Mr. Chairman,
I should like to thank
you and the Committee for the opportunity to make a statement at the outset of
the tenth phase of the humanitarian programme for Iraq pursuant to resolution
986 (1995), which began as of 4 July 2001.
I should like to
provide the Committee with an update on a number of matters. Also, I feel duty
bound, on behalf of my colleagues both at the Headquarters level and in the
field, to provide clarifications with regard to a number of questions raised
concerning the implementation of the programme as well as the assertions and
allegations made recently in the Security Council. I feel obliged to make this
statement because I do not wish our silence to be misinterpreted as a
reflection of our agreement with what was stated recently. I owe it to all my
colleagues, both at Headquarters and in particular to those in the field, who
have been carrying out the tasks entrusted to them in implementing the
mandates set forth by the Security Council, under very difficult conditions
and often with personal sacrifice. Some of my colleagues have made the
ultimate sacrifice in losing their lives while working with the humanitarian
programme the objective of which is to serve the Iraqi people.
Exchange of letters
The recent
exchange of letters between the United Nations Legal Counsel and the Permanent
Representative of Iraq to the United Nations, extended the provisions of the
Memorandum of Understanding of 20 May 1996 between the Secretariat of the
United Nations and the Government of Iraq on the implementation of Security
Council resolution 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995 (S/1995/356), for an additional
period of 150 days, effective 4 July 2001, pursuant to resolution 1360 (2001),
adopted by the Council on 3 July 2001, to cover the tenth phase of the
humanitarian programme. The texts of the letters are contained in document
S/2001/682.
Resumption of oil exports
Iraq has started
to pump oil to Ceyhan, Turkey, and the first three vessels are currently under
loading. The first full cargo of 2 million barrels will be leaving Iraq today.
Under phase X, we already have received 10 oil contracts, five of which have
already been approved by the United Nations Oil Overseers. The 10 contracts
concerned under phase X, involve a total of 60 million barrels.
Under approved
contracts from phase IX of the programme, which ended on 3 July 2001, there
still remained 317 million barrels which have not yet been lifted, some 80
million barrels of which were designed as “transitional” between phases IX
and X. At this time, about 90 million barrels from phase IX are transferred
into phase X.
Revenues
As at 4 July
2001, the total of oil proceeds deposited in the United Nations Iraq Account
since the start of the implementation of the Programme in December 1996, was
$37,333,886,478.06 and 8,221,937,774 Euros.
Since the
inception of the humanitarian programme, the United States Dollar (USD)
account had accrued $1,000,641,781.66 and the Euro Account had accrued
19,646,364.78 Euros in interest income. Every cent and every centime deposited
in the United Nations Iraq Account has been invested from the first day oil
proceeds were collected. The earnings have been ploughed back into the
Programme for the benefit of the people of Iraq and for additional
humanitarian purchases to be made by the Government of Iraq.
Since the start
of phase IX, in December 2000, the Programme receives 72 per cent of the total
revenues of oil exports, pursuant to resolution 1330 (2000) - 59 per cent for
the 15 governorates in the center/south of Iraq and 13 per cent for the three
northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. From phase I to phase
VIII of the Programme, 66 per cent of the total revenues received from oil
exports were allocated for the Programme pursuant to resolution 986 (1995),
with 53 per cent allocated for the 15 governorates in the center/south of
Iraq.
As at 30 June
2001, a total of $30 billion was allocated for the Programme - $26.8 billion
to the Government of Iraq for procurement of humanitarian supplies for the 15
governorates in the center/south, including the bulk purchase of food,
medicine/vaccines for all the governorates of Iraq as well as for oil spare
parts and equipment. The balance of $3.2 billion was made available to the
United Nations agencies and programmes for the implementation of the Programme,
on behalf of the Government of Iraq, in the three northern governorates.
As at 30 June
2001, of the total of $23.97 billion worth of approved applications for
supplies and equipment contracted by the Government of Iraq, $13.325 billion
worth of supplies and equipment had already arrived in Iraq. Additional
supplies and equipment, under already approved applications, with a total
value at $10.645 billion, are in the delivery and/or production pipeline.
