividends early on is rather high. Preliminary analysis is thereby needed on whether a collective approach to a peacebuilding problem is really necessary over and above a participatory one. Given limitations on the PBF's capacity as a multilateral donor (its need to raise $100 million USD per year, for example), such an initiative would most likely need to be taken up by a bilateral donor, perhaps one already supportive of the PBF's activities in a particular country in question. The PBF, and the UN more broadly, could then make use of the multi-stakeholder platform as a resource for enhancing the analysis, planning and implementation of its projects.

2. Engaging civil society in New York

In the field of peace and security, civil society actors have developed innovative mechanisms

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92 For the purposes of monitoring this participation, the PBF's Gender Marker template could potentially be adapted to measure the variety of civil society participation. The UN bodies implementing PBF-funded projects in country could report on whether they included one, two or three different civil society sectors in their discussions. One sector is the professional sector such as human rights and peacebuilding NGOs; another is made up of practitioners such as mediators, traditional leaders, healing facilitators and religious groups; and the other of social groups such as associations of women, youth, disabled, rural workers, internally-displaced and academics. Adapting the Gender Marker into an Inclusivity Marker, the UN agency would tick one of three boxes: Marker I could mean the inclusion of only one of these sectors in discussions; Marker II, the inclusion of two sectors; and Marker III the inclusion of all three.

93 See International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, website available at http://www. pbsbdialogue.org/

for influencing the work of the UN's primary body responsible for these affairs, the Security Council. As the PBC is a subsidiary body of the Council, it is interesting to note developments in the relationship between the Council's membership and civil society over the past decade as it has, perhaps surprisingly, gone against the grain. Much can be learned from these existing mechanisms, as they provide models for how the PBA might better engage with civil society.

The NGO Working Group (NGOWG) on the Security Council[94] has managed to progressively encourage member states on the Security Council to interact with civil society on a regular basis. Since its inception in 1997 – on the heels of talks about Council reform resulting from a sharp increase in Council activity in the post-Cold War era – the NGOWG on the Security Council has organised dialogue sessions between member states on the Council and civil society representatives to discuss issues on the Council's agenda. Having started off with meetings on an ad hoc basis to discuss topics such as the Council's annual report, the NGOWG on the Security Council now meets Security Council Ambassadors on a regularly scheduled basis to discuss various work streams of the Council through informal, off-the-record meetings.

The invitation for dialogue has also been extended to senior UN staff, such as the heads of UN agencies and Under Secretary-Generals. The NGOWG on the Security Council has around forty INGO members, is managed by a steering group, and is supported by a permanent Coordinator. Member states also reportedly seek regular engagement with the NGOWG on the Security Council beyond the customary minimum of one briefing during their Council presidency. This shows the extent to which diplomats

value civil society input, particularly should read perspectives from those with partners in countries on their agenda, and just before major policy debates and decisions.

In interviews for this report, it was noted that before the creation of the NGOWG on the Security Council, there was very little regular interaction between INGOs and member states on the Council, and now it is a given that these meetings will take place. The Security Council does not have formal guidelines for civil society consultation but from the perspective of INGOs, the working group fulfils that need. One INGO expert interviewed said that no one remembers when this was not the case, it is now just understood that all Security Council members will meet with INGOs through the NGOWG. Another INGO expert who was involved in the early days when it was difficult to even get reports of the Council's work issued publicly, said: *"it's unbelievable how they meet with us now."*

Using a similar organisational title but a different model of engagement is the NGOWG on Women, Peace and Security.[95] Originally coming together in 2000 as a loose group of INGOs who had called for a normative change in how the Council deals with women during conflicts and in post conflict situations, the NGOWG on Women, Peace and Security was formally formed once they achieved their principle goal of obtaining a Security Council Resolution on women and conflict, namely UNSCR 1325 (2000).[96] With the financial support of around a dozen member states and foundations and three full-time staff – an Executive Coordinator, a Research Manager and a Programme Assistant – the NGOWG on Women, Peace, and Security now monitors the

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94 See NGO Working Group on the Security Council, website available at www.ngowgsc.org/

95 See NGO Working Group on Women Peace and Security, website available at womenpeacesecurity.org/
96 See Security Council resolution 1325, S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000), available at www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/S-RES-1325%282000%29-E.pdf

implementation of UNSCR 1325 around the globe through regional and national action plans, builds the capacity of women peacebuilders and produces detailed analysis on countries on the Council's agenda from the perspective of gender-sensitive and gender-responsive peacebuilding.

As a practical means of influencing member states and UN policy makers on the implementation of UNSCR 1325, the NGOWG on Women, Peace and Security also developed a Human Rights Defenders Programme where women from countries on the Security Council's agenda come to New York to meet with Council diplomats ahead of mandate renewals in order to advocate for their issues to be dealt with in the new mandates. For the safety of the local participants involved, the programme is not widely publicised but it does enjoy regular funding from member states committed to the mission of UNSCR 1325 - reflecting the importance member states give to hearing directly from local women peacebuilders in a timely manner.

Civil society engagement with the Security Council also benefits from the existence of the Arria Formula. Created in 2000, this mechanism has allowed diplomats to arrange informal briefing sessions with NGOs and outside experts on issues pertinent to the Security Council. These meetings became so useful to the Security Council that they are formally encouraged in the Council's Working Methods Handbook.[97] In recent times however, the mechanism has been criticized as expedient but too narrow as meetings are called quickly, usually regarding a country in crisis, and though officially public, according to those interviewed for this report, the Council's penholder for that country tends to invite NGOs who push for its agenda. Changes

in the diversity of voices heard through this mechanism is another example of the shrinking space for civil society at the UN. Despite these recent limitations, some interviewed suggested that an Arria-type Formula mechanism could be established for the PBC to facilitate civil society engagement in a more formal way.

Finally, it is worth noting that there have been positive examples of NGO engagement with high-level processes recently with the creation of the post-2015 sustainable development agenda after the Rio +20 conference. In particular, the Open Working Group mechanism in the post-2015 process reversed some of the negative trend with civil society being able to attend the Open Working Group Sessions and special interactive dialogue sessions being organised between civil society actors and member states during inter-governmental negotiations. The Non-governmental Liaison Service (NGLS) is also actively seeking civil society speaking roles for the interactive dialogue sessions with member states during the official negotiations. Although the NGLS services only ECOSOC-accredited NGOs, it is worth scoping the possibility of it extending its reach to local peacebuilding NGOs, many of whom do not have the necessary focus or documentation for ECOSOC-accreditation.

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97 See United Nations Securit Council, *Working Methods Handbook*, S/PV.5601, p. 13, available at www. un.org/en/sc/about/methods/arriaformula.shtml

Recommendation

Ensure and enhance the independence and capacity of civil society to engage with the UN in local peacebuilding and in international policy debates.

> ### How:
> - Donors and the UN should provide financial and technical support for the creation of multi-stakeholder platforms in country to discuss peacebuilding initiatives. Participation should include national and local government, INGOs, the UN, and a broad spectrum of local civil society.
> - International donors should directly support local civil society networks and platforms that are already in existence.
> - In New York, donors should support the work of civil society actors in creating a the New York Peacebuilding Group and member states and UN experts should take advantage of its networks and expertise when seeking input for UN policy debates on peacebuilding.

Civil society engagement in the 2015 review: a way forward

Civil society actors in New York have been creative in the ways in which they have engaged with the 2015 review of the PBA, as well as in how they have bridged this process with the reviews of UN Peace Operations and UNSCR 1325. The Terms of Reference for the 2015 review of the PBA does not make any explicit reference to the inclusion of local communities or perspectives, civil society, women, or gender, although the modalities document outlining how the review should be conducted does include reference to interviews with civil society.[98] One of the early reasons for the creation of the New York Peacebuilding Group was to work collectively to try and bring local perspectives and expertise into the PBA review process.

