



Permanent Mission of the  
State of Kuwait to the United Nations  
New York

 Permanent Mission  
of Austria to the  
United Nations in New York

18 July 2023

Excellency,

We have the honour to address you in our capacity as **Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations** on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other related matters to the Security Council (**IGN**) during the 77<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly.

Kindly find attached a copy of a letter dated 13 July 2023 received by the Co-Chairs from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Costa Rica to the United Nations. Upon the request of the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Costa Rica, the attached letter and its document will be **posted on the IGN website** which acts as a repository of the IGN process.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration.

**Tareq Albanai**  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of the  
State of Kuwait to the United Nations

**Alexander Marschik**  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of the  
Republic of Austria to the United Nations

**To: All Permanent Representatives and Permanent Observers to the United Nations, New York**



MPCRONU-474-2023

New York, July 13th, 2023

Excellencies,

I have the honor to address you in your capacity as Co-chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other related matters to the Security Council (IGN) of the 77<sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Permanent membership in the Security Council results in multiple advantages and privileged situations, one of the most pernicious being the extension of their permanence in the vast majority of the Councils, Commissions, and Committees, as well as in the Funds and Programs of the organization, in detriment to the rest of the membership of the United Nations. This situation has been called the Cascade Effect.

Argentina, in 1995, was the first country that examined the Cascade Effect and submitted a working paper to the Co-chairs of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council, document (A/AC.247/5 (a).

Subsequently, in 2005, Costa Rica submitted a working paper entitled: “Security Council enlargement and the cascade effect: enlargement of the permanent member category and its effects on the United Nations System”, circulated as a document of the General Assembly (A/59/856).

I kindly request that the said documents, attached to the note, be included in the electronic repository created for the IGN for the consideration of all Member States.

Please accept, Excellencies, the assurances of my highest consideration.

**Ambassador Maritza Chan-Valverde**  
**Permanent Representative of the**  
**Republic of Costa Rica to the United Nations**



**H.E. Ambassador Tareq Albanai**  
**Permanent Representatives of the State of Kuwait**  
**to the United Nations**

**H.E. Ambassador Alexander Marschik**  
**Permanent Representative of the Republic of Austria**  
**to the United Nations**

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**Fifty-ninth session**

Agenda items 53, 54 and 55

**Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters****Strengthening of the United Nations system****Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit****Note verbale dated 24 June 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

The Permanent Mission of Costa Rica presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to enclose the document entitled "Security Council enlargement and the cascade effect: enlargement of the permanent member category and its effects on the United Nations system", prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Costa Rica, as a contribution to current efforts to reform and revitalize the Security Council and the United Nations at large (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of Costa Rica would like to request that the document be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda items 53, 54 and 55.

**Annex to the note verbale dated 24 June 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

**Security Council enlargement and the cascade effect: enlargement of the permanent member category and its effects on the United Nations system**

The present working paper is an effort to examine the possible effects of Security Council enlargement, in the Permanent Member category, on the opportunities for the broader membership to be represented in the various organs of the United Nations system. It primarily concentrates on what is commonly known as the 'Cascade Effect' and its collateral impact on the possibilities and opportunities of the broader membership to be elected to various United Nations organs.

The purpose of this paper is not to call into question the status or the privileges enjoyed by the current Permanent Members, although that is an issue that might deserve consideration in its own right, but only to sound a note of warning regarding the Cascade Effect as it would relate to any future enlargement in the Permanent Member category. Costa Rica believes that it is necessary to seriously examine this issue, as any extension of the Cascade Effect could potentially affect the sense of collective ownership which necessarily underlies the United Nations.

The Cascade Effect arises from the structural political and legal advantages that Permanent Members enjoy as a result of their permanency in the Security Council. In some cases, these electoral advantages are enshrined in legal norms, such as the requirement that judges to the International Court of Justice be simultaneously but separately elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In other cases, they arise from collateral political influence, such as the customary practice that every Permanent Member is entitled to have at least one national appointed at the Under-Secretary-General level in key departments of the United Nations.

The statistical evidence presented below proves that Permanent Members in the Security Council have generally enjoyed continuous membership in all the key organs and subsidiary bodies of the United Nations system and have had the added benefit of having nationals continuously appointed to the most senior staff positions. The limited exceptions are mostly confined to the transitional period regarding the representation of China (1960s and early 1970s) and to the adoption of voluntary rotation arrangements within the European Union (late 1990s).

**For the broader United Nations membership, the Cascade Effect has a tangible negative impact.** By excluding, *de iure* or *de facto*, a certain number of seats from those available for open election and rotation, or appointment by the Secretary-General in the case of senior posts, the Cascade Effect substantially reduces the opportunities of Member States or their nationals to serve in various United Nations organs. For all intents and purposes, Permanent

Members of the Security Council displace all other Member States from seats and posts that should, respectively, be open to democratic election by Member States or appointment by the Secretary-General. The precise impact of the Cascade Effect on each seat varies in relation to the total number of seats available for election in each organ. Similarly, it varies on each post in relation to the total number of posts to be appointed by the Secretary-General. Therefore, although comprehensive in its grasp, the Cascade Effect can manifest itself differently in each case.

When considering the expansion of the Security Council and, in particular, the possible creation of new Permanent Members, it is necessary to examine whether new Permanent Members would enjoy the advantages that arise from the Cascade Effect. Without proper safeguards to correct the legal and political factors that give rise to it-- for example, a firm binding commitment otherwise-- the Cascade Effect will, in all likelihood, extend its asphyxiating grasp on the opportunities and possibilities for the broader membership to be represented in the various organs of the United Nations system.

## **Statistical Findings**

The Cascade Effect is a rather understudied phenomenon, although its ramifications can be felt throughout the United Nations system. There have been few previous attempts to examine it (probably the most notable, albeit confined to an analysis of the 1984-1993 period, was submitted by Argentina during UNGA49 in 1995 and circulated as part of document A/49/965), and not a single attempt that comprehensively extrapolates its full force and scope since 1946. Therefore, to fill in that void, the following analysis seeks to demonstrate, on a case by case basis, and in quantitative and comparative terms, the full force and scope of the Cascade Effect since 1946 and its probable future effects if there is an enlargement in the Permanent Member category.

For simplicity, the working paper takes enlargement in the Permanent Member category to mean 6 new additional Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A of the High-Level Panel Report "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" and the "In Larger Freedom" Report by the Secretary-General. This should not be construed, in any way, as an endorsement of Model A.

## 1. Economic and Social Council and Subsidiary Bodies

### 1.1 Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1961-1971), Permanent Members have served continuously on the ECOSOC since its creation in 1946 or immediately after in 1947. Of all the elective organs within the United Nations Systems, the ECOSOC is one organ where the Cascade Effect is most evident.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1946-2005	100.0%
United States	1946-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1947-2005	98.3%
United Kingdom	1947-2005	98.3%
China	1946-1960, 1972-2005	81.7%

Of the 54 seats in the ECOSOC, 5 [9.3%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [20.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 90.7% to 79.6% of the seats.**

### 1.2 Commission on Human Rights [CHR]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1964-1981), and just 4 one-year gaps, Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Human Rights since its creation in 1946 or immediately after in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1946-1976, 1978-2005	98.3%
Russian Federation	1947-2005	98.3%
United States	1947-2001, 2003-2005	96.7%
United Kingdom	1947-1978, 1980-1990, 1992-2005	95.0%
China	1947-1963, 1982-2005	68.3%

Of the 53 seats in the CHR, 5 [9.4%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [20.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 90.6% to 79.2% of the seats.**

### 1.3 Commission on Narcotic Drugs [CND]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1970-1985), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Narcotic Drugs since its creation in 1946.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1946-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1946-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1946-2005	100.0%
United States	1946-2005	100.0%
China	1946-1969, 1986-2005	73.3%

Of the 53 seats in the CND, 5 [9.4%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [20.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 90.6% to 79.2% of the seats.**

### 1.4 Commission on Population and Development [CPD]

With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1968-1981, while another Permanent Member has not been a member since 2001), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Population and Development since its creation in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1947-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1947-2005	100.0%
United States	1947-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1947-2001	93.2%
China	1947-1967, 1982-2005	78.0%

Of the 47 seats in the CPD, 5 [10.6%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [23.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 89.4% to 76.6% of the seats.**

## 1.5 Committee for Program and Coordination [CPC]

With the exception of one Permanent Member that began to serve in 1987, all Permanent Members have served continuously in the Committee for Program and Coordination since its creation in 1973 or immediately after in 1974.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
United Kingdom	1973-2005	100.0%
France	1974-2005	96.9%
Russian Federation	1974-2005	96.9%
United States	1974-2005	96.9%
China	1987-2005	62.5%

Of the 34 seats in the CPC, 5 [14.7%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [32.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 85.3% to 67.6% of the seats.**

## 1.6 Commission on Social Development [CSoD]

With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve in 1965 and between 1969-1988, another Permanent Member has not served since 1983), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Social Development since its creation in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1947-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1947-2005	100.0%
United States	1947-2005	100.0%
China	1947-1964, 1966-1968, 1989-2005	64.4%
United Kingdom	1947-1982	61.0%

Of the 46 seats in the CSoD, 5 [10.9%] seats have been affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [23.9%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 89.1% to 76.1% of the seats.**



## 1.7 Commission on Sustainable Development [CSD]

All Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Sustainable Development since its creation in 1993.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
China	1993-2005	100.0%
France	1993-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1993-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1993-2005	100.0%
United States	1993-2005	100.0%

Of the 53 seats in the CSD, 5 [9.4%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [20.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 90.6% to 79.2% of the seats.**

## 1.8 Commission on the Status of Women [CSW]

With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1968-1972 and between 1977-1979, while another did not serve between 1987-1996), and just 3 one-year gaps, Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on the Status of Women since its creation in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
Russian Federation	1947-2005	100.0%
France	1947-1983, 1985-2005	98.3%
United States	1947-1994, 1996-2005	98.3%
China	1947-1963, 1965-1967, 1973-1976, 1980-2005	84.7%
United Kingdom	1947-1986, 1997-2005	83.1%

Of the 45 seats in the CSW, 5 [11.1%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [24.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 89.9% to 75.6% of the seats.**

## 1.9 Statistical Commission

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1969-1986), and just 3 one to three-year gaps, Permanent Members have served on the Statistical Commission since its creation in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
United Kingdom	1947-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1947-2005	100.0%
United States	1947-1981, 1984-2005	96.6%
France	1947-1980, 1982-1997, 2001-2004	91.5%
China	1947-1967, 1984-2003	67.8%

Of the 24 seats in the Statistical Commission, 5 [20.8%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [45.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 79.2% to 54.2% of the seats.**