Banking arrangements – working relations with the
Central Bank of Iraq (CBI)
With regard to
banking arrangements and our working relations with the Central Bank of Iraq,
I am afraid I will have to provide you with some details in view of the recent
statement made in the Security Council that we have not been providing to the
Government of Iraq “any information concerning the banking operations
relating to Iraq’s resources,” and that the Central Bank of Iraq “has no
inkling of what happens in United Nations banking operations, even though the
Memorandum of Understanding stipulates the appointment of a liaison official
from the Central Bank of Iraq to be apprised of this information and
coordination.” In fact, the United Nations Treasury has kept the Central
Bank of Iraq fully informed on a regular basis. The following reports are
provided directly, in duplicate, to the Central Bank of Iraq. (One copy is
sent to the Central Bank by pouch through the Office of the United Nations
Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq (UNOHCI) and another copy is sent through the
Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations):
Daily
statement of transactions
Provided since December 1999, to the Permanent Mission of
Iraq, pursuant to resolution 1284 (1999). This report includes a bank
statement that provides details for the following transactions:
Proceeds from the
sale of Iraqi Crude;
L/C payments made
specifying the letter of credit;
Transfers made pursuant to resolution 986 (1995),
specifying which account is credited (by title and account number);
Interest earned
(separately for USD and Euro);
Payments made to
BOTAS in accordance with the Protocol;
Reimbursements
received from the 13 per cent account.
An additional
summary is provided to the Government of Iraq, indicating the value of letters
of credit outstanding as well as the net value available for issuance of
letters of credit.
Weekly Summary
Statements
Weekly summary
statements have been provided since January 1997, following the receipt of the
first oil proceeds. This is broken down by Phase to show information presented
above.
Monthly Bank
Statement
This is the
original bank statement generated by BNP-Paribas, which is sent to the Central
Bank of Iraq via pouch through UNOHCI. Every copy of every statement has been
sent to the Central Bank of Iraq since the first funding of the account.
A separate
Treasury Investment Report is also provided, which indicates all investments
and the interest rates for each. Finally, an investment summary is provided to
show where investments are held and in which banks.
The
Secretary-General's 90 and 180-day reports
The
Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council provide details with
respect to all Oil letters of credit, proceeds received, humanitarian letters
of credit, issued and payments made, balances in the account and all interest
earned, by currency.
Details on the recent visit made by the representative
of the Central Bank of Iraq
I should like to
provide some details on the recent visit to New York by the representative of
the Central Bank of Iraq. To state that a representative from the Central Bank
of Iraq remained in New York for six months without work is to ignore the
substantial progress made in resolving outstanding issues. Daily
meetings were conducted between the representative of the Central Bank of Iraq
and the Treasury, including the Treasurer on several occasions.
The Treasury
provided the representative of the Central Bank of Iraq with the following
information, among others:
a) "A
spreadsheet" of all letters of credit issued by the BUYER to take to Iraq
and distribute to the buyers for their review;
b) “A
spreadsheet" of all letters of credit that had expired, sorted by BUYER.
The Treasurer asked the Central Bank of Iraq and the buyers to review the
report in order to determine whether the expired letters of credit should be
cancelled or extended; c) Upon his request, the representative of the Central
Bank of Iraq was provided with copies of about 300 letters of credit issued to
take to Iraq.
Further, procedures
that are being followed with regard to the deposits and distribution of the
oil sales in euros and how to follow up on the transactions in the daily
statements were explained in detail.
There were of course
the usual questions of the relationship of BNP-Paribas with the Central Bank
of Iraq. It was emphasized to the representative of the Central Bank that the
holder of the United Nations Iraq Account is the United Nations. The
signatories are United Nations staff members. Accordingly, BNP-Paribas’
relationship is with the United Nations and not the Central Bank of Iraq. As a
general matter, it was explained that the Central Bank's role in connection
with the transactions under resolution 986 (1995) is only to forward to
BNP-Paribas requests to open the letters of credit and any amendments thereto
for purchase of humanitarian and other supplies for Iraq. In any case, the
Treasury facilitated the Central Bank’s representative’s meeting with the
representatives of BNP-Paribas at the United Nations on two occasions, whereby
a number of issues were discussed and resolved:
a) Pending letters of
credit for which BNP-Paribas is awaiting responses from the Central Bank. The
Treasury went through the list and provided copies of all telexes sent to the
Central Bank by BNP-Paribas, to the representative of the Central Bank.