The diversity of membership in the New York Peacebuilding Group allows it to reach out to a wider group of partners in different sectors, beyond those normally engaged in policy debates.

Starting in early 2015, the New York Peacebuilding Group, working in partnership with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), reached out to the Secretariats of both the Peace Operations and the PBA reviews in order to signal its willingness to engage on issues related to peacebuilding and the inclusion of civil society in both processes.

The New York Peacebuilding Group is currently composed of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, the International Peace Institute, Interpeace, PAX, Peace Direct, the Quaker United Nations Office, and World Vision.

This led to two off-the-record meetings in February 2015 between New York-based civil society actors and representatives from both the High-Level Panel on UN Peace Operations as well as the Advisory Group of Experts for the PBA review. All of the panel members who participated in these meetings welcomed the views of civil society and noted that they were particularly interested in getting the perspectives of communities who are impacted by the work of UN peace missions.

The New York Peacebuilding Group and NUPI then planned a three day consultation in March 2015 for civil society partners from countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America to come to New York and spend time sharing and learning from each other as well as preparing key messages to be delivered to representatives of both review panels. After sharing their messages in person during the meetings, they summarised their key points into one document and it was submitted as the New York Peacebuilding Group's official input for both review processes. The document is provided as an Appendix at the end of this report.

Feedback from the civil society participants in this process was that, for many of them, it was their first opportunity to engage with the UN at a policy level. They felt heard and empowered to renew their engagement with the UN locally. Feedback from the panel experts was also positive and it was noted to

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98 *Supra*, note 13.

the Group that the consultation was a unique and effective way to gather a diversity of perspectives on the UN's role in peacebuilding.

As part of the review, members of the AGE are making country visits to Timor Leste, Burundi, South Sudan, CAR and Liberia. Following the New York consultations, the New York Peacebuilding Group and other civil society organisations have assisted the AGE with identifying local partners for them to meet in order to hear community perspectives on peacebuilding and the UN's work.

Peacebuilder from Timor Leste, Luis Ximenes, shares his experience during a three-day civil society consultation with UN staff, diplomats and members of the High-Level panels on the UN's Peace Operations Review and Peacebuilding Architecture Review. The meetings were held at the Quaker House in New York.

For example in March 2015, several members of civil society in Burundi met with members of the AGE during their country visit in a session that was organised by the local NGO Biraturaba, with support from an INGO, the American Friends Service Committee. The members of the AGE heard the opinions of civil society representatives on the status of the national reconciliation process, including demobilisation and reintegration, the funding allocations for peacebuilding activities by the PBF, the need for greater civil society monitoring of these activities, and the shrinking space for civil society action in Burundi, including the space for consultation with UN actors. Feedback from both the civil society actors and the UN was that this was a positive experience and that new and different perspectives came to light from the fact that the participants were not the 'usual' civil society partners who the UN engages with in Burundi.

This process initiated by the New York Peacebuilding Group and partners in setting up mechanisms where local perspectives can be taken into account in a UN policy process, is a model the UN could learn from. The diversity of membership in the New York Peacebuilding Group allows it to reach out to a wider network of partners in different sectors, beyond those normally engaged in policy debates. The time spent during the consultation working with the local participants preparing them for the meeting with the review panels was also exemplary, as it gave everyone an opportunity to learn from each others' local knowledge and build on each others' strengths and experience. These are the types of approaches that are needed in order to enhance the UN's ability to learn from and listen to different civil society groups.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

"Is the PBC filling the gap? The question is if the PBC is the answer for addressing the gap"

INGO representative interviewed for this report

It is well recognised by actors both inside and outside the UN, that given the PBA's current mandate and make up, the political blockages by member states, and the challenges in its relationship with other parts of the UN engaged in peacebuilding, it is very difficult for the Architecture to live up to the original vision of the High-Level Panel on *Threats, Challenges and Change:* that of a robust tool in the UN's toolkit to fill the gap in the UN's response to violent conflict. Meaningful engagement with civil society offers the PBA a way forward. Civil society can bring local perspectives to the otherwise state-led political work of the PBC. It can bring local knowledge and capacities to the analysis, strategising, implementation and monitoring of PBF-funded projects, and it can assist the PBSO in supporting a more transparent and coherent PBC and PBF. The challenge is how to ensure that this engagement is not ad hoc, and yet does not compromise the PBA's flexibility as a UN mechanism. Ultimately, the PBA's improved engagement with civil society actors will help to build a UN approach to peacebuidling that is more relevant, catalytic and strategic. It is important to note that although these recommendations specifically target the PBA, the need to address the issues of transparency, strategic partnerships, convening power and mutual accountability in UN peacebuilding will likely remain no matter what emerges from the 2015 UN Peacebuilding Review process.

1. Transparency

One of the benefits in the way the PBA was initially set up, particularly the PBC, was that it could be more creative and flexible than other UN member state bodies already in existence. Ten years on, while the potential for creativity and flexibility remains a unique advantage for the PBC, the lack of transparency and public communication on its day to day operations such as its monthly schedule, its working methods, its meeting materials and outputs, continues to hamper the ability of civil society and other actors outside of the UN to engage meaningfully or to hold the PBC to account. A more transparent PBA means that there will be more support both inside and outside the UN for its work.

Recommendation

The Organisational Committee of the UN Peacebuilding Commission should review its working methods with an eye to promoting transparency and accountability in the PBC's day-to-day operations, while not losing sight of the benefits of a flexible member-state mechanism. Clear guidelines and processes for the communication of the PBC's activities, such as publishing a monthly calendar of work and circulating meeting materials in advance to relevant NGOs, should be established in consultation with civil society actors. This process would also offer an opportunity for all stakeholders to engage with the PBC around how it does its work and would foster a greater sense of shared commitment to the PBC's mission. As part of this process, the terms of reference for the Chairs of the Country Specific Configurations should be updated and made public.

2. Strategic Partnerships

The inclusion of civil society in meetings, strategies and evaluations, can bring an additional tool to the PBA's toolbox. Civil society actors will bring different perspectives, approaches and feedback from communities who are the ones most impacted by the PBA's work. At the moment, this inclusion is ad hoc and a better mechanism needs to be created to ensure that civil society is engaged systematically in the PBA's work in a flexible way. The provisional guidelines which outline civil society participation in meetings of the PBC have never been reviewed or evaluated since their adoption in 2007. As a result, these guidelines do not reflect developments in the work and functions of the Commission, or in the evolution of civil society's role in peacebuilding both locally and globally. These guidelines, while public, are not widely known or utilized by member states in the PBC or by civil society actors either in New York or in country.

Recommendation

The PBA should systematically include civil society in its activities and seek to build strategic partnerships with civil society actors, both in New York and in country, to enhance its policy debates and contribute to strategic planning and assessments. To facilitate this, the Organisational Committee of the UN Peacebuilding Commission should revisit the 2007 Provisional Guidelines for the Participation of Civil Society in Meetings of the PBC. This process would offer a key opportunity for all parts of the PBA to re- engage with civil society in New York and in PBC-mandated countries, and would result in greater transparency and the fostering of trust and mutual collaboration, which would benefit all actors. It would also help to establish clear guidelines for information sharing and communication between the PBA, civil society and other actors outside of the UN.