## 2. UN Funds and Programmes Executive Boards and Councils

### 2.1 United Nations Development Programme Executive Board [UNDP]

With just 4 one-year gaps and 1 two-year gap, Permanent Members have served continuously in the UNDP Executive Board since its creation in 1994.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
China	1994-2005	100.0%
United States	1994-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1994-1995, 1997-2005	90.0%
France	1994-1995, 1997-1998, 2000-2003	60.0%
United Kingdom	1994-1995, 1997-1999, 2002-2004	60.0%

Of the 36 seats on the UNDP Executive Board, 5 [13.9%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [30.6%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 86.1% to 69.4% of the seats.**

### 2.2 United Nations Environment Programme Governing Council [UNEP]

Permanent Members have served continuously on the UNEP Governing Council since its creation in 1973.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
China	1973-2005	100.0%
France	1973-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1973-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1973-2005	100.0%
United States	1973-2005	100.0%

Of the 58 seats on the UNEP Governing Council, 5 [8.6%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [19.0%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 91.4% to 81.0% of the seats.**

### 2.3 United Nations Human Settlements Programme Governing Council [UN-Habitat]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1989), Permanent Members have served continuously on the UN-HABITAT Governing Council since its creation in 1977 or immediately after in 1978.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1977-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1978-2005	96.4%
United Kingdom	1978-2005	96.4%
United States	1978-2005	96.4%
China	1989-2005	58.6%

Of the 58 seats on the UN-HABITAT Governing Council, 5 [8.6%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [19.0%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 91.4% to 81.0% of the seats.**

### 2.4 United Nations Children's Fund Executive Board [UNICEF]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1958 and then did not serve between 1974-1979), and just 4 one to two-year gaps, Permanent Members have served in the UNICEF Executive Board since its creation in 1946.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
Russian Federation	1946-2005	100.0%
United States	1946-2005	100.0%
France	1946-1996, 1998-1999, 2001-2005	96.7%
United Kingdom	1946-1996, 1998-2000, 2003-2005	95.0%
China	1958-1973, 1980-2005	70.0%

Of the 36 seats on the UNICEF Executive Board, 5 [13.9%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [30.6%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 86.1% to 69.4% of the seats.**

### 3. International Court of Justice [ICJ]

With one exception (nationals of one Permanent Member did not serve between 1968-1984), nationals of Permanent Members have served continuously in the International Court of Justice since 1946. Judges in the ICJ are elected by the Security Council and the General Assembly in separate but simultaneous elections.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY	
France	J. Basdevant	1946-1964	100.0%
	A. Gross	1964-1984	
	G. Ladreit de Lacharrière	1982-1987	
	G. Guillaume	1987-2004	
	R. Abraham	2004-2005	
Russian Federation	S. B. Krylov	1946-1952	100.0%
	S. A. Golunsky	1952-1953	
	F. I. Kojevnikov	1953-1961	
	V. M. Koretsky	1961-1970	
	P. D. Morosov	1970-1985	
	N. K. Tarassov	1985-1994	
	V. S. Vereshchentin	1995-2005	
United Kingdom	Sir Arnold McNair	1946-1955	100.0%
	Sir Hersch Lauterpacht	1955-1960	
	Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice	1960-1973	
	Sir Humphrey Waldock	1973-1981	
	Sir Robert Jennings	1982-1995	
	Dame Rosalyn Higgins	1995-2005	
United States	G. H. Hackworth	1946-1961	100.0%
	P. C. Jessup	1961-1970	
	H. C. Dillard	1970-1979	
	R. R. Baxter	1979-1980	
	S. M. Schwebel	1980-2000	
	T. Buergenthal	2000-2005	
China	Hsu Mo	1946-1956	66.0%
	V. K. Wellington Koo	1957-1967	
	Ni Zhengyu	1985-1994	
	Shi Jiuyong	1994 -2005	

Of the 15 seats on the ICJ, 5 [33.3%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [73.3%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 66.7% to a mere 26.7% of the seats.**

## 4. UN Specialized Agencies

### 4.1 Food and Agriculture Organization Council [FAO]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1949-1972) and 1 one-year gap, Permanent Members have served in the FAO Council consecutively since its creation in 1947. The Russian Federation is not included for it is not a member of FAO.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1947-2005	100.0%
United States	1947-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1947-1955, 1957-2005	96.5%
China	1947-1948, 1973-2005	73.1%

Of the 49 seats on the FAO Council, 5 [10.2%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [22.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 89.8% to 77.6% of the seats.**

### 4.2 International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors [IAEA]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1984), Permanent Members have served continuously on the IAEA Board of Governors since its creation in 1957.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1957-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1957-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1957-2005	100.0%
United States	1957-2005	100.0%
China	1984-2005	42.6%

Of the 35 seats on the IAEA Board of Governors, 5 [14.3%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [31.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 85.7% to 68.6% of the seats.**

### 4.3 International Civil Aviation Organization Council [ICAO]

With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1972 while another did not serve until 1974), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization since its creation in 1947 or immediately after in 1948.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
United Kingdom	1947-2005	100.0%
United States	1947-2005	100.0%
France	1948-2005	98.2%
Russian Federation	1972-2005	57.1%
China	1974-2005	53.6%

Of the 36 seats on the ICAO Council, 5 [13.8%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [30.6%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 86.2% to 69.4% of the seats.**

### 4.4 International Maritime Organization Council [IMO]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1975) and just 2 one-year gaps, Permanent Members have served continuously on the Council of the International Maritime Organization since its creation in 1959.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1959-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1959-2005	100.0%
United States	1959-2005	100.0%
China	1975-81, 1983-87, 1989-2005	63.0%

Of the 40 seats on the IMO Council, 5 [12.5%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [27.5%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 87.5% to 72.5% of the seats.**

#### 4.5 International Telecommunications Union Council [ITU]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1990-1993 and has not served since 2003), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Council of the International Telecommunications Union since its creation in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
China	1947-2005	100.0%
France	1947-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1947-2005	100.0%
United States	1947-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1947-1989, 1994-2002	86.6%

Of the 46 seats on the ITU Council, 5 [10.9%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [23.9%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 89.1% to 76.1% of the seats.**

#### 4.6 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Executive Council

Permanent Members have served continuously on the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons since its creation in 1997 or immediately after in 1998.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
China	1997-2005	100.0%
France	1997-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1997-2005	100.0%
United States	1997-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1998-2005	88.8%

Of the 41 seats on the OPCW Executive Council, 5 [12.2%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [26.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 87.8% to 73.2% of the seats.**



#### 4.7 World Health Organization Executive Board [WHO]

With two exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1949-1972 and then from 1986-1989 and another that did not serve between 1951-1957) and just 3 one-year gaps, Permanent Members have served on the Executive Board of the World Health Organization since its creation in 1947 or immediately after in 1948.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
United States	1947-2005	100.0%
France	1948-2001, 2003-2005	94.8%
United Kingdom	1947-1999, 2001-2004	94.8%
Russian Federation	1948-1950, 1958-2005	86.2%
China	1947-48, 1973-76, 1978-85, 1990-2005	50.0%

Of the 32 seats on the WHO Executive Board, 5 [15.6%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [34.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 84.4% to 65.6% of the seats.**

#### 4.8 World Meteorological Organization Executive Council [WMO]

With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1973 and another did not serve until 1979), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Executive Council of the World Meteorological Organization since its creation in 1951.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1951-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1951-2005	100.0%
United States	1951-2005	100.0%
China	1973-2005	60.7%
United Kingdom	1979-2005	50.0%

Of the 37 seats on the WMO Executive Council, 5 [13.5%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [29.7%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 86.5% to 70.3% of the seats.**

## **4.9 International Labor Organization Governing Body [ILO]**

The continuity of the Permanent Members in the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization is guaranteed as they hold non-elective seats as “states of chief industrial importance”. This status only extends to 5 other Member States. The compounded impact of the Cascade Effect, through the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, is uncertain and cannot be easily ascertained in this case.

## 5. General Assembly Subsidiary Bodies

### 5.1 General Committee

By virtue of resolution 33/138 of 1978, 5 of the 21 Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly are representatives of the Permanent Members and thereby members of the General Committee. The compounded impact of the Cascade Effect, through the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, is uncertain and cannot be easily ascertained in this case.

### 5.2 Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions [ACABQ]

With one exception (nationals from one Permanent Member did not serve between 1952-1971) and several minor gaps (2 one-year gaps, 6 three-year gaps, 1 four-year gap, and 1 five-year gap), nationals from Permanent Members have served continuously on the ACABQ since its creation in 1946.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
Russian Federation	1946-2005	100.0%
United States	1946-1996, 2000-2005	94.9%
France	1946-1983, 1987-1989, 1993-1995, 1997-2002	84.7%
United Kingdom	1946-1980, 1984-1986, 1991-1993, 1999-2004	78.0%
China	1946-1951, 1972-1998, 2002-2005	61.1%

Of the 16 seats in the ACABQ, 5 [31.3%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [68.7%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 68.7% to 31.3% of the seats.**

## 6. United Nations Secretariat

Permanent Members have customarily had one or more nationals serving in the most senior positions within the United Nations, typically at the Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General level. Moreover, at times several nationals from a single Permanent Member have monopolized the most senior positions within a particular department, and at times a Permanent Member has traded off one department for another, as is evidenced in part by the following (this is not a comprehensive or exhaustive listing):

PERMANENT MEMBER	DEPARTMENT HEADS	TERMS
China	<b>Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self Governing Territories</b>	
	Victor Hoo Chi Tsai	1946-1953
	<b>Department of General Assembly Affairs and predecessors</b>	
	Victor Hoo Chi Tsai	1954-1961
	<b>Technical Cooperation for Development and predecessors</b>	
	Victor Hoo Chi Tsai	1962-1972
	<b>Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization</b>	
	Tang Ming-chao	1972-1978
	<b>Technical Cooperation for Development and predecessors</b>	
	Bi Jilong	1979-1984
	Xie Qimei	1985-1990
	Ji Chaozhu	1991-1992
<b>Department for Economic and Social Affairs and predecessors</b>		
Ji Chaozhu	1992	
<b>Technical Cooperation for Development and predecessors</b>		
Ji Chaozhu	1993-1995	
Jin Yongjian	1996	
<b>Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services</b>		
Jin Yongjian	1997-2001	
Chen Jian	2001-	
France	<b>Department for Economic and Social Affairs and predecessors</b>	
	Henri Laugier	1946-1950
	Guillaume Georges-Picot	1951-1954
	Philippe de Seynes	1955-1974
	Gabriel van Laetham	1974-1978