b) Approved
contracts for which no letters of credit requests had been received by
BNP-Paribas. It was pointed out to the representative of the Central Bank that
the Executive Director of the Iraq Programme had also written to the
Government of Iraq on various occasions on the subject. In fact, I just sent
yet another letter on 9 July to the Permanent Representative of Iraq,
reiterating our appeals to the Government of Iraq to take the necessary
measures to expedite the issuance of letters of credits for approved
applications. As at 30 June 2001, there were 731 approved applications, with a
total value of $1.146 billion, awaiting instructions from the Central Bank of
Iraq on issuance of letters of credit, for an average period of 73 days.
c) Request for
letters of credit that had been received by BNP-Paribas from the Central Bank,
prior to the approval of applications for contracts. The Treasury went through
22 such requests and provided reasons why the applications for contracts were
on hold and not approved.
d) In view of the
provisions of paragraph 13 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the
Secretariat and the Government of Iraq (S/1996/356), the Treasury emphasized
the need for placing a banking representative from the Central Bank of Iraq in
New York to resolve problems promptly. It may be recalled that in several of
his reports to the Council, the Secretary-General has recommended to the
Government of Iraq to deploy to New York a representative of the Central Bank
of Iraq, at the appropriate level, in order to expedite activities related to
banking arrangements, as envisaged in paragraph 13 of the Memorandum of
Understanding. Should the Committee wish to have more details on banking
arrangements, the Treasurer stands ready to provide you with further details.
Letters of Credit
As of December 2000,
the United Nations began to collect fees from the suppliers for the issuance
of letters of credit and amendments, rather than charging the United Nations
Iraq Account. Accordingly, the suppliers now pay costs related to letters of
credit.
Audits
The United Nations
Secretariat and the agencies and programmes of the United Nations system are
subject to audit in accordance with their respective Financial Rules and
Regulations.
In addition,
paragraph 14 of the Memorandum of Understanding reads as follows:
“In accordance with
the United Nations Financial Regulations, the “Iraq account” will be
audited by the Board of Auditors who are external independent public auditors.
As provided for in the Regulations, the Board of Auditors will issue periodic
reports on the audit of the financial statements relating to the account.
Such reports will be submitted by the Board to the Secretary-General who
will forward them to the 661 Committee and to the Government of Iraq.” The
United Nations Iraq Account has been audited by the Board of Auditors
(external) since the start of the implementation of the programme in December
1996, twice a year. On 5 July 2001, the Secretary-General forwarded the latest
report of the Board of Auditors covering the period 1 January to 31 December
2000, to the Government of Iraq and to the members of the Security Council
Committee.
In addition to
audits by the Board of Auditors, we have been audited regularly by the United
Nations Internal Auditors. We also have resident auditors in our offices in
Baghdad and in Erbil (in the north of Iraq).
I should also
like to inform the Committee that owing to the high value of oil revenues and
the complexity of the Organization’s responsibilities under the relevant
Security Council resolutions, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)
expanded its audit coverage of the activities of the Office of the Iraq
Programme, both at Headquarters and in the field. To meet this requirement, a
new audit section for the Iraq Programme was established in the Audit and
Management Consulting Division of OIOS.
One of the main tasks
of the new audit section is to ensure that activities are coordinated with the
internal audit bodies of the United Nations agencies and programmes which are
implementing projects under the humanitarian programme in the three northern
governorates.
Details on the
work of OIOS regarding the Iraq Programme can be found in the report of OIOS
covering the period 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000 (A/55/436, paras 71-81). I do
not wish to go into further details except to reject categorically the
allegations made recently by those who used that report to castigate the
Secretariat. I invite those interested knowing the details, to read paragraphs
73 and 74 of the OIOS report.
Processing and approval of applications for contracts
Working three
shifts a day, the Contracts Processing Section of the Office of the Iraq
Programme has been processing all applications as expeditiously as possible
and we stand by and we are proud of our record.
As at 3 July
2001, the total value of applications approved under the 59 per cent account
was $24.06 billion, including $5.396 billion worth of applications “notified”
by the Secretariat. The total value of applications on hold was $3.331
billion.