3. Convening Power

Peacebuilding is inherently political, and the PBC as an inter-governmental body is a political forum. This political forum, coupled with the PBC's convening role and its diverse membership, offers a unique space for the discussion of many different issues related to peacebuilding as well as creating the space for different perspectives to be heard and considered. Creating the space for debate and discussion on the impact and linkages between UN peacebuilding, the role of national governments, and most critically, local peacebuilding by civil society actors, is the 'value added' of the PBC. This approach can also be a mechanism where concerns about a country relapsing into conflict can be discussed and links made between UN peacebuilding and the UN's role in the prevention of violent conflict.

Recommendation

The PBC, through its Organisational Committee, Country Specific Configurations and Working Group on Lessons Learned, should take advantage of its convening power to regularly bring together different stakeholders, beyond national governments, in order to create the space for dialogue, support social cohesion, and bring attention to countries that may be at risk of relapsing into violent conflict. The PBA can work with existing civil society networks in New York and in country to identify a diverse range of participants, including women and youth. The inclusion of civil society and focus on local knowledge in these types of discussions would be essential to understanding the full context of a country situation and identifying key drivers of violence. The PBC, in its advisory role, could then share the analysis and

strategies that emerge in these discussions with the Security Council for countries on its agenda. In country, when Configuration Chairs visit their national counterparts, they should seek to use their convening power to bring together all actors, in particular civil society, including women's groups in meetings with government and the UN in order to create the space for open and inclusive dialogue.

4. Mutual Accountability

One of the PBA's key roles is to hold governments and the UN to their commitments by helping to coordinate their peacebuilding strategies. Mutual accountability is not a new concept for the PBA, however in the past it has mainly referred to accountability between national governments and the UN. National ownership is also not a new concept for UN, and by default, it refers to the level of ownership national governments feel they have over peacebuilding processes. It may infer, but does not actively accommodate, the views of the people in those countries. A broadened definition of accountability and ownership must be taken if the PBA is to live up to its original vision as a catalytic and relevant peacebuilding actor and help address the deficit of trust between local communities and the UN.

Recommendation

In promoting mutual accountability, the PBC should explicitly include a role for civil society and local communities in ensuring that both their governments and the UN fulfil their commitments on peacebuilding priorities and the implementation of activities. This means including civil society in the analysis of national issues, the setting of national priorities and the implementation and monitoring of peacebuilding projects. To facilitate this, the Peacebuilding Fund should require UN agencies in receipt of its funds to consult with civil society actors while developing their project proposals, actively include civil society in the monitoring and evaluation of these projects, and earmark funds for re-granting to local civil society organisations.

In its work with governments to identify national peacebuilding priorities, the PBC should include the creation of a National Action Plan for women's participation and leadership in decision- making and the protection of women and girls, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1325.

A further set of concrete recommendations for the PBC, PBSO, PBF and donors:

1. **Ensure the transparency and accountability of PBA policies and working methods that relate to civil society inclusion.**

- The PBA should review and update the *Provisional Guidelines for the Participation of Civil Society in Meetings of the PBC* in close consultation with civil society.
- The PBA should support and implement all of the recommendations in the Secretary-General's report on *Women's Participation in Peacebuilding* and UNSCR 1325 by, amongst other things, including the creation of National Action Plans for women's participation and leadership in decision-making and the protection of women and girls in its work with governments on the setting of national peacebuilding priorities.
- The PBA should institute working methods that foster transparency and greater engagement with civil society, in particular women and youth.

2. **Ensure the inclusion of civil society in key discussions at policy arenas of the PBC and at various points in the strategising and monitoring of PBC activities.**

- The Chairs and members of the OC, CSC, and WGLL should directly consult with civil society on a regular basis and facilitate their participation in meetings in New York, as well as establish opportunities for regular engagement in country.
- Information about meetings and country visits (both before and after) should be made available widely well in advance and civil society expertise, particularly women and youth, should be sought out to help shape the agenda and priorities, and to ensure that meeting logistics enable/do not limit their participation.
- The PBC should establish a strategy to create feedback loops for civil society monitoring and assessments of its activities both in New York and in country.
- The PBC should work with INGOs in New York to help identify local partners and ensure that a diversity of perspectives is included.
- Chairs of the CSCs should ensure that National Action Plans for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, and the active participation and leadership of women in peacemaking and political processes, are part of a country's joint agreement with the PBC.
- The WGLL should organize an annual session to update itself on recent developments in peacebuilding practice, with civil society as key participants.

3. **Ensure transparency, accountability and responsiveness of the PBA to civil society.**

- The PBSO should recruit or appoint a PBSO staff person at the P3 or P4 level to serve as a Civil Society Liaison Officer and actively seek and coordinate civil society input into various PBC processes including OC meetings, CSC meetings, WGLL meetings, policy debates and cross-learning exercises. This person should also be tasked with tracking the inclusion of civil society actors, including women and youth, in

different UN peacebuilding-related processes and their outcomes.

- The PBSO should institutionalize the position of a gender-sensitive peacebuilding expert by opening a permanent post at the P4 or P5 level for this role.
- The PBSO should work with new members of the OC to orient them to the role of INGOs and civil society in New York and in the field.

4. Ensure that civil society is closely engaged in strategic planning, implementation and assessments of PBF-funded projects.

- The PBF should proceed with directly funding INGOs, based on its 2014-2016 business plan, including pre-qualifying INGO partners who can re-grant to smaller peacebuilding actors.
- The PBF should require UN agencies receiving funds to strategically include civil society actors in the elaboration of project proposals and encourage UN agencies to partner with civil society outside of the capital.
- The PBF should hold an annual information session with civil society actors in New York and regularly consult civil society groups in country as part of feedback on PBF-funded projects implemented by various UN agencies.
- The PBF should track the inclusion of civil society in PBF-funded projects and report on the outcomes.
- The PBF should ensure that a broad section of civil society is part of all Joint Steering Committees in country.
- The PBF should include additional representatives and local practitioners from civil society in its Advisory Group, particularly those experienced in gender-sensitive peacebuilding and youth, to provide practical, country-specific input on PBF-funded projects.

5. Ensure and enhance the independence and capacity of civil society to engage with the UN in local peacebuilding and in international policy debates.

- Donors and the UN should provide financial and technical support for the creation of multi-stakeholder platforms in country to discuss peacebuilding initiatives. Participation should include national and local government, INGOs, the UN, and a broad spectrum of local civil society.
- International donors should directly support local civil society networks and platforms that are already in existence.
- In New York, donors should support the work of civil society actors in the New York Peacebuilding Group and member states and UN experts should take advantage of its networks and expertise when seeking input for UN policy debates on peacebuilding.

APPENDIX

Civil Society Recommendations for the Reviews of UN Peace Operations and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture

This briefing note summarizes the recommendations and inputs made by civil society representatives from Africa, Asia, and Latin America who participated in a civil society consultation on the UN Peace Operations Review and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review from March 11-13, 2015 in New York. The civil society representatives took part in a preparatory workshop at Quaker House, gave presentations directly to members of the Independent High-Level Panel on Peace Operations and the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture in a roundtable discussion and were featured speakers in a panel event at the International Peace Institute. These meetings were organised by the New York Peacebuilding Group and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

Key recommendations:

- Community Engagement Strategies

  o The Security Council should mandate the development and implementation of community engagement strategies for all UN Peace Operations as part of a UN mission's overall political strategy. These strategies should be developed in cooperation and consultation with local civil society actors, and shared and reviewed with local communities on a regular basis.

  o The UN Peacebuilding Commission should develop engagement strategies with civil society for each of its Country Specific Configurations in order to assist the chair and its members in ensuring that community peacebuilding perspectives and activities are part of UN peacebuilding strate-gies at the national level as well as policy discussions in New York.