PERMANENT MEMBER	DEPARTMENT HEADS	TERMS	
France [cont.]	Jean-Louis Ripert	1978-1990	
	Antoine Blanca	1989-1992	
	Jean-Claude Milleron	1993-1996	
	<b>United Nations Office in Geneva [UNOG], Director General</b>		
	Antoine Blanca	1992-1993	
	<b>Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO]</b>		
	Bernard Miyet	1997-2000	
	Jean-Marie Guehenno	2000-	
	Russian Federation	<b>Department of Political Affairs [DPA] or predecessors</b>	
		Constantin E. Zinchenko	1949-1952
Ilya S. Tchernychev		1953-1954	
Anatoly F. Dobrynin		1958-1959	
Georgy P. Arkadev		1960-1961	
Evgeny D. Kiselev		1962	
Vladimir P. Suslov		1963-1964	
Alexei E. Nesterenko		1965-1967	
Leonid N. Kutakov		1968-1972	
Arkady N. Shevchenko		1973-1977	
<b>Department of Political Affairs [DPA] or predecessors</b>			
Mikhail D. Sytenko		1978-1980	
Viacheslav A. Ustinov		1981-1986	
Vasilij S. Safronchuk		1987-1991	
Vladimir Petrovsky		1992-1993	
<b>United Nations Office in Geneva [UNOG], Director General</b>			
Vladimir Petrovsky		1993-2002	
Sergei Ordzhonikidze		2002-	
United Kingdom		<b>Department for Economic and Social Affairs and predecessors</b>	
		Sir Arthur David K. Owen	1946-1954
	<b>United Nations Office in Geneva [UNOG], Director General</b>		
	Sir Arthur Rucker	1953	
	<b>Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] and predecessors</b>		
Sir Humphrey Trevelyan	1958		

PERMANENT MEMBER	DEPARTMENT HEADS	TERMS
United Kingdom [cont.]	<b>Department of Management [DM] and predecessors</b>	
	Andrew A. Stark	1968-1970
	Horatio K. Matthews	1971-1972
	<b>Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] and predecessors</b>	
	Sir Brian Urquhart	1974-1986
	Marrack I. Goulding	1986-1992
	<b>Department of Political Affairs [DPA] and predecessors</b>	
	Marrack I. Goulding	1993-1996
	Sir Kieran Prendergast	1997-2005
	<b>Department of Safety and Security</b>	
	David Veness	2005-
	<b>Executive Office of the Secretary-General, Chef de Cabinet</b>	
	Mark Malloch Brown	2005-
United States	<b>Executive Office of the Secretary-General, Chef de Cabinet</b>	
	Andrew W. Cordier	1946-1961
	<b>Department of Management [DM] and predecessors</b>	
	Byron Price	1946-1953
	<b>Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] and predecessors</b>	
	Ralph J. Bunche	1955-1970
	<b>Department for Political Affairs [DPA] and predecessors</b>	
	F. Bradford Morse	1972-1975
	William B. Buffum	1976-1986
	Joseph Verner Reed	1987-1988
	Ronald I. Spiers	1989-1991
	<b>Department of Management [DM] and predecessors</b>	
	Dick Thornburgh	1992
Melissa Wells	1993	
Joseph E. Connor	1994-2002	
Catherine Bertini	2003-2005	
Christopher Bancroft Burnham	2005-	

The compounded impact of the Cascade Effect on appointments at the most senior level, through the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, cannot be easily ascertained.

24/06/2005



General Assembly

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Forty-ninth session  
Agenda item 33

QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE  
MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND RELATED MATTERS

Letter dated 15 September 1995 from the Permanent Representatives  
of Finland and Thailand to the United Nations addressed to the  
President of the General Assembly

As Vice-Chairmen of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council, we have the honour to forward the compendium of observations and assessment of the two Vice-Chairmen, their discussion papers, as well as proposals and other documents presented to the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council (see annex).

We shall be grateful if the above-mentioned document could be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under agenda item 33.

(Signed) Wilhelm BREITENSTEIN  
Permanent Representative of Finland  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Nitya PIBULSONGGRAM  
Permanent Representative of Thailand  
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Compendium of observations and assessment of the two Vice-Chairmen, their discussion papers, as well as proposals and other documents presented to the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council

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\* The present section is being published as received, without formal editing.

\*\* The symbols given here are for ease of reference in the present document only.



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A/AC.247/2

9 January 1995

II. SUGGESTED LIST OF QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE  
OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP ON THE QUESTION OF  
EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE  
MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The present non-paper has been prepared by the Permanent Representatives of Finland and Singapore, Vice-Chairmen of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council in 1994, in the light of informal consultations held on behalf of the President of the General Assembly, on 21 and 24 October and 15 November 1994.

Attached is a list of questions on the two main areas of discussions on this subject. The questions, which are not new, will need to be discussed in some detail. These questions are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. The order of the listing of the questions does not indicate any order of priority. The questions represent an attempt to facilitate a systematic and constructive exchange of views in the Working Group.

/...

[pages 19-22 offset]

A/AC.247/3

6 January 1995

III. PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT ON THE VIEWS EXPRESSED  
BY MEMBER STATES DURING THE FORTY-NINTH SESSION OF THE  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. The present non-paper is prepared solely on the basis of the views expressed by Member States during the general debate as well as the debate on agenda item 33 at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly.
2. The list of views contained in the present non-paper is intended to provide background material for the Working Group. It should be read together with the two similar compilations dated 28 February and 27 May 1994, respectively. The non-paper is not intended to be a comprehensive summary of every view presented by the delegations concerned; rather, it seeks to identify salient points and broad trends to help facilitate deliberations of the Working Group.
3. The views reproduced in the present non-paper are not indicative of the number of delegations holding a similar position on specific suggestions and proposals. The views were expressed either by one or several Member States. Furthermore, the views reflected in the list are not necessarily literal transcriptions of the exact expressions used by Member States as similar positions have been grouped together under a given category. It should be noted further that the order of listing of the items neither reflects nor implies any order of priority.

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V. SUBMISSIONS BY MEMBER STATES OR GROUPS OF MEMBER STATES

1. Argentina

A/AC.247/5 (a)

[Original: English]

[14 September 1995]

1. Please find enclosed herewith a preliminary working paper prepared by our delegation (see annex). It is only an "evolving" document, on which we will continue to work, intended to highlight a matter of concern, related to the overall presence in the United Nations system or the permanent members of the Security Council, beyond the Council itself.

2. The working paper is presented for the purpose of stimulating consideration of the issue, at a time when the membership is examining the structure of the Security Council. It is our view that the aspects contained in the enclosed working paper should - in that connection - be also the object of analysis.

3. We are still double-checking some of the factual information contained in the enclosure and we plan to return to the issue when we are able to complete that work.

(Signed) Emilio J. CARDENAS  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative



ANNEX

Submission by Argentina on the "cascade effect": effects  
of the status of the permanent membership of the Security  
Council on the United Nations system

1. The present working paper is only a first and preliminary attempt to examine, in both quantitative and comparative terms, the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council in the United Nations system as a whole.
2. When analysed in contrast with United Nations institutional regulations, as stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations, a statistical study of the actual participation of the permanent members of the Security Council in the various organs of the system makes possible the identification of a problem intrinsic to the Organization's representative mechanism, namely, the large representation ratio of certain countries to the detriment of others.
3. Such a de facto situation is somehow analogous to granting a different status to a number of Member States in the system as a whole. Given its vast repercussions, it reflects a reality of the United Nations beyond the stipulations of the Charter.
4. We will, therefore, consider both the Charter and the representation figures separately, and take as a basis for comparison the situation of the five permanent members of the Security Council - France, China, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation - to try to assess their overall representational advantage, as the centrepiece of the paper.

I. REGULATIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

5. On the basis of Charter regulations, the status of permanent member has special bearing on:
  - (a) Voting prerogatives in the Security Council - veto right - (Art. 27);
  - (b) Composition of the Military Staff Committee (Art. 47), which consists of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members or their representatives;
  - (c) Composition of the Trusteeship Council (Art. 86, b), integrated by the five permanent members. China joined the group in 1989.
6. As regards participation in the General Assembly, the Charter regulations postulate, inter alia, the following:
  - (a) General Committee
    - (i) According to rule 31 of its rules of procedure, the General Assembly elects 21 vice-presidents. By decision 1 of the Assembly (in

/...

reference to resolution 33/138 of 19 December 1978), five of these vice-presidents are representatives of the five permanent members;

- (ii) The General Committee is highly significant, given its role in assessing the provisional agenda and supplementary list of items, and introducing recommendations as to their inclusion in agenda rule 40);
- (iii) On the other hand, permanent members may not assume the chairmanship of the General Assembly, or the chairmanships of the Main Committees. The latter conforms to rule 31, which indirectly indicates that the presidencies of the Assembly and chairmanships of the Main Committees cannot correspond to the same countries;
- (iv) Likewise, it is established practice that the permanent members do not assume the posts of vice-chairman or rapporteur of the Main Committees;

(b) Committee on Contributions. Established by General Assembly resolution 14 (I) of 1946, this Committee advises the Assembly on matters relating to the allocation of the organization's expenses and on the application of Article 19 of the Charter in cases of arrears in the payment of contributions. Its membership has been expanded several times, now standing at 18. Members are selected by the General Assembly on the basis of geographical distribution, personal qualifications and experience. They serve for a period of three years, retire by rotation and are eligible for re-appointment.

## II. STATISTICAL FINDINGS

### A. General Assembly

#### 1. Committee on Contributions

7. For the period 1984-1993, an average of four permanent members belonged to the Committee in any given year, showing a 70 per cent re-appointment rate; that is, they succeeded in getting re-appointed - on average - 7 out of the 10 times they were eligible for re-appointment. On the other hand, non-permanent members have a 48 per cent re-appointment rate, that is, they succeeded in getting re-appointed a little under 5 out of 10 times when they were eligible for re-appointment.

#### 2. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

8. Established at the first session of the General Assembly, by resolution 14 (I) of 13 February 1946, this particular Committee examines and reports on regular and peace-keeping budgets and accounts of the Organization, as well as on the administrative budgets of the specialized agencies. It also advises the Assembly on other administrative and financial matters referred to it. Its membership has been expanded numerous times, now standing at a total of 16. Members are appointed by the Assembly on the basis of geographical distribution,

personal qualifications and experience. They serve for three-year periods and retire by rotation, but are eligible for re-appointment.

9. For the period 1984-1993, an average of four permanent members served on the Committee in any given year. They presented a combined re-appointment rate of 70 per cent, with France, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation each presenting a 100 per cent re-appointment rate. On the other hand, non-permanent members have a combined re-appointment rate of 41 per cent, re-entering the Committee only 4 out of 10 times when they are eligible to do so.