The total value of
applications approved under the 13 per cent account was $1.7 billion,
including $68.6 million worth of applications “notified” by the
Secretariat. The total value of applications on hold was $273,495.
I will circulate to
the Committee some tables, providing further details on the status of
applications received, including a table on the status of applications
received under phase IX.
We are presently
reviewing the current procedures of the Committee with a view to formulating
some proposals to further streamline the processing and approval of
applications.
Mr. Chairman,
It should be
understood by all concerned that it is the Government of Iraq which selects
its suppliers and signs the contracts under the 59 per cent account for the 15
governorates of Iraq, including also contracts under the bulk purchase
arrangements for the whole country. The Secretariat has no role in that
process and therefore cannot and should not be blamed for the performance of
the contractors concerned. The Secretariat has no control over the suppliers
as to when they submit their applications to the Office of the Iraq Programme,
through their respective permanent or observer missions to the United Nations.
Nor do we have any control as to when they respond to the repeated requests
made by the Secretariat for additional information on the applications,
including many which are submitted to us incomplete.
It may also be
recalled that after tremendous efforts made by the Secretariat in providing
the necessary information ensuring the approval and/or release of a hold, the
Government of Iraq has at times requested the cancellation of a contract
application or has either delayed or refused to request the opening of a
letter of credit.
A case in point,
since it was mentioned recently in the Council, is the application for a Blood
Gas Analyzer. I reviewed the whole process involved in the long and sad saga
of this application. The application, which was initially submitted under
phase V (Comm. number 50917), was placed on hold on 12 October 1999. On 19
April 2000, I wrote the Chairman of the 661 Committee (ED/2000/661/15),
providing comprehensive information concerning all applications placed on hold
in the health sector, and referred to this particular application as one of
the top priority items to be considered for urgent release. The Office of the
Iraq Programme likewise invited particular attention to this application
during the technical meeting of the Committee on 15 June 2000, which was
entirely dedicated to the discussion of holds in the health sector. In the
meantime, the Government of Iraq requested the transfer of this and a number
of other phase V health applications to phase VII, and the application
concerned was assigned a new Comm. number 701124. On 29 June 2000, the
Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations requested me to accord
priority to securing the release of the above and three other health
applications. As the application was being re-circulated under the new Comm.
number, we urged the delegation which had placed the hold to review further
their position concerning the application concerned, along with three other
applications, despite their “dual-use” concerns. On 6 July 2000, the
application was released from hold, on condition of “end-use/user”
observation and reporting by the United Nations observers.
On 12 July 2000, in a
letter addressed to the Chairman of the 661 Committee, (ED/2000/661/26), I
reiterated my request for the early release of the remaining three top
priority items. Consequently, the three applications concerned were all
released from hold between 24 July and 7 August 2000, under the condition of
“end-use” observation and reporting by the United Nations observers.
Regrettably, however,
the United Nations Treasury was informed by the BNP Paribas that the Central
Bank of Iraq had never requested the opening of a letter of credit for the
application containing the Blood Gas Analyzer, despite the fact that the
Office of the Iraq Programme had provided the Government of Iraq with regular
updates on the status of approved applications which are awaiting issuance of
instructions by the Central Bank of Iraq on the opening of letters of
credit.
Therefore, the
claim that after the release of the application from hold, the Committee had
sent a letter to the Ministry of Health informing that the contract was
cancelled, is incorrect. The Committee does not communicate directly with any
purchasing institution in Iraq. Furthermore, once an application is approved,
the current procedures of the Committee do not allow withdrawal
of the approval. Consequently, any cancellation of contract application would
be possible only at the request of one of the parties to the contract and with
the consent of the other party. The Office of the Iraq Programme has not
received such a request as far as the approved application for the Blood Gas
Analyzer is concerned.
Payment to the contractors
While the
Secretariat has made substantial efforts to streamline the process at every
step and reduce delays, the established procedures must be followed
nonetheless. With regard to complaints of delayed payments to the contractors
for supplies which have arrived in Iraq, the Treasury has stressed on several
occasions that payments for letters of credit are based on normal commercial
practice. There have been many instances whereby contractors have failed to
present documents in compliance with the terms of the letter of credit.
Discrepancies in documents result in delays in payment.