- Local Peacebuilding Assessments

  o Reports of the Secretary-General on UN Peace Operations and UN Peacebuilding should provide analysis of the diversity of perspectives and priorities across different groups within countries. To aid in this, UN missions (or UN Country Teams in the case of non-mission settings) should regularly carry out community-based assessments or perception surveys in these countries, preferably through local civil society networks if they are already in place, and provide regular feedback to communities on the UN's mandate and activities on peace and security.

  o The UN's Peacebuilding Architecture (PBC, PBF, PBSO) should integrate local views on peacebuilding in all of its work through the use of community-based assessments or perception surveys in countries it is engaged with in order to be able to be responsive to, and inclusive of, local perspectives when identifying national peacebuilding priorities and evaluating projects that are funded by the PBF.

Summary of main issues raised in three key areas of concern:

- Community Engagement and Peacebuilding

  - The trust deficit between the UN and local populations must be addressed. In many areas, local populations do not have a clear understanding of the role of UN peace operations in their communities because there is no direct interaction. Communities perceive that the UN is there to help the government or the armed groups and not the people. This is further exacerbated when communities do not see accountability for crimes committed by peacekeeping troops.

  - Youth should be seen as positive agents of change for peace, rather than victims or troublemakers. Youth are not just the future, but also the present, and should be considered active peacebuilders and peacemakers in their communities, rather than a 'livelihoods' problem or recruitment threat.

  - Concerted efforts must be made to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 by involving women in peace and security initiatives at all levels. 1325 includes provisions for participation, promotion and protection of women during armed conflict, but it is inconsistently implemented on the ground. National Action plans or strategies should be developed and implemented.

  - Inclusion of all under-represented populations, such as people with disabilities and religious, ethnic, linguistic minorities, is essential for sustainable peace. Exclusion of any group will seriously hamper peace and security efforts.

  - Lessons learned from previous engagements must be taken into account. A great deal of documentation already exists on what makes for effective engagement with local partners for peace operations and peacebuilding, yet the political will to put these into practice is lacking.

  - Put people back in the center of the UN. Institutional rigidity often prevents putting people as the main focus, but without addressing the needs of the people, there will be no lasting impact.

  - Reconciliation is essential for traumatized populations to heal and make progress. Sustainable peace requires transformed relationships at all levels. It is equally important to address this with government officials and senior leaders as it is difficult for people suffering from trauma to effectively lead their country. They, too, need healing, and the UN could help provide space for this.

  - The breadth and depth of civil society must be identified and recognized. There are significant local peace resources, capacities and programmes, and they must be empowered to sustain peace. Issues raised by local civil society actors that might be critical of government should not be ignored by the UN but rather be acknowledged and addressed.

- Responding to Local Peace and Security Needs

  o <u>Multidimensional problems require multidimensional solutions.</u> Although there may be threats that require a military response, political dialogue is necessary to address the root causes of conflicts and find sustainable solutions. Furthermore, securitized approaches to peacebuilding neglect the power of local solutions that do not rely on the presence of armed actors in communities. A long-term military response is not sustainable. Hence, a human security approach is necessary to ensuring sustainable peace and security.

  o <u>There are existing civil society-led efforts to identify and address community security needs, but the UN is not constructively engaging with them.</u> Small-scale, local efforts are more sustainable than top-down, externally-imposed activities. Engaging with communities is not only an opportunity for the UN to learn about their security needs, but also to explain in practical terms what the UN can and cannot do.

  o <u>Local civil society has an important monitoring and accountability role that is not always put to use.</u> Local civil society has firsthand knowledge of the situation on the ground, and can contribute to early warning systems and also monitor the impact of peacebuilding activities throughout project cycles as well as once the UN leaves.

- Broadening Local Participation and National Ownership

  o <u>Context-specific conflict analysis is rarely done, and even then, local peacebuilders' perspectives are not incorporated.</u> Conflict analysis informed by local voices is necessary before, during, and after UN peace operations to understand the context, comprehensively address the challenges, and ensure there is lasting impact and 'Do No Harm'.

  o <u>Even when community engagement is conducted, the voices of people who are not linked to any institution are not always reflected.</u> UN strategies that do not reflect and address the concerns of community members are not sustainable.

  o <u>Youth and women are heard only in relation to a narrow selection of issues.</u> As vital segments of society (often composing the majority in post-conflict countries), youth and women should be consulted in the analysis and design phases of all peacebuilding initiatives and not only with regards to the implementation of gender or livelihood projects.

  o <u>UN strategies lack long-term vision</u>. In some countries, the UN has been present for decades but is still making short-term plans and strategies. The high staff turnover rate also affects sustainability of peace operations.

  o <u>Community engagement should be continuous and systematic rather than ad hoc and sporadic.</u> Often, community members are consulted one time and do not hear how their input is used, making them reluctant to participant in future consultations. Effective information feedback loops in conjunction with consultations are critical.

- o Although it can be difficult, access to rural areas is necessary to ensure the inclusion of all voices.

- o There is no monitoring mechanism for international expenditures for peace. Once the UN has completed a project or activity, there is no system in place to monitor its effectiveness. While communities have firsthand knowledge of the impact, there is no established feedback mechanism for them to share this with the UN.

- o Statebuilding often focuses on developing physical infrastructure but does not address how it will be used. Enormous resources are expended on buildings, cars, and other material items but there is minimal effort made to identify how these efforts will benefit local communities, and they are often misused (or not used at all) while the challenges they were meant to address remain.

- o The UN sometimes tries to play too many roles and does not succeed at any of them. The UN should focus on how it can uniquely contribute to improving state-society relations, and identify ways to support existing, community-led mechanisms rather than creating new systems

Civil Society Participants:

Mr. John Ahere
Peacebuilding Unit Coordinator
ACCORD
South Africa

Mr. Bernardo Arévalo de Léon
Senior Peacebuilding Adviser
Interpeace
Guatemala

Mr. Luis da Costa Ximenes
Director
Belun
Timor Leste

Ms. Martine Ekomo-Soignet
Local Consultant
GPPAC and Peace Direct
Central African Republic

Ms. Oulie Keita
Board Member/WANEP
Special Advisor/GPPAC
Mali

Ms. Nelly Maina
Gender Expert
World Vision
Kenya

Mr. Adrien Niyongabo
Coordinator
Healing and Rebuilding Our Communities
Burundi

Mr. Roosevelt Woods
Executive Director
Foundation for International Dignity
Liberia

* The New York Peacebuilding Group is a gathering of organisations (the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, the International Peace Institute, Interpeace, PAX, Peace Direct, the Quaker United Nations Office, and World Vision) engaged on various peace related issues at the UN and in country. Since September 2014 they have actively worked together to strengthen the role of civil society at the UN on peacebuilding as well as create space for dialogue and collaboration with the UN and member states.

High-Level Thematic: "A World of Risks - A New Commitment for Peace"

Related events

Progress and developments of Francophone contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

When:
11 May 2016, 1.15PM – 2.30PM

Where:
United Nations, New York – Conference Room 11 (interpretation in French and in English will be provided)

Organizers:
The International Organization of La Francophonie (IOF), in collaboration with the Permanent Missions of Canada and Senegal to the United Nations

Additional information:

INVITATION

Progress and developments of Francophone contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

Wednesday, 11 May 2016, 1:15pm to 2:30pm
Conference Room 11 (Conference Building, United Nations)

Interpretation in French and in English will be provided
A light lunch will be served after the meeting.