### 3. General Assembly ad hoc and subsidiary organs

10. Permanent members also take part in a number of important United Nations bodies dependent on the General Assembly:

(a) Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements. By its resolution 957 (X) of 8 November 1955, the General Assembly established a committee, authorized by paragraph 2 of Article 96 of the Charter, to request consultative opinions from the International Court of Justice on decisions of the Administrative Tribunal. The Committee is constituted by the members of the current or most recent General Committee, which includes permanent members;

(b) International Law Commission. Established by resolution 174 (II) of 21 November 1947, the Commission was established by the Assembly with the function of encouraging the progressive development of International Law and its codification. Its membership has been expanded a number of times, now standing at a total of 34, and is elected on the basis of geographical distribution. With the sole exception of the United Kingdom, who did not participate for four years, the permanent members belonged to it continuously during the period 1984-1993. Other members rotated or were retired, at a rate of 20 per cent;

(c) United Nations Conciliation Committee for Palestine. Established by resolution 104 (III) of 11 December 1948, this Committee was, *inter alia*, established by the General Assembly to help with the repatriation of refugees and to assist Israel and the Arab States to achieve final settlements on all questions outstanding between them. The Committee's regular members are France, Turkey, and the United States of America - two of them Security Council permanent members;

(d) United Nations Administrative Tribunal. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 351 A (IV) of 24 November 1949, the Tribunal hears and passes judgement on applications alleging non-observance of contracts of employment on the part of the United Nations Secretariat staff members or of their terms of appointment. Members are appointed by the Assembly on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee for a three-year term. For the period 1984-1993, at least three of the seven positions of the Tribunal corresponded, at any one time, to permanent members, with their tenure averaging 45 per cent of the total;

(e) United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 913 (X) of 3 December 1955, the Committee reports on all major sources of exposure to ionizing radiation in the human environment and submits annual progress reports to the Assembly. Its membership has been expanded a number of times, now standing at a total of 21. With the exception of three years, in which only four of the five permanent members participated, the five permanent members were included continuously in the Committee during 1984-1993;

(f) Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This Committee, established in 1959, acquired permanent status through General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI) of 20 December 1961. Its membership has been gradually expanded to a present total of 53 members, which includes the five permanent members, on a continual basis;

(g) Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 2006 (XIX) of 18 February 1965, it consists of 34 members, including the five permanent members on a continual basis;

(h) Joint Inspection Unit. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 2150 (XXI) of 4 November 1966 and beginning its work in 1968, the Unit ensures that the activities undertaken by organizations of the United Nations system are carried out as economically as possible, with optimum use being made of available resources. It consists of no more than 11 Inspectors elected on the basis of equitable geographic distribution and serving in their personal capacity for a term of five years, which can be renewed only once. With the exception of China, permanent members averaged 3 Inspectors out of 11 at any one time;

(i) United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966, the Commission seeks to promote the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade. Its membership has been expanded on several occasions, with a present total of 36 elected on the basis of six-year terms. With the exception of 1985, when only four of the five permanent members participated, all five served continuously during the period 1984-1993. Other members rotated or were retired at a rate of 15 per cent;

(j) Committee on Relations with the Host Country. Established by the General Assembly by resolution 2819 of 15 December 1971, it consists of 15 members nominated by the President of the Assembly, which includes the five permanent members on a continual basis;

(k) Consultative Committee on Disarmament. Established in 1978 by the General Assembly by resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, the Committee is composed of 20 eminent personalities, all nominated by the Secretary-General. It includes experts representing the five permanent members on a continual basis;

(l) Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization. By its resolution 3499 of 15 December 1975, the General Assembly re-established the former Special Committee on the United Nations Charter under a new name. After a number of

successive expansions, the Committee today consists of 47 members nominated by the President of the Assembly, including the five permanent members on a continual basis;

(m) Committee on Information. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 33/115 C of 18 December 1978, it has undergone successive expansions and currently consists of 83 members assigned by the President of the Assembly, including the five permanent members on a continual basis;

(n) United Nations Environment Programme. Established in 1972 by General Assembly resolution 2997 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, UNEP is represented by a Governing Council whose functions are, among others, to promote international cooperation in the environment field, recommend policies to this end and provide general policy guidance for the coordination of environmental programmes within the United Nations system. The Council reports to the Assembly through the Economic and Social Council and is composed of 58 members elected by the Assembly on the basis of geographic distribution and four-year terms. For the period 1984-1993, the five permanent members averaged 10 full years of participation, thus covering the entire period. The rest of the members - combined - averaged eight years of participation;

(o) Human Rights Committee. Based on available information for the period 1986-1993, three permanent members participated in this Committee continuously during the given period, while the rest of the membership was subject to rotation or changes at a rate of 12 per cent;

(p) Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, it consists of 18 experts elected by the Assembly on the basis of geographic distribution. For the period 1984-1993, two permanent members were added to two others (who had already been on the Committee) in 1986, after which all four served on a continual basis. On the other hand, other Committee members were rotated or retired at a rate of 21 per cent.

#### B. Economic and Social Council

11. The five permanent members are also part of the Economic and Social Council and various standing organs of limited membership, re-elected successively since the establishment of such organs.

##### 1. Economic and Social Council (general membership)

12. Consisting originally of 18 members, it was successively expanded to include its present total of 53 members with three-year terms. Eighteen of these are nominated every year in General Assembly elections. With the exception of China, the five permanent members belonged to it almost continuously from its beginnings, until 1993 (combined default time: two

years). 1/ For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while all other members - combined - averaged 3.9 years of participation (39 per cent) in the same period. Figure 1 (sample graph) of the appendix shows this result. Figure 2 establishes the same comparison, but shows a breakdown of the component of the column "others" corresponding to figure 1 (on the basis of geographical distribution).

## 2. Subsidiary organs of the Economic and Social Council

13. Permanent members have also taken part in a number of other important United Nations bodies dependent on the Economic and Social Council:

(a) Statistical Commission. Established by Economic and Social Council resolution 8 (I) of 1946, the Commission assists the Council in promoting the development of national statistics, coordinating the statistical work of certain specialized agencies and advising United Nations organs on questions regarding statistical information. Its membership has been expanded a number of times to a present total of 24, elected on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Commission almost continuously from its inception until 1993 (combined default time: 3 years). For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent). All other members combined averaged 3.2 years of participation (32 per cent) in the same period;

(b) Population Commission. Established by Economic and Social Council resolution 3 (III) of 1946, the Commission studies and advises the Council on demographic questions and related social and economic matters. Its membership has been expanded successively since 1946, now standing at a total of 27. Members are elected by the Council for four-year terms on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members sat on the Committee continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 2.7 years of participation (27 per cent) in the same period;

(c) Commission for Social Development. Originally known as the Social Commission, it was established by Economic and Social Council resolution 10 (II) of 1946 and renamed in 1966. It advises the Council on social policies of a general character. Its membership, elected directly by the Council for four-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution, has been expanded a number of times and now stands at 32. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Commission almost continuously from its inception until 1993 (combined default time: 11 years). For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 8.8 years of participation (88 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 2.9 years of participation (29 per cent) in the same period;

(d) Commission on Human Rights. Established by Economic and Social Council resolution 5 (I) of 1946, the Commission reports on questions regarding

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1/ Combined default time: total time of non-participation.

the international bill of rights and other related declarations on civil liberties and various forms of discrimination. Its membership has been expanded numerous times, now standing at a total of 53. Members are elected for three-year terms on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members were members of the Commission almost continuously from its inception until 1993 (combined default time: three years). For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent). All other members averaged 3.5 years of participation (35 per cent) in the same period;

(e) Commission on Transnational Corporations. Established by Economic and Social Council resolution 1913 (LVII) of 1974, the Commission comprises 48 members elected directly by the Council for three-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Commission continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent). The remaining members averaged 4.8 years of participation (48 per cent) for the same period;

(f) Committee for Programme and Coordination. Established by Economic and Social Council resolution 920 (XXXIV) of 1962, the Committee functions as the main subsidiary organ of the Council and the Assembly for purposes of planning, programming and coordination. Its membership has been expanded a number of times to its present total of 34. Members are elected by the Council for three-year terms on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members sat on the Committee continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 9.4 years of participation (94 per cent), while all others averaged 3.7 years of participation (37 per cent);

(g) Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Established by Economic and Social Council resolution 9 (I) of 1946, the Commission comprises a total of 53 members elected by the Council for four-year terms at two-year intervals on the basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Commission continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 9.6 years of participation (96 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 5.2 years (52 per cent);

(h) Commission on Human Settlements (Habitat). Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 32/162 of 19 December 1977, the Commission comprises a total of 58 members elected for three to four-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members sat on the Commission continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 8.4 years of participation (84 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 5.5 years (55 per cent);

(i) Commission on the Status of Women. Established by Economic and Social Council resolution 11 (II) of 1946, the Commission comprises a total of 45 members elected on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members participated in the Commission almost continuously from its beginnings until 1993 (combined default time: eight years). For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 8.6 years of participation

(86 per cent), while the remaining members averaged a total of 3.7 years (37 per cent).

14. Appendix figure 3 (sample graph) shows average participation of permanent and non-permanent members in the Economic and Social Council subsidiary organs mentioned above. Figure 4 establishes the same comparison, but shows a breakdown of the component "others" corresponding to figure 3 (on the basis of geographic distribution).

### C. International Court of Justice

15. Although the Statute of the International Court of Justice does not directly specify it, the five permanent members of the Security Council are de facto permanent members of the Court.

### D. Related United Nations programmes and specialized agencies

#### 1. International Atomic Energy Agency

16. Beginning its activities in 1957, the Agency seeks to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. Its executive organ is the Board of Governors, members of which are designated on an annual basis by the Board itself and on a bi-annual basis by the Agency's General Conference, all by the principle of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members have sat on the Board continuously since 1957. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 10 years of participation (100 per cent); other members combined averaged 3.1 years of participation (31 per cent) in the same period.

#### 2. International Civil Aviation Organization

17. Beginning its activities in 1947, ICAO fosters the planning and development of international air transport so as to ensure a safe growth of civil aviation throughout the world. Its executive body is the members' Council, composed of 33 contracting States. Permanent members participated in the Council for an average of 35.6 years (possible total: 46 years) between 1947 and 1993, that is, almost 80 per cent of the total time. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 1.8 years of participation (18 per cent) in the same period.

#### 3. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

18. Established in 1945, FAO includes a main Council as its chief executive organ, composed of 49 member nations elected by the FAO Conference for three-year terms. With the exception of the Russian Federation, which is not a member, the permanent members averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent) in the period 1984-1993; the rest of the membership averaged 2.7 years of participation (27 per cent) in the same period.



#### 4. International Maritime Organization

19. Established in 1959, IMO regulates standards of maritime safety and facilitates cooperation among Governments on technical matters affecting international shipping. Its chief executive body is the IMO Council, composed of 32 members. With the exception of China, the permanent members have sat on the Council continuously since 1959. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 1.8 years (18 per cent) in the same period.