It should be
noted however that the majority of complaints arise due to delays in the
submission of a particular document, Confirmation of the Secretary-General's
Designee on the arrival of goods in Iraq. This document is prepared based on
an authentication document received from the Independent Inspection Agents.
There are also inordinate delays at the port of Umm Qasr in Iraq, in unloading
the supplies which have to be authenticated by the Independent Inspection
Agents. Substantial efforts have been made by the Secretariat on how to
streamline the process further. The Treasury as well as BNP-Paribas have
noticed a significant decrease in the number of complaints regarding delays in
payment since the implementation of the measures taken to allow electronic
signatures and daily transmission of authentication data from the field.
Programme implementation
I should like to
assure all concerned that all my colleagues and I, as international civil
servants, have been carrying out all the tasks entrusted to us in full
compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the
Memorandum of Understanding. In referring to the Memorandum of Understanding,
it should be understood by all concerned that all the provisions of that
memorandum should be fully complied with, by both parties, without any
selective approach.
It may be
recalled that in his latest report to the Security Council last May
(S/2001/505 para. 129), the Secretary-General stated that with increased
funding level and the growing magnitude and scope of the programme, the whole
tedious and time-consuming process of the preparation and approval of the
distribution plan and its annexes were no longer in step with current
realities. As requested by the Secretary-General, I will continue discussions
with the Government of Iraq with a view to devising a more appropriate and
flexible planning process that would meet the requirements of the expanded
programme.
Keeping the Government of Iraq informed on our
operations in the three northern governorates
The United
Nations implements the programme in the three northern governorates on behalf
of the Government of Iraq. We have kept the relevant authorities in Baghdad
fully informed, within United Nations rules and regulations, through regular
meetings with and provision of information, in writing, to the relevant
officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the technical ministries
concerned. It should also be understood by the authorities concerned that
there are certain documents such as contracts and invoices, which we simply
cannot provide. We also have our own legal obligations and constraints.
Contrary to what
has been stated in the Council recently, our requests for visas for United
Nations personnel to carry out implementation of projects in the three
northern governorates have not been “for irrational purposes”. You may
recall that in paragraph 134 of his latest report to the Security Council
(S/2001/505), the Secretary-General expressed his “deep concern over the
current visa situation and the negative impact that the interruption in
essential activities is having on the humanitarian situation in the three
northern governorates.” He reiterated his call upon the Government of Iraq
to issue the required visas to United Nations officials, experts and other
personnel performing contractual services for the United Nations in Iraq, in
conformity with the letter and spirit of the relevant provisions of the
Memorandum of Understanding, in particular paragraph 46. We have provided to
the Government of Iraq all the information required, or requested by the
Government of Iraq, regarding the responsibilities to be undertaken by those
for whom visas have been requested.
As stated by the
Secretary-General, it should be noted that, as title for all 13 per cent
account properties in the three northern governorates remain, for the time
being, with the United Nations, the Organization finds itself responsible not
only for the building and installing of infrastructure and equipment, but also
for its operation and maintenance and for the training of national staff. With
the expansion of programme activities, in order to fulfill the
responsibilities entrusted to it by the Security Council, the United Nations
will require an increasing number of international staff.
I very much
regret that as of yesterday, the number of outstanding visas was 280,
including 140 for UNDP electricity projects and 111 for UNOPS demining
programme.
As so many
critical remarks and allegations were made regarding the implementation of the
programme with respect to the electricity sector and demining activities in
the north. I will not respond to them one by one at this meeting, particularly
to those for which no details were provided. Otherwise, I can keep you here
until mid-night.
We have kept the
Committee as well as the Government of Iraq fully informed on our activities
under the electricity sector as well as on our demining activities in the
north. You will also recall that in May this year, we provided you with a Special
Report on the Electricity Network Rehabilitation Programme in the Three
Northern Governorates of Iraq.
However, I should
like to give a few examples on certain assertions made in the Security Council
recently. The cost per mine/unexploded ordnance removed in the three northern
governorates is approximately$1,500, contrary to the statement made in the
Security Council that it was $21,000. In fact, our actual costs could be lower
if the Government of Iraq would consider our repeated requests to provide
maps/records of the minefields laid that do not jeopardize national security.