An initiative of the International Organization of La Francophonie (IOF), in partnership with the Permanent Missions of Canada and Senegal

Since 2000, the International Organization of La Francophonie has been committed to reinforcing the participation of Francophone countries in peacekeeping operations, by mobilizing their capacities and expertise. On the occasion of the High-Level Thematic Debate of the UN General Assembly on Peace and Security, the IOF, together with its partners, shares its views and perspectives on the progress of Francophone contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. In the current international security environment, this side-event will also address the main challenges in this field, with regard to the UN - IOF partnership, as well as the experience of Francophone countries.

1- Peace and Security: Today's and tomorrow's challenges for the United Nations and for the International Organization of La Francophonie
Representative of the President of the UN General Assembly (to be confirmed)

2- Addressing peacekeeping operations in 2016: developments in the mobilization of Francophone countries
Mr. Hervé Ladsous, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
Mr. Georges Nakseu-Nguefang, Director of « Political Affairs and Democratic Governance », International Organization of La Francophonie (IOF)

3- Contributing to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: exploring the challenges. Perspectives of two key witnesses
*Mr. Fodé Seck, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of **Senegal** to the United Nations (to be confirmed), and Colonel Barthelemy Diouf, Military Advisor*
*Brigadier-General Martin Girard, Military Advisor, Permanent Mission of **Canada** to the United Nations*

4- Q & A

Moderator: *Mr. Paul Robert Tiendrébéogo, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the IOF to the United Nations*

Contact/RSVP: *diedhioum@francophonie.org - reper.new-york@francophonie.org*
Tel.: (212) 867 6771

*À l'occasion du Débat thématique de haut niveau de l'Assemblée générale
des Nations Unies sur la paix et la sécurité*

INVITATION

Progrès des contributions francophones
aux opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies

Mercredi 11 mai 2016, de 13h15 à 14h30
Salle de conférences 11 (Bâtiment des conférences, Nations Unies)

Interprétation disponible en français et en anglais
Un repas léger sera servi à l'issue de la rencontre.

Une initiative de l'Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF),
en partenariat avec les Missions permanentes du Canada et du Sénégal

Depuis 2000, la Francophonie s'est engagée à renforcer la participation des Etats francophones dans les opérations de maintien de la paix, en mobilisant les capacités et l'expertise de ses Etats membres. A l'occasion du Débat thématique de haut niveau sur la paix et la sécurité organisé par le Président de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, l'OIF et ses partenaires font le point sur les progrès enregistrés dans le domaine des contributions francophones aux opérations de paix onusiennes. Au regard du contexte sécuritaire international actuel, il s'agira également de présenter les défis à relever dans ce domaine, en s'appuyant sur le partenariat entre l'OIF et les Nations unies et l'expérience de certains Etats francophones.

1- La paix et la sécurité dans le monde : les défis d'aujourd'hui et de demain pour les Nations Unies et la Francophonie
Représentant du Président de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies (à confirmer)

2- Les opérations de maintien de la paix : progrès de la mobilisation francophone
M. Hervé Ladsous, Secrétaire général adjoint aux opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies
M. Georges Nakseu-Nguefang, Directeur « Affaires politiques et gouvernance démocratique » de l'Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF)

3- Contribuer aux opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies : quels enjeux ? Regards croisés de deux grands témoins
*Monsieur l'Ambassadeur Fodé Seck, Représentant permanent du **Sénégal** auprès des Nations Unies (à confirmer), et le Colonel Barthelemy Diouf, Conseiller militaire*
*Brigadier-Général Martin Girard, Conseiller militaire de la Mission permanente du **Canada** auprès des Nations Unies*

4- Échanges

Modérateur : *Monsieur l'Ambassadeur Paul Robert Tiendrébéogo, Représentant permanent de l'OIF auprès des Nations Unies*

Contacts/RSVP : *diedhioum@francophonie.org* - *reper.new-york@francophonie.org*
Tél. : (212) 867 6771

High-Level Thematic: "A World of Risks - A New Commitment for Peace"

Related events

Women & Mediation: Experiences in Ensuring Wider Participation of Women in Peace Processes

When:
11 May 2016, 3PM – 4.30PM

Where:
United Nations, New York – Conference Room 6

Organizer:
Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations

Additional information:

CONCEPT NOTE

Side-event at the High-Level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace and Security

Wednesday 11th May 2016 at 3.00 pm - 5.00 pm

Venue: UN Headquarters, Conference Room 6

Women & Mediation:
Experiences in Ensuring Wider Participation of Women in Peace Processes

Objective and format

This year means a shift to the implementation phase of the three UN security related reviews. Increased focus on mediation as well as women, peace and security has been emphasized in all three reports. To ensure lasting peace, there is a clear need to have more women participating in peace processes. To promote this, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, together with partner countries and operational partners of the Nordic Women Mediators' Network will host a High-Level Side Event on Wednesday 11th May, on the sidelines of the High Level Thematic debate of the UN Peace and Security. The aim is to identify gaps and ways forward while discussing experiences in ensuring wider participation of women in peace processes.

The side-event offers a forum for experience-sharing and gathering lessons learned. The event will feature Ministers and senior UN officials, and during the panel discussion representatives from the Philippines, and South Africa as well as members of the Nordic Women Mediators' Network will share insights and experiences from peace processes. The panel will address the successes and challenges of increasing women's influence and meaningful participation in peace processes, what the outcomes could be and what can be globally learned from them.

Key questions:

> ➤ Building on experience and existing bodies and networks, how could women's influence and meaningful participation in peace processes be increased?
> ➤ What are the main challenges in nominating female mediator or including female mediation experts in the mediation team? How could this be overcome?
> ➤ What kind of thematic experience and knowledge should all mediation experts have so that they would bring added value to the negotiation team? Do mediators have those skills today?
> ➤ How can mediators bring more women to peace processes?

Background

While important gains have been made in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325), formal peace and mediation processes have lagged behind in effectively engaging and meaningfully involving women, whether as negotiators' representing parties to a conflict or as members of the teams facilitating peace processes. The UN Security Council has on a number of occasions expressed concern at the persistent obstacles to women's full involvement in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. Special attention has been drawn to the constant under-representation of women in formal peace processes.

A study done by the UN of 31 major peace processes between 1992 and 2011 found that only two percent of chief mediators, nine percent of negotiators, and four percent of signatories were women (UN Women 2012). Women's absence at the peace table generally translates into their absence in subsequent peace agreements.

INVITATION

Women & Mediation:
Experiences in Ensuring Wider Participation of Women
in Peace Processes

Side-event at the High-Level Thematic Debate on Peace and Security

Wednesday 11th May 2016 at 3.00 pm - 5.00 pm

Venue: UN Headquarters, Conference Room 6

The three recent UN peace and security reviews (peace operations, peacebuilding architecture, Women, Peace and Security) have all highlighted the importance of mediation and advancing women's leadership and inclusion. To ensure lasting and sustainable peace, there is a clear need to have more women participating in peace processes.

The Nordic countries Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden will host on Wednesday, 11 May, a side event "*Women and Mediation: Experiences in Ensuring Wider Participation of Women in Peace Processes*" in the margins of the High Level Thematic Debate on peace and security. The event is organized in cooperation with the Nordic Women Mediators' Network and their operational partners.

The aim of the side event is to identify gaps, and think of ways forward in ensuring wider inclusion of women. The participants will share their experiences and best practices. After the high-level remarks from the Nordic ministers and senior UN representatives, there will be a panel discussion featuring prominent women who have served as lead mediators and sat at the peace tables. The discussion will be followed by a Q & A session.