#### 5. International Telecommunication Union

20. The Union's chief executive organ is its Council, the members of which are elected by the ITU Conference and are eligible for re-election (total Union membership is 183). With the exception of the United Kingdom, the permanent members have been members of the Council continuously since 1947. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 9.2 years (92 per cent) of participation in the Council, while the rest of the membership averaged 1.9 years (19 per cent) in the same period.

#### 6. World Meteorological Organization

21. WMO became a specialized agency in 1951, with the WMO Executive Council serving as its chief executive body. Permanent members sat on the Council for an average of 31 years (possible total: 42 years) between 1951 and 1993, that is, 75 per cent of the total time. For the period 1984-1993, all five permanent members averaged 8.7 years (87 per cent) of participation, while the rest of the membership averaged 1.8 years (18 per cent) in the same period.

#### 7. World Health Organization

22. WHO became a specialized agency in 1948, with the WHO Executive Board serving as its chief executive organ. Permanent members served on the Board for an average of 36 years (possible total: 45 years) between 1948 and 1993, that is, 80 per cent of the total time. For the period 1984-1993, all five permanent members averaged 9.2 years (92 per cent) of participation, while the rest of the membership averaged 2 years (20 per cent) of participation in the same period.

#### 8. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

23. The organization was established in 1945. Its chief executive organ, the Executive Board, is elected by the UNESCO General Conference and consists of 51 member States who appoint representatives for four-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution. For the period 1984-1993, China, the Russian Federation and France were members of the Board continuously (10 full years of participation), while the rest of the membership averaged 3 years (30 per cent) of participation in the same period.

#### 9. United Nations Children's Fund

24. Originally established as the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund in 1946, it became a full permanent organ by General Assembly resolution 802 (VII) of 15 September 1953. Its leading executive body is the Executive Board, comprising 36 members elected for three-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Board continuously until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while the remaining members averaged 3.6 years (36 per cent) of participation in the same period.

#### 10. United Nations Development Programme

25. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 2029 (XX) of 22 November 1965, UNDP includes a Governing Council as its chief executive organ. The Council's membership has been successively expanded - now standing at a total of 48 - and is elected on the basis of equitable distribution among "developed" and "developing" countries as two separate categories. With the exception of China, the permanent members participated in the Board continuously until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while average participation for the remaining "developed" countries (excluding the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation) averaged 6.5 years (65 per cent).

#### 11. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

26. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 319 (IV) of 3 December 1949, UNHCR includes an Executive Committee as its leading organ. The Committee's membership has been expanded a number of times, now standing at a total of 46 regular members, which includes (and has always included) all Security Council permanent members except for the Russian Federation.

#### 12. Universal Postal Union

27. UPU became a United Nations specialized agency in 1948, with an Executive Council as its leading organ. For the period 1984-1993, the five permanent members averaged 6 years (60 per cent) of participation in the Council, while the rest of the membership averaged 2.1 years (21 per cent).

28. The above data make it somehow clear that the effective rates of participation of the five Security Council permanent members seem to be not directly reflective of Charter stipulations. In effect, they may be producing a certain degree of disequilibrium in the United Nations structure.

29. Such an apparent disequilibrium may find its roots in a number of reasons, which cause what can be called the "cascade effect". The permanent members' relative weight and negotiational advantage when soliciting their admittance into organs outside of the Security Council may well be reverberating throughout

the Organization. The ongoing review of the Security Council may well grant all members an opportunity to look also in depth into this particular matter.

[pages 63-64 offset]

2. Australia

A/AC.247/5 (b)

[Original: English]

[15 September 1995]

1. I hereby submit the attached paper entitled Possible Models for Enlarging the Security Council to be included as part of the compendium of papers of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council to be circulated as a General Assembly document.

2. The paper, which was previously circulated in the Open-ended Working Group, provides a chart that illustrates the current situation and models that could be used to facilitate discussion on how the composition of the Security Council might be changed. I would like to emphasize that these are not formal proposals but simply models to assist further deliberation of these issues.

3. I would be grateful if you could ensure that the present explanatory letter is attached to the Australian paper for inclusion in the compendium.

(Signed) Richard BUTLER, AM

/...

ANNEX

Possible models for enlarging the Security Council

Existing arrangement a/

	Western Europe (27)	Eastern Europe (20)	Africa and Asia (102)	Latin America and the Caribbean (33)	Total
PM <u>b/</u>	3	1	1	-	5
NPM <u>c/</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>10</u>
Total	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>15</u>

Simple model

	Western Europe (27)	Eastern Europe (20)	Africa (53)	Asia (49)	Latin America and the Caribbean (33)	Total
PM	4	1	2	2	1	10
NPM	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>10</u>
Total	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>20</u>

Alternative models

A. Existing groups

	Western Europe (27)	Eastern Europe (20)	Africa (53)	Asia (49)	Latin America and the Caribbean (33)	Total
PM	3	1	-	1	-	5
QPM <u>d/</u>	1	-	3	2	2	8
NPM	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>10</u>
Total	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>23</u>

B. New groups

	Western Europe (24)	Central and Eastern Europe (22)	Middle East and Maghreb (19)	Africa (43)	Central Asia and Indian Ocean (17)	East Asia and Oceania (25)	Americas (35)	Total
PM	2	1	-	-	-	1	1	5
QPM	1	-	1	1	1	2	2	8
NPM	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>10</u>
Total	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>23</u>

a/ As at 1 March 1995, three Member States were not members of any regional group.

b/ Permanent member.

c/ Non-permanent member.

d/ Quasi-permanent member (i.e. re-elected).

3. Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland and Slovenia

A/AC.247/5 (c)

[Original: English]

[9 May 1995]

Discussion paper

1. The present discussion paper on the main issues under consideration in the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council has been prepared by an informal group of small and medium-sized countries.

2. In drawing up the paper, the delegations concerned considered that a sufficient level of broad agreement existed between their positions on the principal issues under consideration for it to be worthwhile setting these down with a view to establishing a general framework within which further work could be undertaken.

3. In the view of the group, a stage has been reached in the deliberation of the Open-ended Working Group at which there would be merit in sharing its approach with other delegations. It is for this reason that the group has decided to circulate the present discussion paper now.

4. In doing so, the group wishes to stress that the positions reflected in the paper are flexible and evolving. The discussion paper should not be seen as cutting across the work of the Open-ended Working Group, nor should it be viewed as a package solution to all the outstanding issues. It is intended, rather, as a contribution to the ongoing work of the Working Group from a group of countries that share a similar approach to the problems being addressed.

5. In this context, the views of other delegations are welcome, particularly those delegations which felt that they would wish to join with the group in developing the ideas further.

General comments

6. The reform of the Security Council should be in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The reform of the Security Council must not put in danger its effectiveness, on the contrary it should strengthen it;

(b) Enlargement of the Security Council should enhance its representativity, taking into account the emergence of new economic and political powers as well as the increase of United Nations membership;

/...



(c) Enlargement of the Security Council should enhance equitable geographic representation;

(d) The possibility for smaller Member States to serve on the Security Council should not be diminished;

(e) Enlargement should take place in both categories of permanent and non-permanent members.

#### Cluster 1

##### 1. Permanent membership

7. There is a need to increase the number of permanent seats (two to five additional permanent seats). Global influence, capacity and willingness to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in particular through peace-keeping operations and through the assumption of an additional financial burden (peace-keeping operations budget) should be taken into account for selecting new permanent members. Fixing objective criteria for selecting new permanent members would, however, be difficult to achieve and might threaten the whole process of reform. In addition to Germany and Japan, already perceived by many as candidates for permanent seats, Africa, Asia and Latin America should also be given permanent seats.

##### 2. Non-permanent membership

8. The increase in permanent seats should be accompanied by an appropriate increase in non-permanent membership in order to preserve as much as possible a balanced configuration of the Security Council. The current criteria for selecting non-permanent members (Article 23.1 of the Charter) should be maintained.

##### 3. Other categories of membership

9. An increase in membership should take place within the framework of the current distinction between permanent and non-permanent; special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries should not be established.

##### 4. Veto

10. There would be value in limiting the use of veto and the suggestions already made in this regard should be considered.

##### 5. Size

11. Twenty to 25 should be the size of an enlarged Security Council.

/...

6. Other matters

12. Review of the composition of the Security Council should remain possible in order to adapt it to the changing configuration of international relations.

Cluster 2

13. Measures already taken to enhance the relationship between the Council and the general membership as well as to improve the working methods and procedures of the Council, constitute a positive development. These measures should be maintained and improved, and, when appropriate and if possible, should receive a certain degree of formalization. Other new measures should be developed along the same lines. An amendment of Article 24 of the Charter might recognize the principle of information and consultation of all Member States by the Security Council to the largest possible extent.

14. The following should receive particular attention:

- (a) Briefings on the work of the Council by the President of the Council;
- (b) Open orientation debates of the Council;
- (c) Consultations between Security Council and troop-contributing countries;
- (d) Transparency of the work of sanctions committees.

4. Belize

A/AC.247/5 (d)

[Original: English]

[15 September 1995]

At your request, we are transmitting the attached copy of the submission made by the delegation of Belize to the Open-ended Working Group of the General Assembly on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council for inclusion in the Co-Chairmen's compendium of all the proposals submitted.

(Signed) Lawrence A. SYLVESTER  
for Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Answers to suggested questions for Cluster 1 and related statement delivered on 25 January 1995 to the Open-ended Working Group of the General Assembly by His Excellency Mr. Edward A. Laing, Permanent Representative of Belize

I. SUMMARY OF ANSWERS TO CLUSTER 1 QUESTIONS

1. Indefinite (permanent) membership

(a) The number should be increased by between five and eight;

(b) There should be established the principle of at least two members from each of the five regions;

(c) Subject to what is said in section VII below, in each of the five regions any State would have the right to contest a seat in elections conducted within the United Nations for each regional group. Tenure would not exceed a renewable period to be prescribed. In addition, the States contributing a specified minimum percentage of the Organization's budget would be members;

(d) Deferred, except for 4 below.

2. Regular (non-permanent) membership

(a) The number should be increased by approximately 10;

(b) The Article 23 criteria would be essentially the same as at present, with the emphasis on equitable geographical distribution;

(c) The ratio between the two categories should be approximately 2:1.

3. Other categories of membership

(a) There is no need for additional substantial categories of membership. As stated in 1 (c), regional representation should be the main criterion of indefinite (permanent) membership. It should also be the main criterion for regular membership. In both membership categories, pairs of prospective members should also have the purely voluntary option of forming composite or constituency groups;

(b) The basis for self-selection through this modality would be geographical, including trans-aquatic, adjacency or common membership of a Chapter VIII agency;

(c) The right to vote, exercise the veto (if any) and participate in debates and in closed sessions would be rotated monthly. However, at all times, the delegation would be comprised of representatives from both participants in the composite or constituency group.