This would reduce the need to search large tracts of land and thus increase
efficiency in the utilization of our resources. It would also be helpful if
the visas pending approval for months were granted expeditiously, and if the
large number of demining equipment, including mechanical mini-flails, waiting
at the border, were released, thus enabling the programme to operate at full
efficiency. Furthermore, contrary to what was stated regarding cost of
demining dogs, during the period July 1999 to June 2000, 140 dogs were
deployed under the programme, each of which was fed 0.8 kg of imported dog
food. The imported food was enhanced by local food such as chicken and fat.
The average cost of feeding one dog during this period was $34 per month, or
just under one dollar a day, or $408 per year, and not $1,248 per year as was
stated in the Council recently. I very much regret to go into such details. I
have been given no alternative in view of the remarks made. I will refuse also
to respond to other remarks made about our handling the dogs, which were
incredible.
I should like to
inform you that a total of 22,000 mines and UXOs have been destroyed. In
addition, under the Mines Victims support programme, UNOPS has provided 1,702
prosthesis/orthoses, as well as services to over 39,000 out-patients during
the course of one year alone.
Progress in
implementing the demining programme should be measured in terms of access to
grazing and cultivated land, provision of water, housing needs, transportation
improvements and/or infrastructure improvements and casualty reduction.
With regard to
the electricity programme in the north, we have provided special briefings and
reports to the Committee on a regular basis. Undoubtedly, we had, and continue
to have, a number of difficulties in fully implementing the programme. Similar
to the difficulties encountered in importing essential demining equipment I
just referred to, we have been experiencing, in a rather new development, very
serious difficulties in bringing into Iraq essential equipment for the
electricity projects in the three northern governorates. I was informed by
UNDP yesterday that some 250 trucks loaded with about 4,800 tons of equipment
are in Turkey, awaiting clearance by the Iraqi authorities, with substantial
financial implications.
Despite the
difficulties encountered, however, much has been accomplished in the
electricity sector and the Government of Iraq has been fully kept informed of
those accomplishments. Major achievements include the building of 13 new
sub-stations and the rehabilitation of nine others, the building of 1,179
kilometers, and the rehabilitation of a further 1,675 kilometers of
transmission lines, as well as rehabilitation work on the Dokan and
Derbandikan hydro-electricity dams. In addition, in order to meet emergency
generation needs until reconnection to the national electricity grid takes
place, we have installed and are operating three 29 MW generating plants –
one in each of the three northern governorates. However, we are unable to run
the three 29 MW generating stations 24 hours a day the way other public
utilities run, due to the fact that the visas requested for personnel to run
the stations have not yet been granted. Furthermore, over 1,000 small to
medium size generators have now been installed to provide electricity to
essential humanitarian facilities such as hospitals and pumping stations, as
well as to low-income families. On a parallel track, we have succeeded in
encouraging the local authorities in the north to reach a “common
understanding” on the question of reconnection to the national electricity
grid, which has been forwarded to the authorities in Baghdad for their
consideration. We are still waiting for a response from the authorities in
Baghdad.
In brief, Mr.
Chairman, on the one hand we are denied the essential means and the tools to
implement the programme effectively and on the other, we are accused of
failure to implement the programme effectively.
Administrative matters
In regard to the
statement made on a range of administrative matters, I am prepared to address
them where they were sufficiently detailed.
Pursuant to
resolution 986 (1995) and the relevant resolutions adopted thereafter, 2.2 per
cent of the revenues received from oil exports are set aside for the
administrative and operational costs of the United Nations. Under the
directive of the Secretary-General we have done our best to cut costs in order
to make additional funds available to the humanitarian programme. In fact, as
may be recalled, the Secretary-General transferred $52 million from the 2.2
per cent account to the 53 per cent account. The Controller has kept the
matter under constant review and I have not doubt we will be able to transfer
additional funds from the 2.2 per cent account for the purchase of
humanitarian supplies and equipment.
Disposal of used equipment
Although we are
in favour to turn over to the Government of Iraq and the local authorities in
the three northern governorates United Nations-owned equipment and vehicles
purchased under the 2.2 per cent account, disposal of UN-owned equipment or
vehicles is guided by the relevant rules and regulations regarding the
disposal of mission property. In order to dispose of non-expendable UN-owned
property by sale, donation or transfer it would be necessary, under the
current applicable rules and procedures governing our operations in Iraq, to
secure the approval of the 661 Committee.