Member States, UN and civil society members are invited. For further information and please contact Ms. Marianne Heino at the Permanent Mission of Finland, by email: marianne.heino@formin.fi or by telephone: (212) 821 0215.

Program

15.00   **Introduction** by H.E. Mr. Kai Sauer, Permanent Representative of Finland to the UN

15.05   **Opening remarks:**
H.E. Mr. Børge Brende, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway
H.E. Ms. Margot Wallström, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden

15.15   **Remarks by** H.E. Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, UN
Remarks by H.E. Ms. Lakshim Puri, Deputy Executive Director, UN Women

15.20   **Video Greeting by** Mr. Staffan de Mistura, UN Special Envoy for Syria, and a representative of the Syrian Women's Advisory Board

15.30   **Panel**: **Experiences in Ensuring Wider Participation of Women in Peace Processes**

H.E. Ms. Lourdes Ortiz Yparraguirre, Permanent Representative of Philippines to the UN
Ms. Lulama Rulumeni, Deputy Director, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, South Africa

Nordic Women Mediators' Advisory Group members:
Ms. Elisabeth Rehn, Minister of State, CMI/Advisor
Ms. Greta Gunnarsdottir, Ambassador for Human Rights, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland

Q & A

Discussion is moderated by Mr. Itonde Kakoma, Director for Sub-Saharan Africa Program, Crisis Management Initiative

16.30   **Remarks by** H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft, President of the General Assembly

16.35   **Closing Remarks by** H.E. Ms. Lilja Alfredsdottir, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland

High-Level Thematic: "A World of Risks - A New Commitment for Peace"

Related events

The Future of Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Endorsing and Implementing the Kigali Principles

When:
11 May 2016, 3PM – 5PM

Where:
United Nations, New York – Conference Room 1

Organizers:
Permanent Missions of Rwanda and of the Netherlands, in collaboration with the Global Centre for R2P

Additional information:

INVITATION

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Rwanda to the UN and the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN
are pleased to invite your PR, DPR & experts to a side event and endorsement ceremony

The Future of Civilian Protection in Peace Operations
Endorsing and Implementing the Kigali Principles

May 11th 2016, 3.00-5.00 PM, Conference Room 1, United Nations Headquarters

Co-chairs:
- H.E. Mr. Bert Koenders, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
- H.E. Mr. Eugène-Richard Gasana, Minister of State in Charge of Cooperation and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Rwanda to the UN

Moderator:
Dr. Simon Adams, Executive Director, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

Speakers:
- H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft, President of the General Assembly
- H.E. Ms. Samantha Power, Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN
- Mr. Ian Martin, Executive Director, Security Council Report
- Lt. General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, former Force Commander MONUSCO

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**KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
CANDIDATE 2017 - 2018**

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

**GLOBAL CENTRE
FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT**

CONCEPT NOTE

The Future of Civilian Protection in Peace Operations

Endorsing and Implementing the Kigali Principles

May 11th 2016, UNHQ NY

Context

Protection of Civilians (PoC) in armed conflict is at the core of the work of the UN. It is a key responsibility for members of the international community. Since the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica, the United Nations has taken steps to ensure that peacekeeping is made more effective. Still, challenges in a range of conflict situations remain enormous. Peacekeepers are increasingly called upon to uphold the international community's responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities. The tremendous suffering by civilians in armed conflict can be seen on a daily basis on your newsfeed; it is reflected in the morbid statistics of civilian deaths in conflict situations around the globe.

In his latest report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict issued in June 2015, the Secretary-General draws the attention of the Security Council to the deliberate targeting and indiscriminate attacks on civilians that have become a recurrent feature in many conflicts, resulting in increased levels of civilian casualties, displacement, and human suffering. The report highlights the challenges faced by humanitarian organizations to meet basic needs, including access restrictions and direct attacks against humanitarian personnel, supplies and facilities. The Secretary-General noted that prevailing disrespect for international humanitarian law by some States and non-State armed groups, and pervasive impunity for violations, have become "one of the most critical challenges for the protection of civilians."

In an unprecedented joint appeal on 31 October 2015, the Secretary-General and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) condemned the growing lack of respect for international humanitarian law and the decline in protection of civilians in many conflicts. Together the Secretary-General and ICRC President urged States to make every effort, individually and collectively, to achieve political solutions to conflicts, exert their influence to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law, hold perpetrators of violations accountable, grant unhindered access to and protect humanitarian and medical personnel and facilities, and respond to the needs of internally-displaced persons and refugees.

On May 28-29, 2015, Rwanda organized a High-level International Conference on the Protection of Civilians in Kigali in the run-up to the Leaders' Summit on UN Peacekeeping. During that conference, Rwanda presented the Kigali Principles on PoC. A year later several countries have endorsed the principles. More are to follow. The Kigali Principles set out critical benchmarks for Member States to guide collective efforts in improving the capacity of peace operations to protect civilians. This event welcomes those that are ready to join the signatories of the Kigali Principles to do so in a public ceremony.

The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report launched in June 2015 also contains valuable recommendations to the UN and its Member States regarding PoC. A closer look at how these recommendations are being implemented is timely. This event will address the state of play of the main recommendations and the Secretary-General's reaction to it.

There is also a need to pay special attention to the negative impact of misconduct by peacekeepers. The Report of an Independent Review of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic of December 17th 2015 illustrates the vulnerability of the actions by a few individuals that have a huge negative impact on the reliability of UN peacekeepers as a whole and additionally inflicts a huge reputational damage to the UN. The UN Security Council has taken steps to prevent and combat sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers by adopting resolution 2272 on 11 March 2016.

The High-Level Event of the UNGA on "The strengthening of the UN in international peace and security" forms the context in which this event takes place. High level participation from Member States, the UN as well as relevant think tanks and NGO's will ensure an event that will take the commitment to PoC one step further towards implementation. On the basis of questions from the moderator, panelists will make practical recommendations to Troop Contributing Countries (TPP), the UN and other actors on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

Objectives/desired outcomes

- More UN Member States join the current signatories of the Kigali Principles in endorsing these principles.

- The interactive discussion is an opportunity for Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCC/PCCs) and other Member States to reflect on the Kigali Principles and consider how their implementation can best contribute to future efforts to uphold civilian protection mandates. It is also an opportunity to better understand the current and emerging challenges TCC/PCCs face with regard to protecting civilians. Member States are encouraged to base their interventions on the following questions relating to civilian protection and linked to the spirit of the Kigali Principles:

    o *The decision to 'open the gates' to civilians fleeing violence in South Sudan saved thousands of lives. However, UNMISS faces considerable challenges and pressures in providing ongoing security to civilians still taking refuge inside the POC sites. What can be done to provide security in POC sites and address internal and external security issues?*

    o *Sometimes peacekeepers have decided not to intervene to protect civilians who are under attack just outside their bases or they have retreated from areas rather than confronting approaching armed groups. This can be caused by a lack of clarity regarding the rules of engagement. How can TCC/PCCs achieve better clarity on the use of force to protect civilians (e.g. through better guidance or training)?*

    o *How can the UN strengthen its monitoring and evaluations of troops and police in the field and prevent such protective failures?*

    o *While civilians still bear the brunt of armed conflict there has been an alarming increase in deliberate attacks against peacekeepers. What can be done to enhance safety and security for uniformed personnel?*

    o *Following the pledges made at the September Peacekeeping Summit, what resource and capabilities gaps still exist specifically as it relates to protection of civilians? How successful has phased mandating been in narrowing the gap between expectations and capacities?*

Using the Kigali Principles as a foundation, concrete recommendations will be drafted on how Member States and the UN can improve their roles in protecting civilians.