4. Veto

Ideally, the veto power should not be retained. If this is not feasible, it should be thus modified: a minimum of 3 States (if the Council is enlarged to over 25) or 2 States should jointly cast vetoes.

II. INTRODUCTION

1. At various times this delegation has presented its ideas both in this Working Group and in the plenary, as it did on 13 October 1994. Given the diversity of cultures, regions and economic and social realities, and the complexity of our proto-twenty-first century world, we stand by the proposals elaborated on that occasion. Nevertheless, in our endeavour to move forward, this delegation is today offering some additional thoughts. Some of these are based on ideas that have been expressed by several distinguished delegations. At the same time, our present formulation includes several elements from our previous proposals. Chief of these is the composite or constituency modality of membership.

2. Central to our notions is the importance of ensuring democracy in the United Nations. If this Organization's moral authority is to be preserved in an increasingly democratized world, it is inescapable that its own processes must be made more democratic. The essential ingredients of such democracy must be the introduction of equality and even-handedness. The first notable area in which this must be accomplished is that of membership categories and terminology. Surely the very notion of permanent membership contradicts the fundamental principle of democracy for which we have waged at least one major war in this century. It was a cardinal principle in the Atlantic Charter of the Second World War and the Charter of this Organization, which was spawned by that war. I would insult the intelligence of my listeners if I were to say any more on the history of this subject than that an entire large branch of international law and United Nations law is based on a veritable forest of weighty resolutions of this Assembly, notably resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 on the granting of independence to colonial territories and peoples. In view of the vital importance of democracy, this delegation therefore proposes that the category of permanent membership should be relabelled "indefinite membership" and that the incidents of that category should reflect the basic notions of democracy, without posing any threat whatsoever to the peace and security of the world.

3. Similarly, overall democracy within the Organization and internal democracy within the Council itself must be made to apply to the incidents of voting, particularly the veto, which this delegation has previously recommended should be the foundation of reform. Logic would suggest that the veto should be abolished. But, in the realm of peace and security, logic is an abominable master. Therefore we repeat our suggestion that the veto should be reformed.

4. Democracy obviously requires that there should be essential equality between the weak and the strong, between the poor and the rich, and between the small and the large. It requires the widest possible participation in representative bodies. No United Nations organ, especially the Council, must

/...

become so complex as to preclude a category of State from participation. Wisdom, like democratic rights, should be widely shared. There must be full access to the distilled experiences of the weak, the poor and the small. Thus, ideas on Council reform should squarely reflect this concern.

5. In addition to democracy, we must acknowledge that, like States, international organizations are dynamic organisms. Their structures must therefore be flexible. That is an additional reason why modification of the veto and of permanent membership is required. Membership criteria and other structures must therefore reflect the reality that, throughout history, the dimensions, composition, boundaries and very existence of States have often been in flux. When these changes have taken place through democratic and peaceful means, this Organization has generally made the necessary accommodations. The very notions of permanent membership and the veto, as they presently exist, preclude such accommodation in cases of State succession. We must ensure that this is now rectified.

6. The final introductory point is that, in view of the dynamism to which reference has been made, an institution as vital as the Security Council must be provided with a mechanism for orderly change. This includes the Council's membership criteria. At the same time, reform should not be so idealistic and radical as to deprive the international system of the continued benefit of those States which have furnished yeoman service in the sensitive and dangerous fields of peace and security.

### III. INDEFINITE MEMBERSHIP

7. Indefinite membership would replace the present category of permanent membership. This delegation envisages that there might be two such members from each of the Organization's [five] regions. It might be argued that there are disparities between the existing regions in size and population numbers. However, that argument does not detract from the imperative of giving equal and democratic representation to each region. The solution to this perceived problem might be to reform the Organization's regional system.

8. Tenure would be indefinite in the sense that it would be of longer duration than the two years for regular members. The period could conceivably be five years, if indefinite membership included such responsibilities and obligations as justify an extended period for the amortization of necessary investments. Clearly, one of the incidents of such a status as indefinite membership should be indefinite renewability.

9. Elections of the permanent members from each region would be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, with participation of all the members of each respective regional group.

10. In addition to this modality of selection based on regional considerations, this delegation proposes that two or three additional permanent members would so qualify on the basis of their contribution to the budget of the Organization. It is submitted that, in view of the size of the Organization's budget for international security, it is unrealistic to deny the nexus between financial

contributions and peace and security. One State that would obviously qualify under such criteria is the United States of America. This delegation further suggests that such States would not be counted among those which are qualified as contestants and electors in the regional elections described in the preceding paragraph.

11. To either type of indefinite membership could be applied the optional selection modality of composite or constituency membership. In the case of the budget-contribution criterion, the contributions of both States in a composite/constituency group would be aggregated in order to determine whether they satisfied the required threshold. The adjacency criterion would be applied as described in section V below.

#### IV. REGULAR MEMBERSHIP

12. Because of the imperatives of democracy (from the perspective of both equality and even-handedness), the label "non-permanent membership" conveys a sense of second-class citizenship. It is therefore proposed that it be relabelled "regular membership" or simply "membership". For reasons that have been canvassed in this statement, the number of regular members should be increased so that the proportion of regular to indefinite members would be approximately 2:1. In that event, the total number of members of the Council would be approximately 33, which would be consistent with efficiency, particularly if the Council ensures that its procedures are consistent with the effective use of time. As long as there is continued emphasis on equitable geographical distribution and the composite or constituency modality is utilized, it is perceived that the criteria presently in Article 23 (1) would suffice.

#### V. COMPOSITE OR CONSTITUENCY MEMBERSHIP

13. Regionalism is at the core of the proposals discussed so far. The expression has been used mainly in the sense of the existing United Nations regional groups. Consistently with the Council's role in peace and security, it has also been used in the sense of the functional security regions, which are the subject of Chapter VIII of the Organization's Charter. As noted in the Secretary-General's recent update to (A/50/60-S/1995/1) and the Council's recent debate on the Agenda for Peace (A/47/277-S/24111), the Organization has been relying increasingly on regional mechanisms. Since it appears likely that this trend will continue, it is rational to relate the composition of the Council to this reality, which bears a broad relationship to collective self-defence (Article 51 of the Charter). This is the essence of the composite or constituency modality, which follows a development in agencies that provide specific benefits or have certain defined or tangible functions.

14. This modality of membership would facilitate the effective participation in the work of the Council of the scores of States that have never been able to afford to participate, while providing the breadth of experience and nuanced views prevailing in the various functional regions.

15. It is most important to stress that this modality of membership would be available for both categories of membership. It would be purely optional for pairs of adjacent States. The concept of adjacency would include trans-aquatic adjacency and non-adjacent States that are members of a regional agency certified by the Security Council.

16. The vote and veto, if any, would rotate monthly between the parties to the composite/constituency arrangement. So would be the right to speak in debates, in both open and closed sessions. At all times, however, the delegations of composite members would include delegates from each component, who would be seated accordingly and would participate fully in committee work without regard to rotation.

#### VI. THE VETO

17. As this delegation has previously recommended, the exercise of the veto would be limited to cases in which more than one indefinite member coincided in its exercise. It is recommended that if the total size of the Council is increased beyond 25, the minimum number of coinciding members should be 3. Otherwise, it should be two.

#### VII. THE ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA FOR INDEFINITE MEMBERSHIP

18. As an alternative to today's proposal on the criteria for indefinite membership, this delegation wishes to reiterate the proposals it last summarized on 13 October 1994. It will be recalled that the most important elements in those proposals are population size (with a threshold of 100 million) and contribution to the Organization's budget. They also include a criterion based entirely on extraordinarily large population size. In addition, concepts are included for compensating for marginal non-satisfaction of the population and contribution criteria and for "grandfathering" existing members. Those concepts on grandfathering should be included in the new proposals outlined in the present statement. To that extent, the regional concept could not be fully applied in at least one of the five regional United Nations groups.

19. Nevertheless, I understand that at least one other delegation, fully cognizant of the changeability of international life, suggests that the Assembly should revisit this matter at regular prescribed intervals, in the first instance not later than 10 years from the date of effectiveness of the forthcoming set of reforms. This delegation endorses that suggestion.



5. Cuba

A/AC.247/5 (e)

[Original: English]

[15 September 1995]

Please find enclosed a copy of the proposal presented by Cuba on the question of equitable representation and on the increase in the members of the Security Council, within the Working Group on this issue.

(Signed) Yamira CUETO  
Counsellor

ANNEX

1. One of the formulas for the process of expansion and reform of the Security Council can be the following.
2. The increase in the number of permanent and non-permanent members should be strictly in accordance with the principle of the equitable geographic representation.
3. In any formula, the expansion of the permanent membership should not only contemplate industrialized countries. This would simply generate a further imbalance in the membership of the Council. New permanent members from developed and developing countries should enter the Council together and at the same time.
4. The total number of members of the enlarged Security Council could be 23, with the following distribution:
  - (a) Three from Asia;
  - (b) One from Europe and others;
  - (c) Two from Africa (as this is the decision of the Organization of African Unity, although taking into account the amount of countries in this region and their diversity, the number could be higher);
  - (d) Two from Latin America and the Caribbean.

6. Indonesia

A/AC.247/5 (f)

[Original: English]

[15 September 1995]

I have the honour to submit herewith criteria proposed by Indonesia for permanent membership in the Security Council (see annex).

It would be greatly appreciated if this could be included in the compendium of proposals submitted by Member States for consideration by the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council.

(Signed) Isslamet POERNOMO  
Ambassador  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

ANNEX

Criteria for permanent membership in the Security Council

1. The reform and revitalization of the Security Council is a conditio sine qua non for strengthening the United Nations and is critically important for the emerging new world order. The main objective in these endeavours is to render the Council more responsive to the emerging challenges and changing realities in the international landscape. In this context, it is essential to ensure that the question of an increase in the permanent membership reflects the current configuration of membership of the United Nations and to ensure a more representative and effective Security Council. It is undeniable that the present arrangements do not reflect the profound changes and transition that have taken place in the global arena. The international community continues to face an untenable anomaly where three States from Europe are among the five permanent members. At the same time Asia is underrepresented, while Africa and Latin America are not represented, an arrangement that in geopolitical terms is unacceptable.

2. Objective criteria should therefore guide the selection process for an increase in the permanent membership of the Security Council. While the principle of equitable geographic representation is a valid basis, it should not constitute the sole criterion to determine eligibility for permanent membership. A host of other criteria are equally important to assume the responsibilities inherent in such a status.