We are at present
preparing a list of equipment for disposal, which we intend to submit to the
661 Committee for its consideration and approval.
Housing of United Nations personnel
All housing costs
of United Nations personnel are paid for by the individual staff members
concerned, out of their own emoluments, whether in the centre/south or in the
three northern governorates of Iraq.
Local procurement
Once the
mechanism through which local procurement is agreed to by all concerned, the
United Nations will be in a position to purchase items locally.
It may be
recalled that in paragraph 24 of resolution 1284 (1999), the Council requested
the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements, subject to Security
Council approval, to allow funds deposited in the escrow account to be used
for the purchase of locally produced goods and to meet the local cost for
essential civilian needs which have been funded in accordance with the
provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions, including, where
appropriate, the cost of installation and training services.
Regrettably, the
Secretary-General has been unable thus far to submit proposals pursuant to
paragraph 24 of resolution 1284. All concerned know very well as to why that
has not been possible.
With respect to a
cash component for the oil sector, the Security Council has already before it
the report of the Secretary-General (S/2001/566) submitted pursuant to
paragraph 15 of resolution 1330 (2000), to allow funds up to 600 million euros
from the escrow account to be used for the cost of installation and
maintenance, including training services, of the equipment and spare parts for
the oil industry funded under the programme. We had the full cooperation of
the Government of Iraq in the preparation of the report of the
Secretary-General, which I hope the Council will respond to positively.
I should like to
reiterate the hope expressed by the Secretary-General in his latest report to
the Council (S/2001/505, para. 128) that, once the arrangements proposed are
approved by the Council, similar modalities could be extended to support
activities in other sectors.
Meeting of UN Finance and Administration Officers,
held in Geneva
The purpose of
the meeting of the UN Finance and Administration officers in Geneva in April
this year, which was long overdue, was to plan and coordinate the entire
inter-agency budget preparation process. These are very large budgets,
requiring extensive justification for each expenditure. The preparation of the
budget for a programme of such magnitude is a complex exercise involving
detailed narrative and statistical data that must be collected both from
agency headquarters and the field. In order to improve upon the quality of
submissions and to ensure fiscal responsibility, the meeting was held to
coordinate the entire budget preparation process and to ensure that all
agencies were informed of the information requirements, including financial
reporting requirements for expenditures and cash flow projections.
Reports submitted to the Amorim Panel
With regard to
the Amorim Panel, of which I was a member, I should like to state the
following. Although the Humanitarian Coordinator reports to me, I had
requested, in no uncertain terms, the then Humanitarian Coordinator as well as
all the representatives of the agencies and programmes concerned working in
Iraq, to submit all their inputs to the Amorim Panel directly to the Permanent
Mission of Brazil to the United Nations.
All concerned are
also fully aware that the then Humanitarian Coordinator, along with all agency
and programme colleagues, both from the field and some accompanied by their
colleagues from their respective headquarters, appeared before the Amorim
Panel.
Assignment in Iraq
Given the
difficulties we have been encountering in recruiting staff to go and work in
Iraq, I find it very odd hearing the claim that “a mission to Iraq is one of
the most cherished and sought-after assignments by the United Nations
Secretariat staff.” There are many factors that make Iraq a difficult duty
station. These include security concerns, the fact that it is a non-family
duty station, that staff must live in hotels, and that getting in and out of
the country is arduous leading to a sense of isolation. For these reasons, it
has always been difficult to find staff to come and work in the country. In
this regard, it should also be noted that the financial incentives and
entitlements to work in Iraq are very much equal, and in many cases,
considerably less than those provided for in other duty
stations.
Mr. Chairman,
I very much
regret to have taken so much of your time today. I had no alternative in light
of what has been stated recently regarding our performance. My colleagues and
I have been implementing a mandate established by the Security Council and
inevitably caught between various parties. We are prepared to be judged, and
must be judged, by our performance in carrying out the tasks entrusted to us.
As directed by the Secretary-General, we have spared no effort in ensuring
that those of us involved in the implementation of the programme observe fully
the parameters governing the humanitarian programme, in full compliance with
the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the Memorandum of
Understanding.