Programme

The event will take place from 3:00PM to 5:00PM on 11 May in Conference Room 1 at United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Minister of State in Charge of Cooperation of the Republic of Rwanda will provide opening remarks. Dr. Simon Adams, Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, who will serve as moderator for the dialogue, will then invite the distinguished panelists to provide opening remarks before opening the floor to delegates and other participants. Delegations are encouraged to engage in an open and interactive discussion. At the end of the interactive discussion segment there will be a ceremony for all signatories of the Kigali Principles; representatives of all missions that have endorsed the principles will be called forward for a photo opportunity. The co-Chairs will the close the event with concluding remarks.

Speakers

Co-Chairs:

- H.E. Mr. Bert Koenders, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
- H.E. Mr. Eugène-Richard Gasana, Minister of State in Charge of Cooperation/Permanent Representative of Rwanda

Opening Remarks:

- H.E. Mogens Lykketoft, President of the General Assembly (PGA)

Speakers:

- H.E. Ms. Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Mr. Ian Martin, Executive Director, Security Council Report
- Lt. General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, former Force Commander of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)

Moderated by Dr. Simon Adams, Executive Director, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

Venue

Conference Room 1 at UN Headquarters.

Schedule

15.00-15.15 - Opening by co-chairs, followed by opening remarks from the PGA

15.15-16.00 - Discussion by speakers on the basis of questions from the moderator

16.00-16.45 - Q&A session with interventions from the public

16.45-16.55 - Ceremony with all signatories of the Kigali Principles, including photo opportunity

16.55-17.00 - Closing by co-chairs

High-Level Thematic: "A World of Risks - A New Commitment for Peace"

Related events

High-Level Expert Group Meeting on "Sustaining Peace: Mechanisms, Partnerships and the Future of Peacebuilding in Africa"

When:
12 May 2016, 9AM – 1PM

Where:
United Nations, New York – Conference Room 1

Organizers:
The United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the African Union Commission (AUC)

Additional information:

PROGRAMME

High-Level Meeting	
"Sustaining Peace: Mechanisms, Partnerships and the Future of Peacebuilding in Africa"	
Thursday, 12 May 2016, 9:00am-1:00pm	
Conference Room 1, UNHQ, New York	

09:00-09:30	**Opening session** Moderator • **Mr. Jan Eliasson,** UN Deputy Secretary-General Speakers • **Vice-President of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly** • **H.E. Mr. Sameh Shoukry,** Foreign Minister of Egypt and President of the Security Council for the month of May • **H.E. Mr. Tete Antonio,** Permanent Observer of the African Union to the UN • **H.E. Mr. Macharia Kamau,** Permanent Representative of Kenya and PBC Chair
09:30-12:45	**Thematic Session: Operationalizing the 'Sustaining Peace' Agenda and Review in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities** Co-Moderators **Mr. Maged Abdelaziz**, Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa **Mr. Oscar Fernandez-Taranco,** Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support Presentations • **H.E. Mr. Gert Rosenthal,** Chair of the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture • **Mr. Nigel Roberts,** Chair of the Advisory Group of the UN Peacebuilding Fund Speakers • **H.E. Mr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus,** Foreign Minister of Ethiopia • **H.E. Ms. Margot Wallström,** Foreign Minister of Sweden • **H.E. Mr. Bert Koenders,** Foreign Minister of the Netherlands • **H.E. Mr. Abdusalam Omer,** Foreign Minister of Somalia • **H.E. Mr. Vincenzo Amendola**, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs of Italy

	• **Mr. Pascal Couchepin,** Former President of Switzerland and Francophonie Special Envoy for the Great Lakes • **H.E. Amb. Ashraf Gamaal Rashed,** Member of COMESA Committee of Elders **Interactive discussion/Q and A/Statements by ambassadors and representatives of groups**
12:45-13:00	**Closing remarks** Speakers • **H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft**, President of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly • **H.E. Mr. Macharia Kamau,** Permanent Representative of Kenya and PBC Chair • **Mr. Oscar Fernandez-Taranco,** ASG for Peacebuilding Support

Concept Note

High-level Meeting

"Sustaining Peace:

Mechanisms, Partnerships and the Future of Peacebuilding in Africa"

Thursday, 12 May 2016

Conference Room 1, United Nations HQ, New York

Introduction
The United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), in collaboration with the African Union Commission, will convene a High-Level Meeting on the theme "Sustaining Peace: Mechanisms, Partnerships and the Future of Peacebuilding in Africa". The event is scheduled to take place from 9:00am to 1:00pm on 12 May 2016 in Conference Room 1 at the United Nations in New York.

The main purpose of the meeting is to sustain and expand the political momentum for peacebuilding in Africa and discuss ways to advance the implementation of the General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282 (2016) on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, adopted on 27 April 2016. The meeting will provide an opportunity to discuss the outcome and implications of the 2015 Review, including reinforcing UN-Africa peacebuilding partnerships and increasing financing for sustaining peace in Africa, building on cooperation with African regional and sub-regional peacebuilding organizations.

The event will bring together key stakeholders, including Member States, the African Union, African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and civil society organizations, as well as the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and other international partners. The meeting will be open to the participation of all Member States.

Background and rationale
Ten years after the ground-breaking establishment of the UN's dedicated Peacebuilding Architecture – consisting of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) – the UN has undertaken a comprehensive review of its approach to building and sustaining peace. The 2015 Review was requested by UN Member States as a response to a 2010 UN Review which found that, despite committed efforts and substantial peacebuilding support to countries at risk of or emerging from conflict, the UN's peacebuilding architecture had yet to realize its full potential (A/64/868 - S/2010/393). In 2014, the General Assembly and the Security Council jointly set up a two-step review process (A/69/674-S/2014/911), requesting the establishment of an Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) tasked with preparing a review report, followed by an intergovernmental process which deliberated on the report's findings and submitted recommendations in the form of parallel and substantively identical General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, which were adopted on 27 April 2016 (A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282).

Enhanced UN peacebuilding performance and capacity is of particular interest to Africa, as the continent remains at the heart of UN peacebuilding efforts. All of the countries currently on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission are from Africa, as are the majority of the recipients of assistance from the Peacebuilding Fund. Africa is also the key destination of UN peacekeeping operations (87 per cent of peacekeepers are deployed in Africa), who have increasingly become 'early peacebuilders', and a key contributor to UN peacekeeping (about half of the roughly 100,000 peacekeepers deployed around the world are from Africa). Over the last decade and a half, the African Union has also developed its own comprehensive continental peace and security architecture - the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which includes peacebuilding capacities, notably the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework (PCRD) and the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI). To further enhance peacebuilding on the African continent, the African Union seeks greater cooperation and complementarities between its own and the UN's peacebuilding efforts and instruments, as

outlined in the April 2015 Common African Position on the review of UN Peace Operations (PSC/PR/2(DII).

Outcome of the 2015 UN Peacebuilding Review
The report of the Advisory Group of Experts (A/69/968–S/2015/490) was issued in June 2015. In recognition of the importance of UN peacebuilding for Africa, the African Union contributed to the report through common positions, regional consultations, workshops and other written material.
The AGE Report calls on the UN to reframe and reprioritize its entire approach to peacebuilding, and to peace and security itself. It urges the UN to move from a reactive to a more preventative approach that avoids viewing conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping and 'post-conflict' peacebuilding as separate activities with distinct timeframes, actors and instruments. Instead, it argues that 'sustaining peace' is a core task and a shared Charter responsibility that must inform all UN efforts before, during and after conflict. For the UN to be successful in sustaining peace, the report calls for more coherent, coordinated and integrated action in conflict and post-conflict situations, by addressing the fragmentation between the Principal Organs, between the Secretariat and the field and between different peacebuilding actors. It also stresses the importance of predictable, sustained, rapid and flexible financing for sustaining peace. In its report, the Advisory Group calls for inclusive national ownership, to ensure credible and sustainable peacebuilding processes beyond peacebuilding templates and "one size fits all" approaches, in line with the spirit of the people-centred, inclusive and transformative vision of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. The report also underscores the need for improving the peacebuilding capability of the UN system and of strengthened partnerships, particularly with the international financial institutions (IFIs) and regional and sub-regional organizations. It attaches specific importance to the role of the African Union, and regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa, in efforts to sustain peace.