3. Far from paying mere lip service and perfunctory exhortations, States must have supported the United Nations as the principal multilateral organization through which Governments can and should resolve conflicts and thereby seek to strengthen the validity and efficacy of its organs as forums for consultations and negotiations on all issues of global concern. Such a stance, stemming from a genuine commitment to an active and independent foreign policy that is free from externally induced constraints must have the continuing and steadfast support of the Governments and peoples concerned for the United Nations and, most importantly, in their timely contributions to its budget.

4. Furthermore, the willingness of Member States to assume the onerous responsibilities inherent in permanent membership of the Security Council and thereby bolster its capacity in fulfilling its mandate must be deemed to be essential. These should have been convincingly demonstrated by their contribution to the promotion of regional peace and global security through successful diplomatic initiatives to the prevention and resolution of conflicts. Equally important is participation in peace-keeping activities over a period of time, as well as contributions to the civil, military, financial and other resources of the United Nations. Proven capacity for constructive global influence and for undertaking global responsibilities, especially in guiding a coalition of the largest number of States in history comprising all continents and regions, would constitute yet another criterion. It is also pertinent to take into account the size of the population.

5. Moreover, a country's standing within the new realities of regional and subregional dynamism and in building the edifice of confidence and concordance should be fully considered. It is also pertinent to take into account the legitimate aspirations of the largest States and the varied abilities and potentialities of their populations as important attributes for permanent membership. Of no less importance is a prominent and constructive role in resolving issues of global concern, particularly through compromise, cooperation and consensus.

6. Additionally, economic power - both current and potential - and social stability, as well as the capacity and willingness to contribute significantly to socio-economic development, are other factors. Another central criterion that should be taken into account is a record of strong and sustained economic growth, including progress towards balanced, equitable and sustainable development that would make it one of the largest and vibrant economies in the world. This could be assessed by such characteristics as rapid output and productivity in agriculture and industry together with increased growth rates in physical and human capital. Likewise, sustained economic performance and resilience even in the face of adverse global economic conditions such as recession should also be given due weight. Stable macroeconomic performance, substantial domestic and foreign investment flows and demographic strength, not just in quantitative terms but also with regard to quality and participation in economic growth and development, are also essential attributes. It is from such strengths that a country's capacity to contribute towards development cooperation under multilateral auspices is derived.

7. An increase in membership of the Security Council should therefore accommodate new permanent members who should join on the basis of a combination of appropriate criteria, which would reflect, among others, the new and emerging constellation of powers, their proven regional and global responsibilities as well as political, economic and demographic realities.

8. A measured and realistic expansion of the permanent membership in the Security Council has become both necessary and appropriate. In these endeavours, the exclusion of developing countries through a process of predetermined selection should be unacceptable. Enlargement should be accomplished through a process of open-ended negotiations on the basis of consensus and as a comprehensive package. The time for reform and restructuring of the Security Council has long been overdue. It has now become imperative to achieve a more representative Security Council.

7. Italy

A/AC.247/5 (g)

[Original: English]

[14 September 1995]

I am pleased to enclose a revised version of the Italian proposal for the enlargement of the Security Council (see annex).

I formally ask you to include the attached document in the compendium, which - as agreed in the Working Group today - is scheduled to be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly.

(Signed) F. Paolo FULCI  
Ambassador

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ANNEX

A revised proposal for the enlargement of the Security  
Council of the United Nations

15 May 1995

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1. It is generally agreed that the present membership of the Security Council is in need of expansion, if only to reflect the steady rise in membership of the United Nations. General membership has grown from 51 members in 1945, to 113 in 1965 (date of the Council's only enlargement, from 11 to 15 seats), to 185 today.

2. The five permanent members all belong to the northern hemisphere, and four of them are economically developed countries, while one is rapidly approaching industrialized status. To add new permanent seats only for two developed countries, which also belong to the northern hemisphere, would not be equitable or democratic. Rather than correct the existing imbalance, such a solution would aggravate it.

3. To redress this situation, one logical remedy might be to add three permanent seats to the Security Council, one for each of the three geographic areas presently underrepresented (Asia, Africa and Latin America), but there would be the objective difficulty of selecting the countries that should represent the three continents.

4. A more equitable solution for all would be to increase non-permanent seats only, as was the case with the reform of 1965. Among other things, this would prevent the difficulties connected with the proliferation of veto power and its dangers.

5. The numbers speak clearly: 79 countries have never been members of the Security Council, while 44 others have been able to serve only once (see appendices I and II). The problem stems mainly from the fact that, within each geographic group, several large countries tend to compete for a Security Council seat much more frequently, thus elbowing out the smaller countries. A formula must be found to redress this chronic situation and provide for a greater and more regular involvement of the many, not of the few, in the Security Council.

II. PROPOSAL FOR THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

6. Italy first presented its proposal on 30 June 1993, in response to the Secretary-General's questionnaire. The proposal was later illustrated by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the General Assembly on 30 September 1993 and gradually modified in the light of observations and proposals made by other countries in the course of the meetings of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and

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Increase in the Membership of the Security Council. The present document is the latest revision of the Italian proposal, which can now be summarized as follows:

(a) The two categories of permanent and non-permanent members should be kept, and the current permanent membership of five should remain the same;

(b) Eight to 10 new non-permanent seats should be added. For each of these seats, 3 States would be rotating, making a total of 24-30 States. Consequently, each of them would remain two years on and four consecutive years off the Council. These 24-30 States, which therefore would rotate more frequently than others, should be selected on the basis of objective criteria to be determined by the General Assembly;


(c) All 24-30 countries due to rotate more frequently would be subject to regular elections. They would need to obtain two thirds of the votes of the General Assembly, in a manner similar to the present clean-slate mechanism, every time it is their turn;

(d) Obviously this model presupposes maintaining the Charter provision that bans immediate re-election for a member who has just completed a two-year term. In fact, if the ban were to be abolished, the number of spaces available for other countries would automatically be reduced, limiting the right of all to equitable representation. We should not forget that in the League of Nations, the possibility of immediate re-election to a seat on the Council was one of its key problems;

(e) The list of the above-mentioned 24-30 countries to rotate with greater frequency would be subject to periodic revisions (every 10, 12 or 15 years), thus avoiding the risk of creating new situations of "eternal" privilege. The assessment should depend essentially on the degree to which a country has managed to honour the commitment and meet the increased responsibilities stemming from its more frequent rotation. If it has not, it should be replaced, by resolution of the General Assembly, with another country.



7. The Italian proposal may be better illustrated by this diagram:



8. Should there be a total of 25 members on the new Council, 10 additional non-permanent seats would be needed and 30 Seats would rotate on them; should there be a total of 24 members, 9 non-permanent seats would have to be added, to rotate among 27 States; should there be a total of 23 members, 8 non-permanent seats would have to be added, to rotate among 24 States; and so forth.

9. In other words, for the additional non-permanent seats the ratio would be of one seat per three rotating countries. The geographic distribution of these seats could be made once the total number of new seats has been defined. Naturally the subdivision should favour geographic areas that are currently underrepresented, out of respect for the principle established in Article 23 of the Charter.

III. CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING COUNTRIES TO ROTATE WITH  
GREATER FREQUENCY

10. By way of example, one could consider the following criteria:

(a) The contribution of Member States to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization (Article 23 of the Charter);

(b) Equitable geographic distribution (Article 23 of the Charter);

(c) The capacity and willingness of States to contribute specifically to peace-keeping operations with military personnel, equipment and financial resources;

(d) The ability and willingness to participate in voluntary funds for humanitarian activities, economic development and the protection of human rights.

11. Needless to say, additional criteria could be taken into consideration.

IV. ADVANTAGES FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

12. Following are some of the benefits to the Organization:

(a) An enlarged Council more representative of the increased general United Nations membership;

(b) Avoidance of new situations of "eternal" privilege, as would occur instead if additional permanent seats were created;

(c) A greater and more democratic participation of all Member States in the activities of the Council, which is a basic premise for more effective decisions;

(d) A more equitable geographic distribution of the seats in the Council. It is easier to obtain this result on a basis of 24-30 countries than on the more limited basis of two or five additional permanent member countries;

(e) An important incentive for more frequently rotating members to maintain or increase their commitment to achieving the objectives of the Charter, in particular for the maintenance of international peace and security. Such members might be asked to make an increased contribution to peace-keeping operations; this would be a tangible sign of the greater responsibilities deriving from their more frequent presence in the Council;

(f) Lowering the growing contentiousness that seems to characterize elections to the Security Council.

#### V. ADVANTAGES FOR ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES

13. The proposal also presents a set of concrete advantages for all Member States of the United Nations, namely:

(a) Smaller countries would be given a more fair chance of being elected to a non-permanent seat by removing and shielding them from the unequal competition of the larger ones in each regional group. Even better, rotation agreements could be reached, and respected, within each group, thus ensuring that also for ordinary rotation the "clean slate" formula could be adopted;

(b) Countries rotating more frequently would be given recognition of their more substantial role in support of the United Nations. They could also plan - in a more regular and long-term way - their policy of support for the United Nations and their contribution, financial and otherwise, to the achievement of the goals of the Organization, in particular to those of the Security Council. Furthermore, these countries could establish among themselves special liaisons, in groups of three, for rotating the additional non-permanent seats;

(c) The permanent members could see their present burden for peace-keeping operations reduced, since it could be shared not with 2 or 5 additional members, but with 24-30 more frequently rotating countries.

#### VI. REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE EXTENSION OF VETO POWER

14. Veto power - invoked as an inalienable prerogative of permanent membership by some countries aspiring to that status - is an institution that may have been justified during the cold war years. Nowadays, the hope of many is that it may become obsolete through non-use.

15. While in recent years the permanent members have shown considerable restraint in making recourse to the veto, it is also true that nothing guarantees that this tendency will continue and become irreversible. Moreover, the simple threat to use the veto can have a strong impact on the Security Council's proceedings and the final outcome of its debates.

16. This is why Italy is opposed to extending veto power to other countries. One of the main advantages of the Italian proposal - to increase non-permanent members - is that the issue of such an extension would not arise at all.

17. Moreover, while it may appear unrealistic to hope that the current holders of the veto will be willing to renounce it spontaneously, Italy shares the opinion of those who believe that its use should nevertheless be regulated and contained as much as possible: by trying to limit its area of application, for example, or requiring at least two vetoes to block the adoption of a resolution.

## VII. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

18. If the Italian proposal were adopted, the General Assembly would maintain its central role and link with the Security Council for the following reasons:

(a) It would be up to the General Assembly to determine, by a resolution and on the basis of objective and agreed upon criteria, the list of 24-30 countries rotating more frequently;

(b) The General Assembly would periodically, every 10 to 15 years, review such a list and make changes in its composition;

(c) All non-permanent members of the Council - without exception - would have to submit to elections by secret ballot in the General Assembly and obtain a two-thirds majority.

19. Critics of this formula imply that it ultimately creates a third category of members. This is simply not so. First of all, in their selection, review and election for every term, these countries would be totally subject to the decisions of the General Assembly. Secondly, up to now countries rotating more frequently than others have always existed within geographic groups. What the Italian proposal aims for is an easing of rivalries and a fostering of a more fair and equitable participation in the Council for everyone. In fact, the major beneficiaries of such a reform would include the smaller States, which have thus far been kept out of the Council. Shielded from the competition of larger countries, they could in turn establish fair rotation agreements among themselves for "clean slate", with a realistic hope of being elected.

20. Last but not least, such a reform would be easy to implement. All that would be needed is to amend two articles in the Charter of the United Nations: Article 23 (composition), to reflect the increase in non-permanent members, and Article 27 (voting), to indicate the new majority required for decisions.

APPENDIX I

(For offset)

APPENDIX II

A. Member States that have not served on the Security Council

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Afghanistan                            | 41. Lesotho                                   |
| 2. Albania                                | 42. Liechtenstein                             |
| 3. Andorra                                | 43. Lithuania                                 |
| 4. Angola                                 | 44. Luxembourg                                |
| 5. Antigua and Barbuda                    | 45. Malawi                                    |
| 6. Armenia                                | 46. Maldives                                  |
| 7. Azerbaijan                             | 47. Marshall Islands                          |
| 8. Bahamas                                | 48. Micronesia (Federated States of)          |
| 9. Bahrain                                | 49. Monaco                                    |
| 10. Barbados                              | 50. Mongolia                                  |
| 11. Belize                                | 51. Mozambique                                |
| 12. Bhutan                                | 52. Myanmar                                   |
| 13. Bosnia and Herzegovina                | 53. Namibia                                   |
| 14. Brunei Darussalam                     | 54. Palau                                     |
| 15. Cambodia                              | 55. Papua New Guinea                          |
| 16. Central African Republic              | 56. Qatar                                     |
| 17. Chad                                  | 57. Republic of Korea                         |
| 18. Comoros                               | 58. Republic of Moldova                       |
| 19. Croatia                               | 59. Saint Kitts and Nevis                     |
| 20. Cyprus                                | 60. Saint Lucia                               |
| 21. Democratic People's Republic of Korea | 61. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines          |
| 22. Dominica                              | 62. Samoa                                     |
| 23. Dominican Republic                    | 63. San Marino                                |
| 24. El Salvador                           | 64. Sao Tome and Principe                     |
| 25. Equatorial Guinea                     | 65. Saudi Arabia                              |
| 26. Eritrea                               | 66. Seychelles                                |
| 27. Estonia                               | 67. Singapore                                 |
| 28. Fiji                                  | 68. Slovakia                                  |
| 29. Gambia                                | 69. Slovenia                                  |
| 30. Georgia                               | 70. Solomon Islands                           |
| 31. Grenada                               | 71. South Africa                              |
| 32. Guatemala                             | 72. Suriname                                  |
| 33. Guinea-Bissau                         | 73. Swaziland                                 |
| 34. Haiti                                 | 74. Tajikistan                                |
| 35. Iceland                               | 75. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia |
| 36. Israel                                | 76. Turkmenistan                              |
| 37. Kazakstan                             | 77. Uzbekistan                                |
| 38. Kyrgyzstan                            | 78. Vanuatu                                   |
| 39. Lao People's Democratic Republic      | 79. Viet Nam                                  |
| 40. Latvia                                |   |

B. Member States elected only once to the Security Council

- |                                |                                 |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Bangladesh                  | 23. Madagascar                  |
| 2. Belarus                     | 24. Mali                        |
| 3. Benin                       | 25. Malta                       |
| 4. Botswana                    | 26. Mauritania                  |
| 5. Burkina Faso                | 27. Mauritius                   |
| 6. Burundi                     | 28. Nicaragua                   |
| 7. Cameroon                    | 29. Niger                       |
| 8. Cape Verde                  | 30. Oman                        |
| 9. Congo                       | 31. Paraguay                    |
| 10. Costa Rica                 | 32. Portugal                    |
| 11. Djibouti                   | 33. Rwanda                      |
| 12. Gabon                      | 34. Sierra Leone                |
| 13. Greece                     | 35. Somalia                     |
| 14. Guinea                     | 36. Sri Lanka                   |
| 15. Honduras                   | 37. Sudan                       |
| 16. Iran (Islamic Republic of) | 38. Thailand                    |
| 17. Jamaica                    | 39. Togo                        |
| 18. Kenya                      | 40. Trinidad and Tobago         |
| 19. Kuwait                     | 41. United Arab Emirates        |
| 20. Lebanon                    | 42. United Republic of Tanzania |
| 21. Liberia                    | 43. Uruguay                     |
| 22. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya     | 44. Yemen                       |

8. Mexico

A/AC.247/5 (h)

[Original: Spanish]

[15 September 1995]

It is my pleasure to attach herewith the Mexican proposal for a new composition of the Security Council which was submitted in April 1995 to the Working Group of which you are Vice-Chairmen (see annex). I should be grateful if you would have this proposal included in the Working Group's compendium of documents which will be issued shortly.

(Signed) Manuel TELLO  
Permanent Representative of  
Mexico to the United Nations



ANNEX

Proposed new membership of the Security Council

[Original: English]

<u>Region</u>	<u>Existing</u>	<u>First two-year period</u>	<u>Second two-year period</u>
Africa	3	4	4
Asia	2	3	3
Latin America and the Caribbean	2	3	3
Western Europe and other States	2	3	2
Eastern Europe	1	1	2
Permanent members	5	5	5
Japan	-	1	-
Germany	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	<u>15</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>20</u>

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[pages 94-105 offset]

11. Singapore

A/AC.247/5 (k)

[Original: English]

[15 September 1995]

At the meeting of the Open-ended Working Group on Security Council reform yesterday, the Working Group decided to issue a compendium containing, inter alia, Member States' proposals to reform the Council. I am pleased to forward a copy of Singapore's suggestions (see annex) and would like to request that these suggestions be included in the compendium. These suggestions were first made by the Singapore Foreign Minister in his plenary speech at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Bilahari KAUSIKAN

ANNEX

Proposal for the reform of the Security Council

1. The Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council has discussed the critical issue of permanent membership in the Security Council since the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly. Several Member States have been proposed as new permanent members. Each of the prospective candidates has its own strengths and weaknesses. At this stage, however, no consensus exists on which specific Member State could be elevated to this status.

2. There are two basic problems. The first is simply to decide what is the current configuration of international power that should be reflected in the distribution of permanent seats. This is not as straightforward as it may seem.

3. When the Charter was being drafted, the end of the Second World War was in sight and prepared for, with easily discernible winners and losers. The intention was for the winners to have primary responsibility for guiding the new international order. The end of the cold war took everyone by surprise and was far from clear-cut in its resolution. Economic, political and military power no longer necessarily cohere in a single locus.

4. The second problem is even more vexing. If the new Security Council is really to reflect the current international distribution of power, it should logically entail the relegation of some from the élite as well as the appointment of others. Even if some were to be so elevated without necessarily displacing others, the expansion of the small group of the select would imply the relative diminution of the status of the current permanent members. This reality compels us to confront the difficult question of the veto.

5. To make progress, Singapore is of the view that there is no alternative but gradually to shape a consensus through a patient process of debate and discussion. To force the pace or attempt to impose a majority agreement will not work.

6. At this stage, it would be most useful to try to identify and build consensus on objective general criteria that all permanent members, present or aspiring, must fulfil. This is a more clinical and constructive approach than attempting to identify and promote one specific Member State or another. To attempt to do so at this stage is premature and as the Working Group's experience of the past two years has demonstrated, is only divisive. The identification of objective criteria will set a common standard, and if we can agree on them, a consensus on specific countries will naturally emerge.

7. Singapore suggests the following criteria that could be used for selecting new permanent members of the Security Council:

(a) A permanent member must have a long-established tradition of good conduct in keeping with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United

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Nations and in particular in the maintenance of international peace and security;

(b) The Charter confers upon the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. A permanent member must therefore first of all have the capacity and will to wield military force in support of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. All permanent members should be prepared to give effect to Article 43 of the Charter and be ready to place their military forces at the disposal of the United Nations;

(c) A permanent member must also have the capacity and will to contribute civilian and humanitarian resources, which are increasingly needed in the growing multidimensional nature of United Nations peace-keeping operations;

(d) Privilege must be paid for. A permanent member should not shirk its financial commitments to the United Nations and must be prepared to carry a larger portion of the financial burden of the United Nations. In particular, a permanent member must bear special financial responsibilities for peace-keeping;

(e) A permanent member must be a major contributor to other aspects of the United Nations besides peace-keeping. These include international economic, financial and social cooperation, which are major elements in bringing about international peace and security;

(f) A permanent member should have the widest possible if not consensual support of all the members of the United Nations.

12. Turkey

A/AC.247/5 (1)

[Original: English]

[15 September 1995]

Please find enclosed herewith the Turkish position paper on Security Council reform (see annex). I would appreciate it if you could include the enclosed text in the compendium.

(Signed) Tuluy TANÇ  
Ambassador  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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ANNEX

Position paper

1. Turkey presented its first written proposal pertaining to the reform of the Security Council on 28 June 1993. This proposal was published in General Assembly document A/48/264, dated 20 July 1993. Following is the revised version of the Turkish proposal on the question of enlargement of the Security Council, which was initially outlined in the statement of the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the Open-ended Working Group on 30 January 1995.
2. The prospective size of the Council should be determined on the basis of the concepts of representativity, democracy, legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness.
3. Turkey holds the view that a Security Council with at least 25 members would be more representative as well as more effective and efficient.
4. The Security Council should be enlarged with an additional 10 non-permanent members. Thus, the existing ratio of 1:3 between permanent and non-permanent members should be reorganized as 1:5.
5. These new additional seats should rotate among a predetermined list of countries. The number of countries to be included in this list could be fixed between 30 to 40.
6. The selection of the countries to be included in the list could be made according to a set of objective criteria.
7. The criteria and the list should be flexible so that it could be updated after a certain period of time, that is, there should be a mechanism that would ensure that political and economic changes in the international scene would be reflected in the composition of the Council more regularly. The review of the list could be made either every 12 or 16 years.
8. This proposal also calls for a new assessment of the concept of constituencies in the distribution of seats in the Council. As stated in Turkey's first written proposal of 28 June 1993, present arrangements for the geographical distribution of the non-permanent seats of the Council, adopted in 1963, are outdated. With the enlargement of the membership, a new approach in this regard based on the replacement of the current large geographical groups by narrower constituencies is worth considering. Designation of separate and smaller constituencies would further enhance the representative character of the Council. It would also ensure more equitable and balanced geographical distribution.

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