In the second stage of the review process, which commenced in the fall of 2015, an intergovernmental process co-facilitated by Angola and Australia examined the findings and recommendations of the AGE report. The process concluded with the adoption by the General Assembly and the Security Council of substantially identical resolutions (A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282) on 27 April 2016, guiding the UN and the international community to improve their policies and approaches to sustaining peace through concrete enabling measures. Throughout the intergovernmental process, Member States have consistently welcomed the vision and the far-reaching outlook of the AGE Report, while putting particular emphasis on strengthening intergovernmental and operational coherence, peacebuilding partnerships and predictable and sustained financing for sustaining peace. The resolutions envisage a number of 'next steps' both for the UN membership and UN entities, which would lead to a more efficient and effective peacebuilding architecture, stronger coherence between the intergovernmental and operational levels of UN action, and better coordination between the peace and security, development and human rights pillars of the UN in the interest of conflict-affected countries. It would also serve to prioritize the imperative of 'sustaining peace' and preventive solutions on the next Secretary-General's agenda.

Operationalizing the 2015 Peacebuilding Review
In light of the complex peacebuilding challenges in Africa and beyond, it is critical that the resolutions are operationalized to the fullest extent possible. In its first ten years, the peacebuilding architecture has provided important support to countries on the African continent. However, more can and should now be done. A more engaged, effective and well-resourced peacebuilding architecture will benefit from increased political support for its role and activities, mobilize greater resources for peacebuilding and generate greater coherence and cooperation

between the wide range of global, regional, national governmental and non-governmental peacebuilding actors in Africa and elsewhere. Incomplete or insufficient operationalization may further dent the collective hopes and expectations in the UN's ability to effectively help its members build durable peace and prevent a return to violent conflict, especially in Africa.

The effective operationalization of the resolutions will also require achieving coherence, complementarity and synergies with related peace and development frameworks and reform agendas. This includes the High-Level Review and Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security as well as the review of UN peace operations which is guided by the June 2015 report of the UN High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO) and the Secretary-General's the follow-on report on the future of peace operations. In addition, it is critical that the implementation of the peacebuilding review will be carried out in the context and in support of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and Goals, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, as well as Agenda 2063, Africa's 50-year transformative agenda for peace, security and development that was adopted by African Heads of State and Government in January 2015.

Objective:
The key objective of the meeting is to sustain and expand the political momentum for peacebuilding in Africa and discuss ways to advance the effective operationalization of the conclusions and outcome of the 2015 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture.

Specific objectives:
➢ Discuss the outcome and implications of the AGE report and the parallel GA-UNSC resolutions on UN peacebuilding, from an African perspective, and chart a way forward for their effective operationalization

➢ Maintain the momentum to further enhance and better utilize the UN peacebuilding architecture

➢ Mobilize political support for recommendations that require further attention

➢ Contextualize key recommendations of the sustaining peace agenda by providing concrete ideas and proposals for implementation, especially towards enhancing peacebuilding partnerships and increasing predictable financing for peacebuilding in Africa.

➢ Highlight African tools and approaches to sustain peace, with a view to strengthening international support for African peacebuilding capacities and priorities in the context of the Agenda 2063 and the AU's objective to silence all guns by 2020.

Expected outcome:
1. An outcome document, summarizing key policy recommendations on opportunities, mechanisms and partnerships for sustaining peace, in the follow up of the review of the peacebuilding architecture and related resolution. The outcome document will be adopted by the high level meeting and will feed into future relevant processes.

2. A report detailing the proceedings with the main messages, the proposals on how to operationalize key peacebuilding recommendations, including measures to strengthen the

peacebuilding partnership of the UN with the AU, the RECs, the IFIs and regional development banks. The report can inform existing and future meetings and initiatives to maintain momentum for the operationalization of the evolved approach for sustaining peace, including the PBC Annual Session in June 2016, the PBC visit to the African Union in the second half of 2016, and reform efforts of the PBC Chair.

Format:
The meeting will be held from 9AM through 1:00PM at United Nations Headquarters and will include an opening session, a closing session and a thematic session which will be followed by an interactive discussion to allow participants to engage and contribute to the discussion.

Participants:
The event will bring together key stakeholders, including Member States, the African Union, African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and civil society organizations, as well as, the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and other international partners. The meeting will be open to all.

High-Level Thematic: "A World of Risks - A New Commitment for Peace"

Related events

Global Focal Point on Police, Justice and Correction side event in the margins of the High Level Thematic Debate on Peace and Security

When:
12 May 2016, 3PM – 5PM

Where:
United Nations, New York – Conference Room 10

Organizers:
Australia Permanent Mission to the UN (Host), DPKO/ROLSI and UNDP/BPPS/ROLJSHR

Additional information:

Concept Note
Global Focal Point on Police, Justice and Correction side event in the margins of the High Level
Thematic Debate on Peace and Security
Thursday 12 May 2016
15:00-16:00, UN Secretariat, Conference Room 10

Background:

The year 2015 was marked by three major reviews of United Nations peace and security efforts and operations - its peace operations1, the peacebuilding architecture2, and progress in implementing Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security[3]. These processes collectively put prevention and peacebuilding at the center of United Nations efforts, stressing the primacy of political solutions and sustainable peaceful settlements and the interlinkages with efforts to advance sustainable development articulated in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In his response to the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations in September 2015, the Secretary-General highlighted the importance of integrated approaches and announced his intention to accelerate the establishment of platforms for coordinated work in cross-cutting areas. One model for such coordination is the *Global Focal Point (*GFP*) for the police, justice and corrections areas in the rule of law in post-conflict and other crisis situations*, which brings together the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Women, UNODC and others to respond efficiently and predictably to country-level requests for guidance, skill sets and financial resources.

Objective:

Against this background, Australia, DPKO and UNDP are organizing a side event in the margins of the High-Level Thematic Debate on Peace and Security, to reflect on how models such as the GFP arrangement enhance the predictability, coherence, accountability and effectiveness of UN assistance. The event will bring together representatives from DPKO, UNDP, other GFP partners, Member States, civil society and think tanks to discuss how the UNCT contributes to implementing mission mandates in the areas of rule of law, security and human rights.

Agenda:
- Introductions Dr. Almut Wieland-Karimi (Director ZIF) (Chair)
- Statement H.E. Ambassador Gillian Bird, Permanent Representative of Australia
- Statement by Assistant Secretary-General Magdy Martinez-Soliman (UNDP)
- Statement by Assistant Secretary-General Dmitry Titov (DPKO)
- Discussion (Q&A)
- Closing statement by Chair

For further questions or queries, please contact iman.sayedtaha@undp.org and caburnayj@un.org

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[1] Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (AGE), 29 June 2015, A/69/968–S/2015/490
[2] Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people (HIPPO), 16 June 2015, A/70/95–S/2015/446 (para. 152)
[3] S/RES/1325 (2000) adopted on 31 October 2000.